area handbook series 

Mongolia 

country study 



Mongolia 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Robert L. Worden and 
Andrea Matles Savada 
Research Completed 
June 1989 



On the cover: A thirteenth-century Mongol hunter 



Second Edition, 1991, First Printing, 1991. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Mongolia: A Country Study / Federal Research Division / Library 
of Congress, edited by Robert L. Worden and Andrea Matles 
Savada — 2d ed. 

Area Handbook Series, DA Pam 550-76 

"Research completed June 1989." 

Bibliography: pp. 275-301. 

Includes index. 

Supt. of Docs. no. : D 101.22:550-76/991 

1. Mongolia I. Worden, Robert L., 1945- . II. Savada, Andrea 
Matles, 1950- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research Divi- 
sion. IV. Series. V. Series: Area Handbook Series. 

DS798.W67 1990 951. 7'3— dc20 90-6289 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-76 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to a number of individuals, without 
whose assistance this book would have been much more diffi- 
cult to make a reality. Dr. Denis Sinor, Distinguished Professor 
Emeritus of the Department of Uralic and Altaic Studies, Indiana 
University, made an extremely useful critique of the entire 
manuscript, helping the authors and the editors to focus their efforts 
more sharply. Mary Frances Weidlich of the United States Depart- 
ment of State provided a great deal of invaluable assistance, trans- 
lating Mongol-language research materials, making numerous 
helpful suggestions on many of the topics discussed in the book, 
and reviewing the completed text. Barbara L. Dash, compiler and 
editor of The American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies, 
assisted with abundant bibliographic citations on Mongolia and 
Inner Asian affairs as well as with translations of Russian-language 
materials used in compiling maps. 

Various staff members of the Library of Congress also contrib- 
uted to the research and production of the book. David W. Tsai, 
Exchange and Gift Division, supplied current Mongolian research 
materials, and Thomas M. Skallerup of the Copyright Office 
provided insights on Russian-Mongolian history. The authors also 
wish to express their appreciation to members of the staff of the 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, who contributed 
to the preparation of the book. Tracy M. Coleman provided 
research assistance and word processing for early book drafts. 
Additionally, Irena A. Weiss assisted with Russian-language sources 
used in compiling maps, Carolina E. Forrester reviewed the maps 
and the geography section for technical details, Stanley M. Sciora 
researched the military rank and insignia information, and Serge 
Demidenko and Alberta King helped with proofreading. The mem- 
bers of the Graphic Support Unit, David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. 
Ferrell, and Kimberly A. Lord, prepared the layout and the graph- 
ics for the book; Ms. Lord designed the cover and the chapter 
illustrations. Richard F. Nyrop reviewed most parts of the bock 
and made valuable suggestions throughout its development before 
his retirement. Sandra W. Meditz, his successor, also made use- 
ful contributions to the later stages of the completed manuscript. 
Martha E. Hopkins, at each critical juncture, managed editing and 
also edited portions of the text; Marilyn Majeska managed book 
production; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson performed 
word processing. 



v 



The following individuals are gratefully acknowledged as well: 
Barbara Harrison for editing the body of the book; Carolyn Hinton 
for final prepublication editorial review; Shirley Kessel of Com- 
munications Connection for preparing the index; and Malinda B. 
Neale of the Printing and Processing Section, Library of Congress, 
for phototypesetting, under the direction of Peggy Pixley. Those 
who contributed photographs used to illustrate the book are ac- 
knowledged in the photo captions. 



VI 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction xxvii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Robert L. Worden 

EARLY DEVELOPMENT, ca. 220 B.C.-A.D. 1206 5 

Origins of the Mongols 5 

Xiongnu and Yuezhi 6 

Donghu, Toba, and Ruruan 7 

Rise of the Turk 10 

Influence of Tang China 10 

Kitan and Jurchen 11 

THE ERA OF CHINGGIS KHAN, 1206-27 13 

Rise of Chinggis Khan 13 

Early Wars in China 15 

Conquest of Khwarizm and Reconnaissance 

into Europe 16 

The Last Campaign of Chinggis Khan 18 

SUCCESSORS OF CHINGGIS, 1228-59 18 

Ogedei and Continuing Conquests 18 

Subetei and the European Expedition 20 

Reign of Kuyuk 21 

Mengke and the War in China 22 

KHUBILAI KHAN AND THE YUAN DYNASTY, 

1261-1368 23 

A New Khan , 23 

The Yuan Dynasty 25 

The Ilkhans 27 

The Golden Horde 27 

The Mongol Decline 30 

MONGOLIA IN TRANSITION, 1368-1911 31 

Return to Nomadic Patterns 31 

Caught Between the Russians and the Manchus 32 

The End of Independence 36 



vii 



MODERN MONGOLIA, 1911-84 38 

Period of Autonomy, 1911-21 38 

Revolutionary Transformation, 1921-24 40 

Consolidation of the Mongolian People's 

Republic, 1925-28 42 

Purges of the Opposition, 1928-32 44 

Economic Gradualism and National Defense, 1932-45 46 

Peacetime Development, 1946-52 50 

Socialist Construction under Tsedenbal, 1952-84 .... 51 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 57 

Donald R. DeGlopper 

GEOGRAPHY 60 

Landforms 60 

Climate 63 

Environmental Concerns 66 

POPULATION 67 

Vital Rates 67 

Pro-natal Policies 69 

Population Distribution 71 

The Urban Population 71 

ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC GROUPS 72 

Mongols and Kazakhs 72 

Chinese, Russians, and Others 73 

SOCIETY 75 

Pastoral Nomadism 75 

Traditional Patterns 80 

Planned Modernization 81 

Collectivized Farming and Herding 87 

Kinship, Family, and Marriage 91 

Position of Women 94 

Social Mobility 96 

Cultural Unity and Mongol Identity 98 

RELIGION 100 

Buddhism 100 

The Suppression of Buddhism 102 

Uses of Buddhism 103 

Religious Survivals 104 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 104 

Health-Care Systems 104 

Precautions Against AIDS 107 

EDUCATION 107 

The School System 107 

Higher Education 110 



viii 



Study in the Soviet Union 110 

Mongolian Science Ill 

Science, Progress, and Tradition 112 

Chapter 3. The Economy 115 

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis 

SOCIALIST FRAMEWORK OF THE ECONOMY 118 

Role of the Government 118 

Planning 119 

Budget 121 

Structure of the Economy 121 

Economic Reforms 123 

NATURAL RESOURCES 125 

AGRICULTURE 127 

Crop Production 131 

Animal Husbandry 132 

Forestry 134 

Fishing 136 

INDUSTRY 137 

Light Industry 139 

Mining 141 

Energy 142 

Construction 143 

SERVICES 144 

Banking and Insurance 144 

Domestic Trade and Other Services 146 

Retail Trade and Consumption 146 

LABOR FORCE 149 

Composition 149 

Labor Force Policy and Planning 150 

Working Conditions and Income 152 

Trade Unions 154 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND 

COMECON 156 

Participation in Comecon 158 

Foreign Assistance, Investment, and Joint 

Ventures 158 

Exports and Imports 161 

Trading Partners 162 

Tourism 163 

TRANSPORTATION 163 

Roads , 164 

Railroads 165 

Inland Waterways 167 



IX 



Civil Aviation 167 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 168 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics m 

Marcia R. Ristaino 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 173 

Form of Government 173 

Constitutional Framework 175 

Major State Organizations 178 

Local Administration 183 

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ... 184 

Membership 185 

Party Congress 185 

Central Committee 187 

Political Bureau and Secretariat 188 

Regional and Local Party Organizations 189 

Mass Organizations 190 

THE POLITICAL PROCESS 194 

Democratic Centralism 194 

Political Issues 198 

Role of the Military 200 

General Political Values and Attitudes 202 

FOREIGN POLICY 203 

Motivation and Goals 203 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 204 

Foreign Relations 204 

International Organizations 212 

THE MEDIA 212 

Information Policy 213 

Major Channels 214 

Foreign Sources 216 

Chapter 5. National Security 219 

Ronald E. Dolan 

THE ARMED FORCES 222 

Historical Traditions 222 

Beginning of Modern Military Practices, 1911-21 . . . 223 

The Mongolian Army, 1921-68 228 

Organization since 1968 240 

Civil-Military Relations 246 

Economic Role 246 

Threat Perception 247 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY 248 

The Legal System 249 



x 



The Penal System 255 

Law Enforcement 256 

Appendix. Tables 261 

Bibliography 273 

Glossary 299 

Index 303 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Mongolia, 1989 xxvi 

2 Tribes, Nations, and Boundaries of Mongolia and 

Inner Asia, ca. A.D. 1150-1227 14 

3 The Mongol Empire, ca. A.D. 1280 24 

4 Topography and Drainage 62 

5 Precipitation 64 

6 Temperature 65 

7 Population Density, 1986 68 

8 Age-Sex Ratio, 1990 Projection 70 

9 Minerals and Mining, 1989 . . 126 

10 Agriculture and Forestry, 1985 130 

11 Industry, 1985 140 

12 Transportation, 1989 . 166 

13 Organization of the Government, 1989 174 

14 Organization of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary 

Party, 1989 186 

15 Organization of the Armed Forces, 1989 240 

16 Armed Forces Personnel Strength, Selected Years, 

1978-88 242 

17 Officer and Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1989 244 



XI 



Preface 



This is the first revised edition of the Area Handbook for Mongolia, 
published in 1970. The new edition recounts events in Mongolia 
during the intervening years and brings up to date such develop- 
ments as the changing geopolitical role of Mongolia in Sino-Soviet 
relations, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mon- 
golia and the United States, the evolution to a more open, reform- 
minded administration, and broad economic achievements. 

Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to present an ob- 
jective and concise account of the major social, economic, politi- 
cal, and national security concerns of contemporary Mongolia, as 
well as to provide a historical framework for this overview. The 
1970 edition, which this volume replaces, was prepared for The 
American University by a team composed of Trevor N. Dupuy, 
Wendell Blanchard, Martin Blumenson, Richard L. Butwell, 
Nancy Gager Clinch, Alvin D. Coox, Grace Person Hayes, Marilyn 
Heilprin, Virginia M. Herman, Steven J. Hunter, Brooke Nihart, 
Francis J. Romance, and Ellen L. Sato. 

The current Mongolia: A Country Study results from the combined 
efforts of a multidisciplinary team. The authors obtained informa- 
tion from a variety of sources, including scholarly studies, official 
reports from government and international organizations, as well 
as foreign and domestic newspapers and periodicals. Brief com- 
mentary on some of the more useful and readily accessible English- 
language sources appears at the end of each chapter. Full refer- 
ences to these and other sources used by the authors are listed in 
the Bibliography. Users of the book seeking additional materials 
on Mongolia, the Mongols, and Inner Asian peoples are encouraged 
to consult the annual editions of the Bibliography of Asian Studies and 
The American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies and Lidiia 
Pavlovna Popova, et alii Mongol Studies in the Soviet Union: A Bib- 
liography of Soviet Publications, 1981-1986 (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1988). 

The authors have limited the use of foreign and technical terms, 
which are defined when they first appear. Readers are also referred 
to the Glossary in the back of the book. The contemporary place- 
names used in this book have been romanized — but without using 
the dieresis and breve diacritics — from Mongolian Cyrillic Script 
according to the system approved by the United States Board on 
Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographical 
Names for British Official Use. The pinyin system of romanization 



Xlll 



is used for Chinese personal names and place-names, although 
occasionally some familiar Wade-Giles romanizations have been 
provided. All measurements are given in the metric system. A con- 
version table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric 
measurements (see table 1, Appendix). 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Date 



Events 



3d century B.C. 



2d- 1st centuries B.C. 



lst-2d centuries 
A.D. 317 
386-533 

mid-8th century 
916-1125 

1038-1227 

1115-1234 

1139-47 
1196-1206 

1209-15 

1220-26 

1227 
1231 
1235 
1237-41 

1240-1480 

c. 1252-79 
1260 



A.D. 



Iron weapons in use; Xiongnu invasion of China 
repulsed 

Nomads expand west; pressure on China con- 
tinues 

Renewed attacks on China 

Xianbei conquer northern China 

Period of Northern Wei Dynasty, established by 
the Toba in northern China 

Possible early Mongol links with Tibetan 
Buddhism 

Period of Kitan Liao Dynasty, established over 
eastern Mongolia, Manchuria, and northern 
China 

Tangut Western Xia Dynasty, established in 
northwestern China 

Jurchen establish Jin Dynasty in Manchuria, 
northern China 

Jurchen defeat Mongols in Pamirs 

Temujin unites Mongols, assumes title of 
Chinggis Khan 

Mongols conquer south to Beijing, west to Lake 
Balkash 

Southwest Asia conquered; invasion of Europe 
and China 

Chinggis dies 

Korea invaded 

Capital rebuilt at Karakorum 

Expedition into Europe, halted at Vienna with 
death of Ogedei 

Suzerainty over Russia established by Golden 
Horde (see Glossary) 

Conquest of Song China 

Mongols defeated by Egyptian Mamluks 



XV 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



1274 and 1281 

1279 

1368 

1388 

1391 

1400-54 

1409-49 

1466 

1480-1502 

1571 
1586 
1641-52 

1672 
1691 

1728 
1732 



750s 



1783 



December 1, 191: 



December 28, 1911 



Unsuccessful attempts at invasion of Japan 

Yuan Dynasty established in China 

Yuan Dynasty destroyed; Mongols driven back 
into Mongolia 

Chinese troops destroy Karakorum 

Timur defeats Golden Horde 

Civil war ends Mongol unity 

Renewed Mongol invasions of China 

Dayan Khan reunites most of Mongolia 

Muscovites end Mongol control of Russia; last 
of Golden Horde defeated 

Mongols end 300-year war with China 

Buddhism becomes state religion 

Russians defeat Buryat Mongols, gain control 
of Lake Baykal region 

Mongols raid Siberia and Russia 

Most Khalkha Mongols accept suzerainty of 
Manchus, absorbed into Chinese empire 
(Qing Dynasty, 1644-1911) 

Sino-Russian Treaty of Kyakhta redefines tradi- 
tional Mongolian borders 

Dzungar Mongols defeated; Mongol indepen- 
dence ended 

Chinese divide Mongolia into northern, Outer 
Mongolia (see Glossary), and southern, Inner 
Mongolia (see Glossary) 

Last reigning descendant of Chinggis in the 
Crimea deposed by Russians 

Outer Mongolia proclaims independence from 
China 

Mongolia establishes autonomous theocratic 
government 



XVI 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



November 3, 1912 

November 5, 1913 

May 25, 1915 

September 1918 
March-June 1920 

October 1920 
March 1-3, 1921 

March 13, 1921 



Russia affirms Mongolia's separation from 
China 

Sino-Russian agreement acknowledges Chinese 
suzerainty over Mongolia 

Treaty of Kyakhta formalizes Mongolian au- 
tonomy 

Chinese troops occupy Outer Mongolia 

Mongolian People's Party formed, establishes 
links with Communist International (see Glos- 
sary) and Soviets 

Russian White Guards invade Mongolia 

First National Party Congress of the Mongolian 
People's Party held in Kyakhta, Soviet Union 

Mongolian People's Provisional Government 
formed 



July 1921 

July 11, 1921 

September 14, 1921 
November 5, 1921 

February 22, 1923 
May 31, 1924 

August 1924 

November 6, 1924 
November 25, 1924 

March 1925 
September 1927 



Mongolian-Soviet army drives out White 
Guards 

Mongolian People's Government, a limited 
monarchy, proclaimed 

Mongolian independence proclaimed 

Soviets recognize Mongolian People's Govern- 
ment 

Revolutionary hero Damdiny Sukhe Bator dies 

Sino-Soviet treaty recognizes Chinese sov- 
ereignty over Mongolia 

Mongolian People's Party becomes Mongolian 
People's Revolutionary Party 

First National Great Hural convenes 

Mongolian People's Republic proclaimed; 
Soviet style state constitution adopted; Niyslel 
Huree renamed Ulaanbaatar 

Soviet troops ostensibly withdraw 
Inner-party struggle at Sixth Party Congress 



xvii 



Table A. — Continued 



Date 



Events 



December 1928 
1929-32 

April-May 1932 

November 27, 1934 

March 12, 1936 

1937-39 

1938 

1939 

July- August 1939 

March- April 1940 

August 10, 1945 
January 5, 1946 
February 27, 1946 

February 1949 

January 26, 1952 
May 1952 
December 1952 

April 1956 
October 1956 
July 6, 1960 
October 27, 1961 



Horloyn Choybalsan emerges as party leader 

Feudal estates confiscated; religious communi- 
ties suppressed 

Soviet troops help quell rebellions; party repu- 
diates extremism 

Mongolian-Soviet "gentlemen's agreement" 
allows Soviet troops into Mongolia 

Treaty and mutual defense protocol signed with 
Soviet Union 

High-level government purges 

Buddhist monasteries closed 

Choybalsan emerges as undisputed leader 

Mongolian- Soviet joint force defeats Japanese 
at Halhin Gol 

Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal becomes party general 
secretary 

Mongolia declares war on Japan 

China recognizes Mongolia's independence 

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and 
Agreement on Economic and Cultural 
Cooperation signed with Soviet Union 

Ninth National Great Hural, first since 1940, 
convenes 

Choybalsan dies 

Tsedenbal becomes premier 

Economic and cultural cooperation agreement 
signed with China 

"Personality cult" of Choybalsan condemned 

New collective efforts start 

New state Constitution adopted 

Mongolia admitted to United Nations 



XV111 



Table A.— Continued 



Date 



Events 



January 1962 
June 7, 1962 
1966 

June 1974 

August 23, 1984 
December 12, 1984 

April 1986 
January 15, 1987 

January 27, 1987 
November 28, 1988 
March 7, 1989 



Choybalsan's "personality cult" again con- 
demned 

Mongolia joins Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary) 

Serious Mongolian-Chinese differences emerge 

Jambyn Batmonh becomes chairman of Coun- 
cil of Ministers; Tsedenbal becomes chairman 
of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural 
and continues as party first secretary 

Tsedenbal retires; Batmonh becomes party 
general secretary 

Batmonh elected chairman of Presidium of Peo- 
ple 's Great Hural; Dumaagiyn Sodnom be- 
comes premier 

Long-term trade agreement signed with China 

Soviet Union announces intention to withdraw 
one of five Soviet divisions stationed in 
Mongolia 

Diplomatic relations established with the United 
States 

Treaty on a border control system signed with 
China 

Soviets announce that troop withdrawal plans 
had been finalized 



XIX 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Mongolian People's Republic. 
Short Form: Mongolia. 
Term for Citizens: Mongolian(s). 
Capital: Ulaanbaatar. 

Date of Independence: March 13, 1921, from China. Formerly 
Outer Mongolia (see Glossary), a dependency of China, 169 1-1911; 
autonomous state under Russian protection, 1912-19; partially 
under Chinese control, 1919-21. 

Geography 

Size: Total 1,565,000 square kilometers. 

Topography: Mountains and rolling plateaus; vast semidesert and 
desert plains, 90 percent pasture or desert wasteland, less than 1 
percent arable, 8 to 10 percent forested; mountains in north, west 
and southwest; Gobi, a vast desert in southeast; Selenge river sys- 
tem in north. 

Climate: Desert; high, cold, dry, continental climate; sharp sea- 
sonal fluctuations and variation; little precipitation; great diurnal 
temperature changes. 

Society 

Population: 2,125,463 in July 1989; in 1989, birth rate 35.1 per 
1,000; death rate 7.6 per 1,000. Approximately 51 percent live in 
urban areas; nearly 25 percent in Ulaanbaatar in 1986. In 1987 
population density per square kilometer 1.36; sex ratio 50.1 per- 
cent male, 49.9 percent female as of 1986. 

Ethnic Groups: Nearly 90 percent Mongol. Rest Kazakh (5.3 per- 
cent), Chinese (2 percent), Russian (2 percent); Tuvins (see Glos- 
sary), Uzbeks (see Glossary), Uighurs (see Glossary), and others 
(1.5 percent). 

Languages: Khalkha Mongol (official language), 90 percent; minor 
languages include Turkic, Chinese, Russian, and Kazakh. 



xxi 



Religion: Predominantly Yellow Sect of Tibetan Buddhism 
(Lamaism); about 4 percent Muslim (primarily in southwest), some 
shamanism. Limited religious activity although freedom of religion 
guaranteed in 1960 Constitution. 

Health: Life expectancy in 1989 sixty-three for males, sixty-seven 
for females. Infant mortality 49 to 53 per 1,000; 112 hospitals in 
1986 with a ratio of 110 hospital beds and 24.8 doctors per 10,000 
population. Overall free medical care; medical specialists and facil- 
ities concentrated in urban areas; close cooperation with Soviet 
Union in medical research and training. 

Education: Four years compulsory elementary school overall and 
four years compulsory secondary school in all but most remote 
areas; two-year noncompulsory general secondary. Higher edu- 
cation: one university, seven other institutes of higher learning. 
In 1985 primary and secondary education included: 28 specialized 
secondary schools, 40 vocational schools, 900 general education 
schools enrolling 435,900 students; many Mongolian students study 
at universities and technical schools in the Soviet Union and East 
European countries — approximately 11,000 studied abroad in 
1986-87. In the late 1980s, educational reform plans announced 
for 1 1 -year system of general education with traditional empha- 
sis. In 1985 national literacy rate estimated at 80 percent; 100 per- 
cent claimed by government. 

Media: Thirty-five newspapers and thirty-eight magazines pub- 
lished in 1986. 

Economy 

Major Features: Economy traditionally based on agriculture, 
livestock breeding, and forestry. In 1980s Soviets assisted in de- 
velopment of extensive mineral resources; mining and processing 
of coal, copper, molybdenum, tin, tungsten, and gold accounted 
for large portion of industrial production. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1985 estimated at US$1.7 
billion; per capita income based on GDP was US$880. 

Agriculture: Livestock predominates; camels, cattle, goats, horses, 
and sheep major livestock types. Crops include wheat, barley, oats, 
hay, potatoes, and vegetables. 

Industry: Processing of forestry, animal, and fishery products; 
building materials, food and beverage; and mining (particularly 

coal). 



xxn 



Resources: Coal, copper, molybdenum, tungsten, phosphates, tin, 
rare earth, sodium chloride, nickel, zinc, wolfram, fluorite, and 
gold. 

Exports: In 1985 approximately 2 billion tugriks (US$670 million; 
free on board). Major commodities: cement, lumber and sawn tim- 
ber, wool, large and small hides, grain, meat, clothing, and min- 
erals. Nearly all trade with communist countries (about 80 percent 
with Soviet Union); 3.3 percent to noncommunist countries in 
1986. 

Imports: Approximately 3.3 billion tugriks (US$1.0 billion, cost, 
insurance, and freight, 1985). Major imports: machine tools, diesel 
generators, electric motors, transformers, construction equipment, 
gasoline and diesel fuel, iron and steel, foodstuffs, and consumer 
durables. Nearly all trade with communist countries (about 80 per- 
cent with Soviet Union); 1.7 percent to noncommunist countries 
in 1986. 

Exchange Rate: 2.985 tugriks = US$1 in March 1989. 
Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Communications 

Inland Waterways: 397 kilometers of principal routes, primarily 
on Hovsgol Nuur and Selenge Moron, navigable only 5 months 
of year. 

Roads: In 1986 total highways 6,700 kilometers; 900 kilometers 
paved. Main roads linked Ulaanbaatar with Chinese and Soviet 
frontiers at Erenhot and Kyakhta, respectively. Bus services in 
Ulaanbaatar and other large towns; road haulage services through- 
out country on basis of motor- transport depots, mosdy in aymag 
(provincial) centers. 

Railroads: Diesel-drive rolling stock; 1,750 kilometers of 1.524- 
meter broad-gauge track in 1986. In 1984 accounted for more than 
70 percent of total freight turnover. 

Civil Aviation: Airfields totaled eighty, thirty usable, ten with 
permanent- surface runways; largest at Ulaanbaatar. National car- 
rier: Mongolian Airlines (MIAT). Domestic service to provincial- 
level and many county centers. International service from Ulaan- 
baatar to Irkutsk, Soviet Union, and Beijing. Total route length, 
38,300 kilometers. Aeroflot connected Ulaanbaatar to major world 
capitals. 



xxiii 



Telecommunications: New radio relay lines planned; 13 AM, 1 
FM radio station, 1 television station with 18 provincial-level relays; 
88,100 television sets; 207,000 radio receivers; at least one satel- 
lite ground station. 

Government and Politics 

Party and Government: Communist, modeled on Soviet system; 
limited degree of private ownership permitted by 1960 Constitu- 
tion. Unicameral People's Great Hural with 370 deputies elected 
in June 1986 for four-year term; 328 were members or candidate 
members of ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Coun- 
cil of Ministers with highest executive power. Political processes 
guided in theory by People's Great Hural, which enacts basic laws 
of country, but real power vested in ten-person party Political 
Bureau. Central Committee appoints and removes Political Bureau 
members and is itself appointed by National Party Congress. Mon- 
golian People's Revolutionary Party only legal party in 1989. Land, 
natural resources, factories, transport, and banking organizations 
state property. Cooperative ownership of most public enterprises, 
especially livestock herding. 

Administrative Divisions: Eighteen provinces (aymags), three 
municipalities (hots), and counties (somons), each with own Mon- 
golian People's Revolutionary Party organization, which directs 
work of local assemblies, cooperatives, and government on its 
level. 

Judicial System: Blend of Soviet, Chinese, and Turkish systems 
of law; administered by courts and Office of the Procurator of the 
Republic — appointed to five-year term by People's Great Hural. 
No constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; 
does not accept International Court of Justice jurisdiction. Supreme 
Court elected by People's Great Hural for four-year term. Lower 
court judges elected by local assemblies for three-year terms. Peo- 
ple's Great Hural appoints procurator, who appoints lower-level 
procurators. Procurator and Supreme Court accountable to Peo- 
ple's Great Hural and its presidium. 

Foreign Affairs: Heavily dependent on Soviet Union for economic 
assistance, technical aid, and labor. Historical focus on two 
neighbors — China and Soviet Union, with which it shares strategic 
location; latter with a powerful influence over many aspects of for- 
eign policy. Diplomatic relations established with United States in 
1987. 



xxiv 



National Security 

Armed Forces: Mongolian People's Army — 21,000 (17,000 con- 
scripts); Mongolian People's Air Force — 3,500, in 1988. 

Military Budget: US$249.44 million (1987). 

Military Units: Four motorized rifle divisions; one air fighter regi- 
ment; two transport squadrons; one helicopter squadron. 

Equipment: T-54, T-55, T-62 main battle tanks; 100mm anti- 
tank guns; 120mm and 160mm mortars; 122mm, 130mm, and 
152mm towed artillery; 14.5mm, 37mm, and 57mm air defense 
guns; 122mm, 132mm, and 140mm multiple rocket launchers; 
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles; MiG-21 fighters; An-2, An-24, An-26, 
and An-32 transports; Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters. 

Auxiliary Forces: Paramilitary force (responsible for border patrol, 
guard duty, and immigration) of 15,000 under jurisdiction of Minis- 
try of Public Security; also militia (internal security troops) and 
200,000 army reservists. 



xxv 




xxvi 



Introduction 



MONGOLIA AND THE MONGOL PEOPLE have periodically 
been at the center of international events. The histories of nations — 
indeed, of continents — have been rewritten and major cultural and 
political changes have occurred because of a virtual handful of seem- 
ingly remote pastoral nomads. The thirteenth-century accomplish- 
ments of Chinggis Khan in conquering a swath of the world from 
modern-day Korea to southern Russia and in invading deep into 
Europe, and the cultural achievements of his grandson, Khubilai 
Khan, in China are well-known in world history. Seven hundred 
years later, a much compressed Mongolian nation again attracted 
world attention, as a strategic battleground between Japan and the 
Soviet Union in the 1930s and between the Soviet Union and China 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the 1980s, the Mongolian Peo- 
ple's Republic continued to be a critical geopolitical factor in Sino- 
Soviet relations. 

The Mongols arose from obscure origins in the recesses of Inner 
Asia to unify their immediate nomadic neighbors and then to con- 
quer much of the Eurasian landmass, ruling large parts of it for 
more than a century. Emerging from a newly consolidated heart- 
land north of the Gobi in the thirteenth century, the Mongols and 
their armies — made up of conquered peoples — thrust through 
western Asia, crossed the Ural Mountains, invaded the countries 
of Eastern Europe, and pressed on to Austria and the Adriatic. 
They also advanced through southwest Asia to the eastern Mediter- 
ranean and they conquered the Chinese empire. At about the same 
time, they embarked on ambitious maritime expeditions against 
Java and Japan. The Mongols were phenomenally hard-driving 
and ambitious for such a small group, and their accomplishments 
were considerable. Only the Mamluks of Egypt, the "divine winds" 
of Japan, and the Mongols' own legal tradition — the need to return 
home to elect a new khan — halted the inexorable Mongol military 
advances. 

Resistance to, and accommodation of, the Mongols had mixed 
effects on the national development of some of the conquered 
nations. European kingdoms and principalities formed alliances 
to do battle, albeit unsuccessfully, against the Mongol armies. 
Europeans even joined the hated Muslims in Egypt and Palestine 
to oppose the common Mongol enemy. Although the Mongol 
invasion of Japan was not successful, it contributed to the even- 
tual downfall of Japan's ruling faction. The conquering Mongols 



xxvn 



brought an infusion of new ideas and unity to China, but they were 
eventually absorbed and lost their ability to rule over a people 
hundreds of times more numerous than they were themselves. 

But Mongol influence did not end with the termination of mili- 
tary conquests or absorption. Their presence was institutionalized 
in many of the lands that they conquered, through the adoption 
of Mongol military tactics, administrative forms, and commercial 
enterprises. The historical development of such disparate nations 
as Russia, China, and Iran were directly affected by the Mongols. 
Wherever they setded outside their homeland, the Mongols brought 
about cultural change and institutional improvements. Although 
there never was a Pax Mongolica, the spread of the Mongol polity 
across Eurasia resulted in a large measure of cultural exchange. 
Chinese scribes and artists served the court of the Ilkans in Iran, 
Italian merchants served the great khans in Karakorum and Dadu 
(as Beijing was then known), papal envoys recorded events in the 
courts of the great khans, Mongol princes were dispatched to all 
points of the great Mongol empire to observe and be observed, 
and the Golden Horde (see Glossary) and their Tatar (see Glos- 
sary) descendants left a lasting mark on Muscovy through adminis- 
trative developments and intermarriage. Although eventually 
subsumed as part of the Chinese empire, the Mongols were quick 
to seek independence when that empire disintegrated in 1911. 

The Mongol character has been greatly influenced by the ex- 
tremes of Mongolia's geography, comprising huge rolling plateaus, 
rugged mountain ranges, and areas susceptible to earthquakes. On 
the one hand, Mongolia has Hovsgol Nuur — one of Asia's largest 
freshwater lakes — and river systems that drain toward the Arctic 
and Pacific oceans and into Central Asia, and on the other, the 
Gobi, a vast arid rangeland within which there are even less hospita- 
ble desert areas. The climate is mostly cold and dry with long frigid 
winters and short hot summers. Minimal precipitation, tempera- 
tures that freeze the nation's rivers and freshwater lakes for long 
periods of the year, and severe blizzards and dust storms leave only 
about 1 percent of the land arable and make human and livestock 
existence fragile at best. 

Such an inhospitable land, not unexpectedly, is home to a rela- 
tively small, widely dispersed population. Of the 4 million plus 
Mongols — only a fourfold increase over the population of the era 
of Chinggis Khan — only a little more than 2 million people live 
in the modern Mongolian People's Republic (the rest are minor- 
ity peoples in China and the Soviet Union). Except for a concen- 
tration of 500,000 people in Ulaanbaatar, the capital, population 
is sparsely distributed: another quarter of the population resides 



xxvm 



in small urban areas and the remaining approximately 49 percent 
live in the vast countryside. The population, however, is young 
and growing rapidly as government incentives encourage large fami- 
lies to offset labor shortages. Nearly 90 percent of the population 
is composed of ethnic Mongols, making the nation extremely 
homogeneous; Turkic peoples, such as Tuvins (see Glossary) and 
Kazakhs, Chinese, Russians, and other minorities make up the 
remainder. 

Nomadic peoples of uncertain origins are recorded as living in 
what is now the Mongolian People's Republic in the third century 
B.C., and archaeological evidence takes human habitation in the 
Gobi back a hundred centuries or more earlier. Warfare was a way 
of life, against other nomadic peoples in competition for land, and 
in the south against the Chinese, whose high culture and fertile 
lands were always attractive to the Mongols and other Inner Asian 
peoples. China responded with punitive expeditions, which pushed 
these pre-Mongol and proto-Mongol peoples farther north, west, 
and east and resulted in periods of Chinese hegemony over parts 
of Inner Asia. The Mongols of Chinggis Khan emerged in central 
Mongolia in the twelfth century under Chinggis 's grandfather. 
Tribal alliances, wars, clan confederations, and more wars con- 
tributed to a new Mongol unity and organization and the even- 
tual conquest of lands throughout Eurasia. 

The high point of Mongol achievements was followed by gradual 
fragmentation. The Mongol successes throughout the first part of 
the thirteenth century were eroded by overextension of lines of con- 
trol from the capital, first at Karakorum and later at Dadu. By 
the late fourteenth century, only local vestiges of Mongol glory per- 
sisted in parts of Asia. The main core of the Mongol population 
in China retreated to the old homeland, where their governing sys- 
tem devolved into a quasi-feudalistic system fraught with disunity 
and conflict. Caught between the emergence of tsarist Russia and 
the Manchus — distant cousins of the Mongols — in the seventeenth 
century, Mongolia eventually was absorbed into the periphery of 
the Chinese polity, where it remained until 1911. As the Chinese 
imperial system disintegrated, the Mongols sought national in- 
dependence; the Chinese did not willingly give up, however, and 
Mongolia continued to be divided into northern (Outer 
Mongolia — see Glossary) and southern (Inner Mongolia — see Glos- 
sary) sections. Russian interest in Mongolia was replaced by Soviet 
involvement; the Japanese sought political leverage and applied 
periodic pressure up through World War II. 

Throughout the twentieth century, Russian and Soviet influence 
over Mongolia has been a predominant factor in its national 



xxix 



development. The tsarist government aided Mongolian revolution- 
aries both diplomatically and militarily against the Chinese, and 
anti-Bolshevik White Russian military forces did active battle 
against both the Chinese and the indigenous revolutionaries. The 
theocratic monarchy established after 1911 was greatly limited by 
the Mongolian Revolution of 1921 and eventually was replaced 
by a "people's republic" under heavy Soviet influence. This in- 
fluence continued throughout the twentieth century in the form 
of political guidance and economic aid. Severe purges of monar- 
chists, Buddhists, conservative revolutionaries, and any other real 
or perceived opponent of the new communist regime took place 
throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s. Extremism bordered 
on national disaster before evolving into more moderate policies 
of a new Mongolian socialism characterized by closely planned eco- 
nomic growth. Joint Mongolian-Soviet armies successfully fended 
off Japanese military advances in 1939. The rest of World War 
II produced further agricultural and industrial development in sup- 
port of Moscow's war efforts and made Mongolia a critical buffer 
in the Soviet Far Eastern defense system. Technically neutral, Mon- 
golia declared war against Japan only in August 1945. 

Peacetime brought additional Soviet and East European eco- 
nomic aid (and eventually membership in the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance [Comecon — see Glossary]) and a new rela- 
tionship with the People's Republic of China, after its establish- 
ment in 1949. Improved Mongolian-Chinese relations resulted in 
still more economic assistance from, and trade with, Beijing. Mon- 
golia's external policies, however, were founded on those of the 
Soviet Union, and relations with China, always influenced by sus- 
picions over real or imaginary claims by China to "lost territo- 
ries," faltered in the wake of the Sino-Soviet rift that developed 
in the late 1950s. By the late 1960s, Mongolia had become an armed 
camp; Soviet and Chinese troops were poised against one another 
along the Mongolian-Chinese border. Tensions between Ulaan- 
baatar and Beijing lessened only when Sino-Soviet rapprochement 
began to evolve in the mid-1980s. The issue of Soviet troop with- 
drawal from Mongolia still constrained Mongolian-Chinese rela- 
tions in the late 1980s. 

Some of the same late twentieth-century geopolitical develop- 
ments that lessened tensions with China also brought Mongolia 
farther into the mainstream of world affairs. Mongolia participated 
more actively in international organizations and improved rela- 
tions with a growing number of Western countries, including the 
United States, which established diplomatic relations with Mon- 
golia in 1987. 



XXX 



Traditional Mongolian society was affected heavily by foreign 
influences: commerce was controlled by Chinese merchants and 
the state religion — Tibetan Buddhism (or, Lamaism — see Glos- 
sary) — was simultaneously bureaucratic and otherworldly. Modern 
society has been shaped by the continued foreign — primarily 
Soviet — influence. Despite increasing urbanization and industri- 
alization, however, nearly half of the population in the late 1980s 
lived either by the traditional methods of pastoral nomadism — 
moving their herds (sheep, horses, cattle, goats, and yaks) from 
one area of temporary sustenance to another — or in a close sym- 
biotic relationship with the nomads. Despite its hardships, the no- 
madic life provides Mongols with national values and a sense of 
historical identity and pride. 

Traditional values and practices have made modernization of 
society a difficult task, however. Once they had eliminated what 
the communists called feudal aspects of society, Mongolia's new 
leaders still had to take radical steps to modernize their country. 
Scientific methods were applied to animal husbandry and agricul- 
ture, and new industries, such as copper and coal mining, were 
developed. Herding and agricultural collectives, mines, factories, 
and education institutions became the focal point of a social or- 
ganization controlled by state administrators, most of whom were 
members of the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. 
Modernization inevitably brought greater differentiation and mo- 
bility in Mongolian society as party functionaries, white collar ad- 
ministrators, factory workers, and increasing numbers of urban 
residents (who typically have larger family units than rural resi- 
dents) surpassed in numbers and opportunities the once self- 
sufficient pastoralists, who remain at the bottom of the social system. 

The development of the economy has been closely associated with 
social modernization in Mongolia. Beginning with the 1921 revo- 
lution, the government took increasing control over the economy. 
Mongolia has a planned economy based on state and cooperative 
ownership. Annual planning began in 1941, and five-year plans 
began in 1948. The plans have been closely integrated with the 
five-year plans of the Soviet Union since 1961 and with Comecon 
multilateral plans since 1976. In the years since 1921, Mongolia 
has been transformed from an almost strictly agrarian economy 
to a diversified agricultural-industrial economy. Economic reforms 
in the Soviet Union inspired similar efforts in Mongolia under 
Jambyn Batmonh, premier between 1974 and 1984 and general 
secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party after 1984. 
The acceleration of economic development, greater application of 
science and technology to production, improved management and 



xxxi 



planning, greater independence for economic enterprises, and better 
balance among individual, collective, and societal interests were 
the target areas of reform in the late 1980s. 

Underpinning society and the economy are the government and 
party. Mongolia has a highly centralized government run by a cabi- 
net (the Council of Ministers), with a unicameral legislature (Peo- 
ple's Great Hural), and an independent judicial branch overseeing 
the courts and the criminal justice system. Provinces, provincial- 
level cities, counties, and town centers constitute local adminis- 
tration. As in all communist-run states, there is one-party rule. 
The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, with a membership 
of nearly 90,000, operates with quinquennial party congresses and 
an elected Central Committee. The party's Political Bureau and 
Secretariat provide standing leadership and carry out day-to-day 
business. Local party administration coincides with government 
offices and production units at each level. 

Mongolia's national security is intimately linked with that of the 
Soviet Union. The armed forces have a rich historical tradition 
in the legacy of the great khans — an era of Mongolian history still 
resented by the Soviets — and of their more immediate revolution- 
ary forbearers of the 1910s and 1920s. The Mongolian People's 
Army was established in 1921, when the new provisional national 
government was proclaimed. As is the case in all aspects of modern 
Mongolian organization, Soviet influence has predominated. Soviet 
Red Army troops remained in Mongolia at least until 1925, and 
they were brought back in the 1930s to help quell anticommunist 
rebellions. Since then, they have had a major military presence, 
poised first against the Japanese and later against the Chinese threat. 
Up through the 1940s, Mongolian troops had had fighting 
experiences against White Russians, Chinese warlord armies, 
Mongolian rebels, the Japanese, and Chinese Guomindang 
(Kuomintang in Wade-Giles romanization) or, Chinese Nation- 
alist Party, forces. 

In the 1950s, serious efforts were made at military moderniza- 
tion, but it was the Sino-Soviet rift that brought about the most 
dramatic changes. Increasingly close ties developed between the 
Mongolian and Soviet armed forces in accordance with a succes- 
sion of mutual defense pacts. Open hostilities between Soviet and 
Chinese forces in the late 1960s further strengthened ties and led 
to still greater modernization of the ground and air forces. By 1988 
the armed forces numbered 24,500 active-duty personnel — most 
organized into four motorized rifle divisions and a MiG-21 fighter 
regiment — and some 200,000 reservists and paramilitary personnel. 



xxxn 



Military training for able-bodied civilians — both men and 
women — and universal male military conscription (from age eigh- 
teen to age twenty-eight) are key elements in a country with a tra- 
dition in which all men were considered warriors. Additionally, 
all citizens are obliged to participate in civil defense preparedness 
activities. Close ties between the military establishment and the 
civilian economy have existed since the 1930s; many industries con- 
tinue to produce both military materiel and civilian-use goods. 
Demobilized soldiers normally have greater technical skills than 
those who did not serve in the military and thus contributes sig- 
nificantly to the economy upon completion of military service. The 
military also plays an important economic role through numerous 
military construction projects for the civilian sector. 

In sum, the Mongolian People's Republic, as it reaches the 1990s, 
is a small, economically developing country that has made great 
strides since it emerged from centuries of Chinese domination. The 
measure of progress is controlled by a one-party, highly central- 
ized system that has long been influenced by its Soviet mentors. 
Because Mongolia's foreign policy is coordinated with that of the 
Soviet Union and is closely integrated with, and heavily depen- 
dent on, Soviet and East European assistance, the degree to which 
Mongolia is able to conduct its own affairs is questionable. As it 
has been for several millennia, Mongolia will continue to be geo- 
politically important. 

June 30, 1989 

* * * 

As this book was being completed, extraordinary developments 
were occurring in Mongolia. Opposition parties emerged, the top 
leadership of the ruling party, the state, and the government was 
replaced, and free multiparty elections were held. Criticisms of the 
old regime brought admissions of falsified official statistics (the 
authors of this book were plagued continually with irreconcilable 
figures; users of the statistical data in this book thus are warned 
to keep in mind the ''official" nature of many of the figures used). 
Accompanying the rejection of the old regime was a resurgence 
of nationalism (including renewed and positive interest in the an- 
cient regime of Chinggis Khan). Like the peoples of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, Mongolians wanted to reform their coun- 
try's social, political, and economic sectors and to be more open 
to the West. The changes set in motion in 1984 by the replace- 
ment of Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal with the reform leadership of 



xxxiii 



Jambyn Batmonh were coming to fruition in 1990, as even Bat- 
monh himself was replaced as the top party and state leader. 

Throughout 1989, Tsedenbal was criticized for having had a 
"dogmatic interpretation of socialism" and for having rushed to 
the conclusion that the period of socialism had begun. The 1989 
leadership blamed Tsedenbal not only for the problems of the past 
but also for having contributed to the current leadership's inabil- 
ity to determine the level of economic construction because of his 
earlier flawed analyses. In an effort to push blame back still far- 
ther, Tsedenbal's reputation was linked with that of his predeces- 
sor, Horloyn Choybalsan, whom Batmonh had criticized at the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the Nineteenth Mongolian People's Revolution- 
ary Party National Party Congress in December 1988. 

Amidst the criticism of recent Mongolian leaders, the previous 
negative analysis of the historical role of Chinggis Khan was re- 
vised. Chinggis was seen in an increasingly favorable light as the 
Mongol nation's founder and as a national hero, a position not 
well received in Moscow. Calls for publication of historical texts 
and literature in Mongol script, rather than in Cyrillic, grew, and 
the usage of Mongol-language rather than Russian-language words 
increased. Officials expressed concern midway through 1989 that 
some of the new nationalist pride might be taking a dangerous anti- 
Soviet line, and appropriate warnings were made to those whose 
thinking may have been swayed by "bourgeois propaganda." 

Western material culture also took hold in reform-minded Mon- 
golia. Semi-professional rock music groups emerged after a decade 
of low-key development (odes to Chinggis Khan were among the 
hottest rock hits), and avant-garde artists began to enjoy official 
sanction. The emphasis on cultural reform, however, appeared to 
concentrate on a renewed interest in traditional prerevolutionary 
achievements. 

High-level exchanges with the Soviet Union continued to be the 
norm in relations between Ulaanbaatar and Moscow; these included 
Batmonh's brief "working visit" with Soviet president Mikhail 
Gorbachev to reaffirm the two communist parties' "close comrade- 
ship" in July 1989. As a sign of more openness among communist 
countries, in July 1989 Mongolia and Albania restored formal diplo- 
matic relations and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 
normalized relations with the Chinese Communist Party. Indica- 
tive of the continually improving relations with China was the visit 
one month later to Mongolia by the Chinese foreign minister, Qian 
Qichen. The capitalist world was not ignored: the minister of for- 
eign economic relations and supply was dispatched to Britain and 
the United States in July 1989 in search of investment and joint 



xxxiv 



venture possibilities, and diplomatic relations were established with 
the European Economic Community in August 1989. 

Domestic organizational activity also took place in the last 
half of 1989. In August 1989, the government announced that a 
new draft constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic would 
be forthcoming in 1990 as part of the process of changing "out- 
dated laws and rules necessitated by the process of renewal. . . ." 
There were changes in the top leadership, such as the retire- 
ment of Minister of Defense Jamsrangiyn Yondon in September 
1989 and his replacement by Lieutenant General Lubsangombyn 
Molomjamts. 

In late 1989, the government revealed the existence in Dornod 
Aymag of the Mardai uranium mine and the nearby town of Erdes, 
which were developed and run as concessions by the Soviet Union. 
Established by a 1981 intergovernmental agreement, the mine 
began shipments of uranium ore to the Soviet Union in 1988. The 
government also disclosed that unemployment officially was 27,000, 
but unofficial estimates ran as high as three times that figure. Fur- 
thermore, Mongolia was more forthright about the economic draw- 
backs stemming from the country's political and ideological 
orientation. 

In late 1989, the new openness about economic conditions oc- 
casioned an admission by a deputy minister of foreign economic 
relations and supply that many official statistics had been falsified 
during the Tsedenbal years to bolster claims of economic progress. 
The statistics had found their way into United Nations (UN) pub- 
lications and had been used for years by foreign analysts project- 
ing the state of the Mongolian economy. After the admission, both 
the Mongolian leadership and media criticized the government's 
channelling of inaccurate economic statistics to UN agencies as well 
as Mongolia's refusal to seek economic assistance from Western 
countries. 

Dissatisfaction with Mongolia's previously self-imposed isolation 
and with Soviet plans to reduce its economic presence in Mongo- 
lia led to great Mongolian efforts in late 1989 and early 1990 to 
expand foreign economic relations beyond communist countries. 
Having joined the Group of 77 — the coalition of more than 120 
developing countries in the UN — in June 1989, Mongolia sought 
to join the Asian Development Bank, to establish official relations 
with the European Economic Community, and to become a mem- 
ber of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Mongolian 
officials actively promoted joint ventures with capitalist companies, 
and they welcomed visits by Western and Asian business represen- 
tatives. Plans were underway to teach foreign languages for trade 



xxxv 



purposes and to foster expanded tourism. In December 1989, Bat- 
monh announced that relations between Mongolia and China had 
been normalized and that conditions were favorable for economic 
cooperation. 

The decade ended with the Seventh Plenary Session of the 
Nineteenth National Party Congress from December 11 to 12 and 
a two-day session of the People's Great Hural from December 12 
to 13. The party plenum retired three Political Bureau members 
and appointed two new, younger men to candidate membership. 
The plenary session closed with a resolution calling for more ener- 
getic implementation of the party's economic and social policy and 
a promise to hold the Twentieth National Party Congress of the 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in late November 1990. 
For the first time, People's Great Hural sessions were broadcast 
nationally over both radio and television as the deputies approved 
a draft socio-economic development plan and a draft state budget 
for 1990. Universal, equal, and direct suffrage through secret bal- 
lot for national and local assembly elections was provided in a draft 
law also approved by the People's Great Hural. 

In December 1989 and early 1990, the Mongolian Democratic 
Union, a group of intellectuals and students labeled as an "un- 
authorized organization" by the government-controlled media, 
started holding rallies in Ulaanbaatar, first to voice support for the 
party and hural documents on socio-economic reconstruction but 
later to demand democracy, government reform, and a multiparty 
system. They also advocated bringing Tsedenbal, who had been 
living in Moscow since 1984, to trial for having allowed Mongolia 
to stagnate during his thirty-two-year regime. An early response 
from the Political Bureau was the announcement that it had re- 
habilitated people illegally repressed in the 1930s and 1940s. Amidst 
contradictory reports of whether or not the party and government 
had both granted official recognition to the Mongolian Democratic 
Union but had banned public assemblies and demonstrations, the 
media criticized the union for making "ridiculous and contradic- 
tory statements" about the administration's reform efforts. Union 
members, believing they were acting in defiance of the public as- 
sembly ban, continued to hold mass rallies and to issue calls for 
action by the government. 

The year 1990 may prove the most momentous in Mongolia's 
modern history. In March Council of Ministers Chairman, or Pre- 
mier, Dumaagiyn Sodnom made a six-day trip to Japan, the first 
visit of a Mongolian People's Republic leader to a noncommunist 
country. Called "epoch making" by Japanese prime minister Kaifu 
Toshiki, the trip included a visit with Emperor Akihito, eulogies 



xxxvi 



for Chinggis Khan, the signing of a most-favored-nation trade 
agreement, and Kaifu's promise to donate US$3 million worth of 
medical equipment and supplies and to encourage Japanese firms 
to assist in the construction of a steel mill in Mongolia. 

Momentous change awaited Sodnom upon his return to Ulaan- 
baatar. From March 12 to 14, 1990, the Eighth Plenary Session 
of the Nineteenth National Party Congress was held in response 
to the continual protests — including hunger strikes — by opposition 
groups. As a result of the meeting, the five-man Political Bureau — 
including the two new members elected in December 1989 — was 
replaced with a more reform-minded leadership. The new mem- 
bers were Gombojabyn Ochirbat, the former chairman of the Cen- 
tral Council of the Mongolian Trade Unions who had been ousted 
by Tsedenbal in 1982; Lodongiyn Tudeb, director of Unen (Truth), 
the party newspaper; Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren, minister of for- 
eign affairs; Nyamyn Michigdorj, head of the party's new Social- 
Economic Department, and Tsebeenjabyn Oold, chairman of the 
party's Control Commission. Sixty-one-year-old Ochirbat — seen 
by observers as a compromise candidate — succeeded Batmonh as 
general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. 
In doing so, Ochirbat bypassed the heir apparent to the position, 
Tserendashiyn Namsray, who was in charge of party security and 
whose succession was feared by liberal party members and oppo- 
sition groups. Tsedenbal was expelled from the party and party 
leaders purged by Tsedenbal in the 1960s were politically rehabili- 
tated. Changes in the government followed. On March 22 Batmonh 
was replaced as chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great 
Hural — the equivalent of president — by forty-eight-year-old Min- 
ister of Foreign Economic Relations and Supply Punsalmaagiyn 
Ochirbat (no relation to the new party general secretary). Sodnom 
was replaced as an interim premier by flfty-five-year-old Deputy 
Premier and Minister of Agriculture and Food Sharabyn Gun- 
gaadorj . 

With new leaders in charge of the ruling party, the state, and 
the government, efforts were made to control the pace of reform 
while moving ahead with structural political changes. Deputies to 
the People's Great Hural, however, sought more fundamental 
change by amending the preamble and Article 82 of the Constitu- 
tion to delete references about the leading and guiding role in so- 
ciety of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Presidium 
chairman Ochirbat declared this move "as an important step in 
separating party and state as well as in the renewal of the state sys- 
tem. ' ' Furthermore, a Law on Elections was passed and multiparty 
hural elections were set for June 1990. Because they perceived the 



xxxvn 



new law as favoring the ruling party, opposition groups mounted 
still more protests culminating in a demonstration of an estimated 
40,000 people in Ulaanbaatar in late March. 

While offering limited domestic political reforms, efforts were 
made to reassure China and the Soviet Union that the new leader- 
ship was stable. Presidium chairman Ochirbat visited Beijing 
in early May, the first visit by a Mongolian head of state in twenty- 
eight years. After talks with China's top party, state, and govern- 
ment leaders — who expressed concern over the unrest in Mongolia — 
a joint communique was issued declaring the intention to return 
to the level of friendship and cooperation the two countries once 
had, noting that their 1960 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual As- 
sistance was still in force. Both party general secretary Ochirbat 
and Presidium chairman Ochirbat visited Moscow in mid-March 
to seek support for their domestic political reforms and to resolve 
some of Ulaanbaatar' s economic grievances. Soviet leaders ex- 
pressed support for Mongolia's 4 'successful renewal" and agreed 
to measures that would redress currency exchange and trade 
problems between the two countries. To complete the momentous 
month of March 1990, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) became 
the 106th country to establish diplomatic relations with Mongo- 
lia. Later in the year Mongolia entered into substantial telecom- 
munications and trade agreements with South Korea. Despite a 
policy that considers Mongolia as part of China, officials of the 
Republic of China government in Taiwan held talks with Mon- 
golian representatives in the United States concerning possible 
Taiwan agricultural and vocational aid in exchange for trade and 
convenient visa issuance procedures. 

In the face of continuing opposition hunger strikes and rallies, 
the People's Great Hural amended the Constitution in May, legaliz- 
ing political parties and allowing direct elections. An important 
democratic change was the establishment of the Small Hural (Baga 
Hural) — a fifty-seat standing legislature empowered to deal with 
budgets, economic plans, and supervision of the work of the govern- 
ment. In the Small Hural, seats were apportioned according to party 
preferences expressed on ballots by the electorate. The People's 
Great Hural would have legislative veto power and the authority 
to elect the head of state; members of the Small Hural could not 
concurrently be deputies to the People's Great Hural. Agreement 
on the amendments came after opposition group representatives 
met with the ruling party and reached a consensus. 

Structural changes in the government during this period included, 
among others, the establishment of several new ministries (Agricul- 
ture, Light, and Food Industry; Construction; Education; Health 



xxxvm 



and Social Security; Heavy Industry; and Trade and Cooperation) 
and the consolidation or abolition of several old ministries (Agricul- 
ture and Food Industry; Foreign Economic Relations and Supply; 
Light Industry; Power, Mining Industry, and Geology; Social 
Economy and Services; and Trade and Procurement). All deputy 
chairmen of the Council of Ministers, or deputy premiers, were 
replaced, as were the majority of ministers. The process was a con- 
tinual one with more changes in the offing as the decade progressed. 

Primary and general elections were held in late July. The Mon- 
golian People's Revolutionary Party won a comfortable majority 
in the People's Great Hural, taking 357 of the 430 seats, or 84.6 
percent, and 61.7 percent share of the party preference vote, giv- 
ing it 31 of the 50 seats in the Small Hural. The largest opposition 
force, the Mongolian Democratic Party, won thirteen seats, while 
the Social Democratic Party and the National Progress Party each 
won three seats. The other registered political parties, the Free 
Labor Party and the Mongolian Green Party, did not win represen- 
tation in the Small Hural. 

Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat was sworn in as Mongolia's first elected 
president in September 1990, the day after he had been overwhelm- 
ingly voted in by the First Session of the Twelfth People's Great 
Hural. While noting Mongolia's "historically . . . complicated sit- 
uation" in his nationally televised inaugural address, Ochirbat 
stressed the need to move away from excessive involvement with 
the Soviet Union and pursue a nonaligned foreign policy with 
stronger ties with the nations of the Asia-Pacific region. He called 
for the introduction of a market economy domestically, and said 
he would seek membership with the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. A possible visit 
to the United States was an early agenda item for the new president. 

The same day Ochirbat was elected president, the People's Great 
Hural elected D. Gombojab, a Mongolian People's Revolution- 
ary Party member, as its new chairman. In a move recognizing 
the dramatic nature of Mongolia's electoral revolution, Radnaasum- 
bereliyn Gonchigdorj, the thirty- six-year- old leader of the Social 
Democratic Party — and former Mongolia People's Revolutionary 
Party member — was elected vice president of Mongolia and chair- 
man of the Small Hural. Several days later, the People's Great 
Hural elected as premier Dashyn Byambarusen, a forty-eight-year- 
old reform-minded economist, member of the Mongolia People's 
Revolutionary Party, first deputy chairman of the former Council 
of Ministers, and chairman of the State Socioeconomic Develop- 
ment Committee. He immediately pledged to form a coalition 
government, including members of the Mongolian Green Party, 



xxx IX 



which had failed to obtain a seat in the People's Great Hural or 
the Small Hural. Among the problems Byambasuren's government 
faced was an accumulated US$5.7 billion debt owed to the Soviet 
Union. Structural alterations came with Byambasuren's accession. 
His official title was changed from chairman of the Council of 
Ministers to premier or prime minister, and the Council of Ministers 
became known simply as the government. The Small Hural held 
its first session in September and had as its main tasks the revision 
of all basic laws and regulations and restructuring the state and the 
national economy. By October a new sixteen-member cabinet was 
in place. 

An easing up on religious institutions accompanied political re- 
forms. The official media reported in September 1990 that 4 'almost 
all" of the eighteen aymags had their own working temples or 
monasteries. The Gandan monastery in Ulaanbaatar was said to 
be so "overloaded" that a second monastery, home for 500 monks, 
was opened in an old temple that had been used as an exhibition 
hall since 1937. Moreover, some 80,000 people reportedly joined 
the Union of Mongolian Believers and its Democratic Party of Mon- 
golian Believers. 

The Mongolian political scene in 1990 was extraordinarily dy- 
namic and, as admitted by its new leaders, complicated. It was 
the culmination of more than half a decade of reform efforts and, 
perhaps, an evolutionary stage of the revolution that had begun 
in 1921. Despite the presence of reform-minded leaders, the in- 
clusion of opposition parties in decision making, and majority rule 
by the communist party, the burgeoning democracy did not as- 
sure political or economic stability. At best, Mongolian society was 
facing a long period of readjustment in all sectors. 

Just before this book was sent to press, a new comprehensive 
reference book on Mongolia — Information Mongolia (Oxford, 1990) — 
was published by Pergamon Press as part of its Countries of the 
World Information Series. It was compiled and edited by the Acad- 
emy of Sciences of the Mongolian People's Republic and contains 
a foreword by President Ochirbat. This encyclopedic seventy-two 
chapter work is recommended for those seeking greater coverage 
and detail than provided by Mongolia: A Country Study. 



November 22, 1990 Robert L. Worden 



xl 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Archer and hunting dog 



MODERN MONGOLIA— the Mongolian People's Republic- 
comprises only about half of the vast Inner Asian region known 
throughout history as Mongolia. Furthermore, it is only a frac- 
tion of the great Mongol empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries that stretched from Korea to Hungary and encompassed 
nearly all of Asia except the Indian subcontinent and parts of 
Southeast Asia. Because the Mongol empire was so vast — the larg- 
est contiguous land empire in the history of the world — the Mon- 
gols were written about in many languages by numerous chroniclers 
of divergent conquered societies, who provided a wide range of 
perspectives, myths, and legends. In addition, because many for- 
eign accounts are about the Mongol invasions and were written 
by the conquered, the Mongols often are described in unfavorable 
terms, as bloodthirsty barbarians who kept their subjects under a 
harsh yoke. Mongol sources emphasize the demigod-like military 
genius of Chinggis Khan, providing a perspective in the opposite 
extreme. The term Mongol itself is often a misnomer. Although 
the leaders and core forces of the conquerors of Eurasia were eth- 
nic Mongols, most of the main army was made up of Uralo- Altaic 
people, many of them Turkic. Militarily, the Mongols were stopped 
only by the Mamluks of Egypt and by the Japanese, or by their 
own volition, as happened in Europe. In their increasingly sophisti- 
cated administrative systems, they employed Chinese, Iranians, 
Russians, and others. Mongolia and its people thus have had a 
significant and lasting impact on the historical development of major 
nations, such as China and Russia, and, periodically, they have 
influenced the entire Eurasian continent. 

Until the twentieth century, most of the peoples who inhabited 
Mongolia were nomads, and even in the 1980s a substantial propor- 
tion of the rural population was essentially nomadic. Originally 
there were many warlike nomadic tribes living in Mongolia, and 
apparently most of these belonged to one or the other of two racially 
distinct and linguistically very different groupings. One of these 
groupings, the Yuezhi, was related linguistically to the ancient 
nomadic Scythian peoples — who inhabited the steppes north and 
northeast of the Black Sea and the region east of the Aral Sea — 
and was therefore Indo-European. The other grouping was the 
Xiongnu, a nomadic people of uncertain origins. 

Although in the course of history other peoples displaced, or be- 
came mteirningled with, the Yuezhi and the Xiongnu, their activities, 



3 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

conflicts, and internal and external relations established a pattern, 
with four principal themes, that continued almost unchanged — 
except for the conquest of Eurasia in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries — until the eighteenth century. First, among these four 
themes, there were constant fierce struggles involving neighbor- 
ing tribes, engaged in frequently shifting alliances that did not al- 
ways follow ethnic, racial, or linguistic lines. Second, during periods 
when China was united and strong, trade with Inner Asian peo- 
ples was allowed, and nomadic states either became vassals of the 
Chinese emperor, or they retreated beyond his reach into the north- 
ern steppes; conversely, when China appeared weak, raids were 
made into rich Chinese lands, sometimes resulting in retaliatory 
expeditions into Mongolia. Third, occasional, transitory consoli- 
dation — of all or of large portions of the region under the control 
of a conqueror or a coalition of similar tribes — took place; such 
temporary consolidations could result in a life-or-death struggle be- 
tween major tribal groupings until one or the other was extermi- 
nated or was expelled from the region, or until they joined forces. 
Fourth, on several occasions, raids into northern China were so 
vast and successful that the victorious nomads settled in the con- 
quered land, established dynasties, and eventually became ab- 
sorbed — sinicized — by the more numerous Chinese. 

Within this pattern, the Xiongnu eventually expelled the Yuezhi, 
who were driven to the southwest to become the Kushans of Iranian, 
Afghan, and Indian history. In turn, the Xiongnu themselves later 
were driven west. Their descendants, or possibly another group, 
continued this westward migration, establishing the Hun empire, 
in Central and Eastern Europe, that reached its zenith under Attila. 

The pattern was interrupted abruptly and dramatically late in 
the twelfth century and throughout the thirteenth century by Ching- 
gis and his descendants. During the consolidation of Mongolia and 
some of the invasions of northern China, Chinggis created sophisti- 
cated military and political organizations, exceeding in skill, effi- 
ciency, and vigor the institutions of the most civilized nations of 
the time. Under him and his immediate successors, the Mongols 
conquered most of Eurasia. 

After a century of Mongol dominance in Eurasia, the traditional 
patterns reasserted themselves. Mongols living outside Mongolia 
were absorbed by the conquered populations; Mongolia itself again 
became a land of incessantly warring nomadic tribes. True to the 
fourth pattern, a similar people, the Manchus, conquered China 
in the seventeenth century, and ultimately became sinicized. 

Here the pattern ended. The Manchu conquest of China came 
at a time when the West was beginning to have a significant impact 



4 



Historical Setting 



on East Asia. Russian colonial expansionism was sweeping rapidly 
across Asia — at first passing north of Mongolia but bringing in- 
cessant pressure, from the west and the north, against Mongol 
tribes — and was beginning to establish firm footholds in Mongolian 
territory by conquest and the establishment of protectorates. At 
the same time, the dynamic Manchus also applied pressure from 
the east and the south. This pressure was partly the traditional at- 
tempt at control over nomadic threats from Mongolia, but it also 
was a response to the now clearly apparent threat of Russian ex- 
pansionism. 

From the late seventeenth century to the early twentieth cen- 
tury, Mongolia was a major focus of Russian and Manchu-Chinese 
rivalry for predominant influence in all of Northeast Asia. In the 
process, Russia absorbed those portions of historical Mongolia to 
the west and north of the present Mongolian People's Republic. 
The heart of Mongolia, which became known as Outer Mongolia 
(see Glossary), was claimed by the Chinese. The area was distinct 
from Inner Mongolia, along the southern rim of the Gobi, which 
China absorbed — those regions to the southwest, south, and east 
that now are included in the People's Republic of China. Continu- 
ing Russian interest in Mongolia was discouraged by the Manchus. 

As Chinese power waned in the nineteenth and the early twen- 
tieth centuries, however, Russian influence in Mongolia grew. Thus 
Russia supported Outer Mongolian declarations of independence 
in the period immediately after the Chinese Revolution of 1911. 
Russian interest in the area did not diminish, even after the Rus- 
sian Revolution of 1917, and the Russian civil war spilled over into 
Mongolia in the period 1919 to 1921. Chinese efforts to take ad- 
vantage of internal Russian disorders by trying to reestablish their 
claims over Outer Mongolia were thwarted in part by China's in- 
stability and in part by the vigor of the Russian reaction once the 
Bolshevik Revolution had succeeded. Russian predominance in 
Outer Mongolia was unquestioned after 1921 , and when the Mon- 
golian People's Republic was established in 1924, it was as a 
communist-controlled satellite of Moscow. 

Early Development, ca. 220 B.C.-A.D. 1206 

Origins of the Mongols 

Archaeological evidence places early Stone Age human habita- 
tion in the southern Gobi between 100,000 and 200,000 years ago. 
By the first millennium B.C . , bronze-working peoples lived in Mon- 
golia. With the appearance of iron weapons by the third century 
B.C., the inhabitants of Mongolia had begun to form tribal alliances 



5 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

and to threaten China. The origins of more modern inhabitants 
are found among the forest hunters and nomadic tribes of Inner 
Asia. They inhabited a great arc of land extending generally from 
the Korean Peninsula in the east, across the northern tier of China 
to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and to the Pamir Moun- 
tains and Lake Balkash in the west (see fig. 1). During most of 
recorded history, this has been an area of constant ferment from 
which emerged numerous migrations and invasions to the southeast 
(into China), to the southwest (into Transoxiana — modern Uzbek 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Iran, and India), and to the west (across 
Scythia toward Europe). By the eighth century B.C., the inhabi- 
tants of much of this region evidendy were nomadic Indo-European 
speakers, either Scythians or their kin. Also scattered throughout 
the area were many other tribes that were primarily Mongol in 
their ethnologic characteristics. 

Xiongnu and Yuezhi 

The first significant recorded appearance of nomads came late 
in the third century B.C., when the Chinese repelled an invasion 
of the Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu in Wade-Giles romanization) across 
the Huang He (Yellow River) from the Gobi. The Xiongnu were 
a nomadic people of uncertain origins. Their language is not known 
to modern scholars, but the people were probably similar in ap- 
pearance and characteristics to the later Mongols. A Chinese army, 
which had adopted Xiongnu military technology — wearing trous- 
ers and using mounted archers with stirrups — pursued the Xiong- 
nu across the Gobi in a ruthless punitive expedition. Fortification 
walls built by various Chinese warring states were connected to 
make a 2,300-kilometer Great Wall along the northern border, as 
a barrier to further nomadic inroads. 

The Xiongnu temporarily abandoned their interest in China and 
turned their attention westward to the region of the Altai Moun- 
tains and Lake Balkash, inhabited by the Yuezhi (Yueh-chih in 
Wade-Giles), an Indo-European-speaking nomadic people who had 
relocated from China's present-day Gansu Province as a result of 
their earlier defeat by the Xiongnu. Endemic warfare between these 
two nomadic peoples reached a climax in the latter part of the third 
century and the early decades of the second century B.C.; the 
Xiongnu were triumphant. The Yuezhi then migrated to the south- 
west where, early in the second century, they began to appear in 
the Oxus (the modern Amu Darya) Valley, to change the course 
of history in Bactria, Iran, and eventually India. 

Meanwhile, the Xiongnu again raided northern China about 
200 B.C., finding that the inadequately defended Great Wall was 



6 



Historical Setting 



not a serious obstacle. By the middle of the second century B.C., 
they controlled all of northern and western China north of the 
Huang He. This renewed threat led the Chinese to improve their 
defenses in the north, while building up and improving the army, 
particularly the cavalry, and while preparing long-range plans for 
an invasion of Mongolia. 

Between 130 and 121 B.C., Chinese armies drove the Xiongnu 
back across the Great Wall, weakened their hold on Gansu Province 
as well as on what is now Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner 
Mongolia — see Glossary), and finally pushed them north of the 
Gobi into central Mongolia. Following these victories, the Chinese 
expanded into the areas later known as Manchuria (see Glossary), 
the Korean Peninsula, and Inner Asia. The Xiongnu, once more 
turning their attention to the west and the southwest, raided deep 
into the Oxus Valley between 73 and 44 B.C. The descendants 
of the Yuezhi and their Chinese rulers, however, formed a com- 
mon front against the Xiongnu and repelled them. 

During the next century, as Chinese strength waned, border 
warfare between the Chinese and the Xiongnu was almost inces- 
sant. Gradually the nomads forced their way back into Gansu and 
the northern part of what is now China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autono- 
mous Region. In about the middle of the first century A.D., a 
revitalized Eastern Han Dynasty (A.D. 25-220) slowly recovered 
these territories, driving the Xiongnu back into the Altai Moun- 
tains and the steppes north of the Gobi. During the late first cen- 
tury A.D., having reestablished the administrative control over 
southern China and northern Vietnam that had been lost briefly 
at beginning of this same century, the Eastern Han made a con- 
certed effort to reassert dominance over Inner Asia. A Chinese army 
crossed the Pamir Mountains, conquered territories as far west as 
the Caspian Sea, defeated the Yuezhi Kushan Empire, and even 
sent an emissary in search of the eastern provinces of Rome. 

Donghu, Toba, and Ruruan 

Although the Xiongnu finally had been driven back into their 
homeland by the Chinese in A.D. 48, within ten years the Xianbei 
(or Hsien-pei in Wade-Giles) had moved (apparently from the north 
or northwest) into the region vacated by the Xiongnu. The Xianbei 
were the northern branch of the Donghu (or Tung Hu, the Eastern 
Hu), a proto-Tunguz group mentioned in Chinese histories as exist- 
ing as early as the fourth century B.C. The language of the Donghu, 
like that of the Xiongnu, is unknown to modern scholars. The 
Donghu were among the first peoples conquered by the Xiongnu. 
Once the Xiongnu state weakened, however, the Donghu rebelled. 



7 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

By the first century, two major subdivisions of the Donghu had 
developed: the Xianbei in the north and the Wuhuan in the south. 
The Xianbei, who by the second century A.D. were attacking 
Chinese farms south of the Great Wall, established an empire, 
which, although short-lived, gave rise to numerous tribal states 
along the Chinese frontier. Among these states was that of the Toba 
(T'o-pa in Wade-Giles), a subgroup of the Xianbei, in modern 
China's Shanxi Province. The Wuhuan also were prominent in 
the second century, but they disappeared thereafter; possibly they 
were absorbed in the Xianbei western expansion. The Xianbei and 
the Wuhuan used mounted archers in warfare, and they had only 
temporary war leaders instead of hereditary chiefs. Agriculture, 
rather than full-scale nomadism, was the basis of their economy. 
In the sixth century A.D., the Wuhuan were driven out of Inner 
Asia into the Russian steppe. 

Chinese control of parts of Inner Asia did not last beyond the 
opening years of the second century, and, as the Eastern Han Dy- 
nasty ended early in the third century A.D., suzerainty was lim- 
ited primarily to the Gansu corridor. The Xianbei were able to 
make forays into a China beset with internal unrest and political 
disintegration. By 317 all of China north of the Chang Jiang 
(Yangtze River) had been overrun by nomadic peoples: the Xianbei 
from the north; some remnants of the Xiongnu from the north- 
west; and the Chiang people of Gansu and Tibet (present-day 
China's Xizang Autonomous Region) from the west and the south- 
west. Chaos prevailed as these groups warred with each other and 
repulsed the vain efforts of the fragmented Chinese kingdoms south 
of the Chang Jiang to reconquer the region. 

By the end of the fourth century, the region between the Chang 
Jiang and the Gobi, including much of modern Xinjiang, was domi- 
nated by the Toba. Emerging as the partially sinicized state of Dai 
between A.D. 338 and 376 in the Shanxi area, the Toba estab- 
lished control over the region as the Northern Wei Dynasty (A.D. 
386-533). Northern Wei armies drove back the Ruruan (referred 
to as Ruanruan or Juan-Juan by Chinese chroniclers), a newly aris- 
ing nomadic Mongol people in the steppes north of the Altai Moun- 
tains, and reconstructed the Great Wall. During the fourth century 
also, the Huns left the steppes north of the Aral Sea to invade 
Europe. By the middle of the fifth century, Northern Wei had 
penetrated into the Tarim Basin in Inner Asia, as had the Chinese 
in the second century. As the empire grew, however, Toba tribal 
customs were supplanted by those of the Chinese, an evolution not 
accepted by all Toba. 



8 



Chinggis Khan, detail from a sixteenth-century 
Iranian genealogical manuscript 
Courtesy The Granger Collection 



9 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The Ruruan, only temporarily repelled by Northern Wei, had 
driven the Xiongnu toward the Ural Mountains and the Caspian 
Sea and were making raids into China. In the late fifth century, 
the Ruruan established a powerful nomadic empire spreading gener- 
ally north of Northern Wei. It was probably the Ruruan who first 
used the title khan (see Glossary). 

Rise of the Turk 

Northern Wei was disintegrating rapidly because of revolts of semi- 
tribal Toba military forces that were opposed to being sinicized, when 
disaster struck the flourishing Ruruan empire. The Turk, a vassal 
people, known as Tujue to Chinese chroniclers, revolted against their 
Ruruan rulers. The uprising began in the Altai Mountains, where 
many of the Turk were serfs working the iron mines. Thus, from 
the outset of their revolt, they had the advantage of controlling what 
had been one of the major bases of Ruruan power. Between 546 
and 553, the Turk overthrew the Ruruan and established themselves 
as the most powerful force in North Asia and Inner Asia. This was 
the beginning of a pattern of conquest that was to have a signifi- 
cant effect upon Eurasian history for more than 1,000 years. The 
Turk were the first people to use this later widespread name. They 
are also the earliest Inner Asian people whose language is known, 
because they left behind Orkhon inscriptions in a runic-like script, 
which was deciphered in 1896. 

It was not long before the tribes in the region north of the Gobi — 
the Eastern Turk — were following invasion routes into China used 
in previous centuries by Xiongnu, Xianbei, Toba, and Ruruan. 
Like their predecessors who had inhabited the mountains and the 
steppes, the attention of the Turk quickly was attracted by the wealth 
of China. At first these new raiders encountered little resistance, 
but toward the end of the sixth century, as China slowly began 
to recover from centuries of disunity, border defenses stiffened. 
The original Turk state split into eastern and western parts, with 
some of the Eastern Turk acknowledging Chinese overlordship. 

For a brief period at the beginning of the seventh century, a new 
consolidation of the Turk, under the Western Turk ruler Tardu, 
again threatened China. In 601 Tardu 's army besieged Chang' an 
(modern XT an), then the capital of China. Tardu was turned back, 
however, and, upon his death two years later, the Turk state again 
fragmented. The Eastern Turk nonetheless continued their depre- 
dations, occasionally threatening Chang'an. 

Influence of Tang China 

From 629 to 648, a reunited China — under the Tang Dynasty 
(A.D. 618-906) — destroyed the power of the Eastern Turk north 



10 



Historical Setting 



of the Gobi; established suzerainty over the Kitan, a semi-nomadic 
Mongol people who lived in areas that became the modern Chinese 
provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin; and formed an alliance with 
the Uighurs (see Glossary), who inhabited the region between the 
Altai Mountains and Lake Balkash. Between 641 and 648, the Tang 
conquered the Western Turk, reestablishing Chinese sovereignty 
over Xinjiang and exacting tribute from west of the Pamir Moun- 
tains. The Turk empire finally ended in 744. 

For more than a century, the Tang retained control of central 
and eastern Mongolia and parts of Inner Asia. During this cen- 
tury, the Tang expanded Chinese control into the Oxus Valley. 
At the same time, their allies and nominal vassals, the Uighurs, 
conquered much of western and northern Mongolia until, by the 
middle of the eighth century, the Uighur seminomadic empire ex- 
tended from Lake Balkash to Lake Baykal. 

It was at about this time that the Arab-led tide of Islam reached 
Inner Asia. After a bitter struggle, the Chinese were ejected from 
the Oxus Valley, but with Uighur assistance they defeated Mus- 
lim efforts to penetrate into Xinjiang. The earliest Mongol links 
with Tibetan Buddhism, or Lamaism (see Glossary), also may have 
been established in this period (see Religion, ch. 2). During this 
time, the Kitan of western Manchuria took advantage of the situ- 
ation to throw off Chinese control, and they began to raid north- 
ern China. 

Despite these crippling losses, the Tang recovered and, with con- 
siderable Uighur assistance, held their frontiers. Tang dependence 
upon their northern allies was apparently a source of embarrass- 
ment to the Chinese, who surreptitiously encouraged the Kirghiz 
and the Karluks to attack the Uighurs, driving them south into 
the Tarim Basin. As a result of the Kirghiz action, the Uighur em- 
pire collapsed in 846. Some of the Uighurs emigrated to Chinese 
Turkestan (the Turpan region), where they established a flourish- 
ing kingdom that freely submitted to Chinggis Khan several 
centuries later (see Early Wars in China, this ch.). Ironically, this 
weakening of the Uighurs undoubtedly hastened the decline and 
fall of the Tang Dynasty over the next fifty years. 

Kitan and Jure hen 

Free of Uighur restraint, the Kitan expanded in all directions 
in the latter half of the ninth century and the early years of the 
tenth century. By 925 the Kitan ruled eastern Mongolia, most of 
Manchuria, and much of China north of the Huang He. In the 
recurrent process of sinicization, by the middle of the tenth cen- 
tury Kitan chieftains had established themselves as emperors of 



11 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

northern China; their rule was known as the Liao Dynasty (916— 
1125). 

The period of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was one of con- 
solidation, preceding the most momentous era in Mongol history, 
the era of Chinggis Khan. During those centuries, the vast region 
of deserts, mountains, and grazing land was inhabited by people 
resembling each other in racial, cultural, and linguistic characteris- 
tics; ethnologically they were essentially Mongol. The similarites 
among the Mongols, Turk, Tangut, and Tatars (see Glossary) who 
inhabited this region causes considerable ethnic and historical con- 
fusion. Generally, the Mongols and the closely related Tatars in- 
habited the northern and the eastern areas; the Turk (who already 
had begun to spread over western Asia and southeastern Europe) 
were in the west and the southwest; the Tangut, who were more 
closely related to the Tibetans than were the other nomads and 
who were not a Turkic people, were in eastern Xinjiang, Gansu, 
and western Inner Mongolia (see fig. 2). The Liao state was 
homogeneous, and the Kitan had begun to lose their nomadic 
characteristics. The Kitan built cities and exerted dominion over 
their agricultural subjects as a means of consolidating their empire. 
To the west and the northwest of Liao were many other Mongol 
tribes, linked together in various tenuous alliances and groupings, 
but with littie national cohesiveness. In Gansu and eastern Xinjiang, 
the Tangut — who had taken advantage of the Tang decline — had 
formed a state, Western Xia or Xixia (1038-1227), nominally under 
Chinese suzerainty. Xinjiang was dominated by the Uighurs, who 
were loosely allied with the Chinese. 

The people of Mongolia at this time were predominantly spirit 
worshipers, with shamans providing spiritual and religious guidance 
to the people and tribal leaders. There had been some infusion of 
Buddhism, which had spread from Xinjiang, but it did not yet have 
a strong influence (see The Yuan Dynasty; Return to Nomadic 
Patterns, this ch.). Nestorian Christianity also had penetrated Inner 
Asia. 

In the eleventh century, the Kitan completed the conquest of 
China north of the Huang He. Despite close cultural ties between 
the Kitan and Western Xia that led the latter to become increas- 
ingly sinicized, during the remainder of that century and the early 
years of the twelfth century, the two Mongol groups were frequently 
at war with each other and with the Song Dynasty (A.D. 960-1279) 
of China. The Uighurs of the Turpan region often were involved 
in these wars, usually aiding the Chinese against Western Xia. 

A Tungusic people, the Jurchen, ancestors of the Manchu, 
formed an alliance with the Song and reduced the Kitan empire 



12 



Historical Setting 



to vassal status in a seven-year war (1 1 15-1 122; see Caught Between 
the Russians and the Manchus, this ch.). The Jurchen leader 
proclaimed himself the founder of a new era, the Jin Dynasty 
(1115-1234). Scarcely pausing in their conquests, the Jurchen sub- 
dued neighboring Koryo (Korea) in 1226 and invaded the terri- 
tory of their former allies, the Song, to precipitate a series of wars 
with China that continued through the remainder of the century. 
Meanwhile, the defeated Kitan Liao ruler had fled with the small 
remnant of his army to the Tarim Basin, where he allied himself 
with the Uighurs and established the Karakitai state (known also 
as the Western Liao Dynasty, 1124-1234), which soon controlled 
both sides of the Pamir Mountains. The Jurchen turned their at- 
tention to the Mongols who, in 1 139 and in 1 147, warded them off. 

The Era of Chinggis Khan, 1206-27 
Rise of Chinggis Khan 

After the migration of the Jurchen, the Borjigin Mongols had 
emerged in central Mongolia as the leading clan of a loose federa- 
tion. The principal Borjigin Mongol leader, Kabul Khan, began 
a series of raids into Jin in 1 135. In 1 162 (some historians say 1 167), 
Temujin, the first son of Mongol chieftain Yesugei, and grandson 
of Kabul, was born. Yesugei, who was chief of the Kiyat subclan 
of the Borjigin Mongols, was killed by neighboring Tatars in 1 175, 
when Temujin was only twelve years old. The Kiyat rejected the 
boy as their leader and chose one of his kin instead. Temujin and 
his immediate family were abandoned and apparently left to die 
in a semidesert, mountainous region. 

Temujin did not die, however. In a dramatic struggle described 
in The Secret History of the Mongols, Temujin, by the age of twenty, 
had become the leader of the Kiyat subclan and by 1 196, the un- 
questioned chief of the Borjigin Mongols. Sixteen years of nearly 
constant warfare followed as Temujin consolidated his power north 
of the Gobi. Much of his early success was because of his first alli- 
ance, with the neighboring Kereit clan, and because of subsidies 
that he and the Kereit received from the Jin emperor in payment 
for punitive operations against Tatars and other tribes that threa- 
tened the northern frontiers of Jin. Jin by this time had become 
absorbed into the Chinese cultural system and was politically weak 
and increasingly subject to harassment by Western Xia, the 
Chinese, and finally the Mongols. Later Temujin broke with the 
Kereit, and, in a series of major campaigns, he defeated all the 
Mongol and Tatar tribes in the region from the Altai Mountains 
to Manchuria. In time Temujin emerged as the strongest chieftain 



13 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



among a number of contending leaders in a confederation of clan 
lineages. His principal opponents in this struggle had been the 
Naiman Mongols, and he selected Karakorum (west- southwest of 
modern Ulaanbaatar, near modern Har Horin), their capital, as 
the seat of his new empire. 

In 1206 Temujin's leadership of all Mongols and other peoples 
they had conquered between the Altai Mountains and the Da 
Hinggan (Greater Khingan) Range was acknowledged formally by 
a kuriltai (council — see Glossary) of chieftains as their khan. Temujin 
took the honorific chinggis, meaning supreme or great (also roman- 
ized as genghis or jenghiz), creating the title Chinggis Khan, in an 
effort to signify the unprecedented scope of his power. In latter 
hagiography, Chinggis was said even to have had divine ancestry. 

The contributions of Chinggis to Mongol organizational develop- 
ment had lasting impact. He took personal control of the old clan 
lineages, ending the tradition of noninterference by the khan. He 
unified the Mongol tribes through a logistical nexus involving food 
supplies, sheep and horse herds, intelligence and security, and trans- 
portation. A census system was developed to organize the decimal- 
based political jurisdictions and to recruit soldiers more easily. As 
the great khan, Chinggis was able to consolidate his organization 
and to institutionalize his leadership over a Eurasian empire. Crit- 
ical ingredients were his new and unprecedented military system 
and politico-military organization. His exceptionally flexible 
mounted army and the cadre of Chinese and Muslim siege-warfare 
experts who facilitated his conquest of cities comprised one of the 
most formidable instruments of warfare that the world had ever 
seen (see Historical Traditions, ch. 5). 

At the time of his first kuriltai at Karakorum, Chinggis already 
was engaged in a dispute with Western Xia, the first of his wars 
of conquest. In 1205 the Mongol military organization, based on 
the tumen (see Glossary), had defeated the much larger Tangut forces 
easily. Despite problems in conquering the well-fortified Western 
Xia cities, the results were the same in the campaigns of 1207 and 
1209. When peace was concluded in 1209, the Western Xia em- 
peror, with substantially reduced dominion, acknowledged Chinggis 
as overlord. 

Early Wars in China 

A major goal of Chinggis was the conquest of Jin, both to avenge 
earlier defeats and to gain the riches of northern China. He declared 
war in 1211, and at first the pattern of operations against Jin was 
the same as it had been against Western Xia. The Mongols were 
victorious in the field, but they were frustrated in their efforts to 



15 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

take major cities. In his typically logical and determined fashion, 
Chinggis and his highly developed staff studied the problems of 
the assault of fortifications. With the help of Chinese engineers, 
they gradually developed the techniques that eventually would make 
them the most accomplished and most successful besiegers in the 
history of warfare. 

As a result of a number of overwhelming victories in the field 
and a few successes in the capture of fortifications deep within 
China, Chinggis had conquered and had consolidated Jin ter- 
ritory as far south as the Great Wall by 1213. He then advanced 
with three armies into the heart of Jin territory, between the 
Great Wall and the Huang He. He defeated the Jin forces, devas- 
tated northern China, captured numerous cities, and in 1215 be- 
sieged, captured, and sacked the Jin capital of Yanjing (later known 
as Beijing). The Jin emperor did not surrender, however, but re- 
moved his capital to Kaifeng. There his successors finally were 
defeated, but not until 1234. Meanwhile, Kuchlug, the deposed 
khan of the Naiman Mongols, had fled west and had conquered 
the state of Karakitai, the western allies that had decided to side 
with Chinggis. 

By this time, the Mongol army was exhausted by ten years of 
continuous campaigning against Western Xia and Jin. Therefore, 
Chinggis sent only two tumen under a brilliant young general, Jebe, 
against Kuchlug. An internal revolt was incited by Mongol agents; 
then Jebe overran the country. Kuchlug' s forces were defeated west 
of Kashgar; he was captured and executed, and Karakitai was an- 
nexed. By 1218 the Mongol state extended as far west as Lake 
Balkash and adjoined Khwarizm, a Muslim state that reached 
to the Caspian Sea in the west and to the Persian Gulf and the 
Arabian Sea in the south. 

Conquest of Khwarizm and Reconnaissance into Europe 

In 1218 the governor of an eastern province of Khwarizm mis- 
treated several Mongol emissaries. Chinggis retaliated with a force 
of more than 200,000 troops, and Khwarizm was eradicated by 
1220. A detachment of about 25,000 Mongol cavalry, as part of 
the Khwarizmian campaign, had crossed the Caucasus Mountains, 
had skirted the Caspian Sea, and had briefly invaded Europe. 

After defeating the Georgians and the Cumans of the Cauca- 
sus, the small Mongol expedition advanced in 1222 into the steppes 
of the Kuban. Combining rapid movement with guile, the Mon- 
gols again defeated the Cumans, captured Astrakhan, then crossed 
the Don River into Russia. Penetrating the Crimea, they stormed 



16 



Stone turtle marking the reputed site of 
Chinggis Khan 's capital at Karakorum 
Courtesy Steve Mann 

the Genoese fortress of Sudak on the southeastern coast, then turned 
north into what later became known as the Ukraine. 

The Mongol leaders now thought they had accomplished their 
mission. Before returning to Mongolia, however, they decided to 
rest their troops and to gain more information about the lands to 
the north and the west. They camped near the mouth of the Dnieper 
River, and their spies soon were scattered throughout eastern and 
central Europe. 

Meanwhile, a mixed Russian-Cuman army of 80,000 under the 
leadership of Mstislav, prince of Kiev, marched against the Mon- 
gol encampment. Jebe and Subetei, another great Mongol gen- 
eral, sought peace; however, when their envoys were murdered, 
they attacked and routed Mstislav' s force on the banks of the Kalka 
River. Historian Charles Halperin estimated that by this time the 
''destructive power of the Mongol war machine eclipsed anything 
the Russians had seen before," and the Kievan Russians found 
themeselves faced no longer with a renewal of the sporadic raids 
of the past but with the threat of subjugation and foreign domina- 
tion. In compliance with a courier message from Chinggis, the ex- 
pedition then marched eastward. As the Mongols were marching 
north of the Caspian Sea, Jebe died of illness. In 1224 Subetei led 



17 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



the expedition back, after a trek of more than 6,400 kilometers, 
to a rendezvous with the main Mongol armies, that were returning 
from their victories over the Khwarizm. 

The Last Campaign of Chinggis Khan 

The vassal emperor of Western Xia had refused to take part in 
the war against the Khwarizm, and Chinggis had vowed punish- 
ment. While he was in Iran, Western Xia and Jin had formed an 
alliance against the Mongols. After rest and a reorganization of 
his armies, Chinggis prepared for war against his foes. 

By this time, advancing years had led Chinggis to prepare for 
the future and to assure an orderly succession among his descen- 
dants. He selected his son Ogedei as his successor and established 
the method of selection of subsequent khans, specifying that they 
should come from his direct descendants. Meanwhile, he studied 
intelligence reports from Western Xia and Jin and readied a force 
of 180,000 troops for a new campaign. 

Late in 1226, when the rivers were frozen, the Mongols struck 
southward with their customary speed and vigor. The Tangut, well 
acquainted with Mongol methods, were ready, and the two armies 
met by the banks of the frozen Huang He. Despite a Western Xia 
army of more than 300,000 troops, the Mongols virtually annihi- 
lated the Tangut host. 

Pursuing energetically, the Mongols killed the Western Xia em- 
peror in a mountain fortress. His son took refuge in the great walled 
city of Ningxia, which the Mongols had failed to conquer in earlier 
wars. Leaving one-third of his army to take Ningxia, Chinggis sent 
Ogedei eastward, across the great bend of the Huang He, to drive 
the Jin forces from their last footholds north of the river. With the 
remainder of his troops, he marched southeast, evidentiy to eastern 
Sichuan Province, where the Western Xia, the Jin, and the Song 
empires met, to prevent Song reinforcements from reaching 
Ningxia. Here he accepted the surrender of the new Western Xia 
emperor but rejected peace overtures from Jin. 

A premonition of death caused Chinggis to head back to Mon- 
golia, but he died en route. On his deathbed in 1227, he outiined 
to his youngest son, Tului, the plans that later would be used by 
his successors to complete the destruction of the Jin empire. 

Successors of Chinggis, 1228-59 

Ogedei and Continuing Conquests 

In compliance with the will of the dead khan, a kuriltai at Karako- 
rum in 1228 selected Ogedei as khan. The kuriltai also decided to 



18 



Historical Setting 



launch a campaign against the Bulghars, Turks in the region of 
Kazan on the middle Volga River, and to complete the conquest 
of the outiying Western Xia territories. By 1229 Batu Khan, grand- 
son of Chinggis, had defeated most of the Bulghar outposts, and 
in 1231 Ogedei sent an expedition to conquer the Korean Peninsula. 

That same year, Ogedei decided to destroy Jin. He formed an 
alliance with the Song, then sent Tului southward with a large army 
into Jin territory. In 1232 in the middle of the campaign, Tului 
died, and Subetei took command. He continued on to besiege 
Kaifeng, the Jin capital. Despite the defenders' skillful use of ex- 
plosives, the city fell to the Mongols after a year's siege. Subetei 
then completed the conquest of the Jin empire, driving many of 
the Jurchen back into their original homeland, but absorbing others 
into the Mongol army for the further conquest of China. Ogedei 
refused to divide the conquered region with the Song, which in 

1234 attempted to seize part of the former Jin empire. This was 
the signal for another war, which lasted forty-five years. 

Ogedei committed the Mongols, whose total population could 
not have exceeded 1 million, to an offensive war against the most 
populous nation on earth, while other Mongol armies were invad- 
ing Iran, Anatolia, Syria, and the steppes of western Siberia and 
Russia. By this time, ethnic Mongols were a minority of the Mon- 
gol armies. The remainder were Turks, Tatars, Tangut, Cumans, 
Bulghars, and other Inner Asian peoples. Nonetheless, the confi- 
dence with which the Mongol armies embarked on these far-flung 
wars was almost as remarkable as the invariable success of their 
operations. 

In compliance with the wishes of Chinggis, as expressed presuma- 
bly in his legal code, the yasaq (see Glossary), his vast empire had 
been apportioned among his sons (only three survived; the eldest, 
Jochi, had died in 1227), and his sons' descendants, subject to the 
overall authority of the khan at Karakorum, which was rebuilt in 

1235 by Ogedei. Jochi' s son, Batu, ruled the region to the north 
and the west of Lake Balkash. Chagadai, the second son of Ching- 
gis, was given the southwestern region that includes modern Af- 
ghanistan, Turkestan (now in the Soviet Union), and central 
Siberia. He and his successors were known as the khans of the 
Chagadai Mongols. By implication, this realm extended indefinitely 
to the southwest, as Batu's did to the northwest. Ogedei and his 
progeny were awarded China and the other lands of East Asia. 
Tului, the youngest of the four principal heirs, was to have cen- 
tral Mongolia, the homeland, in accordance with Mongol custom. 
He and his descendants, however, were to share Mongolia's pre- 
cious fighting manpower with the other three khanates. 



19 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The kuriltai of 1235 authorized at least two more major offen- 
sive operations: one against Tibet, the other in Eastern Europe. 
The Tibetan expedition was led by Godan, son of Ogedei, and the 
conquest was completed in 1239. 

Subetei and the European Expedition 

The European expedition was to be a major Mongol effort, com- 
parable in scope to the war against China. It was to become a catas- 
trophe of monumental proportions for medieval East Europeans, 
who were confronted with devastating wars and serious social dis- 
ruption. Nominal command was to be exercised by Batu, because 
this was the part of the world he had inherited from Chinggis. The 
actual commander was the aging, but still brilliant, Subetei. He 
was probably the most gifted of all Mongol generals, after Ching- 
gis himself, and he had been one of the commanders of the momen- 
tous reconnaissance that had swept through southern Russia fifteen 
years earlier. 

The Bulghars were defeated in 1236, and in December 1237 
Subetei and Batu led an army of 600,000 across the frozen Volga 
River. The Mongols spread destruction and death through Rus- 
sia. Moscow, Vladimir, and other northern Russian principalities 
were destroyed before summer 1238. Subetei then turned south 
to the steppe region around the Don, to allow his army to rest, 
to regain strength, and to prepare for new advances. Apparentiy 
his timetable was delayed for a year by a dispute between Batu 
and other royal princes commanding various hordes (see Glossary). 
Nonetheless, this additional time gave Subetei an opportunity to 
accumulate still further information about central and western 
Europe from his spies. 

In November 1240, after the rivers and marshes of what, in 
modern times, is the Ukraine had frozen enough to take the weight 
of cavalry, the Mongol army crossed the Dnieper River. On De- 
cember 6, it conquered Kiev, the seat of the grand prince and the 
Metropolitan See of Rus'. Subetei continued westward, his army 
advancing, typically, on a broad front in three major columns. 

To the north was the horde of Kaidu Khan, three tumen strong, 
protecting the right flank of the main body. Kaidu swept through 
Lithuania and Poland; on March 18 he destroyed the Polish army 
at Cracow. He detached a tumen to raid along the Baltic coast and 
with the remainder headed westward into Silesia. On April 9. 1241 , 
at Liegnitz (Legnica, in Poland), the more disciplined Mongol army 
decisively defeated a numerically superior combined European army 
in a bitterly contested battle. 



20 



Historical Setting 



Meanwhile, a horde of three tumen under Kadan, another son 
of Ogedei, protected the southern flank and advanced through 
Transylvania, into the Danube Valley, and into Hungary. In mid- 
April Kadan and Kaidu joined the main body — under Batu — in 
central Hungary. 

Batu led the central force across the Carpathian Mountains in 
early April 1241 , lured the army of King Bela IV of Hungary into 
battle at the Sajo River on April 1 1 , and annihilated it. The Mon- 
gols then seized Pest, and they spent the rest of the year consolidat- 
ing their control of Hungary east of the Danube River. 

Late in 1241 , the Mongols were ready to move again. In Decem- 
ber the army crossed the frozen Danube. Scouting parties raided 
into northern Italy toward Venice and Treviso, and up the Danube 
toward Vienna. But suddenly the advance halted. Word had come, 
by way of the incredibly swift Mongol messenger service, that 
Ogedei had died on December 11. 

The yasaq explicitly provided that after the death of the ruler all 
offspring of the house of Chinggis Khan, wherever they might be, 
must return to Mongolia to take part in the election of the new 
khan. From the outskirts of Vienna and Venice, the tumen coun- 
termarched, never to reappear. They moved through Dalmatia and 
Serbia, then eastward where they virtually destroyed the kingdoms 
of Serbia and Bulgaria before crossing the lower Danube. They 
evacuated Hungary for lack of sufficient pasture and moved into 
the southern Russian steppes. Advances into India also ceased. 

Reign of Kuyuk 

It was not until the summer of 1246 that a kuriltai assembled at 
Karakorum to select a successor to Ogedei. This was mainly be- 
cause of political maneuvering by Batu and other royal princes who 
had hopes of being elected. While deliberately stalling in Bulghar 
in 1241, Batu founded Sarai (near modern Leninsk, Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic) on the lower Volga River, as the cap- 
ital of his Khanate of Kipchak, best known to history as the Gold- 
en Horde (see Glossary; The Golden Horde, this ch.). 

Between 1242 and 1246, Ogedei' s widow, Teregene, held power 
as regent in preparation for the selection of her son, Kuyuk, as 
the new khan. Present during the kuriltai was the Franciscan friar, 
John of Piano Carpini, a papal envoy sent to ascertain the inten- 
tions of the Mongols. He recognized that the Mongols planned the 
conquest of Europe, and he belatedly urged Europe's monarchs 
to adopt Mongol strategy and tactics to oppose the coming on- 
slaught. 



21 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Kuyuk apparently was torn between completing the conquest 
of China and continuing the conquest of Europe. The latter project 
was complicated, however, by Kuyuk' s continuing rivalry with 
Batu. Just as civil war seemed imminent in 1249, Kuyuk died. 

Mengke and the War in China 

Except for the descendants of Ogedei and Chagadai, most of the 
royal princes thought that Batu should be elected khan. By this 
time, however, Batu had decided that he preferred the steppes of 
the Volga to the steppes of Mongolia. He declined the offer and 
nominated Mengke, the eldest son of Tului (who had died in 1233), 
unquestionably one of the most gifted descendants of Chinggis. 
Mengke' s nomination was confirmed by a kuriltai in 1251 . He ex- 
ecuted several of Ogedei 's sons who had opposed his election and 
quickly restored to Mongol rule the vigor that had been lacking 
since the death of Chinggis. 

Taking seriously the legacy of world conquest, Mengke decided 
to place primary emphasis on completing the conquest of Asia, par- 
ticularly China; Europe was to be dealt with later. Because the Song 
had had the benefit of a lull of nearly ten years in which to recover 
and to reorganize, conquering Asia had become more difficult than 
it would have been earlier. Mengke himself took command, but 
he also placed great responsibility on his younger brother, Khubilai. 
Another brother, Hulegu, was sent to Iran to renew the expan- 
sion of Mongol control in Southwest Asia. Mengke encouraged 
Batu to raid Central Europe, but did not send him additional 
resources. Thus, although Batu's armies raided deep into Poland, 
Lithuania, and Estonia, and again overran Serbia and Bulgaria, 
these campaigns were not so important as the ones being under- 
taken in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia. 

Mengke also made some major administrative changes in the 
khanates established by the will of Chinggis. He disinherited the 
surviving sons of Ogedei, arranging that he and Khubilai would 
inherit the lands of East Asia. He also placed a limit on the do- 
mains of the successors of Chagadai; these were to end along the 
Oxus River and the Hindu Kush, instead of extending indefinitely 
to the southwest. Southwest Asia was to be the inheritance of 
Mengke's brother, Hulegu, the first of the Ilkhans ("subservient 
khans") or Mongol rulers of Iran (see The Ilkhans, this ch.). 

Mengke prosecuted the war in China with intensity and skill. 
His principal assistant was Khubilai, who was appointed viceroy 
in China. In 1252 and 1253, Khubilai conquered Nanchao (modern 
Yunnan). Tonkin (as northern Vietnam was known) then was 



22 



Historical Setting 



invaded and pacified. The conquest ended with the fall of Hanoi 
in 1257. 

Song resistance in southern China was based upon determined 
defense of its well-fortified, well-provisioned cities. The Chinese 
empire began to crumble, however, under the impact of a series 
of brilliant campaigns, personally directed by Mengke between 1257 
and 1259. His sudden death from dysentery in August 1259, 
however, caused another lull in the war with China and put a stop 
to advances in West Asia. 

Khubilai Khan and the Yuan Dynasty, 1261-1368 
A New Khan 

The overwhelming choice of the kuriltai as Mengke 's successor 
was his equally brilliant brother, Khubilai. Khubilai' s selection was 
opposed violently, however, by his younger brother, Arik-Buka. 
This opposition precipitated a civil war won by Khubilai in 1261 . 
For the next few years, the new khan devoted his attention to ad- 
ministrative reforms of his vast empire (see fig. 3). A major de- 
velopment was Khubilai 's establishment in 1260 of a winter capital 
at what is now Beijing but was then called Dadu ("great capital," 
also called Khanbalik — Marco Polo's Cambaluc) which shifted the 
political center of the Mongol empire south into China and increased 
Chinese influence. Khubilai maintained a summer residence north 
of the Great Wall at Shangdu (the Xanadu of Coleridge). 

In 1268 Khubilai was able to turn his full attention to the war 
in China. A series of campaigns, distinguished by the skill of Bayan 
(grandson of Subetei), culminated in 1276 in the capture of Hang- 
zhou, the Song capital. It took three more years to subdue the out- 
lying provinces. The last action of the war — a naval battle in 
Guangzhou Bay, in which the remnants of the Song fleet were de- 
stroyed by a Mongol fleet made up of defectors from the Song 
navy — took place in 1279. 

Khubilai did not share Mengke 's fierce desire to conquer the 
world. He had warred against China with determination, but ap- 
parently he realized that there was a limit to the Mongol capabili- 
ties for consolidating and for controlling conquered territory. It 
is likely that he recognized that this limit was being approached 
because of an event that occurred during the interregnum between 
Mengke 's death and his own accession. 

Hulegu, who had seized Baghdad and defeated the Abbasid 
Caliphate in 1258 and conquered Mesopotamia and Syria, had 
returned to Mongolia upon receiving news of Mengke 's death. 
While he was gone, his forces were defeated by a larger, Mamluk, 



23 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



army at the Battle of Ain Jalut in Palestine in 1260. This was the 
first significant Mongol defeat in seventy years. The Mamluks had 
been led by a Turk named Baibars, a former Mongol warrior who 
used Mongol tactics. 

Neither Khubilai nor Hulegu made a serious effort to avenge 
the defeat of Ain Jalut. Both devoted their attention primarily to 
consolidating their conquests, to suppressing dissidence, and to 
reestablishing law and order. Like their uncle, Batu, and his Golden 
Horde successors, they limited their offensive moves to occasional 
raids or to attacks with limited objectives in unconquered neigh- 
boring regions. After the failure of two invasion attempts against 
Japan in 1274 and 1281, Khubilai also gave up his goal of expan- 
sion to the east. In January 1293, Khubilai invaded Java and de- 
feated the local ruler, only to be driven off the island by a Javanese 
ally who turned against him. 

After the Song Dynasty had been destroyed, in 1279 Khubilai 
declared himself emperor of a united China with its capital at Dadu, 
and he established the Yuan ("first," "beginning") Dynasty 
(1279-1368). Khubilai, who took the Chinese-style reign title 
Zhiyuan ("the greatest of the Yuan"), proved himself to be one 
of the most able rulers of imperial China. 

The Yuan Dynasty 

A rich cultural diversity evolved in China during the Yuan Dy- 
nasty, as it had in other periods of foreign dynastic rule. Major 
achievements included the development of drama and the novel 
and the increased use of the written vernacular. The Yuan was 
involved in a fair amount of cultural exchange because of its ex- 
tensive West Asian and European contacts. The introduction of 
foreign musical instruments enriched the Chinese performing arts. 
The conversion to Islam of growing numbers of people in north- 
western and southwestern China dates from this period. Nestorian 
Christianity and Roman Catholicism also enjoyed a period of tolera- 
tion. Lamaism flourished, although native Daoism endured Mongol 
persecutions. Chinese governmental practices and examinations 
were reinstated by the Mongols in the hope of maintaining order 
within society. Advances were realized in the fields of travel litera- 
ture, cartography, geography, and scientific education. Certain key 
Chinese innovations — such as printing techniques, porcelain playing 
cards, and medical literature — were introduced in Europe, while 
European skills, such as the production of thin glass and cloisonne, 
became popular in China. 

The Mongols undertook extensive public works. Land and water 
communications were reorganized and improved. To provide 



25 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

against possible famines, new granaries were ordered to be built 
throughout the empire. Dadu was rebuilt with new palace grounds 
that included artificial lakes, hills, and parks, and the capital be- 
came the terminus of the Grand Canal, which was completely reno- 
vated. These commercially oriented improvements encouraged 
overland as well as maritime commerce throughout Asia and facili- 
tated the first direct Chinese contacts with Europe. Chinese and 
Mongol travelers to the West were able to provide assistance in 
such areas as hydraulic engineering, and they brought back to China 
new scientific discoveries, agricultural crops, methods of food prepa- 
ration, and architectural innovations. 

Early records of travel by Westerners to East Asia date from this 
time. Much that the Western world of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries knew about the Mongols and Asia was the result of the 
famous missions of a Venetian trading family. The first mission 
was by two brothers, Niccolo and Maffeo Polo, from 1260 to 1268. 
Another started in 1271, when they were joined by Niccolo 's son, 
Marco. Marco Polo, who remained in Asia until 1295, was trusted 
by Khubilai Khan and undertook a number of diplomatic missions 
and administrative assignments for him throughout the empire. 
The account of his travels, // milione (or, The Million, known in 
English as the Travels of Marco Polo), appeared about the year 1299 
and astounded the people of Europe, who knew little of the highly 
developed culture of East Asia. The works of John of Piano Carpini 
and William of Rubruck also provided early descriptions of the 
Mongols to the West. 

The Mongols sought, but failed, to govern China through its 
traditional institutions. At the outset, they discriminated against 
the Chinese socially and politically, monopolized the most impor- 
tant central and regional government posts, and developed an un- 
precedented and complex six- tier local- government administration. 
Mongols also preferred employing non-Chinese from other parts 
of the Mongol domain — Inner Asia, the Middle East, and even 
Europe — in those positions for which no Mongol could be found. 
Chinese, in turn, were more often employed in non-Chinese regions 
of the empire. 

In time, Khubilai 's successors became sinicized, and they then 
lost all influence on other Mongol lands across Asia. Gradually, 
they lost influence in China as well. The reigns of the later Yuan 
emperors were short and were marked by intrigues and rivalries. 
Uninterested in administration, they were separated from both their 
Mongolian army and their Chinese subjects. China was torn by 
dissension and unrest; bandits ranged the country without inter- 
ference from the weakening Yuan armies. 



26 



Historical Setting 



The last of the nine successors of Khubilai was expelled from 
Dadu in 1368 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming Dy- 
nasty (1368-1644), and died in Karakorum in 1370. Although Zhu, 
who adopted Mongol military methods, drove the Mongols out of 
China, he did not destroy their power. A later Chinese army in- 
vaded Mongolia in 1380. In 1388 a decisive victory was won; about 
70,000 Mongols were taken prisoner, and Karakorum was anni- 
hilated. 

The llkhans 

The Mongol defeat at Ain Jalut in 1260 led directly to the first 
important war between grandsons of Chinggis. The Mamluk leader, 
Baibars, made an alliance with Berke Khan, Batu's brother and 
successor. Berke had converted to Islam, and he thus was sym- 
pathetic to the Mamluk for religious reasons, as well as because 
he was jealous of his nephew, Hulegu. When Hulegu sent an army 
to Syria to punish Baibars, he was attacked suddenly by Berke. 
Hulegu had to turn his army back to the Caucasus to meet this 
threat, and he made repeated attempts to ally himself with the kings 
of France and England and with the Pope in order to crush the 
Mamluks in Palestine. Berke withdrew, however, when Khubilai 
sent 30,000 troops to aid the llkhans. 

This chain of events marked the end of the Mongol expansion 
in Southwest Asia. Although Hulegu 's successors did not exhibit 
the austere martial qualities of their forebears, they did bring a 
partial and brief economic revival to Iran. An increase in com- 
merce and the expansion of trade routes brought a measure of cross 
culturization between Iran and China. The Mongol rulers devoted 
themselves to a more genteel life and let their provinces be governed 
by Turkish viziers. Finally these viziers seized control, and the 
Ilkhan khanate ended with the death of Abu Said in 1335. 

The Golden Horde 

The Golden Horde of Batu had more time and more room for 
expansion of its territories than any other Mongol khanate. The 
Mongols maintained sovereignty over eastern Russia from 1240 
to 1480, and they controlled the upper Volga area, the territories 
of the former Volga Bulghar state, Siberia, the northern Cauca- 
sus, Bulgaria (for a time), the Crimea, and Khwarizm. By apply- 
ing the principle of indirect rule, the Golden Horde Mongols were 
able to preserve the Mongol ruling class and the local dynasties 
for more than 200 years. The influence that the Golden Horde Mon- 
gols came to have over medieval Russia and other areas was im- 
mense and lasting. They played a role in unifying the future Russian 



27 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

state, provided new political institutions, influenced imperial visions, 
and, through indirect rule, facilitated the appearance of a Musco- 
vite autocracy. 

The Golden Horde capital at Sarai became a prosperous center 
of commerce. Here, as in China, Mongol rule meant free trade, 
the exchange of goods between the East and the West, and also 
broad religious toleration. 

In the mid- thirteenth century, the Golden Horde was adminis- 
tratively and militarily an integral part of the Mongol empire with 
its capital at Karakorum. By the early fourteenth century, however, 
this allegiance had become largely symbolic and ceremonial. 
Although certain Mongol administrative forms — such as census and 
postal systems — were maintained, other customs were not. The 
Golden Horde embraced Islam as its state religion and, with it, 
adopted new and more complex administrative forms to replace 
those of the old regime that had been devised for conquest. Even 
though most Mongols remained steppe nomads, new cities were 
founded, and a permanent urbanized bureaucracy and social struc- 
ture took shape at Sarai. The Golden Horde allied itself with the 
Mamluks and negotiated with the Byzantines to combat the Ilkhans 
in a struggle to control Azerbaijan. Rather than isolating Russia, 
the Mongol presence and extensive diplomatic system brought 
envoys to Sarai from central and southern Europe, the Pope, South- 
west Asia, Egypt, Iran, Inner Asia, China, and Mongolia. 

The Mongols' vast contacts opened Russia to new influences, 
both Eastern and Western. The reason the Mongols did not oc- 
cupy Russia itself, but left its administration to local princes, was 
not inability to administer a society that was both urban and agrar- 
ian, or Russian resistance. Rather, some historians believe that 
Russia had little to offer the Mongols in terms of produce or trade 
routes, and even tax revenues were insignificant compared with 
the wealth of the southern realms under their control. The inabil- 
ity of cavalry to operate in forests and swamps — a factor that lim- 
ited the northward advance of the Mongols and largely determined 
the northern frontier of their empire — was undoubtedly a distinct 
disincentive as well. 

In time the Golden Horde Mongols and the Mongol Tatars, 
although still nomads, lost their original identities and — as hap- 
pened to Mongols in China and Iran — became largely synonymous 
with the local Turkic peoples, the Kipchak. Arabic and Tatar 
replaced Mongol as the official language of the Golden Horde, and 
increasing political fragmentation occurred. The power of the 
Golden Horde khans slowly declined, particularly as a powerful 
new state rose in central Russia. 



28 



Elephants carrying Khubilai Khan 's command post in battle 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress 



29 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The Mongol Decline 

Contributing to the eventual Mongol decline in Eurasia was a 
bitter war with Timur, also known as Timur Lenk (or Timur the 
Lame, from which Tamerlane is derived). He was a man of 
aristocratic Transoxianian birth who falsely claimed descent from 
Chinggis. Timur reunited Turkestan and the lands of the Ilkhans; 
in 1391 he invaded the Eurasian steppes and defeated the Golden 
Horde. He ravaged the Caucasus and southern Russia in 1395. 
Timur' s empire disintegrated, however, soon after his death in 
1405. 

The effects of Timur' s victory, as well as those of devastating 
drought and plague, were both economic and political. The Golden 
Horde's central base had been destroyed, and trade routes were 
moved south of the Caspian Sea. Political struggles led to the split 
of the Golden Horde into three separate khanates: Astrakhan, 
Kazan, and the Crimea. Astrakhan — the Golden Horde itself — 
was destroyed in 1502 by an alliance of Crimean Tatars and Mus- 
covites. The last reigning descendant of Chinggis, Shahin Girai, 
khan of the Crimea, was deposed by the Russians in 1783. 

The Mongols' influence and their intermarriage with the Rus- 
sian aristocracy had a lasting effect on Russia. Despite the de- 
struction caused by their invasion, the Mongols made valuable 
contributions to administrative practices. Through their presence, 
which in some ways checked the influence of European Renais- 
sance ideas in Russia, they helped reemphasize traditional ways. 
This Mongol — or Tatar as it became known — heritage has much 
to do with Russia's distinctiveness from the other nations of Europe. 

There were a number of reasons for the relatively rapid decline 
of the Mongols as an influential power. One important factor was 
their failure to acculturate their subjects to Mongol social tradi- 
tions. Another was the fundamental contradiction of a feudal, es- 
sentially nomadic, society's attempting to perpetuate a stable, 
centrally administered empire. The sheer size of the empire was 
reason enough for the Mongol collapse. It was too large for one 
person to administer, as Chinggis had realized, yet adequate coor- 
dination was impossible among the ruling elements after the split 
into khanates. Possibly the most important single reason was the 
disproportionately small number of Mongol conquerors compared 
with the masses of subject peoples. 

The change in Mongol cultural patterns that did occur inevita- 
bly exacerbated natural divisions in the empire. As different areas 
adopted different foreign religions, Mongol cohesiveness dissolved. 
The nomadic Mongols had been able to conquer the Eurasian land 



30 



Historical Setting 



mass through a combination of organizational ability, military skill, 
and fierce warlike prowess, but they fell prey to alien cultures, to 
the disparity between their way of life and the needs of empire, 
and to the size of their domain, which proved too large to hold 
together. The Mongols declined when their sheer momentum could 
no longer sustain them. 

Mongolia in Transition, 1368-1911 

Return to Nomadic Patterns 

The end of the Yuan was the second turning point in Mongol 
history. The retreat of more than 60,000 Mongols into the Mon- 
golian heartland brought radical changes to the quasi-feudalistic 
system. In the early fifteenth century, the Mongols split into two 
groups, the Oirad in the Altai region and the eastern group that 
later came to be known as the Khalkha (see Glossary) in the area 
north of the Gobi. A lengthy civil war (1400-54) precipitated still 
more changes in the old social and political institutions. By the mid- 
dle of the fifteenth century, the Oirad had emerged as the 
predominant force, and, under the leadership of Esen Khan, they 
united much of Mongolia and then continued their war against 
China. Esen was so successful against China that, in 1449, he de- 
feated and captured the Ming emperor. After Esen was killed in 
battle four years later, however, the brief resurgence of Mongolia 
came to an abrupt halt, and the tribes returned to their traditional 
disunity. 

After nearly two more decades of Oirad-Khalkha conflict, another 
Oirad chieftain, Day an Khan, assumed central leadership in 1466 
and reunited most of Mongolia. By the end of the fifteenth cen- 
tury, he had restored peace and had established a new confedera- 
tion comprising a vast region of north-central Asia, between the 
Ural Mountains and Lake Baykal. He then extended his control 
eastward to include the remainder of Khalkha Mongolia. The Oirad 
were surrounded by the Turkic descendants of the Chagadai Mon- 
gols who occupied the lowlands to the east and west, in the three 
independent khanates of Yarkand (modern Xinjiang south of the 
Tian Shan Mountains), Ferghana, and Khwarizm. Early in the 
sixteenth century, these three khanates were overwhelmed, 
however, by the Uzbeks (see Glossary), who earlier had broken 
loose from Mongol authority. The Uzbeks consolidated their con- 
trol over Bukhara (Bokhara), Samarkand, Khwarizm, and Herat. 
During Dayan Khan's rule, quasi-feudalistic administration was 
reestablished, and tribes became more settied, with more specified 
grazing areas. What litde government existed was exercised by noble 



31 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

descendants of Chinggis (including Dayan), but it met with great 
resistance. 

After the death of Dayan in 1543, the Oirad and the Khalkha 
disintegrated once more into insignificant and quarrelsome tribal 
groupings. The Torgut subclan of the Oirad was now perhaps the 
most vital of the Mongol peoples. The Torgut raided frequently 
across the Urals into the Volga Valley, which had been conquered 
by the new Muscovite empire. Farther east the Khalkha roamed 
the region north and south of the Gobi; the Ordos Mongols and 
the Chahar Mongols became loosely grouped in a confederation 
holding most of Southern Mongolia. The boundaries of territories 
ruled by the Uzbeks remained relatively stable. 

Throughout this period of discord among the Mongols, they 
nonetheless shared a continuing hostility to the Ming. The strug- 
gle was maintained principally by the Khalkha. Although the title 
had become almost meaningless, the line of the khans had con- 
tinued in the Chahar tribe, the leader of which became the rally- 
ing point for the conflict against China. 

The war with China was renewed with considerable energy after 
Altan Khan (1507-83) of the Turned clan united the Khalkha. 
Although he was not so prominent in history as his predecessor, 
Dayan, or his successor, Galdan Khan (1632-97), Altan was prob- 
ably the greatest of the Mongol princes in the centuries following 
the collapse of the Yuan. By 1552 he had defeated the Oirad and 
had reunited most of Mongolia. It soon became obvious to Altan 
that there was nothing to be gained by continuing the war with 
the Ming; the empire of Chinggis never could be restored. Accord- 
ingly, he concluded a treaty with the Ming emperor in 1571 , end- 
ing a struggle that had lasted more than three centuries. 

In the remaining eleven years of his life, Altan aggressively 
pushed Mongol power to the south and the southwest, and he raided 
Tibet extensively. Altan, in turn, was coopted by a Buddhist revival 
in Tibet, and he became a fervent convert. In 1586 the first lamaist 
monastery was established in Mongolia, and Buddhism — specifi- 
cally, Lamaism — became the state religion. 

Caught Between the Russians and the Manchus 

By the early seventeenth century, the power of the khan was 
greatiy weakened, and the pattern of decentralized rule reemerged. 
Small tribes within each tumen became petty realms ruled over by 
individual princes. Division of inheritances further weakened the 
overall power structure, and tumen subdivisions (battalions, referred 
to in later Mongol history as banners — see Glossary — or koshuus 
in Mongol) were widely dispersed and therefore fragmented. At 



32 



Historical Setting 



the same time that Mongol rule was disintegrating, tsarist Russia 
in the west and the Manchus in the east were expanding steadily. 
The Mongol and the Turkic peoples, traditionally conquerors, could 
now be conquered themselves not because their warlike proclivi- 
ties had decreased, but because the art of war had progressed be- 
yond the capacity of essentially nomadic peoples. Their economic 
resources would not permit the production or the purchase of 
muskets and cannon, against which their cavalry could not stand. 

A new process of conquest began when most of what is now north- 
eastern China was consolidated by the Manchus. Essentially 
nomadic in origin, the Manchus were descended from the Jurchen, 
who earlier had established the Jin empire. Early in the seventeenth 
century, under their leader Nurhaci, the Manchus began to press 
into southern Mongolia. 

The westward movement of the Manchu soon involved them 
in a struggle with the last of the great khans, Ligdan Khan of the 
Chahar Mongols. Ligdan had been attempting to reestablish 
Chahar predominance among the Khalkha, particularly among 
those tribes inhabiting the region south of the Gobi. These efforts 
alarmed his neighbors, who called upon Nurhaci for assistance. 
For several years, it appeared that the Manchu conqueror had met 
his match because Ligdan possessed some of the military prowess 
of his ancestors. Although he could not prevent the Manchus from 
gaining control of the territory of the neighboring Ordos Mongols, 
Ligdan beat back Manchu efforts to move farther west. After his 
death in 1634, however, Mongol resistance to the Manchus col- 
lapsed in southern Mongolia. This is the period of the Mongolian 
national hero, Tsogto Taji, who is said to have been the only north- 
ern Mongol aristocrat to have led his subjects against the Man- 
chus in defense of the southern Mongols. 

Meanwhile, many of the Tor gut, the westernmost of the Oirad 
Mongols, began to migrate westward in approximately 1620. Pos- 
sibly the movement was a reaction to the growing dominance of 
the Dzungar Mongols, an Oirad subclan and neighbors of the 
Torgut to the south. In any event, the Torgut fought their way 
through Kirghiz and Kazakh territory, to cross the Embe River. 
Becoming better known as the Kalmyk tribe, they subsequently 
settled in the Trans-Volga steppe and raided Russian settlements 
on both sides of the river. Finally submitting to Russia in 1646, 
they maintained autonomy under their own khan. They became 
an excellent source of light cavalry for the Russians, who later used 
them in campaigns against the Crimean Tatars and in Inner Asia. 

The Mongol interest in Tibet that had been aroused in Altan's 
campaigns seems to have been transmitted to the Dzungar. They 



33 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

inhabited a region east of Lake Balkash that extended eastward 
into northern Xinjiang. They carried out a number of campaigns 
into Tibet, and by 1636 they had established a virtual protectorate 
over the region. Because of the generally high quality of their leader- 
ship at this time, the Dzungar dominated Mongolia for much of 
the seventeenth century. 

Farther east, the religious revival begun by Altan had continued 
unabated, and it was perhaps the greatest single influence on Mon- 
gol life and culture during the seventeenth and succeeding centu- 
ries. In 1635 the khan of the Tushetu tribe proclaimed that his son 
was the reincarnation of an ancient and respected scholar, who had 
achieved such a state of virtue that he had become known as a 
buddha. Thus the young Tushetu prince was named the Jebtsun- 
damba Khutuktu or Living Buddha, becoming the highest eccle- 
siastical figure in Mongolia. This was the beginning of a line of 
theocratic leaders that was to continue unbroken for nearly three 
centuries. The successors of the first Jebtsundamba Khutuktu were 
also believed to be reincarnations, and all were found among the 
Tushetu. 

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Russian exploration 
and annexation had become very worrisome to the Mongols and 
the Turks to the southwest. In response to this pressure, in 1672 
Ayuka Khan of the Torgut Mongols raided through western Siberia, 
across the Urals and the Volga, and into Russia. He then made 
peace with the Russians on terms that enabled him to continue 
to control his lands in relative tranquility for the remainder of the 
century. 

Later in the seventeenth century, a new effort toward Mongol 
unity was attempted by Galdan Khan of the Dzungar. He con- 
quered most of Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan (Hotan) from the 
Kirghiz, and he expanded into Kazakh territory. In about 1682, 
intending to conquer the Khalkha, he turned eastward. In 1688 
the hard-pressed Khalkha appealed to the Manchus for aid. The 
Manchus were more than pleased to respond, and a Chinese- 
Manchu army marched to help. A development that further in- 
tegrated the Mongols into the Manchu apparatus was the Man- 
chus' adoption of the Mongol banner system, which combined 
administrative and military functions. 

By this time, the Manchus had conquered all of China and had 
established the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) with its capital in Bei- 
jing. They had become concerned over the steady Russian expan- 
sion eastward that, up to this time, had remained far to the north. 
The Russians had carefully avoided the still-formidable Torgut, 
who inhabited the region that now comprises central Siberia. In 



34 



Seventeenth-century 
incense burner 
Courtesy Prints and 
Photographs Division, 
Library of Congress 



this way, the Russians had reached the Amur Valley and the Pacific 
Ocean by mid-century. In the period between 1641 and 1652, the 
Russians gradually conquered the Buryat Mongols, thereby 
gaining control of the region around Lake Baykal. The Manchus 
observed with considerable apprehension Russia's growing 
pressure on the Turkic peoples and the Mongols of Inner Asia. 
As early as 1653, there were clashes between Manchus and 
Russians in the Amur Valley. In 1660 the Manchus ejected the 
Russians from the Amur region, only to see them reappear when 
the Manchus became occupied with internal troubles in southern 
China. 

In 1683 a second Manchu military expedition began systematic 
operations to eject the Russians, and in 1685 it seized the Russian 
stronghold at Albazin. But later that year, when the Manchus with- 
drew, the Russians reconstructed the fortifications. The Manchus 
began to prepare for a more extensive war. It was at this time that 
the Khalkha appealed to the Manchus for aid. The Manchus 
prompdy responded, seeing an opportunity to gain control of Mon- 
golia as a base for possible war with Russia. 

This move was probably understood by the Russians. They were 
conducting a campaign in Europe, and they decided that the dis- 
pute with China must be settled peacefully. This led to the Sino- 
Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, in which the Russians agreed 
to abandon Albazin and the area north of the Amur River. The 



35 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



terms of that treaty were supplemented in 1727 by the Treaty of 
Kyakhta, which further delineated the Sino-Russian border. 

The End of Independence 

Meanwhile, the Manchus had sent a large army into northern 
Mongolia to confront Galdan in an effort to preempt any attempts 
at establishing a new Mongol empire. The employment of artillery 
had a decisive effect, and the Dzungar were routed. In May 1691 , 
Qing emperor Kangxi called a kuriltai of principal Khalkha chiefs 
at Dolonnur. Those present acknowledged Manchu overlordship 
in return for protection against the Dzungar. It had become ap- 
parent by this time that, although there were strong ties between 
the Qing court and local Mongol rulers, the relations among in- 
dividual Mongol leaders were weak. The head of each banner was 
a vassal of the Qing emperor and was beholden to the Chinese trea- 
sury for a pension. Mongols not only pledged personal loyalty to 
the emperor, but they also became inseparable from their banner 
and could not serve in any capacity in another banner. Member- 
ship was hereditary; class structure was rigid; and the whole feudal- 
like system helped the Manchus isolate and control the Mongols. 
The banners, in effect, became petty fiefdoms. 

By this time, the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu had fled to escape 
Galdan 's renewed advances. After five years of continued raiding 
by the Dzungar into central Mongolia, Kangxi led 80,000 troops 
into Mongolia and in 1696 crushed Galdan near Jao Modo (south 
of present-day Ulaanbaatar). Galdan retreated, and he died the 
next year. This ended the influence of the Dzunger in most of Mon- 
golia, although they retained control of the western regions and 
of parts of Xinjiang and Tibet. 

Despite the defeat at Jao Modo, twenty years later the Dzungar 
again were embroiled in war with the Qing. In 1718 Galdan' s 
nephew and heir, Tsewang Rabdan, invaded Tibet to settle a 
prolonged dispute over the successor to the Dalai Lama. His troops 
seized Lhasa, imprisoned the Dalai Lama, and ambushed a Man- 
chu relief force. Kangxi retaliated in 1720; two Chinese armies 
defeated the Dzungar and drove them from Tibet. This was the 
first war in which Mongol forces made extensive use of musketry; 
they were not very effective, however, against the larger, better- 
armed and better-equipped Qing forces. After the death of the Dalai 
Lama, a new Dalai Lama was installed by Kangxi, and a Manchu 
garrison was left in Lhasa. Meanwhile, another Chinese army in- 
vaded Dzungar territory to capture Uriimqi and Turpan. Additional 
Chinese punitive expeditions eventually defeated the Dzungar in 



36 



Historical Setting 



1732 and virtually ended Mongolian independence for nearly two 
centuries. 

The Russian and the Chinese empires continued their expan- 
sions into Inner Asia during the eighteenth century. They found 
it expedient to delimit the borders between the respective areas of 
ancient Mongolia that they had conquered in the seventeenth cen- 
tury. This was done by the Treaty of Kyakhta in 1727, which es- 
tablished the border between the portions of Mongolia controlled 
by China and those controlled by Russia. 

In the period 1755 to 1757, serious revolts against Chinese rule 
broke out among the Dzungar in Xinjiang. These were suppressed 
promptly, and Chinese control over western Mongolia and Oirad 
territory was strengthened. In 1771 the Chinese government per- 
suaded part of the Kalmyk tribe to return from Russia to repopu- 
late the devastated region. 

During the 1750s, as a result of Manchu administrative poli- 
cies, the first distinction was made between northern and southern 
Mongolia. The southern provinces — Suiyuan, Chahar (or Qahar), 
and Jehol (or Rehol), known as Inner Mongolia — were virtually 
absorbed into China. The remainder of the region — the northern 
provinces, which became known as Outer Mongolia — was consid- 
ered an "outside subordinate" by the Manchus, and it was largely 
ignored. After another 100 years, however, China again became 
alarmed by Russia's expansionist policy and colonial development 
in the regions north and west of Outer Mongolia. Increased Chinese 
activity in Outer Mongolia resulted in some economic and social 
improvements, but it also revealed to the Mongolians the possibil- 
ities of playing off the two great empires against each other. Chinese 
merchants and moneylenders had become ubiquitous, and the ex- 
tent of Mongol debt had become enormous, by the early nineteenth 
century. The debt situation, combined with growing resentment 
over Chinese encroachment, gave impetus to Mongol nationalism 
by the beginning of the twentieth century. 

During the period of Chinese dominance, Mongolia not only 
experienced a century of peace, but it became an increasingly 
theocratic society. Buddhism relatively early had absorbed shaman- 
ism, and the result was a unique local religion (see Religion, ch. 2). 
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, turmoil in China, caused 
by internal rebellion and by pressures from the West, resulted in 
a breakdown of the increasingly expensive administrative appara- 
tus in Outer Mongolia. Mounting debts and higher taxes, which 
led to a growing impoverishment of Outer Mongolia, gradually 
rekindled traditional Mongol dissatisfaction with the Manchu over- 
lord. Rioting, Mongol troop mutinies, and other anti-Chinese 



37 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

incidents occurred with increasing regularity in the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth centuries. Outside help was sought from 
Russia in 1900, when a mission — which failed — was sent to St. 
Petersburg. Thereafter, reform-minded Chinese leaders abolished 
many old social and political proscriptions, and, despite Mongol 
resentment of the idea and of continued Chinese repression, prepa- 
rations were being made for constitutional government when revo- 
lution broke out in China. 

Modern Mongolia, 1911-84 
Period of Autonomy, 1911-21 

With the end of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the 
Republic of China in 1911, revolutionary ferment also emerged 
in Mongolia. As early as July 1911, participants in an anti-Chinese 
meeting in Yihe Huree (see Glossary) had petitioned the Russian 
government — which long had sought the independence of Outer 
Mongolia — for help against China. On December 1, 1911, Outer 
Mongolia in effect proclaimed its independence on the basis that 
its allegiance had been to the Manchus, not to China. On Decem- 
ber 28, the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu became Bogdo Khan 
(holy ruler) of an autonomous theocratic government; a 20,000- 
troop army was created; and Russian officers appeared in Yihe 
Huree (renamed Niyslel — capital — Huree, or Urga) to equip, to 
organize, and to train the army. The new Chinese government 
refused to recognize Mongolian independence, but it was too pre- 
occupied with internal discord to enforce its sovereignty. 

Meanwhile, Russia was moving rapidly to take advantage of the 
situation. On November 3 and December 19, 1912, respectively, 
Mongolian-Russian and Mongolian-Tibetan agreements were 
signed in Niyslel Huree. The latter agreement granted mutual 
recognition of independence; the former only affirmed Mongolia's 
autonomy from China. The Russian agreement and a protocol to 
it created a tsarist protectorate over Outer Mongolia. The Japanese, 
too, sought, unsuccessfully, to influence the independence move- 
ment in 1911 and 1912 with contributions of arms and money. Fol- 
lowing the mobilization of a Mongol army to liberate Inner 
Mongolia, several other agreements affecting Mongolia were 
reached. In a November 5, 1913, agreement, Russia recognized 
Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia, and China recognized Outer 
Mongolia's right to self-rule and to the control of its own commerce 
and industry. China also agreed not to send troops into Mongo- 
lia. On May 25, 1915, a second, tripartite agreement (among 
China, Mongolia, and Russia), the Treaty of Kyakhta, formalized 



38 



Historical Setting 



Mongolian autonomy. Russia's involvement in World War I, 
however, reduced the attention that the tsar's government could 
pay to Mongolia. This neglect, which occurred at the same time 
as new monarchical machinations in China, rekindled Japanese 
interest in, and aid to, anti-Chinese forces in Mongolia and neigh- 
boring Manchuria. 

After revolution broke out in Russia in November 1917, Japan 
moved to aid anti-Bolshevik forces in Mongolia, and a Japanese- 
fostered pan-Mongol movement was established under the influence 
of the Buryat Mongols. A pan-Mongolia conference was held in 
February and March 1919 in Chita, Siberia. The participants de- 
cided to establish a Mongol state, comprising Outer Mongolia, 
Inner Mongolia, and Buryatia (present-day Buryatskaya Autono- 
mous Soviet Socialist Republic) and to send letters to the Versailles 
Peace Conference that ended World War I. Despite formation of 
a small provisional government — in which Outer Mongolia refused 
to participate — and promises of Japanese aid, the movement failed 
in the face of renewed Chinese efforts to regain control over all 
of Mongolia. In October 1919, a Chinese warlord army, embold- 
ened by the demise of the tsarist regime, occupied Niyslel Huree 
and received an acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty from the 
Bogdo Khan government. The Mongol army was disarmed and 
disbanded. 

Soon, however, the effects of the upheaval in Russia began to 
reach Mongolia. In October 1920, Russian White Guard troops 
under Baron Roman Nicolaus von Ungern- Sternberg invaded from 
Siberia. In February 1921, after a fierce battle, von Ungern- 
Sternberg drove the Chinese out of Niyslel Huree and occupied 
the city. At first the White Guards were hailed as liberators by 
Mongolian monarchists, but in the next several months von 
Ungern-Sternberg's reign of terror and destruction aroused popular 
opposition. 

The threatening actions of Chinese, Japanese, and White Rus- 
sian forces greatly stimulated Mongolian nationalism during this 
time. Two secret revolutionary circles emerged in Niyslel Huree 
in 1919, the military-oriented Dzuun (East) Huree Group, under 
Damdiny Sukhe Bator and Horloogiyn Dandzan, and the civilian- 
oriented Consul's Group, headed by Horloyn Choybalsan and Dog- 
somyn Bodoo. The Communist International (see Glossary), also 
called the Comintern, which was headquartered in Moscow, ad- 
vised the two groups to merge in order to present a united front 
to the Chinese and the White Russian occupation forces. The 
merger was accomplished at a conference in Irkutsk in March 1920, 
with the formation of the Mongolian People's Party under the 



39 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

leadership of Sukhe Bator. The Jebtsundamba Khutuktu gave his 
encouragement and support to the revolutionary leaders, and in 
his name they appealed to Moscow for more assistance. 

The Japanese were pressing ahead with efforts to take advan- 
tage of the chaos caused by the Russian civil war. A large Japanese 
force, nominally part of an anti-Bolshevik Allied Expeditionary 
Force intervening in eastern Siberia, had taken over much of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway between Vladivostok and Lake Baykal. 
Japanese funds were provided to von Ungern- Sternberg and other 
White Russian elements, in order to prevent the Soviet govern- 
ment from establishing control in eastern Siberia and from obtain- 
ing too much influence in Mongolia. The Japanese efforts were 
thwarted to a large degree, however, by the neutralist attitude of 
United States elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and Soviet 
forces gradually established control over Siberia. 

The improved Soviet position in Siberia enabled Moscow to 
respond to the appeals of the Mongolian nationalists. Earlier, in 
the 1918 to 1919 period, Moscow had renounced all agreements 
regarding Mongolia that had been reached with Japan and China. 
The First Party Congress of the newly formed Mongolian People's 
Party, was held at Kyakhta (in Siberia, near the Mongolian border) 
on March 1 to 3, 1921 . On March 13, the new party Central Com- 
mittee formed the Mongolian People's Provisional Government, 
and, after Sukhe Bator's Mongolian Partisan Army (established 
in February 1921) captured the Mongolian city of Khiagt (across 
the border from Kyakhta), a new capital was established. A 
Mongolian- Soviet military force also had been formed, and by early 
July it had driven von Ungern-Sternberg's forces out of Niyslel 
Huree and had occupied the city. On July 11 — the date recognized 
as Mongolia's national day — the Bogdo Khan government was 
replaced by a new People's Government of Mongolia, a limited 
monarchy nominally headed by the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu under 
the title of khan. Bodoo was named premier and foreign minister; 
Sukhe Bator continued as commander in chief and became minister 
of war, with Choybalsan as his deputy. The government was bol- 
stered by Soviet troops, who virtually occupied the country (see 
Historical Traditions, ch. 5). 

Revolutionary Transformation, 1921-24 

Fighting against the White Russians culminated in the capture 
of von Ungern- Sternberg in August 1921 ; the rest of his forces were 
defeated by January 1922. On September 14, 1921, the indepen- 
dence of Mongolia was proclaimed, and on October 26 a legisla- 
tive assembly, the National Provisional Little Hural, opened. The 



40 



The Bogdo Khan 's palace, now a museum, Ulaanbaatar 

Courtesy Allen H. Kassof 



formalization of Mongolian- Soviet relations then was accelerated. 
On November 5, 1921, a bilateral Agreement on Mutual Recog- 
nition and Friendly Relations was signed in Moscow. It recognized 
the People's Government of Mongolia, and it facilitated the ex- 
change of diplomatic representatives. Furthermore, it provided for 
the self-determination of Tannu Tuva (see Glossary), a region in 
northwestern Mongolia that had been a Russian protectorate be- 
tween 1914 and 1917. 

At this juncture, discord emerged among the Mongolian fac- 
tions. When supporters of the Bogdo Khan regime expressed dis- 
pleasure with the limits placed on the monarchy, the Mongolian 
People's Party levied further restrictions on it, while giving more 
power to the party-controlled government. At the same time, some 
members of the new regime were concerned about Mongolia's close 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Even Premier Bodoo sought 
to distance himself from Soviet influence. In August 1922, however, 
he and forty others were arrested and charged with 4 'counterrevolu- 
tionary activities" and with wanting to restore an unlimited monar- 
chy. Bodoo and fourteen others were executed. When the Second 
Party Congress of the Mongolian People's Party was held in July 
1923, Mongolian-Soviet solidarity was reiterated amid calls, for 



41 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

the first time, in favor of purging "oppressor class elements" from 
the party. 

At this critical stage, several key leadership changes occurred 
that caused momentous political developments. On February 22, 
1923, thirty-year-old revolutionary hero Sukhe Bator died of ill- 
ness (although Choybalsan later claimed he had been poisoned), 
leaving the way clear for Choybalsan' s eventual accession. Next, 
the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu died on May 20, 1924, and the Peo- 
ple's Government, which had resolved to form a republic, forbade 
the traditional search for the reincarnation of the defunct ruler. 
This move eliminated the theocratic symbol of Mongolia. At the 
same time, a new Soviet treaty with China on May 31 , 1924 (which 
provided for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia), set 
the stage for the final step in the nominal independence of Mongolia. 

The Third Party Congress of the Mongolian People's Party met 
in Niyslel Huree from August 4 to 24, 1924, but it quickly became 
embroiled in a debate led by party chairman Dandzan, who, like 
Bodoo, hoped to reduce Soviet influence. The congress culminated 
in the arrest and execution of the "capitalist" Dandzan. Among 
the achievements of the congress was purging the party of "use- 
less elements" and renaming it the Mongolian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party. On November 25, 1924, with the adoption of a 
Soviet- style state constitution by the First National Great Hural, 
the new national assembly, the Mongolian People's Republic was 
formally established. The National Little Hural, the standing body 
when the National Great Hural was not in session, was elected; 
it, in turn, elected a cabinet with Balingiyn Tserendorj as premier 
and Choybalsan as commander in chief of the army. At the same 
time, Niyslel Huree was renamed Ulaanbaatar (literally, Red 
Hero). 

Consolidation of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1925-28 

Soviet troops ostensibly were withdrawn in March 1925 (although 
some historians have debated whether all actually departed). Despite 
the treaty — between the Soviet Union and China — that acknowl- 
edged Outer Mongolia as an autonomous, but integral, part of 
China, the Soviet Union explicitly recognized Mongolia's indepen- 
dence of China in internal affairs and its ability to pursue an in- 
dependent foreign policy. While continuing its cautious relationship 
with Beijing, Moscow made it clear that it would permit no Chinese 
encroachment on Mongolia. Mongolia's general foreign policy line 
was based on strong ties with the Soviet Union, "the reliable pil- 
lar of [Mongolia's] independence and prosperity 4 ' according to the 
party line. 



42 



Historical Setting 



Under Moscow's guidance, the leftist leaders of Mongolia began 
to strengthen their still -weak position. The Mongolian communists, 
with Comintern help, gradually undermined the rightist elements 
in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and attacked the 
power of the two great institutions that had dominated Mongolia 
for centuries: first the nobles; then, the abbots (whose monastic 
followers comprised at least one-third of the adult males). In this 
period of cautious consolidation, the party abolished the aristoc- 
racy's feudal privileges, a reform which had the initial effect of in- 
fluencing wealthy nobles to embark on capitalist ventures, such 
as investing in the new cooperatives. Gradually, however, the 
revolutionaries built a state-guided economy supported by Mon- 
golian cooperatives and by Soviet trade. 

Moscow's economic hold on Mongolia tightened as exports to 
the Soviet Union rose rapidly from about 14 percent of Mongo- 
lia's total production (chiefly livestock and animal products), in 
1923 to 1924, to 85 percent, in 1928 to 1929. By 1929 Mongolia's 
imports lagged far behind its exports. Aside from the provision of 
technical and political advisers, Soviet trade policy did not yet pro- 
vide for economic development aid to newer socialist countries as 
had been envisioned by Lenin in 1920. 

Other areas of the economy showed more progress. The Mon- 
golian National Bank, established in 1924 as a joint Mongolian- 
Soviet company, issued the tugrik, the new national currency, as 
part of monetary reform. The cooperative movement, directed by 
the Mongolian Building Cooperative, began to show impressive 
results. A standardized tax system was instituted, and other ad- 
ministrative reforms slowly took hold. The army, equipped and 
trained by the Soviets, was steadily growing and improving (see 
The Mongolian Army, 1921-68, ch. 5). The government refrained 
from a direct attack on the venerated religious establishment, but 
some higher-level monks were imprisoned and executed. 

Although the Mongolian communists had not yet overthrown 
the conservatives in the government and the economic sectors dur- 
ing this period, they had gained progressively in strength as evi- 
denced by the changes they had made in society (see Society, ch. 2). 
Slowly, the young Soviet- taught Mongols were taking over the po- 
litical, the military, and the economic apparatus. Many nobles re- 
tained their wealth, however, and the number of monastics actually 
increased between 1925 and 1928. Nearly 90 percent of all trade 
was controlled by Chinese firms in Mongolia. The Fourth Party 
Congress (September 1925), the Fifth Party Congress (Septem- 
ber 1926), and the Sixth Party Congress (September 1927) had 



43 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

witnessed policy struggles between leftist and rightist elements that 
presaged the victory of the left. 

Purges of the Opposition, 1928-32 

A decisive clash between leftists and rightists occurred at the 
Seventh Party Congress from late October to December 10, 1928. 
After forty-eight days of debate, party chairman Tseren-Ochiryn 
Dambadorj was exiled to Moscow, and other rightist members were 
expelled as the left seized control of the party and the government. 
With their power now secure at the top and with party opinion 
united on major policy goals, the leftists accelerated their programs. 

Strong Soviet backing was assured by Josef Stalin, who in the 
meantime had triumphed over his political foes in Moscow. In ad- 
dition, after 1927 Soviet caution toward China no longer was neces- 
sary; Stalin was no longer constrained by his relationship with 
Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang (Kuomintang in Wade-Giles 
romanization), or Chinese Nationalist Party, which had broken 
with the Chinese Communist Party and had consolidated its rule 
over eastern China from Nanjing. Both domestic and international 
changes had freed Mongolian leftists for radical changes. 

Policies confirming the party line of developing the country along 
noncapitalist lines were ratified by the Fifth National Great Hural 
in December 1928. As conservative officials were eliminated from 
the government, Choybalsan was chosen as head of the National 
Little Hural. The leftist leaders called for the immediate confisca- 
tion of feudal property, the development of a five-year plan, the 
collectivization of stockbreeders, the ouster of Chinese traders, and 
the implementation of the Soviet trade monopoly. These extreme 
measures followed standard Soviet economic policy. In less- 
sophisticated Mongolia, however, the economic situation seemed 
to defy such planning. The basically nomadic society was largely 
illiterate, and there was no industrial proletariat; the aristocracy 
and the religious establishment held a large share of the country's 
wealth; popular obedience to traditional authorities continued to 
be widespread; the party lacked grass-roots support; and the govern- 
ment had little organization or experience. Nevertheless, the party 
was receptive to Moscow's directives; and the Mongolian revolu- 
tionaries made mistakes similar to those of the Soviets through an 
excess of zeal, intolerance, and inexperience. 

The first harsh repression of opposition came in 1929. Under 
the direction of Choybalsan, more than 600 feudal estates (herds 
and fixed property) were confiscated and were given to members 
of the laity and to monks who left their monasteries. In 1931 and 
1932, the property of more than 800 religious and secular leaders 



44 



Historical Setting 



was seized, and more than 700 heads of households were killed or 
imprisoned. The antireligious campaign was three-pronged: ordi- 
nary monks were forced to leave the monasteries and enter the army 
or the economy; monks of middle status were put in prison camps; 
and those of highest rank were killed. Collectivization followed ex- 
propriation, and by 1931 more than one- third of the stock-raising 
households had been forcibly communized. 

The brutal collectivization of herdsmen was rapid, and it caused 
bloody uprisings. Although the Eighth Party Congress from Febru- 
ary to April 1930 had recognized that the country was unprepared 
for total socialization, the party reaction to opposition was to reen- 
force its measures nevertheless. The massive shift from private 
property to collectivization and communization was accelerated. 
The party then attacked the entire monastic class, the nobility, the 
nomads, and the nationalists, while purging its own ranks. The 
government imposed high and indiscriminate taxes, confiscated pri- 
vate property, banned private industry, forced craft workers to join 
mutual aid cooperatives, and nationalized foreign and domestic 
trade and transportation. 

Extremism produced near-disaster. The power of the monks and 
the feudal nobles finally was broken, Chinese traders and other 
foreign capitalists were ousted, and still greater dependence on 
Soviet aid was required (see The Suppression of Buddhism, ch. 2). 
The mechanical imposition of communes on an unprepared no- 
madic sheep-herding and cattle-herding society, however, resulted 
in the slaughter of 7 million animals in three years by angry and 
frightened herders. Mongolia's economy, which rested entirely on 
animal husbandry, was severely affected. The failure of communes, 
the hasty destruction of private trade, and inadequate Soviet sup- 
plies contributed to spreading famine. By 1931 to 1932, thousands 
were suffering severe food shortages, which, together with the peo- 
ple's reaction to terror, had brought the nation to the verge of civil 
war. Finally the government was forced to call in troops and tanks; 
with Soviet assistance, it suppressed the spreading anticommunist 
rebellion in western Mongolia. 

In May 1932, a month after anticommunist uprisings in western 
Mongolia, the Comintern and the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union directed the Mongolian party to end its extremism. The next 
month, the party Central Committee rejected its prior policy as 
"leftist deviation" and expelled several top leaders as "left-wing 
adventurers." Choybalsan announced that "the overall devel- 
opment of our country has not yet entered the stage of social- 
ism, and also it is wrong to copy Soviet experience in every single 
thing." The entire socioeconomic pattern was swiftly changed. The 



45 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



collective farm experiment was dropped, worker cooperatives were 
abandoned, the cattle tax was reduced, and herders and peasants 
again were allowed to hold private property. Foreign trade, still 
channeled exclusively to the Soviet Union, continued to be con- 
trolled by the state, however. Under continuing Soviet protection 
and domination, Mongolia now settled down to a period of gradual 
social change. 

An underlying reason for Moscow's reversal of the course of 
Mongolian socialism had been the growing Japanese threat. The 
September 18, 1931, Mukden incident had opened the way for 
Japan to establish Manchukuo (Japanese-controlled Manchuria). 
Mongolians were not alone in the fear that Japan might try to es- 
tablish a Japanese-controlled Mongolian monarchy, Mengkukuo. 

Economic Gradualism and National Defense, 1932-45 

The New Turn Policy, 1932-40 

The new policy of socioeconomic gradualism — the New Turn 
Policy — continued until the mid- 1940s, when Mongolian social- 
ism entered its modern stage of collectivization and economic 
growth. The Ninth Party Congress in September and October 1934 
pronounced the New Turn a success, but it became obvious that 
this gradualism actually had been determined by the basic Soviet 
need to maintain Mongolia as a stable buffer state against either 
Japanese or Chinese expansion. At the beginning of this period, 
the Soviets did not want to enlarge Mongolia's small-scale indus- 
tries because this might provide a further incentive for Japanese 
invasion. Instead, Mongolia's raw materials were used to strengthen 
the Soviet Union, while Soviet Red Army units and a large cavalry- 
oriented Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army were deployed 
to defend Mongolia against attack. 

On November 27, 1934, a Mongolian- Soviet ' 'gentlemen's 
agreement" was reached that provided for mutual assistance in 
the face of Japanese advances in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. 
In January 1935, Soviet troops reentered Mongolia as Japanese 
forces began to probe the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On 
March 12, 1936, the 1934 agreement was upgraded when the ten- 
year Mongolian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship — which included a 
mutual defense protocol — was signed. The pact did not mention 
Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia, and Moscow ignored Chinese 
protests. 

In addition to concluding defense treaties with the Soviet Union, 
Mongolia concentrated on building its army with Soviet guidance 



46 



Monument to Sukhe Bator, Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Allen H. Kassof 



and military aid. In 1936 military expenditures were doubled, and 
by 1938 more than half of Mongolia's budget was for defense. The 
government built paved roads, extended railroads, and established 
military air bases and communication lines, all with Soviet aid. 
Military equipment and training also were supplied by the Soviet 
Union. It is estimated that during World War II the Mongolian 
Army numbered between 80,000 and 100,000 troops, a huge per- 
centage of the total population of 900,000. 

Security concerns and a more conservative economic approach 
prevented major advances in stock raising and other internal devel- 
opment during this period. A few small Mongolian- Soviet enter- 
prises were initiated to support the war economy. The abandonment 
of agricultural communes and the return to private enterprise sig- 
naled a trend toward gradualism. Voluntary producers' coopera- 
tives were encouraged, but they remained small until the 1950s 
(see Peacetime Development, 1946-52, this ch.). Only a few state 
farms were started. Apart from some veterinary and credit as- 
sistance, the government made few efforts to support the nomads, 
and by 1941 herds had reached the highest recorded growth in Mon- 
golian history. Consumer cooperatives continued to expand, and 
the state controlled the rest of internal trade. 



47 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The policy of gradualism was particularly ineffective in educa- 
tion. In 1941 an estimated 90 percent of the people were illiterate. 
In 1942 the country's first university — Choybalsan University, later 
renamed Mongolian State University — was established in Ulaan- 
baatar, but the spread of general education had to await the late 
1940s and the 1950s. The first large-scale literacy program did not 
begin until 1947 (see Education, ch. 2). 

Despite the government's official policy of not overtly persecut- 
ing religious beliefs, its antireligious campaign continued slowly 
but relentlessly. Emphasis was placed on ideological and economic 
persuasion, which curtailed monastic growth and induced monks 
of lower rank to return to secular life. Government representatives 
were attached to monasteries to monitor their activities, construc- 
tion of new monasteries was forbidden by law, the enrollment of 
minors was disallowed, and monks became eligible for military ser- 
vice. Many monasteries were destroyed; others were converted to 
secular use. Methods of suppression became especially bloody in 
the second half of the 1930s. In 1935 abbots and monks of higher 
rank were tried publicly; in 1937 and 1938, about 2,000 of them 
were executed. Thousands of others were arrested and jailed. The 
financially shattered monasteries gradually were closed in the period 
1938 to 1939. 

The campaign against the Buddhists was largely successful. 
Within two decades, the resident monastic population was reduced 
from about 15,000 to approximately 200 monks. A handful of small 
monasteries and one large institution were all that were left physi- 
cally of what had been, at the century's start, the best organized 
and most intellectual force in Mongolian life. 

There also were renewed purges in the inner party ranks in 1937 
to 1939. Minor rebellions continued to plague the government, and 
uncooperative political leaders increasingly were accused of aid- 
ing the opposition or the Japanese. One after the other, many top 
party and government officials fell from power and were executed 
or were imprisoned. By 1939 Choybalsan had emerged as the pre- 
mier, the minister of war, and the undisputed leader of Mongolia. 
It later was acknowledged, in 1956 and in 1962, that Choybalsan 
had "committed serious errors" and had established a "personal- 
ity cult" during this period (see Socialist Construction under 
Tsedenbal, 1952-84, this ch.). 

In March and April 1940, the Tenth Party Congress met. 
Although it confirmed Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal as general secretary, 
Choybalsan continued to be the predominant force in the party. 
The ensuing Eighth National Great Hural adopted a new state con- 
stitution, which, however, made no basic alterations in the 1924 



48 



Historical Setting 



constitution. Although it emphasized the new Mongolian author- 
ity structure, the bypassing of capitalism, and the necessity of overall 
state planning, the 1940 constitution did not change the policy of 
gradualism. Private ownership, especially of livestock, was allowed 
until the turn to total communization began in late 1947. 

National Defense, 1940-45 

As political and religious purges finally drew to a close, the in- 
ternational situation worsened. Fighting had broken out, in May 
1939, with Japanese forces based in Manchukuo. That summer 
a Japanese army invaded eastern Mongolia. Soviet General Georgi 
Zhukov commanded the Soviet-Mongolian army that met this in- 
vasion. Between May and September 1939, there was large-scale 
ground and aerial fighting along the Khalkhyn Gol, a river in north- 
eastern Mongolia. The Mongolian troops and their Soviet allies 
severely defeated the Japanese, who may have sustained as many 
as 80,000 casualties compared with 1 1,130 on the Mongolian- Soviet 
side. Hostilities ended on September 16, 1939. The Soviet Union 
and Japan signed a truce, and a commission was set up to define 
the Mongolian-Manchurian border. Although Japan did not in- 
vade again, it did mass large military forces along the Mongolian 
and the Soviet borders in the course of the war, while continuing 
its southward drive into China. 

The Soviet position in Mongolia was now fully consolidated. 
Throughout World War II, Choybalsan followed Moscow's direc- 
tives, and Mongolia supported the Soviet Union with livestock, 
raw materials, money, food, and military clothing. The Mongolian 
army was maintained intact throughout the war; it served as an 
important buffer force in the Soviet Far East defense system, but 
it did not actually join the Red Army. Moreover, the Soviets, on 
the occasion of the April 13, 1941, Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, 
obtained a commitment from Japan to respect Mongolia's territorial 
integrity. 

Modernizing the army and keeping it at peak mobilization was 
a heavy drain on the nation's undeveloped economy and small 
population. Even so, the party leaders pressed on with what lim- 
ited social progress they could manage in a wartime situation. As 
more teachers became trained, literacy began to accelerate, and 
government efforts to assist the herdsmen in sheltering, feeding, 
and caring for their livestock continued. Stock raising bore the major 
war burden, however, and with large Soviet requisitions to fill, herd 
totals fell sharply during the war. 

Mongolia's wartime neutrality ended in the closing days of World 
War II. On August 10, 1945, two days after the Soviet Union had 



49 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



declared war on Japan, Mongolia also declared war on Japan. The 
Mongolian army, some 80,000 strong, joined Soviet troops in in- 
vading Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. On August 14, 1945, in 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, China agreed 
to recognize the independence of Mongolia within its "existing 
boundary," provided that a plebiscite confirmed the Mongolian 
people's desire for independence. Mongolia obliged, and in an 
October 20 referendum, 100 percent of the electorate voted for in- 
dependence from China. On January 5, 1946, China recognized 
Mongolian independence and, on February 14, agreed to exchange 
diplomatic representatives. None, however, were exchanged. The 
ensuing Chinese civil war and the victory of the Chinese communists 
over the Guomindang government in 1949 led instead to Ulaan- 
baatar's recognition of the new People's Republic of China. 

Peacetime Development, 1946-52 

On February 27, 1946, Mongolia and the Soviet Union signed 
the ten-year renewable Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance 
and the first Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation. 
With the war over and Chinese and Japanese threat eliminated 
from Mongolia, the way for renewed assertion of Soviet influence 
in Mongolia was clear. Mongolia was a strong defense buffer, a 
trading partner, and a dependable ally in international conferences 
for the Soviet Union. A further indication of close ties was Mon- 
golia's adoption in February 1946 of the Cyrillic alphabet for use 
in schools and military units (see Ethnic and Linguistic Groups, 
ch. 2). 

Secure in its relations with Moscow, Ulaanbaatar expanded its 
other international ties. Diplomatic relations were established with 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the 
new communist governments in Eastern Europe. Mongolian par- 
ticipation in communist-sponsored conferences and international 
organizations increased; Mongolia applied for membership in the 
United Nations, but representatives from Ulaanbaatar were not 
seated until 1961 (see Socialist Construction under Tsedenbal, 
1952-84, this ch.). Mongolia was among the first countries to recog- 
nize the new People's Republic of China in October 1949. 

In its shift to postwar development, the party and the govern- 
ment reduced defense expenditures and shifted personnel from mili- 
tary to civilian enterprises. Rationing was curtailed, and prices for 
some manufactured items and foodstuffs were reduced. Attention 
was given to redeveloping the livestock and the agrarian sectors 
at the same time that modern mining, industrial, transportation, 
and communications sectors were being established. Initiatives also 



50 



Historical Setting 



were taken in raising education and health levels and in improv- 
ing the general well-being of the people. The First Five- Year Plan 
(1948-52), presented at the Eleventh Party Congress in Decem- 
ber 1947, was important in carrying out postwar construction (see 
Socialist Framework of the Economy, ch. 3). The first session of 
the national hural held since 1940, was convened in February 1949 
as the Ninth National Great Hural. 

Socialist Construction under Tsedenbal, 1952-84 

Choybalsan died on January 26, 1952, and a major era in modern 
Mongolian history came to an end. He was succeeded as govern- 
ment leader by Tsedenbal who continued to be party general secre- 
tary as well. 

Economic developments and extensive purges of party and 
government personnel marked the transition. In March 1953, a 
party Central Committee plenum was convened to review the results 
of the First Plan, and in November 1954, the Twelfth Party Con- 
gress belatedly approved guidelines for the Second Five- Year Plan 
(1953-57). A continuing major economic target included in the 
plan was the development of the livestock sector, and a 72 percent 
increase in grain production over 1952 levels was envisioned. Special 
attention also was paid to expanding electrification and interna- 
tional economic cooperation. Also at the Twelfth Congress, Dashiyn 
Damba was elected general secretary, replacing Tsedenbal as party 
leader. 

In 1956 the party Central Committee condemned the ' 'person- 
ality cult" of Choybalsan, specifically pointing out the excesses of 
the 1937 to 1939 period. Claiming success for the Second Plan, 
the Thirteenth Party Congress, March 17 to 22, 1958, adopted 
a special Three-Year Plan (1958-60), aimed at raising Mongolia 
from a livestock economy to an agricultural-industrial economy, 
all with Soviet aid. New emphasis was placed on stepping up in- 
dustrial capacities — particularly in the coal mining, electric power, 
and construction sectors — and on increasing output of petroleum 
industry products, minerals, and nonferrous ores (see Industry, 
ch. 3). Damba was reelected at the Thirteenth Congress, only to 
be dismissed for ideological reasons and replaced by Tsedenbal 
several months later. On July 6, 1960, the government adopted 
the national Constitution that continued to be in force in 1989 (see 
Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). In January 1962, Choybalsan's 
" personality cult" again was attacked by the party Central Com- 
mittee. 

Foreign inputs and expansion of international contacts were im- 
portant to Mongolia's development plans in the 1950s. A result 



51 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

of the close alliance of China and the Soviet Union during this 
period was Sino-Soviet cooperation in developing Mongolia. In 
1952 a ten-year Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic and Cul- 
tural Cooperation marked an important step in developing rela- 
tions between the two long-estranged nations. China helped build 
railroad lines, gave ruble aid and loans for construction projects, 
and even sent large contingents of laborers in the mid-1950s. Ulaan- 
baatar also subscribed to the anticolonial stance of the 1955 Ban- 
dung Conference and adopted the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence (see Glossary; see also Foreign Policy, ch. 4). Rela- 
tions were developed with countries beyond the communist bloc — 
for example, India, Burma, Cambodia, nations in Africa and the 
Middle East, and, later, Cuba. 

Soviet troops were withdrawn in 1956, increasing Mongolia's 
control over its own internal affairs. There were residual fears of 
a renewed Chinese ascendancy, however, despite Mongolia's sign- 
ing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with China 
on May 31, 1960, and the improved state of bilateral affairs. 
Memories of Chinese claims to "lost territories" — a theme, in 
Chinese foreign policy toward Mongolia, raised by Sun Yat-sen 
in 1912; reiterated by Chiang Kai-shek in the 1920s and by Mao 
Zedong in the 1930s; and, although rebuffed, raised at the 1945 
Yalta Conference, when Chiang asserted China's claim to suzer- 
ainty based on the 1924 treaty with the Soviet Union — were strong 
in Mongolian consciousness. 

Soon after the July 1961 Fourteenth Party Congress, Mongolia 
had garnered enough support from communist countries and from 
the Third World to be admitted to the United Nations in October 
1961. The following June, Mongolia joined the Soviet-sponsored 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary). 

Mongolian-Soviet ties continued to be close during the 1960s; 
additional aid was granted to Mongolia, and repayment deadlines 
were extended. In October 1965, a new three-year Agreement on 
Economic and Cultural Cooperation was signed. A twenty-year 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which 
replaced the 1946 treaty, was the culmination of a state visit to 
Ulaanbaatar by the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, in January 
1966. Soon after the signing of the friendship treaty, which included 
a defense clause, there was a buildup in Mongolia of Soviet troops 
and military infrastructure (including bases, roads, airfields, 
sheltered fighter aircraft sites, radar detection networks, commu- 
nication lines, and missile sites). Mongolia, more than ever, had 
become a front line of Soviet defense against China. As part of 



52 



Historical Setting 



its alliance with the Soviet Union, Mongolia signed the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty in 1963. 

As relations with Moscow grew still closer, there was a cor- 
responding coolness in those with Beijing. Although a difficult 
bilateral question was resolved with China in December 1962, when 
a border demarcation agreement was reached, by 1966 serious 
Mongolian-Chinese differences had surfaced. Chinese aid was 
stopped; trade decreased to low levels; relations cooled. The Chinese 
were angry over Ulaanbaatar's siding with Moscow in the Sino- 
Soviet rift; Mongolia, observing the excesses of China's Cultural 
Revolution, was concerned anew over China's designs on its 
sovereignty. 

After the Fifteenth Party Congress had approved new economic 
plans in June 1966, Mongolia continued to try to transform its no- 
madic economy into ranch-style livestock herding and to expand 
its industrial sector. The economy, however, continued to have se- 
vere problems. For example, poor weather plagued the country; 
in 1967, blizzards caused a US$37 million loss in livestock alone. 
Severe winters were followed by drought and by plummeting har- 
vests and exports. Planned increases in agricultural and industrial 
production did not materialize, and the lack of raw materials con- 
tinued to hamper even light industry. Some of the blame was placed 
on the pullout of Chinese economic and technical assistance and 
the end of trade with China in consumer goods. It was admitted, 
however, that the economy envisioned in the Fourth Five- Year Plan 
(1966-70) had ''not developed as rapidly as those of fraternal so- 
cialist states," and, indeed, achievements fell notably short of goals. 

Large infusions of Soviet and Comecon aid eventually had salu- 
tary effects in the early 1970s. High-level state visits were exchanged 
in the 1969 to 1971 period, with the result that Moscow agreed 
to underwrite the Fifth Five- Year Plan (1971-75). Soviet economic 
difficulties in the early 1970s, however, had repercussions for Mon- 
golia. The Soviet Union started insisting that trade quotas be 
honored, a move that caused economic disruption just as Mongo- 
lia was recovering from the economic distress of the late 1960s. 
Nevertheless, some economic progress was achieved between 1971 
and 1974, a period during which gross industrial production rose 
by nearly 45 percent. Severe winters continued to hurt the antici- 
pated growth of livestock herds. By the mid-1970s, direct business 
and other cooperative links had been established between cor- 
responding Mongolian and Soviet ministries, departments, research 
institutes, and industries, and cooperative ties also had been es- 
tablished between neighboring Mongolian aymags (see Glossary) 
and Soviet oblasts. 



53 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

More than 100,000 Soviet troops were garrisoned in Mongolia 
in the early 1970s. Ulaanbaatar's anti-Chinese criticism intensi- 
fied during this period, ostensibly because of increased numbers 
of Chinese military exercises along the frontier and alleged anti- 
Mongolian subversive activities. Mongolia received assurances that 
Soviet troops would remain; Brezhnev himself, when in Ulaan- 
baatar, said that Beijing's demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Mongolia, as a precondition for the normalization of Sino- 
Soviet relations, was "absolutely unacceptable." 

After a decade of steady growth in party membership, a dra- 
matic change occurred in the composition of those attending the 
Sixteenth Party Congress in July 1971 . Although membership on 
the Political Bureau, the Central Committee, and the Secretariat 
remained stable, 82 percent of the delegates were new. As the de- 
cade continued, changes at the top began to emerge. In June 1974, 
Tsedenbal, while retaining his position as general secretary of the 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, resigned as chairman 
of the Council of Ministers — the premiership — to become chair- 
man of the People's Great Hural, the de facto president of Mon- 
golia. The former rector of the Mongolian State University, Jambyn 
Batmonh, in a move presaging the succession a decade later, was 
appointed premier; he also was elevated to the party Political 
Bureau. After these changes, the party leadership was more sta- 
ble. The closeness of Mongolian-Soviet relations was manifested 
by meetings in October 1976 in Moscow among Tsedenbal, 
Batmonh, and three other party Political Bureau members and the 
Soviet Communist Party general secretary Leonid Brezhnev; the 
president, Nikolai Podgorny; and the premier, Alexei Kosygin. 
While the talks were described as "fraternal," they also were charac- 
terized as "frank," probably because of increased Mongolian de- 
mands for economic aid. Soviet aid was forthcoming for the Sixth 
Five-Year Plan (1976-80), primarily in support of agriculture, min- 
ing, fuel, power, food, and light industries. Mongolian relations 
with Beijing — following Moscow's lead — were less hostile in the 
years after the 1976 death of Mao, but fears of China's "preda- 
tory aspirations" still lingered in Ulaanbaatar. In 1980 Chinese 
nationals were expelled from Mongolia on charges ranging from 
gambling and drug use to public disorder and espionage. 

Severe weather in the winter of 1976 to 1977 caused some of 
the worst damage to animal husbandry in a decade. Heavy snow- 
falls, severe frosts, disease, starvation, and mismanagement com- 
bined to create a perilous economic situation. Recovery was slow, 
and livestock targets were overestimated continually throughout 
the rest of the 1970s. Developments in other economic sectors, such 



54 



Former burial site of Sukhe 
Bator, Altan Olgiy Mountain 
Courtesy Institute of 
Party History, Ulaanbaatar 




as mining and irrigated farming, saw some improvement during 
the period, however. 

The 1980s began with some improvements in the economy, but 
also with a number of top party and state leadership changes, cul- 
minating in the end of Tsedenbal's rule. While Tsedenbal was in 
Moscow in August 1984, special sessions of the party and the Peo- 
ple's Great Hural were held to announce his retirement. Batmonh 
replaced the reportedly ailing party head, amid tributes to Tseden- 
bal's forty-four-year career as an "outstanding leader" and "very 
close friend." In December 1984, Batmonh also was elevated to 
the chairmanship of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, 
and Vice Premier Dumaagiyn Sodnom became premier as Mon- 
golia embarked on historic reforms (see The Political Process, ch. 4). 

* * * 

A number of scholarly sources provide the basic framework for 
studying Mongolian history. Rene Grousset's The Empire of the 
Steppes provides a detailed historical analysis of Mongolian history 
from the Scythian period to the annexation of Mongolia by the 
Manchus. David Morgan's The Mongols provides a succinct account 
of the high point of Mongol history in the thirteenth and the four- 
teenth centuries. A more general treatment of Mongol history in 
the context of general Asian history is in East Asia: Tradition and 



55 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Transformation by John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and 
Albert M. Craig. Key sources for those studying Mongolian his- 
tory are two translated works under the same title, History of the 
Mongolian People's Republic — a condensed Soviet translation of a 
larger Russian/Mongolian edition by Soviet and Mongolian acade- 
micians, which covers the history of Mongolia from the stone age 
to 1971 — and an American translation and annotation of volume 
three of an original Mongolian work written by Mongolian schol- 
ars, which covers the years 1921 to 1966. A detailed documentary 
history of Mongolia's independence movement is Urgunge Onon 
and Derrick Pritchatt's Asia 's First Modern Revolution. Several works 
by Denis Sinor and Sechin Jagchid also are important contribu- 
tions. Mongolia's Culture and Society, by Jagchid and Paul Hyer, pro- 
vides excellent background on the historical development of 
Mongolia. A seminal work on the modern period, which includes 
an extensive chronology and bibliography, is Robert A. Rupen's 
Mongols of the Twentieth Century. The Minorities of Northern China by 
Henry G. Schwarz and Russia and the Golden Horde by Charles J. 
Halperin provide useful information on Mongol integration into 
neighboring cultures. For those interested in original source mate- 
rial, The Secret History of the Mongols, translated by Francis Wood- 
man Cleaves, should be consulted. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



56 



A balladeer playing a two-stringed morin huur 



IN 1986 MONGOLIA CELEBRATED the sixty-fifth anniver- 
sary of the revolution that had begun the transformation of a tradi- 
tional feudal society of pastoral nomads into a modern society of 
motorcycle-mounted shepherds and urban factory workers. The 
reshaping of Mongolian society reflected both strong guidance and 
a high level of economic assistance from the Soviet Union. The 
relations between Mongolia and the Soviet Union have been ex- 
tremely close. The ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 
has so faithfully echoed the line of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union that some Western observers have doubted the real- 
ity of Mongolia's independence. 

From Ulaanbaatar, however, issues of autonomy and the path 
of social development are seen differendy. Of all the peoples of Inner 
Asia — Uighurs (see Glossary), Uzbeks (see Glossary), Kirghiz, 
Tibetans, Tajiks, and others — only those in Mongolia retain any 
degree of independence. As a small nation of barely 2 million 
people, caught between two giant and sometimes antagonistic neigh- 
bors, China and the Soviet Union, Mongolia has had to accom- 
modate itself to one or the other of those neighbors. Twice as many 
Mongols live outside the boundaries of Mongolia (3.4 million in 
China and .5 million in the Soviet Union), as live within it, and 
the fate of the larger Mongol population of China, who have be- 
come a 20 percent minority in the Nei Monggol Autonomous 
Region — once part of their own country — demonstrates that alter- 
natives to the pro- Soviet alignment might well be less attractive. 
In the opinion of most Western observers, most Mongolians tradi- 
tionally have tended to view the Soviet Union as a model of modern 
society, and the Russian language has been the vehicle for the in- 
troduction of science and modern technology and for contacts with 
the larger communist world. 

Mongolia in 1921 was an exceptionally economically undeve- 
loped society in which nomadic herders, illiterate and marginally 
involved in a market economy, constituted most of the population. 
They supported some petty nobles and a large number of Bud- 
dhist monks. The society's dominant institution was the Buddhist 
monastic system, which enrolled much of the adult male popula- 
tion as monks. Such limited commerce as existed was controlled 
by Chinese merchants, to whom the native nobility was heavily 
in debt. The only avenue of mobility and escape from broad and 
ill-defined obligations to hereditary overlords was provided by 



59 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

entrance to the Buddhist clergy, whose monks devoted themselves 
primarily to otherworldly and economically unproductive pursuits. 
The population appears to have been declining, because of high death 
rates from disease and poor nutrition, the large proportion of celi- 
bate monks, and high levels of infertility caused by venereal disease. 

Against such a historical foundation, claims that contemporary 
Mongolia represents a completely new society are quite plausible. 
In many ways, the society has been transformed, and in the 1980s 
rapid social change continued. The ruling party saw the nation as 
having leaped directly from feudalism to socialism, bypassing the 
capitalist stage of development. Many of the forms of socialist 
organization, particularly in the rapidly growing urban and indus- 
trial sectors, appeared to be direct copies of Soviet models, with 
some modification to fit the Mongolian context. The population 
has nearly tripled since 1920, as the government pursued a pro- 
natal policy rare among developing nations. Mongolia's herds of 
livestock, which outnumbered the human population by at least 
ten-to-one, had been collectivized, and herders in the 1980s worked 
as members of pastoral collectives that drew up monthly and an- 
nual plans for milk and wool production. 

By 1985 a slim majority of Mongolia's population was urban, 
working in factories and mines, and increasingly housed in Soviet- 
model, prefabricated highrises. Public health and education had 
been the objects of intense development, which by the 1980s had 
produced vital rates approaching those of developed nations and 
nearly universal literacy among the younger generation. Much of 
Mongolia's industrial development and urban growth has taken 
place since the mid-1970s and has been so recent that the country 
was only beginning to recognize the problems attending rapid in- 
dustrialization, urbanization, and occupational differentiation. 

The drive for modernization along Soviet lines has been accom- 
panied by an equally strong, but much less explicitly articulated, 
determination to maintain a distinctive Mongolian culture and to 
keep control of Mongolia's development in Mongolian hands. 
Although the topic was politically sensitive, Mongolia's leaders were 
nationalists as well as communists, and they aspired to much more 
independence than was permitted to the "national minorities" of 
the Soviet Union and China with whom the Mongolians otherwise 
had so much in common. 

Geography 
Landforms 

The terrain is one of mountains and rolling plateaus, with a high 
degree of relief (see fig. 4). Overall, the land slopes from the high 



60 




Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 



The Society and Its Environment 



Altai Mountains of the west and the north to plains and depres- 
sions in the east and the south. Hutyen Orgil (sometimes called 
Nayramadlin Orgil — Mount Friendship) in extreme western Mon- 
golia, where the Mongolian, the Soviet, and the Chinese borders 
meet, is the highest point (4,374 meters). The lowest is 560 meters, 
an otherwise undistinguished spot in the eastern Mongolian plain. 
The country has an average elevation of 1,580 meters. The land- 
scape includes one of Asia's largest freshwater lakes (Hovsgol Nuur), 
many salt lakes, marshes, sand dunes, rolling grasslands, alpine 
forests, and permanent montane glaciers. Northern and western 
Mongolia are seismically active zones, with frequent earthquakes 
and many hot springs and extinct volcanoes. 

Mongolia has three major mountain ranges. The highest is the 
Altai Mountains, which stretch across the western and the south- 
western regions of the country on a north west- to- southeast axis. 
The Hangayn Nuruu, mountains also trending northwest to 
southeast, occupy much of central and north-central Mongolia. 
These are older, lower, and more eroded mountains, with many 
forests and alpine pastures. The Hentiyn Nuruu, mountains near 
the Soviet border to the northeast of Ulaanbaatar, are lower still. 
Much of eastern Mongolia is occupied by a plain, and the lowest 
area is a southwest-to-northeast trending depression that reaches 
from the Gobi region in the south to the eastern frontier. The rivers 
drain in three directions: north to the Arctic Ocean, east to the 
Pacific, or south to the deserts and the depressions of Inner Asia. 
Rivers are most extensively developed in the north, and the coun- 
try's major river system is that of the Selenge Moron, which drains 
into Lake Baykal. Some minor tributaries of Siberia's Yenisey River 
also rise in the mountains of northwestern Mongolia. Rivers in 
northeastern Mongolia drain into the Pacific through the Argun 
and Amur (Heilongjiang) rivers, while the few streams of southern 
and southwestern Mongolia do not reach the sea but run into salt 
lakes or deserts. 

Climate 

Mongolia is high, cold, and dry. It has an extreme continental 
climate with long, cold winters and short summers, during which 
most precipitation falls. The country averages 257 cloudless days 
a year, and it is usually at the center of a region of high atmospheric 
pressure. Precipitation is highest in the north, which averages 20 
to 35 centimeters per year, and lowest in the south, which receives 
10 to 20 centimeters (see fig. 5). The extreme south is the Gobi, 
some regions of which receive no precipitation at all in most years. 
The name Gobi is derived from the Mongol word govi, meaning 



63 




Huyten Orgil ^j^-' rr 
(4374) *Cf. 



11 vs 





z 




Choybalsan 



r 



V 



* Dalandzadgad 

G o^ " ... 



> 



Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative. 



International 

boundary 
® National capital 
• Populated place 



100 200 Kilometer 
I 1 1— ' 1 



100 200 Miles 



Figure 4. Topography and Drainage 
62 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 




65 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

desert, depression, salt marsh, or steppe, but which usually refers 
to a category of arid rangeland with insufficient vegetation to sup- 
port marmots but with enough to support camels. Mongols distin- 
guish govi from desert proper, although the distinction is not always 
apparent to outsiders unfamiliar with the Mongolian landscape. 
Govi rangelands are fragile and are easily destroyed by overgraz- 
ing, which results in expansion of the true desert, a stony waste 
where not even Bactrian camels can survive. 

Average temperatures over most of the country are below freez- 
ing from November through March and are about freezing in April 
and October. January and February averages of -20°C are com- 
mon, with winter nights of -40°C occurring most years. Summer 
extremes reach as high as 38°C in the southern Gobi region and 
33 °C in Ulaanbaatar. More than half the country is covered by 
permafrost, which makes construction, road building, and min- 
ing difficult. All rivers and freshwater lakes freeze over in the winter, 
and smaller streams commonly freeze to the bottom. Ulaanbaatar 
lies at 1,351 meters above sea level in the valley of the Tuul Gol, 
a river. Located in the relatively well- watered north, it receives 
an annual average of 31 centimeters of precipitation, almost all 
of which falls in July and in August. Ulaanbaatar has an average 
annual temperature of-2.9°C and a frost-free period extending 
on the average from mid-June to late August (see fig. 6). 

Mongolia's weather is characterized by extreme variability and 
short-term unpredictability in the summer, and the multiyear aver- 
ages conceal wide variations in precipitation, dates of frosts, and 
occurrences of blizzards and spring dust storms. Such weather poses 
severe challenges to human and livestock survival. Official statis- 
tics list less than 1 percent of the country as arable, 8 to 10 percent 
as forest, and the rest as pasture or desert. Grain, mostly wheat, 
is grown in the valleys of the Selenge river system in the north, 
but yields fluctuate widely and unpredictably as a result of the 
amount and the timing of rain and the dates of killing frosts. 
Although winters are generally cold and clear, there are occasional 
blizzards that do not deposit much snow but cover the grasses with 
enough snow and ice to make grazing impossible, killing off tens 
of thousands of sheep or cattle. Such losses of livestock, which are 
an inevitable and, in a sense, normal consequence of the climate, 
have made it difficult for planned increases in livestock numbers 
to be achieved (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

Environmental Concerns 

After many years of uncritical fostering of industrial and urban 
growth, Mongolia's authorities became aware in the late 1980s of 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



the environmental costs of such policies. Belated Soviet concern 
over the pollution of Lake Baykal encouraged Mongolian actions 
to preserve their counterpart Hovsgol Nuur, which is linked to Lake 
Baykal through the Selenge Moron. A wool-scouring plant that 
had been discharging wastes into Hovsgol Nuur was closed; truck 
traffic on the winter ice was banned; and the shipping of oil in barges 
on the lake was stopped. Deforestation in the Hangayn Nuruu, 
had reduced the flow of northern Mongolia's rivers, which were 
polluted by runoff from the fertilized and pesticide-treated grain 
fields along their banks, by industrial wastes, and by untreated sew- 
age from growing settlements. Ulaanbaatar — located in a valley — 
with factories and 500,000 inhabitants who depend on soft coal, 
had severe air pollution, especially when the air was still and cold 
in winter. Deforestation, overgrazing of pastures, and efforts to 
increase grain and hay production by plowing up more virgin land 
had resulted in increased soil erosion, both from wind and from 
heavy downpours of the severe thunderstorms that bring much of 
Mongolia's rain. In the south, the desert area of the Gobi was ex- 
panding, threatening the fragile govt pasturelands. The government 
responded by founding the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
in 1987 and by giving increased publicity to environmental issues. 

Population 

Vital Rates 

Mongolia's population is sparsely distributed, young, and in- 
creasing rapidly. With an estimated midyear 1989 population of 
2,125,463, the average population density was 1.36 people per 
square kilometer (see fig. 7). The annual growth rate was about 
2.7 percent, which, if sustained, would double the population in 
27 years. The rate of natural increase was the result of high birth- 
rates and of death rates that were relatively low by world standards 
(see table 2, Appendix). Mongolia does not publish figures for in- 
fant mortality, but estimates in the late 1980s ranged between 49 
and 53 per 1 ,000 births. The population's sex ratio was nearly even, 
with official 1986 figures showing 50. 1 percent of the total popula- 
tion as male and 49.9 percent as female. 

Such high population growth was one of the most striking ex- 
amples of the profound transformation of traditional Mongolian 
society. The high growth rate dated only to the late 1950s, when 
the effects of improved public health and medical services were 
reflected in sharply reduced death rates. Despite a growth rate of 
under 3 percent, government statistics claimed that the population 
doubled between 1963 and 1988. The rate of population increase 



67 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 



had peaked in 1960 at 3.27 percent, but it had declined to about 
2.7 percent by 1989. Such a quickly growing population was neces- 
sarily a young population. In 1988 population experts in a World 
Bank publication projected that by 1990 72 percent of Mongolia's 
population would be fourteen years old and younger (see fig. 8). 

Pro-natal Policies 

A larger population has been a long-standing goal of the govern- 
ment, which provided a series of incentives to encourage large 
families. A labor shortage has provided the primary overt justifi- 
cation for the policy, and economic aid from the Soviet Union has 
enabled Mongolia to meet the costs of supporting a large and eco- 
nomically unproductive cohort of children. Because the economy 
of Mongolia was to a large extent integrated with that of eastern 
Siberia, where the Soviet Union has suffered endemic labor short- 
ages, encouraging the growth of the Mongolian population and 
labor force was in the interest of the Soviet Union (see Socialist 
Framework of the Economy, ch. 3). Reinforcing the policy may 
be a desire to ensure the survival of Mongols as an ethnic group 
and to boost the initially somewhat questionable legitimacy and 
sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic by occupying the 
land and by ensuring that key institutions and enterprises are staffed 
by Mongolians rather than by management imported at the be- 
hest of the Soviet Union. 

The government and the ruling party put no obstacles in the 
way of early marriages, and engagements and marriages among 
university students were common. In 1985 there were 6.3 mar- 
riages and 0.3 divorces per 1,000 people. A March 1989 Mongolian 
newspaper reported that every twentieth marriage broke up, that 
more than 15,000 mothers were receiving alimony from former 
husbands, and that 45,000 of the 870,000 children aged fifteen and 
younger were illegitimate. When resident Chinese laborers were 
expelled from Mongolia in the late 1960s as a result of the Sino- 
Soviet conflict, their alleged offenses included the possession and 
the distribution of contraceptives (see Socialist Construction Under 
Tsedenbal, 1952-84, ch. 1). Childbearing was promoted as every 
woman's patriotic obligation, and exhortations to fecundity were 
backed up by a range of material incentives (see The Position of 
Women, this ch.). Working women were granted a maternity leave 
of 101 days, and the Labor Law prohibited dismissal of pregnant 
women and of those with children younger than one year. Parents 
received family allowances in cash; subsidies, paid to families with 
more than four children younger than sixteen, could amount to 
as much as an average industrial wage. Women with five or more 



69 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



75 AND OVER 








m 








70-74 








m 








65-69 








mm 








60-64 
















55-59 




MALES 




FEMALES 




50-54 
















45-49 
















40-44 








v///////mmm 






35-39 














30-34 






Y/A 








25-29 






V///// 








20-24 










15-19 








■ 




10-14 








5-9 




0-4 





400 300 200 100 100 200 300 400 



POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from K.C. Zachariah and My T. Vu, World Population Projec- 
tions, 1987-88 Edition, Baltimore, 1988, 282. 

Figure 8. Age-Sex Ratio, 1990 Projection 

living children received the Order of Maternal Glory, Second Class, 
medal and an annual subsidy of 400 tugriks (for value of the tugrik — 
see Glossary) per child; those with more than eight children received 
the Order of Maternal Glory, First Class, and 600 tugriks per child. 
The medals entitied the mothers to all-expenses paid annual vaca- 
tions of two weeks at the hot springs spa of their choice, steep dis- 
counts in fees for child care, and other benefits. Marriage and 
childbearing also were promoted by a special tax (of an unspecified 
amount) levied on unmarried and childless citizens between the ages 
of twenty and fifty. Full-time students in secondary schools and col- 
leges were exempted from this tax, as were military conscripts. 

The birth needed to bring the current Mongolian population to 
2 million was the occasion for national celebration in 1987. The 
government's Central Statistical Board determined that one of the 
260 babies born July 1 1 (Mongolia's National Day) was the 2 mil- 
lionth citizen. Twenty-five of the babies were selected as "Two 
Million Babies." The state awarded each of their families two new 
residences (probably apartments), the Children's Foundation 
awarded each a 5,000-tugrik subsidy (industrial wages range from 
an average of 550 tugriks to a high of 900 tugriks per month), and 
local governments and the parents' workplaces also gave gifts. 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



Population Distribution 

The 1979 census showed that 51 percent of the population was 
urban, and this percentage remained unchanged through 1986. 
Rural population density in the mid-1980s was highest in the well- 
watered regions of the north and the west and lowest in the arid 
and desert areas of the south and the east. The country as a whole 
averaged 1.36 people per square kilometer, with rural densities in 
1986 ranging from 1 .9 people per square kilometer in Bayan-Olgiy 
and Selenge aymags (see Glossary) to 0.22 people per square kilo- 
meter in Omnogovi Aymag (see fig. 1). The three largest cities — 
Ulaanbaatar, Darhan, and Erdenet — are in north-central Mon- 
golia, on or near the main railroad line and the Selenge Moron 
or its major tributaries. Half the country's population lived in this 
core area, with its river valleys, productive upland pastures, coal 
and copper mines, and relatively well-developed transportation sys- 
tem. The remaining, much larger area — occupied by widely dis- 
persed herders and by isolated administrative centers — was the 
economic and social periphery. 

The Urban Population 

The city system is dominated by Ulaanbaatar — a classic primate 
city far larger than the second-ranking or third-ranking cities — in 
which all important political, economic, and cultural functions are 
centralized. In 1986 Ulaanbaatar had 500,200 people, or nearly 
25 percent of the nation's population. Its dominant position was 
demonstrated by the transportation system, which radiated out from 
Ulaanbaatar (see Transportation, ch. 3). The industrial center of 
Darhan, on the main railroad line north of Ulaanbaatar, had 74,000 
people in 1986; Erdenet, founded in 1976 and built around a major 
copper and molybdenum mining complex, had 45,400. Fourth place 
went to Choybalsan, the industrial metropolis of eastern Mongo- 
lia in Dornod Aymag, which had 28,600 people in 1979. Fifth 
through tenth places were occupied by a set of aymag seats with 
populations in the 16,000-to-18,000 range in 1979. The lowest rung 
of the urban hierarchy was occupied by the headquarters of state 
farms or herding cooperatives, which usually featured administra- 
tive offices, primary schools with boarding facilities, clinics, assem- 
bly halls, fodder storage facilities, and the cooperative's motor pool 
and truck maintenance centers. 

During the 1980s, the pace of urban residential construction was 
rapid, and an increasing proportion of the urban populace was 
housed in Soviet-designed, prefabricated four-story or high-rise 
apartment complexes. Such housing complexes — equipped with 



71 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

heat from central plants and served by planned complexes of shops, 
schools, and playgrounds as well as by bus routes — represented 
the zenith of modernism and progress. Many people in cities con- 
tinued to live in the traditional Mongolian round felt tents called 
ger (see Glossary). Mongolians do not regard ger as backward or 
shameful, even in Ulaanbaatar, but urban planners considered that 
the much higher population densities afforded by high-rise hous- 
ing would permit optimum use of often- scarce flat ground and would 
afford the most efficient utilization of public transportion and public 
utilities such as water and sewer lines. 

Ethnic and Linguistic Groups 

Mongols and Kazakhs 

Mongolia's population is ethnically quite homogenous; about 
90 percent of the populace speaks one of several dialects of the Mon- 
gol language. Mongol is an Altaic language, related to the Turkic 
languages, such as Uzbek, Turkish, and Kazakh (see Glossary), 
and more distantly to Korean and perhaps, in the opinion of some 
linguists, to Japanese. Except for the dialect of the Buryat Mon- 
gols, who predominantly inhabit the area around Lake Baykal in 
Siberia, and the dialects of scattered isoglosses in Mongolia, all 
dialects of Mongol spoken in Mongolia are readily understood by 
native speakers of the language. The Khalkha (see Glossary) Mon- 
gols are the largest element of the population. According to the 
1979 census, they made up 77.5 percent of the population (see 
table 3, Appendix). The term khalkha, which means "shield," has 
been used at least since the mid-sixteenth century to refer to the 
nomads of the traditional Mongol heartland of high steppes and 
mountains. They have been the most thoroughly pastoral of all the 
Mongol tribes or subethnic groups, the nomads' nomads, and the 
least affected by foreign influences. In the twentieth century, they 
occupied most of the central and the eastern areas of the country. 
Khalkha Mongol is the standard language; it is taught in the schools 
and is used for all official business. The written language is based 
on the Khalkha of the Ulaanbaatar region, and when Mongol script 
was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet between 1941 and 1946, the 
Russian Cyrillic was modified to suit the phonetic structure of 
Khalkha. 

Another 12 percent of the population in 1979 spoke a variety 
of western or northern Mongol dialects, such as Dorbet, Dzakchin, 
Buryat, or the southeastern Dariganga. Speakers of these dialects 
were concentrated in their ancestral territories in far western or 
northwestern Mongolia in Hovd, Uvs, and Hovsgol aymags, or along 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Chinese frontier in the southeast. Ethnic distinctions among 
the various Mongol subgroups have been relatively minor; they 
have been expressed in oral traditions of historical conflicts among 
the groups, in such ethnic markers as women's headdresses or the 
shapes of boots, and in such minor variations in pastoral technique 
as placement of camels' nose pegs (see Mongolia in Transition, 
1368-1911, ch. 1). Apart from immediate adaptation to different 
environments, Mongol culture has been relatively uniform over 
large areas, and dialect or tribal differences have not become sig- 
nificant political or social issues. 

Mongolia's largest minority, accounting for 5.3 percent of the 
population in 1979, is the Kazakh people of the Altai. The Kazakhs, 
who also live in the Soviet Union's Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 
and in China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, are a pas- 
toral, Turkic-speaking, and traditionally Muslim people who live 
in Bayan-Olgiy Aymag in extreme western Mongolia. Bayan-Olgiy 
is a largely Kazakh administrative unit, where the Kazakh language 
is used in the primary schools and in local administrative offices. 
There is a fairly high level of contact with the Soviet Union's Kazakh 
Republic, which provides textbooks for the schools. Kazakhs of the 
Altai traditionally have hunted from horseback with trained golden 
eagles on their wrists and greyhounds slung across the saddle — 
both to be launched at game — and pictures of eagle-bearing 
Kazakhs are common in Mongolian tourist literature. Mongol is 
taught as the second language and Russian as the third in Kazakh 
schools, and bilingual Kazakhs appear to participate in the Mon- 
golian professional and bureaucratic elite on an equal footing with 
Mongols. Kazakhs also make up a disproportionate number of the 
relatively highly paid workers in the coal mines of north-central 
Mongolia; this situation may indicate either limited opportunities 
in the narrow valleys of Bayan-Olgiy Aymag or government efforts 
to favor a potentially restive minority, or both. 

Chinese, Russians, and Others 

The 1979 census identified the "nationality" of 5.5 percent of 
the population simply as "other," an undefined category that 
presumably included small numbers of Tungu sic- speaking hun- 
ters and reindeer herders in the northeast, some Turkic- speaking 
Tuvins (see Glossary) in Uvs and Dzavhan aymags, and, in the Altai 
region, isolated clusters of Uzbeks and Uighurs (the latter of 
whom — whose ancestors migrated north from Xinjiang in north- 
western China — grow irrigated rice in the relatively sheltered Hovd 
Basin). The category also included Russian and Chinese residents, 
whose national and legal status is, perhaps intentionally, obscure. 



73 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Mongolia's 1956 census counted Chinese as 1.9 percent and Rus- 
sians as 1 .6 percent of the population, but as of 1989 no totals for 
those groups had been published since. The United States Govern- 
ment in 1987 estimated 2 percent of the population as Russian and 
2 percent as Chinese. 

Historically, the Gobi served as a barrier to large-scale Chinese 
settlement in what was, before 1921, called Outer Mongolia (see 
Glossary); the unsuitability of most of the territory for agriculture 
made southern settlement less attractive. The small Chinese popu- 
lation in the early 1920s consisted of merchants or peddlers, arti- 
sans working for Buddhist monasteries or Mongol aristocrats, and 
a few market gardeners near Ulaanbaatar (then called Niyslel — 
capital — Huree, or Urga — see Glossary) and the smaller popula- 
tion centers of the Selenge region (see Religion, this ch.). Many 
of the Chinese married or formed liaisons with Mongol women. 
Their children, who spoke Mongol as first language, were regarded 
as Chinese by the rules of patrilineal descent common to both 
Chinese and Mongols. In the early 1980s, Ulaanbaatar was reported 
to have a small Chinese community, which published a Chinese- 
language newspaper and which looked to the Chinese embassy for 
moral support. In 1983 the Mongolian government expelled about 
1 ,700 Chinese residents, who were accused of "preferring an idle, 
parasitic way of life" to honest labor on the state farms to which 
they had been assigned. At the same time, ethnic Chinese who had 
become naturalized citizens were reported to be unaffected. Be- 
cause the presence and the status of Chinese residents in Mongo- 
lia were politically sensitive subjects, Mongolian sources usually 
avoided mentioning the Chinese at all. 

The same sources frequently referred to the Soviet residents of 
Mongolia, but they always described them as helpful foreigners 
who would return to their proper homes when their terms of ser- 
vice were over. Most presumably were not included in the Mon- 
golian census figures. There were small numbers of descendants 
of Russian settlers along the border, and the "national" status of 
Buryat Mongols, Tuvins, or Kazakhs who at some point had 
crossed the border from their home territories in the Soviet Union 
was not clear. Thousands of Soviet nationals were working in Mon- 
golia as technical experts, advisers, and skilled workers; they were 
a noticeable presence in Mongolian cities in the late 1980s. Erde- 
net, which was built around a joint Mongolian- Soviet copper- 
molybdenum mining and processing complex in the late 1970s, had 
a 1987 population of 40,000 Mongols and 10,000 Soviet workers 
on three-year contracts. In the 1980s, an estimated 55,000 Soviet 
troops were based in Mongolia, and some of them worked on 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



construction projects in cities (see Threat Perception, ch. 5). 
Although since 1920 many Russians have settled in the Tannu Tuva 
and Buryat Mongol regions of Siberia across the border from north- 
ern Mongolia, there has been no Russian migration to, and settle- 
ment in, Mongolia. 

Society 

Pastoral Nomadism 

Almost every aspect of Mongolian society has been shaped by 
pastoral nomadism, an ecological adaptation that makes it possible 
to support more people in the Mongolian environment than would 
be true under any other mode of subsistence. Pastoralism is a com- 
plex and sophisticated adaptation to environments marked by ex- 
treme variability in temperature and precipitation, on time scales 
ranging from days to decades. Mongolia's precipitation is not only 
low on the average; it varies widely and unpredictably from year 
to year and from place to place. The dates of first and last frosts, 
and hence the length of the growing season, also vary widely. Such 
general conditions favor grasses rather than trees, and they produce 
prairies rather than forests. Grain can be grown under such condi- 
tions, but not every year. Any population attempting to support 
itself by cereal agriculture could expect to lose its entire crop once 
every ten years, or every seven years, or every other year, depend- 
ing on the localities they were farming. Because ecological systems 
adapt to extreme limiting conditions rather than to the mean of var- 
iation, agriculture is not adaptive to Mongolian circumstances. 

Pastoralism, however, permits societies to exploit the variable 
and patchy resources of the steppe. The key to pastoralism is mo- 
bility, which permits temporary exploitation of resources that are 
not sufficient to sustain a human and herbivore population for an 
entire year. Pastoralism may be combined with agriculture if a stable 
resource base, such as an oasis, permits, or agriculture may serve, 
as in central Mongolia, only to supplement herding and may be 
practiced only to the extent that labor is available. 

A host of features of nomadic life reflect the demands and costs 
of mobility and of dependence on herds of animals to convert the 
energy stored in grasses to the milk and meat that feed the human 
population. Such societies commonly develop a conscious and ex- 
plicit nomadic ethos, which values mobility and the ability to cope 
with problems by moving away from threats or toward resources 
and which disparages permanent setdement, cultivation of the earth, 
and accumulation of objects. 



75 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Societies based on pastoral nomadism do not exist in isolation, 
and nomads commonly live in symbiotic relationships with settled 
agriculturalists, exchanging animal products for grain, textiles, and 
manufactured goods. Both the nomads and the agriculturalists can, 
if necessary, survive without the goods provided by the other, but 
under most circumstances both benefit from exchange. Mongols typi- 
cally dressed in sheepskin tunics covered with Chinese silk; drank 
tea from China; consumed a certain amount of millet, barley, and 
wheat flour; and used cooking pots and steel tools produced by non- 
nomadic smiths, some of whom were Mongols and some Turkic 
speakers or Chinese. However, the scattered nature of the popula- 
tion and the necessity of moving trade goods long distances by camel 
caravan limited the quantity of bulky goods available to nomads. 

Pastoralism as a Cultural System 

Mongolian society and culture developed in interaction with, and 
in conscious opposition to, that of settled agriculturalists, most of 
them Chinese. Along the ill-defined Inner Asian frontier between 
the lands with sufficient rainfall and warm weather to support 
agriculture and the grasslands most effectively exploited by pas- 
toralists, people and cultural elements for centuries have moved 
in both directions, with some agriculturalists abandoning their mar- 
ginal farms and becoming herders, and with some herders settling 
down either as dominant overlords or as laborers. Superimposed 
on the gradation and shading that are characteristic of frontier cul- 
tural and biological systems is a cultural system of ethnic groups 
that exaggerates distinctions and denies commonalities. 

Much of Mongolian traditional culture thus goes beyond the ob- 
jective, technical demands of pastoral life to a conscious glorifica- 
tion of the values of nomadism and a disparagement of practices 
associated with settlement in general and with Chinese culture in 
particular. Traditionally, Mongols not only preferred a diet of meat 
and milk, but they despised, and refused to eat, vegetables, justify- 
ing this with a proverb, "Meat for men, leaves for animals." 
Although Mongolian lakes and rivers are full of fish, traditionally 
Mongols did not eat fish. Mongols disdained the sort of regular, 
patient toil practiced by Chinese farmers or traders, and scorned 
any work that could not be performed from horseback. Such values 
and attitudes have presented severe obstacles to efforts to moder- 
nize Mongolian society. 

Pastoralism in Practice 

Mongols herd sheep, horses, cattle, goats, camels, and yaks. 
Although horses are the most valued animal, Mongols actually 



76 



A yurt or ger 
Courtesy Regina Genton 



depend on sheep for their basic livelihood. Horses are the focus 
of an elaborate cultural complex, in which the care of horses is a 
male prerogative, whereas tending and milking sheep is a female 
task. In Mongolian epics, the second lead is always the horse, which 
gives sound advice to the hero. In Mongolian chess, the most power- 
ful piece is called the horse, rather than the queen. The national 
musical instrument is a bowed string instrument with a carved 
horse's head, called a morin huur, which, according to legend, was 
invented by a rider who used the rib bones and the mane of his 
favorite horse to make an instrument to express his sorrow at its 
death. Fermented mare's milk, ayrag, is the national drink; it is 
considered to have special nutritional and tonic qualities. State- 
owned mines and factories maintain special herds of horses to pro- 
vide their workers with the ayrag they are thought to require to main- 
tain their health. 

Sheep provide milk, which is processed into butter, cheeses, and 
other dairy products; mutton, wool, and hide for clothes and tents; 
and dung for cooking and heating. Sheep can be herded on foot, 
with one person and a few dogs responsible for a flock. Mongolian 
dogs, which are famous for their ferocity and hostility to strangers, 
do not help herd sheep as Western sheepdogs do, but they protect 



77 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

the flocks from wolves or other predators. Sheep are driven back 
to the camp every night, both for their protection and to provide 
a concentrated and convenient supply of dung. The sheep are led 
out to pasture each day, ideally moving out from the camp in a 
spiral until fresh pasture is so far away that it is more convenient 
to move the camp. 

Each species of animal is herded separately, and herders must 
balance, therefore, the expected benefit from each type of animal 
against the cost of providing human labor to watch each separate 
herd and to move to the precise environment to which each animal 
is best suited. Sheep are basic, horses something of a luxury item, 
and other species are added to the camp inventory as labor power 
and environmental considerations dictate. The demands on human 
labor mean that a single household is not the optimal unit for herd- 
ing. The basic unit in Mongol pastoralism is a herding camp, com- 
posed of two to six households, that manages its flocks as a single 
integrated economic unit. In the past, the members of a herding 
camp were usually, though not necessarily, patrilineal kinsmen. 
Membership of the herding camp was reconstituted on a year-to- 
year basis, with some households remaining in the same camp, 
others leaving to join different camps, and some camps dividing 
if their human and animal populations grew too large for effective 
operation. Under collectivization, herding camps remained the basic 
unit of pastoral production. 

Constraints on Herding 

The harsh winter provides the greatest challenge to pastoralists. 
The herds traditionally have spent the winter eating dried grasses 
on the range, with at most a stone corral for shelter from the worst 
winter blizzards. Since the 1950s, Mongolian authorities have 
worked to provide shelters and fodder for the herds. Catastrophic 
storms, coming in midwinter or at the spring lambing season, can 
wipe out entire herds or severely reduce their numbers. Herders 
move to special winter campsites, and they reduce the size of the 
herd to be carried on the winter pasture by slaughtering any animals 
thought unlikely to survive the winter. Late fall is the only time 
Mongols routinely slaughter animals; the meat, preserved by dry- 
ing and freezing, sustains the people during the season when neither 
sheep nor horses are producing milk. (Mongols do not eat horse- 
flesh; Kazakhs do.) Mongols traditionally have consumed more 
milk products than meat; animals are slaughtered in seasons other 
than fall only for ceremonial occasions or for obligatory hospital- 
ity to guests. 



78 



High-rise apartment building, Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Steve Mann 



Winter conditions, which severely test the Mongols' ability to 
sustain their herds and hence themselves, throw the society's 
property system and the larger political structure into relief. The 
key element in bringing a herd through the winter is a suitable 
winter campsite, which must have a source of water near terrain 
sheltered from the worst storms but open enough for the wind to 
blow snow off the grasses. The number of winter campsites is lim- 
ited, and their ownership always has been well-defined. In the past, 
they were owned privately by families under the residual owner- 
ship of the lowest-level local administrative unit known by a num- 
ber of names, banners (see Glossary) being common. Now they 
are owned by the herding cooperative or state farm, which allo- 
cates them to herding camps. 

Outsiders, who tended to observe Mongolian herders only in 
the summer, mistakenly assumed that they wandered randomly 
across an undifferentiated sea of grass. From a Mongolian perspec- 
tive, however, the landscape was far from undifferentiated, and 
each move of a camp reflected a careful decision that matched the 
needs of the herd with an estimate of the condition of the grasses 
and the water supply at several known sites within a large, but 
bounded, territory. Traditionally, Mongols thought of ownership 



79 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

and territory not, as an agriculturalist would, in terms of square 
kilometers or hectares of ground with a sharp line around them, 
but as rights to use certain strategic areas in the landscape, such 
as springs, streambanks adjacent to good pasture, or named and 
permanent winter campsites. Such areas were the objects of con- 
flict between and among groups of herders; the larger political struc- 
ture, both past and present, regulated access to these key resources 
and adjudicated claims to them. 

Traditional Patterns 

Mongolia's modern rulers, using common Marxist categories, 
describe society before 1921 as "feudal." The term, although not 
totally accurate, better fits traditional Mongolian society than it 
does many other societies that have undergone communist-directed 
revolutions. In traditional Mongolian society, almost all statuses 
were hereditary. Most exchanges were embedded in long-term, 
multifaceted social relations rather than transacted in an imper- 
sonal market through money; the political system was based on 
a hierarchy of all-embracing service owed to hereditary overlords; 
and such limited formal education and social mobility as existed 
took place within the monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism, or Lama- 
ism (see Glossary). The society was dominated by hereditary nobles, 
who claimed descent from Chinggis Khan and governed the 
commoners. The nobles were vassals of the Manchu emperors of 
China's Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), and the hierarchy continued 
down to the level of the common herders (see Caught Between the 
Russians and the Manchus, ch. 1). In this system, people owed 
broad and ill-defined service, including military duty, the temporary 
provision of horses to those traveling on official business, and the 
supply of sheep and livestock on both fixed and special occasions 
to their overlords. Mongol social life was marked by an elaborate 
etiquette that expressed degrees of hierarchy and deference through 
words and gestures. 

Above the level of the herding camp, Mongols were enrolled in 
larger groups that had exclusive rights to use of territory and were, 
in their formal structure, hereditary military units. Such groups, 
the names of which varied from place to place and from time to 
time (banner, aymag, and so forth), were established by political 
rulers, and people originally were allocated to them regardless of 
kinship or preexisting social bonds. Membership in such groups 
was thus fundamentally a political status. Although Mongols recog- 
nized exogamous lineages based on patrilineal descent, lineages 
were not political or property-holding groups, and their member- 
ship commonly was spread over several territorial groups. 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



Commerce was in the hands of foreign merchants, most of them 
Chinese. Traditional Mongols exhibited a cavalier disdain for 
money and practiced careful pecuniary calculation. Mongol aris- 
tocrats ran up huge debts to Chinese and Russian merchants, and 
when pressed by creditors, tried to exact more livestock or services 
from their dependent commoners. The merchants controlled the 
interface between the internal Mongol economy — which operated 
largely with the social mechanisms of reciprocity and redistribu- 
tion — and the larger market economy, and they profited in the con- 
version from one economic sphere of exchange to the other. During 
the 1920s, foreign merchants were expelled from Mongolia, and 
the debts owed to them were repudiated. 

The only alternative to the all-embracing feudal system of subor- 
dination was provided by the Tibetan Buddhist church, which 
recruited both young boys and men as monks, or lamas, and offered 
careers to those with talent. Although rational and bureaucratic 
in its organization and accounting, the Buddhist church was dis- 
tinctly otherworldly, not interested in progress, and, with some 
justification, was considered the major obstacle to the moderniza- 
tion of Mongolian life. Between 1925 and 1939, it was destroyed 
as a significant political and social force (see Modern Mongolia, 
1911-84, ch. 1; Religion, this ch.). 

The structure of traditional Mongolian society consisted of a large 
number of equivalent units: herding camps; basic-level territorial 
units; and Buddhist monasteries, integrated only through their com- 
mon subordination to political superiors and the shared values of 
Tibetan Buddhism and Mongol ethnicity. Most of the population 
occupied only a few occupational roles; herders and ordinary monks 
accounted for more than 90 percent of the population. Hereditary 
aristocrats — 8 percent of the population — occupied a larger range 
of occupational roles and offices as political leaders and adminis- 
trators; so did the higher monks, with their more differentiated in- 
ternal organization. The society was traditional in its preference 
for status relations over contractual ones, for ascribed statuses over 
achieved ones, for functionally diffuse over functionally specific or- 
ganization, and in its very low levels of division of labor. 

Planned Modernization 

Modernization in Mongolia has meant establishing new, special- 
purpose organizations, expanding the scope and responsibilities of 
the government, generating new occupational roles and hence in- 
creasing the division of labor, as well as formulating new mechan- 
isms to integrate and to coordinate a society that is much more 
differentiated than its predecessor. Mongolia's modernization has, 



81 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

furthermore, taken place at the direction of a political party and 
a foreign patron the ideology of which emphasizes rational plan- 
ning and disparages the use of market mechanisms to integrate the 
society. In the 1980s, Mongolia's leaders and mass media continued 
to stress the necessity of planning, of meeting goals and targets, 
and of carrying on large-scale projects. 

The former value of accommodation to, and harmony with, the 
natural world has been replaced by a fervent assertion of the domin- 
ion of man over nature and a major effort to control and to con- 
quer the natural environment. Science in the form of veterinary 
medicine, artificial insemination, and selective breeding has been 
applied to the herds in the effort to reach the increases in sheep, 
yaks, horses, and goats that were set in the five-year plans (see So- 
cialist Framework of the Economy, ch. 3). Mongolia's press has 
publicized the number of hectares of steppe planted with wheat 
and has praised the labor heroes who level mountains of copper 
ore or control huge excavators at open-pit coal mines. The appli- 
cation of the most up-to-date science and technology has been ex- 
pected to result in "the comprehensive development of the 
productive forces of socialist society, ' ' which in turn would produce 
rapid economic growth and increases in people's prosperity. The 
value of control, over both the natural environment and the human 
population, was associated closely with the ideology of planning, 
and carrying out the dictates of the plan has been made a primary 
political virtue for Mongolian citizens. 

Social change in modern Mongolia has consisted of the enroll- 
ment of previously self-sufficient herders into bureaucratically struc- 
tured and economically specialized productive units, such as herding 
collectives or state factories and mines. Most Mongolians have be- 
come wage-earners, subject to labor discipline and to the supervi- 
sion of a new class of managers and administrators, most of whom 
belong to the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In 
return for submission to labor discipline and surveillance, workers 
have received greater security and a range of welfare benefits from 
their enterprise or herding collectives. Benefits include free medi- 
cal care and education, child allowances, sick leave and annual holi- 
days, and old-age pensions. The government has made considerable 
efforts to reduce the gap between the benefits and the opportuni- 
ties available to industrial workers and urban administrators and 
those provided to the pastoralists. 

A modernized state farm and its machine operators were 
described in a Mongolian magazine in the 1980s. The drivers 
of tractors and combines were graduates of a three-year voca- 
tional secondary school, and each had a daily quota of plowing or 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



harvesting. Those who fulfilled their day's quota received a free 
lunch, "prepared by professional cooks," and overfulfillment of 
the daily quota brought additional remuneration. Like most Mon- 
golian workers, they engaged in "socialist emulation" contests, 
a Soviet practice under which teams of workers competed to do 
a task quickly or to surpass a quota. Each worker was rated as a 
first-class machine operator or a second-class machine operator, 
and the skill rating, in combination with an increment for length 
of service, determined the wage level. The state farm's chief 
agronomist, a graduate of an agricultural college, toured the area 
on his motorcycle to check the quality of each day's plowing. The 
state farm's administrative center was described as an urban- style 
community with two- story buildings and such amenities as a second- 
ary school, medical facilities staffed with physicians, day-care 
centers for children of working parents, shops, and a "palace of 
culture." 

Modernization has meant the creation of a substantial body of 
planners, supervisors, accountants, and clerks. The state has clearly 
attempted to control and to monitor the performance of all work- 
ers, including herders, who had quotas for weekly and monthly 
production of milk, butter, cheese, and wool. 

Unifying Structures 

As the economy has developed, the population has increased, 
the society has grown more differentiated, the people have come 
to have less in common, and the need to coordinate and to inte- 
grate their activities has become more pressing. The society for- 
merly was held together and was coordinated by a set of unifying 
structures, of which the most significant were the ruling party, the 
educational system, and a set of party-directed organizations in- 
tended to enroll nearly every Mongolian in their activities. 

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, like other ruling 
communist parties, directed the activities of all enterprises and large- 
scale organizations, from herding collectives to the national govern- 
ment (see Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, ch. 4). Col- 
lective farms and factories usually were run by the first secretary 
of the local party branch, and the party made an effort to recruit 
outstanding workers and people with leadership and managerial 
potential. Party members belonged to two organizations, their work 
unit and the party, and were the intermediaries who linked enter- 
prises and local communities with the national political system. 
Party members constituted most of the extensive ranks of adminis- 
trators who ran the country on a day-to-day basis. They were po- 
litical generalists, generic managers; those at the higher levels 



83 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

usually had been trained in special party schools in the Soviet Union 
or in Ulaanbaatar. 

In marked contrast with the past, almost all young Mongolians 
were enrolled in schools in the 1980s (see Education, this ch.). Eight 
years of schooling was claimed to be universal, and most cities and 
centers of collectives offered ten-year schools, usually with board- 
ing facilities for the children of herders. Literacy among young peo- 
ple was reportedly nearly universal, and the schools provided explicit 
training in nationalism and party ideology. Like schools in most 
countries, Mongolian schools also provided the training in punc- 
tuality, respect for abstract rules and standards, and participation 
in collective tasks needed to prepare young people for employment 
in formal, bureaucratic organizations, including the military services 
(see Organization since 1968, ch. 5). 

A set of organizations — trade unions, children's Young Pioneers, 
the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League (modeled on the Soviet 
Komsomol, for people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-eight), 
the Mongolian Women's Committee, and various sports and hobby 
groups — was intended to enroll every member of the population 
and to ensure that citizens who were not members of the elite party 
nonetheless were exposed to its ideology, example, and leadership. 
Mass organizations were controlled by the party (see Mass Organi- 
zations, ch. 4). Although the extent to which mass organization 
actively enrolled and mobilized the citizenry was unclear, they 
claimed huge memberships — 94.7 percent of all laborers and office 
and professional workers in state-owned enterprises belonged to 
trade unions in 1984; they were obviously intended to unify the 
populace and to promote identification with national goals (see 
Trade Unions, ch. 3). The responsibilities of the Mongolian 
Women's Committee included "the enlistment of women in the 
conscious performance of their civic and labor duty," which was 
accomplished through such means as annual rallies for female stock- 
breeders. By cutting across local and regional boundaries, the mass 
organizations promoted identification with the nation rather than 
the locality and with vocational or avocational rather than regional 
or ethnic interests. 

Increasing Social Differentiation 

Mongolia's economic development in the 1970s and the 1980s 
produced a population increasingly divided along occupational, 
educational, and regional lines. There were growing distinctions 
between workers and white-collar administrators; between urban 
and rural residents; between factory workers and pastoralists; be- 
tween professionals, such as teachers and engineers, and the 



84 



Traditional fur-lined coat and cap 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs 
Division, Library of Congress 



Woman in sheepskin- lined coat 
Courtesy Prints and Photographs 
Division, Library of Congress 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

politically elite generalist managers; between those with only a 
primary school education and the graduates of post-secondary in- 
stitutions in Mongolia or the Soviet Union; and, perhaps, between 
residents of the economic core in north-central Mongolia and those 
of the larger, but more sparsely populated, peripheral regions. All 
these distinctions entailed differences in income, life chances, pres- 
tige, and power, and they indicated potential strains in the social 
and political system. The strains took the form both of increased 
competition for the more desirable occupations and of concern 
within the government and the party over the way policies and prac- 
tices favored some segments of the population over others, such 
as industrial workers at the expense of pastoralists, or urban univer- 
sities at the expense of rural primary schools. 

The 51 percent urban population reported in the 1979 census 
reflected rapid migration to the cities in the 1970s. The influx of 
rural people created housing problems, among them long waits for 
assignment to an apartment, expansion of ger districts on the edges 
of built-up areas, and pressure to invest in more housing, roads, 
and other urban infrastructure. The 1979 census showed Mongo- 
lia's class structure to consist approximately 40 percent of workers, 
39 percent of herders in cooperatives, and 21 percent of intelligent- 
sia. The last term was not defined but presumably referred to those 
with at least secondary schooling and non-manual occupations. 

Mongolia has suffered from a continual shortage of skilled labor 
and has had to rely on foreign workers. They come from the Soviet 
Union and the member countries of the Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance (Comecon — see Glossary) on short-term contracts. 
At the same time, the ranks of Mongolian clerks, accountants, and 
low-level managers grew many fold, and Mongolian leaders occa- 
sionally alluded to problems in persuading young people to aim 
for careers as skilled workers or engineers rather than as office work- 
ers. The result of the government's great efforts to expand educa- 
tion has been a society very conscious of educational credentials; 
in some instances, the diploma is more significant than any sub- 
stantive knowledge or skill it might represent. 

The elite consisted of bureaucrats and ranking members of the 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Such people were usually 
male graduates of universities or military academies; they possessed 
a good command of Russian, had experience studying or working 
in the Soviet Union, and tended to live in Ulaanbaatar. They held 
positions in the nomenklatura (see Glossary), the Russian term denot- 
ing, narrowly, the elite administrative positions the ruling party 
filled by appointment and, more broadly, the elite "New Class" 
that dominated Soviet society. They had urban apartments, scarce 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



consumer goods, opportunities for foreign travel, the use of offi- 
cial vehicles, and access to first-rate medical care; they probably 
sent their children to universities and into professional occupations. 

Under the managerial elite were technical specialists, such as 
engineers, doctors, professors, and financial and planning experts, 
who also were university-trained, fluent in Russian, and predomi- 
nately urban. Below them were the comparatively large categories 
of industrial workers, employees of state farms, and administra- 
tive and clerical personnel. Such people had an occupational title 
or certification, and they received a regular wage from the state 
payroll. 

At the bottom, or the edges, of the system were the nomadic 
herders, the arads (see Glossary). They had no vocational certifi- 
cation or formal job titles, and their incomes and livelihood still 
depended to a large extent on the vagaries of the weather. Although 
they were honored publicly as the prototypical Mongolian work- 
ing class and the repository of traditional values, they were a shrink- 
ing segment of the population and one that few urbanites aspired 
to join. In spite of government efforts to raise their living stan- 
dards, their dispersed and nomadic mode of livelihood limited ac- 
cess to such public services as health care and education. Their 
children could rise through the school system to the professional 
or administrative elite, but at the cost of long separation from their 
families in boarding schools. Unlike those of workers in the state 
sector of the economy, herders' incomes depended on the perfor- 
mance of the cooperatives, and that in turn rested on the weather 
and the health of the herds. 

Collectivized Farming and Herding 

Mongolian agriculturalists, most of whom were actually herd- 
ers of animals, worked either for state-owned farms or for herding 
cooperatives. State farm workers were on the state payroll, just as 
were those who worked in state factories or for the national rail- 
road. Influenced by the Soviet Union, state-owned farms represent- 
ed a more creative adaptation of Soviet models to the Mongolian 
environment than did factories or government offices. In practice, 
membership was compulsory, and the collectives owned the means 
of production in the form of both the livestock herds and the rights 
to use pastures and winter campsites. Member families carried on 
a modified form of traditional herding by dispersed small herding 
camps of several households. Households were permitted to own 
a limited number of private livestock — analogous to the private plot 
allocated to collective farmers — about 20 percent of the total herd. 
Households received much of their income in kind, and they earned 



87 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

a share of the collective's profit from the sale of animals and animal 
products to state purchasing agencies. Their total income, in kind 
and in cash, varied, from year to year and from collective to col- 
lective, along with the condition of the herds and the weather. 

The average herding cooperative had about 300 households. The 
cooperative employed some people as administrators, truck drivers, 
and the like, but most work consisted of the traditional tasks of 
herding and milking animals, and of producing butter, cheese, and 
wool products. As in the past, herding was done by herding camps 
of two to six households. The herding cooperatives in most cases 
had the same boundaries as the somon (see Glossary), the third- 
level administrative units into which Mongolia's eighteen aymags 
were divided, and the administration of the somon and the herding 
cooperative appeared to be in the same hands. 

Modernized Nomads 

In contrast to the period before the collectivization of herding, 
which was carried out in the late 1950s, the work of individual herd- 
ers in the late 1980s was more closely supervised by administra- 
tive authorities. Herders were responsible for a herd of collective 
animals that usually included some of their privately held stock as 
well, thus providing an incentive for careful management. Herd- 
ers with a record of losing too many animals or failing to meet 
monthly or annual quotas were deprived of custody of the collec- 
tive animals and were reassigned to other tasks. The moves of the 
herds and the herding camps were plotted on a map in the cooper- 
ative 's headquarters, and officials of the cooperative — riding on 
motorcycles or jeeps, and on a more limited basis, airplanes — 
scouted for good pasture and then told the herding camps where 
to move next. Moves from one campsite to the next usually were 
made, using the cooperative's jeeps or trucks, and sometimes cross- 
ing the roadless steppes at night with uncanny accuracy. The co- 
operatives attempted, with mixed success, to grow hay and other 
fodder, which was stored at the winter campsites, some of which 
had barns and sheds to shelter animals. Herding camps were as- 
signed to winter campsites, which often were provided with stocks 
of coal and sometimes with portable electric generators to provide 
power for lights and even television sets. Herders on the range used 
transistor radios to listen to weather reports and storm warnings. 

The somon center became a miniature urban outpost, providing 
a meeting hall for regular assemblies of the cooperative, political 
rallies, plays, concerts, and films; for the administrative offices of 
the somon and the cooperative; for a clinic, or small hospital, and 
a veterinary clinic; for the motor pool and vehicle repair station; 



88 





89 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

for shops, run by the state trading organization; for storage and 
processing facilities for food and wool; for a sports ground, and 
for a school with boarding facilities. The center kept in touch with 
the herding camps through radio telephones and motorcycle cou- 
riers, who, bearing messages, mail, and newspapers, usually visited 
the camps every three to five days. Like urban residents or state- 
sector employees, herders from cooperatives were eligible for an- 
nual vacations, often spent at the holiday camps or spas operated 
by aymag governments. The government and the party took care 
to recognize the value of the herders' work and devoted resources 
to improving their lives without demanding that they settle down 
in permanent dwellings. In this regard, Mongolian pastoralists were 
more fortunate than their counterparts in many countries in Asia 
and Africa. There, urban-based governments attempted to force 
nomads to settle down and to abandon their migrations for what 
was thought of as a more modern and civilized way of life, but 
that usually proved detrimental to the livelihood of the nomads and 
to the national economy. The pastoral background of Mongolia's 
leaders and their understanding of the realities of the nomadic way 
of life produced policies designed to modernize, but not to destroy, 
an ancient and productive ecological system. 

Work Collectives 

For modern Mongolians, the primary social units were based 
on occupation rather than locality. Employers, such as state-owned 
factories or government departments, commonly provided hous- 
ing, meals in unit cafeterias, day-care facilities for workers' chil- 
dren, and sports and recreational activities. Trade unions in 
enterprises offered group holidays or week-long stays at special 
resorts or spas. Much emphasis was placed on the mutual ties and 
family-like relations among members of the collective. In cities fel- 
low workers were guests and providers of gifts at weddings, and 
older members of work collectives often were described as taking 
a paternal or maternal interest in the performance of newly hired 
young workers. The process by which workers secured, or were 
assigned to, jobs was not clearly spelled out in Mongolian sources, 
but it evidently combined administrative direction with some degree 
of personal choice. The general shortage of labor meant that in- 
dividuals had no problems finding jobs. However, the jobs they 
obtained may not have been those they most wanted. Although 
it was possible to change jobs or to be reassigned by the govern- 
ment, such changes were not common, and individuals usually ex- 
pected to spend many years, if not their entire working lives, in 
one enterprise and one housing collective. 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



The organization of work units reflected Soviet models, and if 
there was a distinctively Mongolian character to such units, it was 
not captured in official accounts. As in the Soviet Union, there 
was a strong emphasis on the solidarity of the collective and its pri- 
ority in the lives of the workers, as well as on the use of such 
managerial techniques as the designation of heroes of labor, the 
use of socialist emulation and socialist competition to spur produc- 
tion, and the promotion of "shock battalions" and "shock days" 
to meet or surpass quotas. These techniques were attempts to moti- 
vate a work force through the use of non-material incentives and 
through manipulation of group pressures. Students of Soviet and 
Chinese industrial relations refer to a distinctive pattern of "clien- 
talist bureaucracy" and "neo- traditionalist" forms of patronage 
and dependency in the factories of those countries. Both the force 
of the Soviet example and inherited traditional Mongolian attitudes, 
toward hierarchy and broadly defined relations of subordination 
and dependence, made such patterns likely in Mongolia. 

Kinship, Family, and Marriage 

Kinship 

Traditional Mongols traced descent patrilineally, from fathers 
to sons, and recognized progressively larger and more inclusive 
sets of patrilineal lineages and clans, thought of as all the male 
descendants of a common grandfather, great-grandfather, and so 
on. By the nineteenth century, such descent groups had no politi- 
cal role, were not coresident, held no common estate, and hence 
were of little significance in the lives of ordinary Mongolians. The 
hereditary aristocrats based their status on membership in aristo- 
cratic lineages (which claimed descent from Chinggis Khan), but 
political office was more important for elite status than lineage mem- 
bership alone. Lineages and clans have not played a major role 
in modern Mongolian society, and it is doubtful that many con- 
temporary people even know their lineage affiliation. Contemporary 
Mongols use a single given name with a patronymic, so names pro- 
vide few clues to common descent or kinship. There is no infor- 
mation on the extent to which Mongolians observe traditional 
exogamic restrictions on marriage with various categories of 
patrilateral and matrilateral kin. 

Family Structure 

Mongolians, unlike the settled agriculturalists to the south, have 
never valued complex extended families, and in the 1980s most 
lived in nuclear families composed of a married couple, their 



91 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

children, and perhaps a widowed parent. The high birthrate, 
however, meant that large families were common; the 1979 cen- 
sus showed 16 percent of families with 7 to 8 members and 11.8 
percent with 9 or more (see table 4, Appendix). Urban families 
were larger than rural families, perhaps because rural people tended 
to marry and to set up new households at younger ages. The aver- 
age size of rural families also may have reflected the high rates of 
migration to the cities. 

Among traditional herders, each married couple occupied its own 
tent, and sons usually received their share of the family herd at 
the time of their marriage. The usual pattern was for one son, often, 
but not necessarily, the youngest, to inherit the headship of the 
parental herd and tent, while other sons formed new families with 
equivalent shares of the family herd; daughters married out to other 
families. Adult sons and brothers often continued their close as- 
sociation as members of the same herding camp, but they could 
leave to join other herding camps whenever they wished. In the 
1980s, herders were likely to continue to work closely with patrilineal 
kin, and many of the basic level suuri, a subdivision of the negdel 
(see Glossary) herding camps, consisted of fathers and sons or 
groups of adult brothers and their families. Herders no longer in- 
herited livestock from parents, but they did inherit membership 
in the herding cooperative. If cooperative officials granted custody 
of collectively owned animals and permission to hold privately 
owned stock on a family basis, which was how private plots were 
allotted in Soviet collective farms in the 1980s, then it would be 
to the advantage of newly married sons to declare themselves new 
families. 

Family background continued to be an important component 
of social status in Mongolia, and social stratification had a certain 
implicit hereditary element. The shortage of skilled labor and the 
great expansion of white-collar occupations in the 1970s and the 
1980s meant that families belonging to the administrative and 
professional elite were able to pass their status on to their many 
children, who acquired educational qualifications and professional 
jobs. At the other end of the social scale, no one but the children 
of herders became herders. Some herders' children, perhaps as 
many as half, moved into skilled trades or administrative positions, 
while the rest remained with the flocks. 

Modern family life differed from that before the 1950s because 
the children of most herders were away from their families for most 
of year. Between the ages of seven and fifteen, they stayed in board- 
ing schools at the somon center. Most Mongolian women were in 
the paid work force, and many (in 1989 there were no complete 



92 



Kazakh hunters 
Courtesy Steve Mann 



figures) infants and young children were looked after on a daily 
or weekly basis in day-care centers or in all-day or boarding kin- 
dergartens. The efforts to bring women into the formal work force 
and to educate the dispersed herders resulted in separation of par- 
ents and children on a large scale. There was some historical prece- 
dent for this in the practice of sending young boys to monasteries 
as apprentice lamas, which had previously been the only way to 
obtain a formal education for them. 

Marriage 

In the twentieth century, most marriages have been initiated by 
the couple themselves rather than by parental arrangement. The 
image of courtship presented in contemporary Mongolian stories 
and pictures is of a young couple riding across the grassland on 
their horses while singing in harmony. In form the traditional Mon- 
golian wedding was an agreement between two families, with 
elaborate transfers of bridewealth in livestock from the groom's fam- 
ily and a dowry of jewelry, clothing, and domestic furnishings from 
the bride's. The wedding, which was a contractual agreement be- 
tween families rather than a religious ceremony, was marked by 
celebratory feasting that brought together as many of the relatives 



93 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

of the bride and the groom as the families could afford to feed. 
Some version of this custom survived in the countryside in the 
1980s, as did the practice of the bride's moving to reside in the 
camp of her husband's family, which traditionally provided a new 
ger for the bridal couple. Brides usually had their own household 
and family rather than joining the household of their husband's 
parents as subordinate daughters-in-law, and they made fairly fre- 
quent return visits to their natal families. Among herders, a tradi- 
tional place to seek a spouse was from the adjacent herding camp 
that exchanged daytime custody of lambs (to prevent the ewes from 
nursing the lambs in the pasture). In-laws frequently cooperated 
in herding or joined the same herding camp. 

In cities, the wait to be assigned an apartment did not seem to 
delay marriages, perhaps because the couple had the option of mov- 
ing to a ger on the edge of the city until an apartment became avail- 
able. Urban weddings sometimes were celebrated in special wedding 
palaces. That of Ulaanbaatar, an imposing white structure vaguely 
resembling a traditional Mongolian hat in shape, was one of the 
capital's architectural highlights. For a modest fee, the couple 
received their choice of traditional or modern wedding costumes, 
the services of a photographer, the use of a reception hall, a civil 
ceremony and wedding certificate, and a limousine to carry them 
to their new home. Fellow workers and colleagues played a rela- 
tively large role in urban weddings, as guests and donors of gifts 
to set up the new household. 

Most marriages were between schoolmates or coworkers. Such 
a mechanism of mate selection reinforced the tendency, common 
in many countries, for people to marry within their own social stra- 
tum. Herders tended to marry herders, and young professionals 
married young professionals. Divorce was possible, but rare; there 
were 5.6 marriages and 0.3 divorces per 1 ,000 inhabitants in 1980 
and 6.3 marriages and 0.3 divorces per 1 ,000 inhabitants in 1985. 
Mongolian fiction described disparities between the educational level 
of spouses or the unwillingness of husbands to accept the demands 
of their wives' jobs as sources of marital strain. 

Position of Women 

Traditional Subordination 

Leading Western scholars agree that Mongolian women tradi- 
tionally have had relatively higher social positions and greater auton- 
omy than women in the Islamic societies of Inner Asia or in China 
and Korea. Women herded and milked sheep, and they routinely 
managed the household if widowed or if their husbands were absent 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



to perform military service, corvee labor, or caravan work. Mon- 
gols valued fertility over virginity and did not share the obsessive 
concern with female purity found in much of Southwest, South, 
and East Asia. Women, however, although not shy, remained 
subordinate to men and were restricted to the domestic sphere. It 
is characteristic of Mongolian attitudes toward male and female 
contributions that the care of sheep — which provided Mongolians 
with their basic, daily sustenance — was the responsibility of women, 
while the care of horses — which contributed much less to subsis- 
tence but more to prestige, war, and sport — was the prerogative 
of men. Traditional Mongols combined firm notions of female 
subordination with a flexible attitude toward female participation 
in male-associated tasks, and women ordinarily filled in for men 
when no males were available for such activities as milking horses 
or even riding them in races. Archery contests, one of the "three 
manly sports" (the others are racing and wrestling), always included 
a female round. 

The 1921 revolution began efforts to bring women into public 
life and into the extra-domestic labor force (see Revolutionary 
Transformation, 1921-24, ch. 1). The state's constant efforts to 
promote population growth also have led to a strong emphasis on 
women's reproductive capacities; bearing large numbers of chil- 
dren has been considered a civic duty. Possible contradictions 
between women's productive role in the economy and their 
reproductive role in the population have been glossed over in public 
rhetoric. The tension had existed, however, and frequent child- 
bearing, state-mandated maternity leaves, as well as caring for 
young children probably have affected the sorts of jobs women hold 
and their commitment to their occupational roles (see table 5, Ap- 
pendix). 

Education and Employment 

The major change in the position of Mongolian women is their 
nearly universal participation in all levels of the educational sys- 
tem and in the paid work force. In 1985 women made up 63 per- 
cent of the students in higher educational establishments and 58 
percent of the students in specialized secondary schools. In the same 
year, they constituted 51 percent of all workers, up from nearly 
46 percent in the 1979 census. By 1979 medicine and teaching were 
predominately female fields; women were 65 percent of all doc- 
tors and 63 percent of those working in education, art, and cul- 
ture. Women made up 67 percent of the teachers in general schools 
and 33 percent of the teachers in higher educational establishments. 
They constituted nearly 47 percent of agricultural workers and 46 



95 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

percent of those in industry. Women's high level of enrollment in 
higher education reflected the female predominance in medicine, 
nursing, teaching, and professional child care. This echoed the pat- 
tern in the Soviet Union, where most physicians were women and 
where the social and the economic status of physicians was lower 
than it was in the United States or Western Europe. 

The most highly skilled Mongolian scientists, engineers, mili- 
tary officers, and administrators had been trained in the Soviet 
Union. In 1989 no figures were available on the percentage of 
women among these elite professionals. Mongolian accounts of 
working women indicated that some women worked in such jobs 
as airline pilot, judge, and sculptor, and that women predominated 
in the less highly paid food processing, textile, and catering trades. 

Mongolian women had legal equality, but once in the labor force 
they suffered the familiar double burden of housework and child 
care on top of a day's work for wages. This problem was recog- 
nized, and a series of studies begun by the Mongolian Academy 
of Sciences in 1978 found that the greatest source of strain on urban 
women was excessive hours spent in transit to and from work and 
shopping. There were too few buses or routes; retail and service 
outlets were not only scarce, but they were located too far from 
many residential areas and kept inconvenient hours. The proposed 
solutions, all indirect, included state provision of more buses; the 
opening of more service outlets, including food shops, restaurants, 
and carry outs; public laundries and dressmakers; and the expan- 
sion of nurseries, kindergartens, and extended-day elementary 
schools. The issues of female overrepresentation in the lower pay- 
ing occupations and of the representation of women in the higher 
professional and administrative ranks in more than token num- 
bers were not addressed (see Party Congress, ch. 4). 

Social Mobility 

High Rates of Mobility 

The expansion of the economy and the rapid growth of the urban, 
industrial, and service sectors made high rates of social mobility 
possible in the 1970s and the 1980s. Population growth, which ac- 
celerated in the late 1950s and peaked around 1970, was barely 
able to keep up with the expansion of positions in new factories, 
schools, and local government bodies. In the 1980s, most Mon- 
golians worked in occupations different from those of their par- 
ents, who were almost universally herders. These conditions, 
however, were not expected to continue. Most of the cohort, born 
in the late 1950s and the 1960s, who secured skilled industrial, 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



professional, and administrative jobs in the 1980s, will not retire 
until the 2020s. The even more numerous cohort born in the 1970s 
and the 1980s will find many desirable positions already filled by 
those ten to fifteen years older. If the rapid expansion of the econ- 
omy, which has been fueled by extensive Soviet aid and invest- 
ment, falters in the 1990s, then the generation born in the 1970s 
and the 1980s will not be able to match the mobility rates of their 
elders. 

Channels of Social Mobility 

There was a single, well-defined track for social mobility, which 
led through the school system and the youth organizations of the 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The keys to upward mo- 
bility were good academic performance, including command of 
Russian, and political reliability, as evidenced either by member- 
ship in the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League or by recom- 
mendations of administrators and party members. The party 
controlled job assignments and promotions at all but the most basic 
levels, and its favor was necessary for significant upward mobili- 
ty. Advanced study in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe was 
both a reward for good performance and a qualification for fur- 
ther career advancement. Military service, which until 1988 was 
three years for almost all young men, did not in itself confer any 
particular advantage on veterans, although it was possible for sol- 
diers with secondary educations who had performed exceptionally 
well to be commissioned as officers (see Organization since 1968, 
ch. 5). It was possible for children of herders in the most remote 
regions to progress, through examinations and recommendations, 
to the Mongolian State University and on to further training in 
the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many). A 1981 account of an eight-year school in a herding cooper- 
ative revealed that half of the sixteen-year-olds completing the course 
left school to become herders, while the other half went on to two 
more years of secondary school in the aymag seat, from which they 
could go to white-collar jobs or to further vocational or general edu- 
cation. 

In the late 1980s, the government was discussing a range of eco- 
nomic reforms, including increased use of the contract system as 
well as relaxed controls on privately owned livestock, on the de- 
velopment of cooperatives, and on individual labor. To the extent 
that such reforms were implemented, they would open an addi- 
tional channel for social mobility for those who had not been fa- 
vored by the monolithic system that had controlled occupational 
movement and advancement. 



97 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Cultural Unity and Mongol Identity 

Implicit Nationalism 

The result of Mongolia's economic development and urbaniza- 
tion was a population that was, on the one hand, increasingly and 
unprecedentedly divided by occupation, education, residence, and 
membership in well-defined and fairly rigid status groups, but that 
was, on the other hand, less clearly distinguished from that of other 
economically developed and urbanized countries. If being Mon- 
golian meant living in a ger in the midst of a sheep herd and being 
good at riding horses, then the Mongolian identity of those who 
lived in high-rise apartments, rode buses, and worked at desks or 
in factories where knowledge of the Russian language was required 
was problematic. Mongolian nationalism, clearly a politically sen- 
sitive topic, continued to be a strong although implicit force in Mon- 
golia. The Mongol language, the cultural trait most obviously 
shared by all Mongolians, continued to be fostered. Much effort 
was devoted to translating foreign literature and textbooks into 
Mongol, and teams of Mongolian scholars carefully replaced Rus- 
sian loan words with new terms developed from ancient Mongol 
roots. The goal appeared to be to ensure that Mongol did not be- 
come a dialect restricted to shepherds or preschool children and 
that the educated elite did not speak mostly Russian or Russian- 
influenced Mongol. 

Apart from the significant omission of Buddhism and the Bud- 
dhist church, much of traditional Mongol culture was studied, 
preserved, and transmitted to the younger generation as a source 
of national pride. In early 1989, party general secretary Jambyn 
Batmonh told a Soviet interviewer that the harmful errors of the 
1930s included destruction of the monasteries and with them the 
priceless cultural heritage of the Mongolian people. In 1989 the 
party called for overcoming indifference to the national cultural 
heritage, and efforts were under way to change the negative evalu- 
ation of Chinggis, who had been condemned as a bloodthirsty and 
aggressive conqueror of, among other places, Russia. Higher second- 
ary schools began teaching the traditional Mongol script, replaced 
by Cyrillic in February 1946. In early 1989, the trade union 
newspaper Hodolmor (Labor) called for mass production of the tradi- 
tional Mongol gown, the deel, and suggested that all Mongolian 
diplomats wear it. 

Promotion of Traditional Festivals 

Although the Buddhist church was suppressed in the 1930s, much 
traditional custom and celebration survived in the 1980s, with either 
the encouragement or the acquiescence of the government and the 



98 



Traditional dance is 
still an important part of 
Mongolian culture- 
Courtesy The Asia Society 




party. The Mongolian new year festival — Tsagaan Sar (the White 
Month) — is celebrated at the same time as the Chinese lunar new 
year, although contemporary Mongolians deny any Chinese ori- 
gin or influence. In the 1960s, the government designated it as Cat- 
tle Breeders' Day and stopped celebrating it as an official holiday. 
In 1989, as part of the party's efforts to reaffirm traditional cul- 
ture, Tsagaan Sar again became a public holiday. The festival re- 
tained its prerevolutionary character as an occasion when relatives 
come together to reaffirm their ties, and juniors honor their elders. 
The Mongolian government sponsored the summer celebrations 
of Naadam, the traditional Mongol sports of horse racing, wrestiing, 
and archery. Naadam celebrations were held in every somon, in 
every aymag seat, and in the great stadium in Ulaanbaatar on Na- 
tional Day, July 1 1 . The celebrations attracted large audiences and 
were one of the few occasions for the normally dispersed pastoralists 
to gather in large crowds, renew old acquaintances, and make new 
friends. Wrestlers, archers, and riders dressed in traditional cos- 
tumes, and a large bowl of ayrag, fermented mare's milk, was poured 
over the head of the winning horse in a form of libation practiced 
on the steppes for more than 1,000 years. Each wrestler was ac- 
companied by a herald or bard, who chanted verses extolling his 
hero in a centuries-old format. There was a hierarchy of contests, 
with the winners at one level going on to the next, so that the na- 
tional Naadam in Ulaanbaatar brought the champions from all over 



99 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

the country. The winning wrestler was a national hero, and, while 
the contests had no obvious political content, they provided an op- 
portunity for the political elite and the ordinary people, the herd- 
ers and the urbanites, to reaffirm their common Mongolian identity 
and culture. 

Religion 
Buddhism 

Traditional Mongols worshipped heaven (the "clear blue sky") 
and their ancestors, and they followed ancient northern Asian prac- 
tices of shamanism, in which human intermediaries went into trance 
and spoke to and for some of the numberless infinities of spirits 
responsible for human luck or misfortune. In 1578 Altan Khan, 
a Mongol military leader with ambitions to unite the Mongols and 
to emulate the career of Chinggis, invited the head of the rising 
Yellow Sect of Tibetan Buddhism to a summit. They formed an 
alliance that gave Altan legitimacy and religious sanction for his 
imperial pretensions and that provided the Buddhist sect with pro- 
tection and patronage. Altan gave the Tibetan leader the title of 
Dalai Lama (Ocean Lama), which his successors still hold. Altan 
died soon after, but in the next century the Yellow Sect spread 
throughout Mongolia, aided in part by the efforts of contending 
Mongol aristocrats to win religious sanction and mass support for 
their ultimately unsuccessful efforts to unite all Mongols in a sin- 
gle state. Monasteries were built across Mongolia, often sited at 
the juncture of trade and migration routes or at summer pastures, 
where large numbers of herders would congregate for shamanistic 
rituals and sacrifices. Buddhist monks carried out a protracted strug- 
gle with the indigenous shamans and succeeded, to some extent, 
in taking over their functions and fees as healers and diviners, and 
in pushing the shamans to the religious and cultural fringes of Mon- 
golian culture. 

Tibetan Buddhism, which combines elements of the Mahayana 
and the Tantric schools of Buddhism with traditional Tibetan rituals 
of curing and exorcism, shares the common Buddhist goal of in- 
dividual release from suffering and the cycles of rebirth. The religion 
holds that salvation, in the sense of release from the cycle of re- 
birth, can be achieved through the intercession of compassionate 
buddhas (enlightened ones) who have delayed their own entry to 
the state of selfless bliss (nirvana) to save others. Such buddhas, 
who are many, are in practice treated more as deities than as en- 
lightened humans and occupy the center of a richly polytheistic 
universe of subordinate deities, opposing demons, converted and 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



reformed demons, wandering ghosts, and saintly humans that 
reflects the folk religions of the regions into which Buddhism ex- 
panded. Tantrism contributed esoteric techniques of meditation 
and a repertoire of sacred icons, phrases, and gestures that easily 
lent themselves to pragmatic (rather than transcendental) and mag- 
ical interpretation. The religion posits progressive stages of enlight- 
enment and comprehension of the reality underlying the illusions 
that hamper the understanding and perceptions of those not trained 
in meditation or Buddhist doctrine, with sacred symbols interpreted 
in increasingly abstract terms. Thus, a ritual that appears to a com- 
mon yak herder as a straightforward exorcism of disease demons 
will be interpreted by a senior monk as a representation of con- 
flicting tendencies in the mind of a meditating ascetic. 

In Tibet Buddhism thus became an amalgam, combining colorful 
popular ceremonies and curing rituals for the masses with the study 
of esoteric doctrine for the monastic elite. The Yellow Sect, in con- 
trast to competing sects, stressed monastic discipline and the use 
of logic and formal debates as aids to enlightenment. The basic 
Buddhist tenet of reincarnation was combined with the Tantric idea 
that buddhahood could be achieved within a person's lifetime to 
produce a category of leaders who were considered to have achieved 
buddhahood and to be the reincarnations of previous leaders. These 
leaders, referred to as living or incarnate buddhas (see Glossary), 
held secular power and supervised a body of ordinary monks, or 
lamas (from a Tibetan title bla-ma, meaning "the revered one"). 
The monks were supported by the laity, who thereby gained merit 
and who received from the monks instructions in the rudiments 
of the faith and monastic services in healing, divination, and 
funerals. 

Buddhism and the Buddhist monkhood always have played sig- 
nificant political roles in Central and Southeast Asia, and the Bud- 
dhist church in Mongolia was no exception. Church and state 
supported each other, and the doctrine of reincarnation made it 
possible for the reincarnations of living buddhas to be discovered 
conveniently in the families of powerful Mongol nobles. 

Tibetan Buddhism is monastic. By the beginning of the twen- 
tieth century, Outer Mongolia had 583 monasteries and temple 
complexes, which controlled an estimated 20 percent of the coun- 
try's wealth. Almost all Mongolian cities have grown up on the 
sites of monasteries. Yihe Huree (see Glossary), as Ulaanbaatar 
was then known, was the seat of the preeminent living buddha of 
Mongolia (the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, also known as the Bogdo 
Gegen and later as Bogdo Khan), who ranked third in the ecclesi- 
astical hierarchy, after the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. 



101 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Two monasteries there contained approximately 13,000 and 7,000 
monks, and the prerevolutionary Mongol name of the settlement 
known to outsiders as Urga, Yihe Huree, means big monastery. 

Over the centuries, the monasteries acquired riches and secular 
dependents; they gradually increased their wealth and power as 
those of the Mongol nobility declined. Some nobles donated a por- 
tion of their dependent families — people, rather than land, were 
the foundation of wealth and power in old Mongolia — to the 
monasteries; some herders dedicated themselves and their fami- 
lies to serve the monasteries either from piety or from the desire 
to escape the arbitrary exactions of the nobility. In some areas, 
the monasteries and their living buddhas (of whom there were a 
total of 140 in 1924) also were the secular authorities. In the 1920s, 
there were about 110,000 monks, including children, who made 
up about one- third of the male population, although many of these 
lived outside the monasteries and did not observe their vows. About 
250,000 people, more than a third of the total population, either 
lived in territories administered by monasteries and living buddhas 
or were hereditary dependents of the monasteries. With the end 
of Chinese rule in 191 1 , the Buddhist church and its clergy provided 
the only political structure available, and the autonomous state thus 
took the form of a weakly centralized theocracy, headed by the 
Jebtsundamba Khutuktu in Yihe Huree. 

By the twentieth century, Buddhism had penetrated deeply into 
Mongolian culture, and the populace willingly supported the lamas 
and the monasteries. Foreign observers had a uniformly negative 
opinion of Mongolian monks, condemning them as lazy, ignorant, 
corrupt, and debauched, but the Mongolian people did not con- 
cur. Ordinary Mongolians apparently combined a cynical and 
realistic anticlericalism, sensitive to the faults and the human fal- 
libility of individual monks or groups of monks, with a deep and 
unwavering concern for the transcendent values of the church. 

The Suppression of Buddhism 

When the revolutionaries — determined to modernize their coun- 
try and to reform its society — took power, they confronted a massive 
ecclesiastical structure that enrolled a larger part of the popula- 
tion, monopolized education and medical services, administered 
justice in a large part of the country, and controlled a great deal 
of the national wealth. The Buddhist church, moreover, had no 
interest in reforming itself or in modernizing the country. The result 
was a protracted political struggle that absorbed the energies and 
attention of the party and its Soviet advisers for nearly twenty years. 
As late as 1934, the party counted 843 major Buddhist centers, 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



about 3,000 temples of various sizes, and nearly 6,000 associated 
buildings, which usually were the only fixed structures in a world 
of felt tents. The annual income of the church was 31 million tugriks, 
while that of the state was 37.5 million tugriks. A party source 
claimed that, in 1935, monks constituted 48 percent of the adult 
male population. In a campaign marked by shifts of tactics, alter- 
nating between conciliation and persecution, and armed uprisings 
led by monks and abbots, the Buddhist church was removed 
progressively from public administration, was subjected to confis- 
catory taxes, was forbidden to teach children, and was prohibited 
from recruiting new monks or replacing living buddhas. The cam- 
paign's timing matched the phases of Josef Stalin's persecution of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1938 — amid official fears that 
the church and monasteries were likely to cooperate with the 
Japanese, who were promoting a pan-Mongol puppet state — the 
remaining monasteries were dissolved, their property was seized, 
and their monks were secularized. The monastic buildings were 
taken over to serve as local government offices or schools. Only 
then was the ruling party, which since 1921 gradually had built 
a cadre of politically reliable and secularly educated administra- 
tors, able to destroy the church and to mobilize the country's wealth 
and population for its program of modernization and social change. 

Uses of Buddhism 

Since at least the early 1970s, one monastery, the Gandan 
Monastery, with a community of 100 monks, was open in Ulaan- 
baatar. It was the country's sole functioning monastery. A few of 
the old monasteries survived as museums, and the Gandan 
Monastery served as a living museum and a tourist attraction. Its 
monks included a few young men who had undergone a five-year 
training period, but whose motives and mode of selection were 
unknown to Western observers. The party apparently thought that 
Buddhism no longer posed a challenge to its dominance and that — 
because Buddhism had played so large a part in the country's his- 
tory, traditional arts, and culture, total extirpation of knowledge 
about the religion and its practices would cut modern Mongols off 
from much of their past, to the detriment of their national iden- 
tity. A few aged former monks were employed to translate Tibetan- 
language handbooks on herbs and traditional medicine. Govern- 
ment spokesmen described the monks of the Gandan Monastery 
as doing useful work. 

Buddhism, furthermore played a role in Mongolia's foreign policy 
by linking Mongolia with the communist and the non-communist 
states of East and Southeast Asia. Ulaanbaatar was the headquarters 



103 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

of the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace, which has held con- 
ferences for Buddhists from such countries as Japan, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan; published a journal for inter- 
national circulation; and maintained contacts with such groups as 
the Christian Peace Conference, the Afro-Asian People's Solidar- 
ity Organization, and the Russian Orthodox Church. It sponsored 
the visits of the Dalai Lama to Mongolia in 1979 and 1982. The 
organization, headed by the abbot of the Gandan Monastery, ad- 
vances the foreign policy goals of the Mongolian government, which 
are in accord with those of the Soviet Union. 

Religious Survivals 

Buddhism survives among the elderly, who pray and attend ser- 
vices at the Gandan Monastery; in the speech of the people, which 
is rich in Buddhist expressions and proverbs; and in the common 
practice of including statues or images of the Buddha on families' 
special shelves with photographs of relatives and other domestic 
memorabilia. Mongolian Buddhism, which restricted full partici- 
pation in the ritual to monks and kept Tibetan as the language 
of ritual and sacred texts, was more vulnerable to persecution than 
a religion more widely dispersed among the populace would have 
been. Studies done among the Buryat Mongols of Siberia by Soviet 
ethnographers in the 1960s and the 1970s found that elimination 
of the complex and conceptually sophisticated culture of Tibetan 
Buddhism had led to a growth of the decentralized and flexible folk 
practice of shamanism. Similar survival or adaptation of folk religion 
in Mongolia would be possible, although Mongolians have pub- 
lished no comparable studies of religion at the local level. Approx- 
imately 4 percent of Mongolians, primarily those living in the 
southwest, are Muslims, as are many of their kin across the border 
in China. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the 1960 Consti- 
tution. 

Health and Welfare 

Health-Care Systems 

Mongolia's government has made great efforts to provide modern 
medical care to the inhabitants. In the 1980s, medical care was 
free and was provided through a hierarchy of clinics and hospi- 
tals. In rural areas, the lowest level of the system was a medical 
station, staffed by a physician's assistant, serving people within a 
thirty- to forty-kilometer radius. Above this was a somon medical sta- 
tion, staffed by a physician, serving a forty- to sixty-kilometer radius; 
an inter-somon hospital, serving a seventy- to eighty-kilometer radius; 



104 



Buddhist monks at Gandan Monastery 
Courtesy Regina Genton 



and an aymag general hospital covering a 150- to 200-kilometer 
radius. The higher the level in the system, the more numerous the 
medical specialties and the more sophisticated the diagnostic equip- 
ment available. The lowest levels concentrated on acute care, public- 
health work, and screening and referring cases up the hierarchy. 

As of 1985, Mongolia had approximately 4,600 physicians, 24.8 
per 10,000 people. There were also about 8,500 nurses and 3,800 
physician's assistants; many of the nurses and the physician's as- 
sistants specialized as midwives, although some medical person- 
nel were trained in midwifery only. Medical care was provided by 
almost 1,200 clinics staffed by physician's assistants, 290 clinics 
staffed by physicians, and by 1986, 112 hospitals. The structure 
of medical specialties reflected both the needs of the young and 
rapidly growing population and the concentration of scarce 
resources on public health, control of epidemic diseases, and the 
health of the working population. The most common medical 
specialty was pediatrics, which accounted for 21 percent of all phy- 
sicians in 1985. The next most common were general practition- 
ers, 15 percent; obstetricians, 6 percent; public health specialists, 
6 percent; and physicians specializing in the prevention and treat- 
ment of epidemic diseases, 6 percent. Government statistics listed 



105 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

only twenty-seven (0.5 percent) oncologists and no cardiologists; 
however, the existence of a large cancer research facility and the 
practice of bypass surgery techniques suggest a greater interest in 
these areas than the statistics indicate. 

In spite of efforts to distribute medical facilities and specialists 
evenly, there was a marked concentration of physicians and hospitals 
in Ulaanbaatar and other major cities. In 1981 Ulaanbaatar had 
49 percent of Mongolia's physicians and an average of 42.9 physi- 
cians per 10,000 people. The cities of Darhan and Erdenet had 
21.7 and 18.8 physicians, respectively, per 10,000 people; low ratios 
of 9.5 physicians per 10,000 in Uvs Aymag and 10.2 per 10,000 
in Hovsgol Aymag were also reported. 

Mongolia cooperated closely with the Soviet Union in medical 
research and training. Soviet specialists held seminars in Mongo- 
lia and helped to build and to operate such special facilities as an 
oncology center and a 600-bed isolation hospital for infectious dis- 
eases in Ulaanbaatar. Mongolia was an active member of Come- 
con's Commission on Cooperation in Public Health, and it 
participated in World Health Organization (WHO) projects on 
maternity and child health, environmental protection, and train- 
ing of medical technicians and mid-level health-care personnel. 

By 1981 Mongolia claimed to have eliminated smallpox, typhus, 
plague, poliomyelitis, and diphtheria, and to have reduced sharply 
the incidence of other infectious diseases. In the past, disease was 
spread through the use of contaminated drinking water and from 
such sources as lice, which were common among the herders, who 
seldom bathed or washed their clothing. Clean drinking water for 
the herders, who often shared water sources with their animals, 
continued to be a problem, but much effort was put into health 
education. The Mongolian Red Cross, an organization that cooper- 
ated with the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, focused 
on preventive medicine and health education. It sent mobile teams 
to factories and herding collectives to teach hygiene and sanita- 
tion and to hold special workshops on infant care and the health 
needs of the elderly. Although traditional Mongols were averse to 
bathing, their modern descendants patronized a network of spas. 
Following the Soviet and East European pattern, Mongolia estab- 
lished sanitoriums where workers and such deserving individuals 
as holders of the Order of Maternal Glory went to rest, to take 
the waters, and to follow a medically prescribed regimen of swim- 
ming, sunbathing, and moderate exercise. The Council of Mon- 
golian Trade Unions operated a network of sanitoriums that used 
the country's many hot springs and mountain lakes. The network 
annually could accommodate 20 percent of the country's factory 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



and office workers during the brief summer season. So popular were 
the spas that aymag authorities established their own sanitoriums 
to provide therapeutic holidays for collective herders. 

Precautions Against AIDS 

At the end of 1988, Mongolia had reported no cases of acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). In 1987 an AIDS research 
center was opened at the Institute of Hygiene and Virology, and 
its specialists were trained in laboratory analysis by WHO experts. 
About 16,000 people had been checked for the disease by Decem- 
ber 1988, but no carriers had been found. All Mongolians who 
had been abroad for more than three months were required to be 
tested. This was considered necessary because Mongolia sends thou- 
sands of young people to study in other countries. Analysis of donor 
blood and blood products had begun by mid- 1988, and special 
laboratories were being established in large hospitals. Foreign stu- 
dents coming to Mongolia were required to be tested for AIDS, 
either in Mongolia or abroad, and Mongolia accepted the results 
of tests performed in the United States. 

Education 

The School System 

Education in Mongolia traditionally was controlled by the Bud- 
dhist monasteries and was limited to monks. Tibetan was the lan- 
guage of instruction, the canonical and liturgical language, and 
it was used at the lower levels of education. Higher-level educa- 
tion was available in the major monasteries, and often many years 
were required to complete formal degrees, which included train- 
ing in logic and debate. With the exception of medicine, which 
involved an extensive pharmacopoeia and training in herbal 
medicines, higher education was esoteric and unworldly. Major 
monasteries supported four colleges: philosophy, doctrine, and pro- 
tocol; medicine; mathematics, astrology, and divination; and 
demonology and demon suppression. In the early twentieth cen- 
tury, officials and wealthy families hired tutors for their children, 
and government offices operated informal apprenticeships that 
taught the intricacies of written records, standard forms, and ac- 
counting. Official Mongolian sources, which tended to depict the 
prerevolutionary period as one of total backwardness, probably 
underestimated the level of literacy, but it was undoubtedly low. 

Secular education began soon after the collapse of Chinese 
authority in 1911. A Mongol-language school under Russian 
auspices opened in Yihe Huree in 1912; much of the teaching of 



107 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

the forty-seven pupils was done by Buryat Mongols from Siberia. 
In the same year, a military school with Russian instructors opened. 
By 1914 a school teaching Russian to Mongolian children was oper- 
ating in the capital. Its graduates, in a pattern that was to become 
common, went to cities in Russia for further education. Perhaps 
in response to the challenge of the few secular schools, monaster- 
ies in the 1920s were running schools for boys who did not have 
to take monastic vows. Such schools used the Mongol language 
and the curriculums had a heavily religious content. 

Education expanded slowly throughout the 1920s. As late as 1934, 
when 55 percent of all party members were illiterate, secular state 
schools enrolled only 2 . 7 percent of all children between the ages 
of eight and seventeen, while 13 percent of that age group were 
in monastic schools. Suppression of the monasteries in 1938 and 
1939 closed the monastic schools, and the state schools expanded 
steadily throughout the 1940s and the 1950s. In 1941 the tradi- 
tional Mongol script, based on the Uighur script, was replaced by 
Cyrillic. It took from 1941 to 1946 — sources differ on the date — to 
implement the change completely. Mongolian authorities an- 
nounced that universal adult literacy had been achieved by 1968. 
A Russian-owned printing shop, opened in Yihe Huree in the early 
twentieth century, turned out Mongolian translations of Russian 
novels and political tracts; in 1915 it printed Mongolia's first 
newspaper, Niysleliyn Hureeniy Sonon Bichig (News of the Capital 
Huree). 

In 1981 education consumed 20 percent of the state budget, and 
by 1985 27 percent (511,200) of the country's population was en- 
rolled in educational institutions from primary through university 
levels. The education system, based on the Soviet model, had eight 
years of compulsory education and a ten-year school system, en- 
rolling students between the ages of seven and seventeen. The first 
four years were primary education; the second four, were second- 
ary. Some students left school after the eighth year, while the others 
went on to either two more years of general secondary education 
or to specialized vocational schools. Some remote settiements offered 
only four-year primary schools, after which students transferred 
to a central eight-year school. Many schools in rural areas were 
eight-year schools, called incomplete secondary schools. Full ten- 
year schools, complete secondary schools, were common in cities, 
and they represented the goal that all regions hoped to achieve. 
In 1988 about 40 percent of the graduates of general schools went 
on to vocational schools; 20 percent, to higher education; and the 
remainder joined the work force. Most rural schools had boarding 
facilities to serve the children of dispersed and nomadic herders; 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



11 percent of rural pupils in 1984 were boarders. From the lowest 
grades, efforts were made to link schooling with the world of work, 
and students routinely put in a few hours a week on useful work 
outside the school. Military training, including weapons instruc- 
tion and outdoor exercises, began in the schools. 

For students who had completed eight years of schooling, there 
were two types of career-oriented schools: vocational schools (some- 
times called vocational/technical schools in Mongolian publications) 
and specialized secondary schools. The distinction between the two 
was not clear. Vocational schools appeared to train more highly 
skilled workers, such as machinists, heavy-equipment operators, 
and construction workers, providing a terminal education to stu- 
dents who did not excel in the classroom. The specialized second- 
ary schools, which corresponded to the Soviet technicum provided 
two-year or three-year courses at the junior college level. They 
trained paraprofessionals and technicians, such as primary school 
teachers, medical technicians, or bookkeepers. Students with diplo- 
mas from specialized secondary schools could apply for admission 
to higher education. As more funds and more technically trained 
teachers became available, the number of vocational schools in- 
creased. In 1988 there were 43 vocational schools, which enrolled 
30,000 students in 110 fields. Specialized secondary schools offered 
two-year or three-year courses, and students received room and 
board and a monthly stipend. During their stints of practical work 
in factories or other enterprises, they received the normal salary 
for their work. The reform of secondary education under way in 
the 1988-89 school year called for three-year vocational courses 
for students with eight years of general education. Students who 
graduated from complete ten-year courses could spend one year 
in vocational schools. The ninth-year and tenth-year classes in 
general education schools prepared students for college admission 
or for generalized white-collar work. 

In 1985 Mongolia had more than 900 general education schools, 
40 vocational schools, 28 specialized secondary schools, 1 univer- 
sity, and 7 institutes. The general schools enrolled 435,900 stu- 
dents; vocational schools, 27,700; specialized secondary schools, 
23,000; and higher education, 24,600 (see table 6, Appendix). 
Women made up 63 percent of all students in higher education, 
and girls constituted 58 percent of students in specialized second- 
ary schools. Women were 67 percent of all teachers in general 
schools, 50 percent of teachers in specialized secondary schools, 
and 33 percent of higher education faculty. In 1985 kindergartens, 
serving families in which both parents worked full time, enrolled 
20 percent of the children who were three to seven years old. 



109 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Higher Education 

Mongolian State University in Ulaanbaatar was founded in 1942 
(as Choybalsan University) with three departments: education, 
medicine, and veterinary medicine. The faculty was Russian, as 
was the language of instruction. In 1983 the university's engineering 
institute and Russian-language teacher training institute became 
separate establishments, called the Polytechnic Institute and the 
Institute of Russian Language, respectively. The Polytechnic In- 
stitute, with 5,000 students, concentrated on engineering and min- 
ing. Mongolian State University, with about 4,000 students, taught 
pure sciences and mathematics, social science, economics, and phi- 
lology. More than 90 percent of the faculty were Mongolian; 
teachers also came from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, France, 
and Britain. Much instruction was in Russian, reflecting the lack 
of Mongol-language texts in advanced and specialized fields. 

Besides Mongolian State University there were seven other in- 
stitutions of higher learning: the Institute of Medicine, the Insti- 
tute of Agriculture, the Institute of Economics, the State Pedological 
Institute, the Polytechnic Institute, the Institute of Russian Lan- 
guage, and the Institute of Physical Culture. In the summer, all 
students had a work semester, in which they helped with the har- 
vest, formed "shock work" teams for construction projects, or went 
to work in the Soviet Union or another Comecon country. In early 
1989, the educational authorities announced that third-year and 
fourth-year engineering students would be told which enterprise 
they would be assigned to after graduation, so that their training 
could be focused with practical ends in mind. 

Study in the Soviet Union 

Mongolia's educational system is supplemented by and crowned 
by study in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. In 1983 more 
than 10,000 Mongolians were studying in the Soviet Union as post- 
graduates at 10 academies, 191 institutions of higher learning, 101 
specialized secondary schools, and 28 vocational schools. Each year 
1,500 Mongolians were sent to Soviet vocational schools. Specialists 
of all sorts, from civil aviation pilots to urban planners to physi- 
cists, were trained in the Soviet Union. Party members at the 
mid-level and higher attended higher party schools in the Soviet 
Union. As it had since the early twentieth century, Russian served 
as the language of modernity and enlightenment, Mongolia's win- 
dow on the wider world. So important was command of Russian 
that, in 1982, the People's Great Hural called for the study of 
Russian to begin in kindergarten. 



110 





Mongolian Science 

Following the organizational pattern of Soviet science, Mongo- 
lia separated research, which was pursued in specialized research 
institutes, from the teaching of science in universities. The Mon- 
golian Academy of Sciences, founded in 1961, had fourteen research 
institutes in 1982. Scientific work in Mongolia reflected the coun- 
try's particular geological and climatic conditions, and it involved 
a good deal of surveying, mapping, and cataloging of minerals, 
soils, plants, and local microclimates. Projects with clear economic 
applications were favored. The Institute of Geography and Perma- 
frost compiled maps of permafrost, which covers more than half 
the country, and devised methods of construction and mining in 
permafrost areas. Geological mapping and prospecting for useful 
minerals had a high priority. The country's climate and location 
make it a good place for astronomical observatories and for studies 
of seismicity and tectonic processes. Mongolian physicists were con- 
centrating on the development of solar energy and photovoltaic 
generation of electricity to serve the dispersed and mobile herders 
and to help stem the flow of the population to the cities. The ex- 
pansion of scientific education and of the number of scientists 



111 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

contributed to concern over the environmental consequences of the 
single-minded focus on short-term economic growth that had 
characterized the period from the 1960s through the late 1980s. 

Science, Progress, and Tradition 

By the end of the twentieth century, Mongolia's achievements 
in economic development and popular education will have produced 
deep, and probably irreversible, changes in the structure of soci- 
ety. After several decades of devotion to increasing the indices of 
economic growth and brooking no disagreement with its policies 
or methods, the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, 
responding in part to trends toward political reform in the Soviet 
Union, was encouraging greater public discussion and criticism 
of past practices. Mongolian leaders seemed ready to step back and 
to consider the price of progress and to discuss the future course 
of the country's development. As indicated by the 1989 moves to 
reevaluate the prerevolutionary past and its heroes, the reconcili- 
ation of progress with tradition and national identity is likely to 
be a major theme of discussion in the 1990s. 

* * * 

Mongolia's contemporary society, unlike its history, has not at- 
tracted much scholarly attention in the West. The best sources avail- 
able to the English-speaking reader are Mongolia, The People's Republic 
of Mongolia, and articles in the Far Eastern Economic Review, all by 
Alan J. Sanders; Robert Rupen's Mongols of the Twentieth Century 
and How Mongolia Is Really Ruled; George G.S. Murphy's Soviet Mon- 
golia; and Urgunge Onon's Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth Cen- 
ury. History of the Mongolian People's Republic, translated by William 
A. Brown and Urgunge Onon, has useful sections on society and 
the environment. Articles by Daniel Rosenberg in Mongolian Studies 
provide relevant material on modern Mongolian society. Owen 
Lattimore's Nomads and Commissars is somewhat out of date, but very 
readable and useful. A helpful, and more recent, source is Thomas 
D. Allen's article in National Geographic. The traditional culture is 
set out in Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer's Mongolia's Culture and 
Society, Lattimore's Mongol Journeys, and Herbert H. Vreeland's 
Mongol Community and Kinship Structure. The U.S. Joint Publications 
Research Service publishes occasional translations of Mongolian 
and Russian statistical summaries and yearbooks on Mongolia. 
Mongolian broadcasts and newspapers are translated and appear 
in the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: 
East Asia. Readers also are directed to the American Bibliography of 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 

Slavic and East European Studies, the Bibliography of Asian Studies, and 
Citation Index for new publications on Mongolian society. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



113 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Camels — one of Mongolia's major livestock types 



ON THE EVE OF the 1921 revolution, Mongolia had an under- 
developed, stagnant economy based on nomadic animal husandry. 
Farming and industry were almost nonexistent; transportation and 
communications were primitive; banking, services, and trade were 
almost exclusively in the hands of foreigners. Most of the people 
were either illiterate nomadic herders or monks. Property in the 
form of livestock was owned primarily by aristocrats and monaster- 
ies; ownership of the remaining sectors of the economy was domi- 
nated by foreigners. Mongolia's new rulers thus were faced with 
a daunting task in building a modern, socialist economy. 

Mongolia's economic development under communist control can 
be divided into three periods: 1921-39; 1940-60; and 1961 to the 
present. During the first period, which the Mongolian government 
called the stage of "general democratic transformation," the econ- 
omy remained primarily agrarian and underdeveloped. After an 
abortive attempt to collectivize herders, or arads (see Glossary), 
livestock raising remained in private hands. The state began to de- 
velop industry based on processing of animal husbandry products 
and crop raising on state farms. Transportation, communications, 
domestic and foreign trade, and banking and finance were nation- 
alized with Soviet assistance; they were placed under the control 
of Mongolian state and cooperative organizations or Mongolian- 
Soviet joint-stock companies. Ulaanbaatar became the nation's in- 
dustrial center. 

During the second period, called the "construction of the foun- 
dations of socialism," agriculture was collectivized, and industry 
was diversified into mining, timber processing, and consumer 
goods production. Central planning of the economy began in 1931 
with an abortive five-year plan and with annual plans in 1941; 
five-year plans began anew with the First Five-Year Plan 
(1948-52). Soviet aid increased, financing the construction of the 
trans-Mongolia railroad — the Ulaanbaatar Railroad — and various 
industrial projects. China also provided assistance, primarily in 
the form of labor for infrastructure projects. Although industrial 
development still was concentrated in Ulaanbaatar, economic 
decentralization began with the completion of the Ulaanbaatar Rail- 
road and the establishment of food processing plants in aymag (see 
Glossary) centers. 

The third stage, which the government called the "completion 
of the construction of the material and technical basis of socialism," 



117 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



saw further industrialization and agricultural growth, aided largely 
by Mongolia's joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon — see Glossary) in 1962. Soviet and East European finan- 
cial and technical assistance in the forms of credits, advisers, and 
joint ventures enabled Mongolia to modernize and to diversify in- 
dustry, particularly in mining. New industrial centers were built 
in Baga Nuur, Choybalsan, Darhan, and Erdenet, and industrial 
output rose significantly. Although animal husbandry was stag- 
nant, crop production increased dramatically with the development 
of virgin lands by state farms. Foreign trade with Comecon na- 
tions grew substantially. Transportation and communications sys- 
tems were improved, linking population and industrial centers and 
extending to more remote rural areas. In the late 1980s, Mongo- 
lia had developed into an agricultural-industrial economy, but the 
inefficiencies of a centrally planned and managed economy and 
the example of perestroika (see Glossary) in the Soviet Union led 
Mongolian leaders to undertake a reform program to develop the 
economy further. 

Socialist Framework of the Economy 

Role of the Government 

In the late 1980s. Mongolia had a planned economy based on 
socialist ownership of the means of production. According to the 
Mongolian Constitution, socialist ownership has two forms: state 
ownership (of land and natural resources, economic facilities and 
infrastructure; and the property of all state organizations, enter- 
prises, and institutions) and cooperative ownership (property of 
agricultural associations and other types of cooperatives). Private 
ownership was negligible in all sectors of the economy, except 
animal husbandry, but economic reforms adopted since 1986 gave 
greater leeway for individual and cooperative enterprises (see Eco- 
nomic Reforms; Animal Husbandry, this ch.). The economy was 
directed by a single state national economic plan, which, when con- 
firmed by the legislature, the People's Great Hural, had the force 
of law. In accordance w-ith the plan, the state annually drew up 
a state budget, which was confirmed and published in the form 
of a law (see Budget, this ch.). The Council of Ministers constitu- 
tionally was charged with planning the national economy; im- 
plementing the national economic plan and the state and local 
budgets; directing financial and credit policy; exercising a foreign 
trade monopoly; establishing and directing the activities of ministries 
and other state institutions concerned with economic construction: 
defending socialist production; and strengthening socialist 
ownership. 



118 




"Program for the Year 2000"- 



■May Day parade, 1988, Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Steve Mann 



In December 1987 and January 1988, the top-level state economic 
organizations under the Council of Ministers were reorganized. The 
State Planning and Economic Committee was formed out of the 
former State Planning Commission, the State Labor and Social Wel- 
fare Committee, the State Prices and Standards Committee, and 
the Central Statistical Board. New economic entities were the Minis- 
try of Agriculture and Food Industry; the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection; the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Sup- 
ply; the Ministry of Light Industry; and the Ministry of Power, Min- 
ing Industry, and Geology. Unaffected by the reorganization were 
the Ministry of Social Economy and Services, the Ministry of Com- 
munications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport, 
the State Construction Committee, and the State Bank of the Mon- 
golian People's Republic. Local government organizations — the ex- 
ecutive committees of hurals (see Glossary) — implemented economic 
plans and budgets, directed economic construction, and supervised 
the work of economic and cooperative organizations at their level. 

Planning 

Planning in communist-run Mongolia had an inauspicious start 
with the Five-Year Plan for 1931-35, which set unrealistically high 



119 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

targets for production and called for the collectivization of agricul- 
tural production. This plan was abandoned in 1932 in the face of 
widespread resistance to collectivization and the failure to meet 
production goals. Annual planning was introduced in 1941 in an 
effort to deal with wartime shortages. Five-year plans were rein- 
troduced in 1948 with the First Plan. The Second Five- Year Plan 
(1953-57) was followed by the Three- Year Plan (1958-60). Regu- 
lar five-year plans were resumed with the Third Five- Year Plan 
(1961-65), and they have continued to be used since then. 

In the late 1980s, economic planning in Mongolia included long- 
term, five-year, and annual plans that operated on multiple levels. 
Planning originated with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party, which produced the guidelines for economic and social 
development for the five-year period corresponding to the party's 
congress. Based on these guidelines, the Standing Commission on 
Economic-Budget Affairs of the People's Great Hural drafted the 
five-year national and annual economic plans, which were approved 
by the People's Great Hural and became law. The Council of 
Ministers directed and implemented national planning through the 
State Planning and Economic Committee and through the Minis- 
try of Finance. Planning for different sectors of the economy was 
conducted by relevant ministries and state committees; local plans 
were drawn up by local governmental organizations. 

Mongolia's five-year plans have been coordinated with those of 
the Soviet Union since 1961 and with Comecon multilateral five- 
year plans since 1976. Annual plan coordination with the Soviet 
Union, which is made official in signed protocols, began in 1971. 
Mongolian planners were trained by Soviet planners and cooper- 
ated with them in drafting long-term plans, such as the General 
Scheme for the Development and Location of the Mongolian Peo- 
ple's Republic Productive Forces up to 1990, produced in the late 
1970s; and the Longterm Program for the Development of Eco- 
nomic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Between the Mon- 
golian People' Republic and the USSR for the Period up to 2000, 
signed in 1985. 

National economic plans included general development goals as 
well as specific targets and quotas for agriculture, capital construc- 
tion and investment, domestic and foreign trade, industry, labor re- 
sources and wages, retail sales and services, telecommunications, 
and transportation. The plans also focused on such social develop- 
ment goals and targets as improved living standards, population 
increase, cultural development, and scientific and technical de- 
velopment. 



120 



The Economy 



Budget 

The Ministry of Finance prepared annual national budgets and 
provided guidance to the formulation of local budgets. The national 
budget included the budget of the central government, the bud- 
gets of aymag and city governments, and the budget of the national 
social insurance fund. The national budget grew with the expan- 
sion of the economy: In 1940 revenues were 123.9 million tugriks 
(for value of the tugrik — see Glossary) and expenditures, 122.1 mil- 
lion tugriks; in 1985 revenues were 5,743 million tugriks and ex- 
penditures, 5,692.5 million tugriks. The structure of the national 
budget changed between 1940 and 1985. In 1940 some 34.6 per- 
cent of revenues came from the turnover tax (a value added tax 
on each transaction), 7.8 percent from deductions from profits, 16.7 
percent from taxes on the population, and 40.9 percent from other 
kinds of income. In 1985 nearly 63 percent of revenues came from 
the turnover tax, 29.9 percent from deductions from profits, 3.5 
percent from deductions from the social insurance fund, 0.7 per- 
cent from taxes on the population, and 3.2 percent from other types 
of income. In 1940 some 21.9 percent of expenditures went to de- 
velop the national economy; 19.7 percent to social and cultural pro- 
grams; and 58.4 percent to defense, state administration, reserves, 
and other expenses. In 1985 about 42.6 percent of expenditures 
went to developing the national economy; 38.7 percent to social 
and cultural programs; and 18.7 percent to defense, state adminis- 
tration, reserves, and other expenses. 

The proposed 1989 budget had revenues and expenditures of 
6.97 billion tugriks. Proposed expenditures for 1989 included 1.8 
billion tugriks for developing agriculture, 2.1 billion for industry, 
and 1.6 billion for capital investment. Of the 2.76 billion tugriks 
proposed for social and cultural development, 1.16 billion was to 
go for education; 597.5 million for health, physical culture, and 
sports; 259.7 million for science, culture, and art; and 747.4 mil- 
lion for the social insurance fund. Subsidies to maintain stable re- 
tail prices totaled 213 million tugriks. Local budgets, through which 
70 percent of social and cultural expenditures were funneled, to- 
taled 3.46 billion tugriks. 

Structure of the Economy 

Socialist development transformed Mongolia from a predomi- 
nantly agrarian, nomadic economy in 1921 into a developing, 
agricultural-industrial economy in the late 1980s. In 1985 a reported 
18.3 percent of produced national income was derived from agricul- 
ture, 32.4 percent from industry, 4.9 percent from construction, 



121 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

11.2 percent from transportation and communications, 31.6 per- 
cent from domestic trade and services, and 1.6 percent from other 
sectors. Sixty percent of disposable national income went to con- 
sumption, and 40 percent went to accumulation. Fixed assets to- 
taled about 38.9 billion tugriks, of which 66.5 percent were 
productive fixed assets, including livestock, and 33.5 percent were 
nonproductive. Industry and construction accounted for 38.1 per- 
cent of the productive fixed assets; agriculture, 16 percent; trans- 
portation and communications, 9 percent; and domestic trade and 
services, 3.4 percent. Investment totaled 4.624 billion tugriks, 97.9 
percent of which went to the state sector, and 2.1 percent, to the 
cooperative sector. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1981-85), 
68.9 percent of investments went into the productive sectors of the 
economy, and 31.1 percent, into nonproductive sectors. Industry 
and construction received 44.7 percent of investment during this 
period; agriculture, 13.9 percent; transportation and communi- 
cations, 9.0 percent; and domestic trade and services, 1.3 percent. 
The Eighth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) called for increasing produced 
national income by 26 to 29 percent and for raising investment 
by 24 to 26 percent, of which 70 percent was to go to developing 
material production. 

In the late 1980s, Mongolia was divided into three economic 
regions. The western region (Bayan-Olgiy, Hovd, Uvs, Dzavhan, 
and Govi-Altay aymags), with 21 percent of the nation's popula- 
tion, was predominandy agricultural (see fig. 1). The western region 
had 32 percent of Mongolia's livestock and produced about 30 per- 
cent of its wool and meat. Local industry was engaged in process- 
ing of animal husbandry products, timber, minerals, and building 
materials. Transportation was predominantly by motor vehicles. 

The central economic region (Arhangay, Bayanhongor, Bulgan, 
Darhan, Dornogovi, Dundgovi, Hovsgol, Omnogovi, Ovorhangay, 
Selenge, Tov, and Ulaanbaatar aymags) was the dominant producer. 
The region had 70 percent of Mongolia's population (including 
the cities of Baga Nuur, Darhan, Erdenet, and Ulaanbaatar); 55 
percent of its territory; 75 percent of its arable land; 90 percent 
of surveyed coal deposits; and 100 percent of copper, molybdenum, 
iron ore, and phosphate deposits. This region accounted for 80 per- 
cent of gross industrial production, 90 percent of light industrial 
production, and 80 percent of food industry production, 75 per- 
cent of coal production, and 100 percent of copper-molybdenum, 
iron ore, and phosphate mining. It also accounted for 60 percent 
of gross agricultural production, 60 percent of milk production, 
50 percent of meat production, and 80 percent of grain, potato, 
and vegetable production. 



122 



The Economy 



The eastern economic region (Dornod, Hentiy, and Suhbaatar 
aymags) had 9 percent of Mongolia's population, 20 percent of the 
arable land, and 15 percent of the livestock. The region contributed 
15 percent of gross meat production and 13 percent of wool produc- 
tion. Grain production on large state farms hewed out of virgin 
lands contributed 90 percent of the region's agricultural output. 
The major industrial center was Choybalsan, which produced 50 
percent of regional gross industrial output. 

Economic Reforms 

In the late 1980s, dissatisfaction with the economic stagnation 
of the last years of the former regime of Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal 
and the influence of the Soviet perestroika led Mongolia to launch 
its own program of economic reforms. This program had five goals: 
acceleration of development; application of science and technol- 
ogy to production; reform of management and planning; greater 
independence of enterprises; and a balance of individual, collec- 
tive, and societal interests. Acceleration of development in gen- 
eral was to result from the attainment of the other four goals. 
Scientific research was being redirected to better serve economic 
development, with electronics, automation, biotechnology, and the 
creation of materials becoming the priority areas of research and 
cooperation with Comecon countries. 

Reform of management and planning began in 1986 with the 
first of several rounds of reorganization of governmental bodies 
dealing with the economy. These changes rationalized and stream- 
lined state economic organizations; reduced the number of adminis- 
trative positions by 3,000; and saved 20 million tugriks between 
1986 and 1988. The role of the central planning bodies was to be 
reduced by limiting the duties of the State Planning and Economic 
Committee to overseeing general capital-investment policy. The 
indicators specified in the five-year and the annual national eco- 
nomic plans also were to be decreased. State committees and minis- 
tries, rather than the State Planning and Economic Committee, 
were to decide upon machinery and equipment purchases. Decen- 
tralization of economic management also was to extend to aymag 
and city administrations and enterprises. These bodies were given 
greater autonomy in construction and production, and they also 
were held financially responsible for profits and losses. 

Efforts to devolve economic decision making to the enterprise 
level began in 1986, when more than 100 enterprises began ex- 
perimenting with financial autonomy (before then, enterprises oper- 
ating with a deficit had been subsidized by the state). Enterprises 
were accountable for their own losses, and they were responsible 



123 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

for fulfilling sales contracts and export orders. The draft law on 
state enterprises, presented to the People's Great Hural in Decem- 
ber 1988, was to extend greater independence in economic mat- 
ters to all state enterprises and to lead to an economy that combined 
planning and market mechanisms. 

Under provisions of the draft law, state enterprises were to be 
authorized to make their own annual and five-year plans and to 
negotiate with state and local authorities to pay taxes based on long- 
term quotas. State enterprises also were to sell output exceeding 
state orders and unused assets; to establish their own, or to cooperate 
with existing, scientific organizations to solve scientific and tech- 
nical problems; to be financially responsible for losses, and to pay 
back bank loans; to set prices independently; to establish wage rates 
based on enterprise profitability; to purchase materials and goods 
from individuals, collectives, state distribution organizations, and 
wholesale trade enterprises; to establish direct ties with foreign eco- 
nomic organizations; to manage their own foreign currency; and 
to conduct foreign trade. 

The draft law stipulated that enterprises were to be divided into 
two categories. National enterprises were to be the responsibility 
of ministries, state committees, and departments; local enterprises 
were to be supervised by executive committees of aymag and city 
administrations or members of local hurals. State and local bodies 
were not to interfere in the day-to-day decision making of enter- 
prises, but they were responsible for ensuring that enterprises 
obeyed the law and that they did not suppress the interests of soci- 
ety. Enterprises were allowed to form three kinds of associations: 
production associations, scientific production associations, and 
enterprise associations to coordinate economic affairs. Finally, the 
draft law said that the state was the owner of state enterprises and 
that the labor collective was the lawful manager of a state enter- 
prise. The labor collective was to elect a labor collective council, 
which was to ensure that the enterprise director (who acted on be- 
half of the collective and the state) met the interests of the collec- 
tive in managing the enterprise. It was unclear how the relationship 
between the enterprise director and the labor collective would work 
out in practice. 

Balancing the interests of society, the collective, and the individual 
entailed providing scope for individual and collective initiative to 
increase production and efficiency. Enlarging the scope for indi- 
vidual initiative had three aspects: linking wages to enterprise prof- 
itability, permitting output exceeding state plans to be sold for profit, 
and providing employment opportunities outside the state and the 
cooperative sectors. In 1988 wage scales dependent on enterprise 



124 



The Economy 



revenues were introduced to the light and food industries and to 
the domestic trade sector, resulting in a reduction in materials uti- 
lized by those sectors. Beginning in late 1986, state farms and negdels 
(agricultural stations — see Glossary) were eligible for state payments 
for output exceeding the annual average growth rate for the previ- 
ous five-year plan. Individual agricultural cooperative members 
and workers were allowed increasing numbers of privately held 
livestock. The draft law also stipulated that enterprises could sell 
production exceeding plan targets for their own profit. In 1987 the 
government began encouraging the formation of voluntary labor 
associations, auxiliary farms, and sideline production attached to 
enterprises, schools, and so forth to increase production of food- 
stuffs and consumer goods, to engage in primary processing of 
agricultural goods, and to provide services. The authorities per- 
mitted the formation of individual and family-based cooperatives; 
by 1988 there were 480 such cooperatives. Contracting among state 
farms and both agricultural cooperatives and families was permitted 
and was increasing in the late 1980s (see Agriculture and Industry, 
this ch.). 

Natural Resources 

Mongolia's natural resources include forests, fish, and a vari- 
ety of minerals. In the late 1980s, Mongolia had 15 million hec- 
tares of forests covering 9.6 percent of the nation. Major forested 
areas were approximately 73 percent Siberian larch, 11 percent 
cedar, and 6.5 percent pine. Timber stocks were estimated to be 
1 .3 billion cubic meters. Mongolia's northern rivers and lakes con- 
tained more than 50 native species of fish; however, this resource 
barely was exploited because fish is not popular among Mongolians. 

The country's richest resources are minerals — coal, copper, 
fluorite, gold, iron ore, lead, molybdenum, oil, phosphates, tin, 
uranium, and wolfram (see fig. 9). Coal deposits in the mid-1980s 
were located at Aduun Chuluu (reserves of 37 million tons), Baga 
Nuur (reserves of 1 billion tons), Nalayh (reserves of 73 million 
tons), Sharin Gol (reserves of 69 billion tons), and Tavan Tolgoy 
(reserves of 9.5 billion tons). Copper and molybdenum were found 
at Erdenetiyn-ovoo and at Tsagaan Subarga in Dornogovi Aymag. 
Fluorite deposits were located at Burentsogt in Suhbaatar Aymag, 
at Berh and Bor Ondor in Hentiy Aymag, and at Har-Ayrag in 
Dornogovi Aymag. Northern Mongolia, particularly Tov and 
Selenge aymags, had widespread gold deposits. These sites included 
Tavan Tolgoy, Erhet, and Bugant; the Yoroo Gol and the Bayan 
Gol; and Narantolgoy. Other gold deposits were found at Noyon 
Uul in Hentiy Aymag and at Altan Uul in Omnogovi Aymag. Iron 



125 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




The Economy 



ore occurred at Bayan Gol, at Bayan Uul in Hovsgol Aymag, at 
Bayasgalant in Dundgovi Aymag, and at Yoroo in Selenge Aymag. 
Lead deposits were found at Jargalthaan in Hentiy Aymag and 
at Bordzongiyn Govi in Omnogovi Aymag. A major limestone 
deposit was discovered at Hotol in Bulgan Aymag. Mongolia ex- 
ploited oil deposits at Dzuunbayan and Tsagaan Els in Dornogovi 
Aymag, and at Tamsagbulag in Dornod Aymag in the 1950s and 
the 1960s. Reports on the exploitation of oil deposits ceased after 
1968. Phosphates were found at Urandosh in Hovsgol Aymag. 
Prospecting teams have discovered extensive veins of potash mica 
running through 350 kilometers of the Altai Mountains. Tin was 
located at Nomgon in Omnogovi Aymag and at Yeguudzer in 
Suhbaatar Aymag. Wolfram deposits were exploited at Burentsogt, 
Chonogol, Ihhayrhan, Salaa, and Hanhohiy in Tov and Suhbaatar 
aymags. Uranium has been discovered in Mongolia, but there were 
no reports of deposits that were being tapped in the 1980s. 

Mongolia has cooperated extensively with Comecon countries 
in surveying the country's natural resources. Joint geological 
prospecting teams have located more than 500 mineral deposits 
in Mongolia. The Erdenetiyn-ovoo copper-molybdenum deposit, 
for example, was discovered with Soviet and Czechoslovak as- 
sistance. The Soviet Union has been the most active of the Come- 
con nations in joint exploration of Mongolia's mineral resources. 
The Joint Mongolian- Soviet Geological Expedition has discovered 
previously unknown minerals, has published monographs and 
metallogenic maps; and has focused its surveying efforts on search- 
ing for nonferrous, rare, and precious metals, fluorite, phosphates, 
building materials, and coal. Geological prospecting is thus con- 
ducted to assist Mongolian economic development by extending 
mining industries and by exploiting new mineral deposits. 

Agriculture 

In the late 1980s, agriculture was a small but critical sector of 
the Mongolian economy. In 1985 agriculture accounted for only 
18.3 percent of national income and 33.8 percent of the labor 
force (see table 7, Appendix). Nevertheless, agriculture remained 
economically important because much of Mongolia's industry 
processed agricultural products — foodstuffs, timber, and animal 
products, such as skins and hides — for domestic consumption and 
for export. In 1986 agriculture supplied nearly 60 percent of Mon- 
golia's exports (see Industry; Foreign Economic Relations and 
Comecon, this ch.). 

Mongolian agriculture developed slowly. An abortive attempt 
to collectivize all arads occurred in the early 1930s; efforts to 



127 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

encourage voluntary cooperatives and arad producers' associations 
followed. In the 1930s, the government also began developing state 
farms, and by 1940 there were ten state farms and ninety-one 
agricultural cooperatives. In 1937 the Soviet Union provided ten 
hay-making machine stations to prepare fodder for livestock. In 
1940 agriculture represented 61 percent of national income, and 
it employed approximately 90 percent of the labor force. 

In the 1950s, agriculture began to adopt its present structure 
and modern techniques, based in part on material and technical 
assistance from the Soviet Union and East European countries. 
In the 1950s, the hay-making machine stations were reorganized 
as livestock machine stations. In 1955 negdels replaced the arad 
producers' associations. By 1959 the state had accomplished the 
collectivization of agriculture. In ten years, agricultural coopera- 
tives had more than doubled, from 139 in 1950 to 354 by 1960. 
Ownership of livestock and sown areas changed dramatically as 
a result of collectivization. In 1950, according to Mongolian govern- 
ment statistics, state farms and other state organizations owned 
approximately 0.9 percent of livestock and 37.8 percent of sown 
areas; negdels had about 0.5 percent of livestock and no sown lands; 
and private owners some held 98.3 percent of livestock and 62.2 
percent of sown areas. In 1960 state farms and other state organi- 
zations owned 2.7 percent of livestock; negdels, 73.8 percent; and 
individual negdel members, 23.5 percent. The state sector owned 
77.5 percent of sown lands, and the cooperative sector the re- 
mainder. 

By 1960 agriculture's share of national income had fallen to 22.9 
percent, but agriculture still employed 60.8 percent of the work force. 
After 1960 the number of state farms increased, state fodder supply 
farms were established, the number of negdels decreased through con- 
solidation, and interagricultural cooperative associations were or- 
ganized to facilitate negdel specialization and cooperation. Mongolia 
also began receiving large-scale agricultural assistance from the Soviet 
Union and other East European countries after Mongolia's 1962 
entry into Comecon. The Soviet Union, for example, assisted in 
establishing and equipping several new state farms, and Hungary 
helped with irrigation. In 1967 the Third Congress of Agricultural 
Association Members founded the Union of Agricultural Associa- 
tions to supervise negdels and to represent their interests to the govern- 
ment and to other cooperative and social organizations. The union 
elected a central council, the chairman of which was, ex officio, the 
minister of agriculture; it also adopted a Model Charter to govern 
members' rights and obligations. In 1969 the state handed over the 
livestock machine stations to the negdels. 



128 



The Economy 



Negdels, which concentrated on livestock production, were or- 
ganized into brigad (brigades) and then into suuri (bases), composed 
of several households. Each suuri had its own equipment and produc- 
tion tasks. Negdels adopted the Soviet system of herding, in which 
arad households lived in permanent settlements rather than travel- 
ing with their herds, as in the pastoral tradition (see Pastoral 
Nomadism, ch. 2). In 1985 the average negdelhad 61,500 head of 
livestock, 438,500 hectares of land — of which 1,200 hectares was 
plowable land, 43 tractors, 2 grain harvesters, and 18 motor vehi- 
cles; it harvested 500 tons of grain. Individual negdel members were 
permitted to own livestock. In mountain steppe pasture areas, ten 
head of livestock per person, up to fifty head per household, were 
allowed. In desert regions, fifteen head per person, up to seventy- 
five head per household, were permitted. Private plots also were 
allowed for negdel farmers. 

State farms, compared with negdels, had more capital invested, 
were more highly mechanized, and generally were located in the 
most productive regions, or close to major mining and industrial 
complexes. State farms engaged primarily in crop production. In 
1985 there were 52 state farms, 17 fodder supply farms, and 255 
negdels. In 1985 the average state farm employed 500 workers; owned 
26,200 head of livestock, 178,600 hectares of land— of which 15,400 
hectares was plowable land, 265 tractors, 36 grain harvesters, and 
40 motor vehicles; it harvested 12,100 tons of grain. 

In the late 1980s, several changes in governmental organization 
occurred to facilitate agricultural development. In October 1986, 
the Ministry of Agriculture absorbed the Ministry of Water Econ- 
omy, which had controlled irrigation. In December 1987, the Minis- 
try of Agriculture, the Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking, and 
the Ministry of Food and Light Industries were abolished and two 
new ministries — the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, 
and the Ministry of Environmental Protection — were established. 
Among the functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food In- 
dustry were the further coordination of agriculture and of indus- 
trial food processing to boost the food supply, and the development 
on state farms of agro-industrial complexes, which had processing 
plants for foodstuffs. The Sharin Gol state farm, for example, grew 
fruits and vegetables, which then were processed in the state farm's 
factories to produce dried fruit, fruit juices, fruit and vegetable 
preserves, and pickled vegetables. The Ministry of Environmen- 
tal Protection incorporated the Forestry and Hunting Economy Sec- 
tion of the former Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking and the 
State Land and Water Utilization and Protection Service of the 
former Ministry of Agriculture (see fig. 10; Forestry, this ch.). 



129 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




The Economy 



Crop Production 

Since its inception, the Mongolian People's Republic has devoted 
considerable resources to developing crop production in what was 
a predominantly nomadic, pastoral economy. Mongols tradition- 
ally disdained the raising of crops, which was conducted for the 
most part by Chinese farmers. Early efforts to force arads to be- 
come farmers failed, and the government turned to the creation 
of state farms to promote crop production. By 1941 when the state 
had established ten state farms, Mongolia had 26,600 hectares of 
sown land. State farms, however, accounted for only 29.6 percent 
of the planted areas. 

After World War II, Mongolia intensified efforts to expand crop 
production by establishing more state farms, by reclaiming virgin 
lands for crop raising, by mechanizing farm operations, and by 
developing irrigation systems for farmlands. When Mongolia began 
to report statistics on arable land in 1960, there were 532,000 hect- 
ares of arable land, and sown crops covered 265,000 hectares of 
the 477,000 hectares of plow land. Mongolia's 25 state farms ac- 
counted for 77.5 percent of sown areas, and cooperatives, for 22.5 
percent. In 1985 when 52 state farms and 17 fodder supply farms 
existed, there were about 1.2 million hectares of arable land, and 
sown crops covered 789,600 hectares of the approximately 1 mil- 
lion hectares of plow land. The state sector accounted for 80.6 per- 
cent of sown areas, and cooperatives, for 19.4 percent. Development 
of virgin lands by state farms was responsible for most of the ex- 
pansion of arable land and sown areas. Land reclamation started 
in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, when 530,000 hectares were 
developed, and it continued throughout each five-year plan. Dur- 
ing the Seventh Plan, 250,000 hectares were assimilated, and the 
Eighth Plan called for an additional 120,000 to 130,000 hectares 
to be reclaimed. 

Mechanization of farm operations commenced on a large scale 
in the 1950s with Soviet assistance. The Soviet Union provided 
most agricultural machines, as well as advice and expertise in 
mechanization. State farms were more highly mechanized than 
cooperatives. For example, in 1985, 100 percent of potato plant- 
ing and 84 percent of potato harvesting were mechanized on state 
farms, compared with 85 percent and 35 percent, respectively, in 
negdels. Beginning in the 1960s, state farms also pioneered the de- 
velopment of irrigation systems for crops. By 1985 Mongolia had 
85,200 hectares of available irrigated land, of which 81,600 hect- 
ares actually were irrigated. 

Crop production initially concentrated on raising cereals; in 1941 
cereals covered 95.1 percent of sown areas, while 3.4 percent was 



131 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

devoted to potatoes and 1.5 percent to vegetables. Cultivation of 
fodder crops began in the 1950s. In 1985 cereals covered 80.6 per- 
cent of sown areas, fodder crops 17.7 percent, potatoes 1.3 per- 
cent, and vegetables 0.4 percent. Mongolia's staple crops were 
wheat, barley, oats, potatoes, vegetables, hay, and silage crops. 
Since 1960 agricultural performance — as measured by gross out- 
put, per capita output, and crop yields — was uneven. Although 
sown acreage expanded dramatically between 1960 and 1980, out- 
put and crop yields remained stagnant and, in some cases, fell be- 
cause of natural disasters and poor management. In addition to 
the staple crops mentioned, Mongolia also produced small quan- 
tities of oil-yielding crops, such as sunflower and rape, and fruits 
and vegetables, such as sea buckthorn, apples, European black 
currants, watermelons, muskmelons, onions, and garlic. Small 
amounts of alfalfa, soybean, millet, and peas also were grown to 
provide protein fodder. 

The Eighth Plan called for increasing the average annual gross 
harvest of cereals to between 780,000 and 800,000 tons; potatoes 
to between 150,000 and 160,000 tons; vegetables to between 50,000 
and 80,000 tons; silage crops to between 280,000 and 300,000 tons; 
and annual and perennial fodder crops to between 330,000 and 
360,000 tons. Emphasis was placed on raising crop production and 
quality by increasing mechanization; improving and expanding 
acreage; raising crop yields; expanding irrigation; selecting cereal 
varieties better adapted to natural climatic conditions and better 
locations for cereal cultivation; applying greater volumes of organic 
and mineral fertilizers; building more storage facilities; reducing 
losses because of pests, weeds, and plant diseases; and preventing 
soil erosion. Emphasis also was put on improving management of 
crop production on state farms and negdels as well as of procure- 
ment, transport, processing, and storage of agricultural products. 

Animal Husbandry 

From prerevolutionary times until well into the 1970s, animal 
husbandry was the mainstay of the Mongolian economy. In the 
traditional economy, livestock provided foodstuffs and clothing; 
after the 1921 revolution, livestock supplied foodstuffs and raw 
materials for industries and for export. Mongolia had 9.6 million 
head of livestock in 1918 and 13.8 million head in 1924; arad owner- 
ship was estimated to be 50 to 80 percent of all livestock, and monas- 
tic and aristocratic ownership to be 50 to 20 percent. Policies 
designed to force collectivization in the early 1930s met with arad 
resistance, including the slaughter of their own animals. Reversal 
of these policies led to a growth in livestock numbers, which peaked 



132 



The Economy 



in 1941 at 27.5 million head. World War II brought new commit- 
ments to provide food and raw materials for the Soviet war effort 
(see Economic Gradualism and National Defense, 1932-45, ch. 1). 
With the levy of taxes in kind, livestock numbers fell to about 20 
million in 1945, and they have hovered between 20 million and 
24 million head since then. Collectivization and advances in veteri- 
nary science have failed to boost livestock production significantly 
since the late 1940s. In 1940 animal husbandry produced 99.6 per- 
cent of gross agricultural output. The share of animal husbandry 
in gross agricultural output declined after World War II, to 71.8 
percent in 1960, 81.6 percent in 1970, 79.5 percent in 1980, and 
70 percent in 1985. The rise in crop production since 1940 has ac- 
counted for animal husbandry's decline in gross agricultural output. 

Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, animal husbandry continued to 
be an important component of the national economy, supplying 
foodstuffs and raw materials for domestic consumption, for process- 
ing by industry, and for export. In 1985 there were 22,485,500 
head of livestock, of which 58.9 percent were sheep; 19.1 percent, 
goats; 10.7 percent, cattle; 8.8 percent, horses; and 2.5 percent, 
camels. In addition, pigs, poultry, and bees were raised. In 1985 
there were 56,100 pigs and 271,300 head of poultry; no figures 
were available on apiculture. Livestock products included meat and 
fat from camels, catde, chickens, horses, goats, pigs, and sheep; 
eggs; honey; milk; wool from camels, cattle, goats, and sheep; and 
hides and skins from camels, cattle, goats, horses, and sheep. In 
1986 exports of livestock products included 15,500 tons of wool, 
121,000 large hides, 1,256,000 small hides, and 44,100 tons of meat 
and meat products. 

In the late 1980s, differences existed in ownership and produc- 
tivity of livestock among state farms, agricultural cooperatives, and 
individual cooperative members. For example, in 1985 agricultural 
cooperatives owned 70.1 percent of the "five animals" — camels, 
cattle, goats, horses, and sheep; state farms, 6 percent, other state 
organizations, 1.7 percent; and individual cooperative members, 
22.2 percent. State farms raised 81.4 percent of all poultry; other 
state organizations, 3.3 percent; cooperatives, 12.9 percent; and 
individual cooperative members, 2.4 percent. State farms accounted 
for 19.1 percent of pig raising; other state organizations, for 34.2 
percent; agricultural cooperatives, for 12.5 percent; and individ- 
ual cooperative members, for 34.2 percent. Survival rates of young 
livestock were higher in the cooperatives than on state farms; 
however, state farms produced higher yields of milk and wool. Fod- 
der for livestock in the agricultural cooperatives was supplemented 



133 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

by production on state fodder supply farms and on state farms, 
which had higher output and yields. 

Despite its economic importance, in the late 1980s animal hus- 
bandry faced many problems: labor shortages, stagnant produc- 
tion and yields, inclement weather, poor management, diseases, 
and the necessity to use breeding stock to meet high export quotas. 
The Eighth Plan attempted to address some of these problems. To 
alleviate labor shortages, the plan called for higher income, increased 
mechanization, and improved working and cultural conditions in 
rural areas to retain animal husbandry workers, particularly those 
with technical training. Measures to raise productivity included 
increased mechanization; improved breeding techniques to boost 
meat, milk, and wool yields and to cut losses from barrenness and 
miscarriages; and strengthened veterinary services to reduce ill- 
ness. Additional livestock facilities were to be built to provide shelter 
from harsh winter weather and to fatten livestock. More efficient 
use of fodder was sought through expanding production; improv- 
ing varieties; and decreasing losses in procurement, shipping, 
processing, and storage. Pastureland was to be improved by ex- 
panding irrigation and by combating pests. 

Overcoming poor management was more difficult. Local party, 
state, and cooperative organizations were admonished to manage 
animal husbandry more efficiendy, and cooperative members were 
requested to care for collectively owned livestock as if it were their 
own. In addition, more concrete measures to improve the manage- 
ment and the productivity of animal husbandry were adopted in 
the late 1980s. The individual livestock holdings of workers, em- 
ployees, and citizens were increased to eight head per household 
in major towns, sixteen head in smaller towns, and twenty-five head 
in rural areas; households were allowed to dispose of surplus produce 
through the cooperative trade network and through the state 
procurement system. Auxiliary farms run by factories, offices, and 
schools were established to raise additional pigs, poultry, and rab- 
bits, as well as to grow some vegetables. Family contracts concluded 
on a voluntary basis with cooperatives or with state farms were 
reported by the government to increase high-quality output, to lower 
production expenses, and to enhance production efficiency. 

Forestry 

Mongolia's vast forests (15 million hectares) are exploited for 
timber, hunting, and fur-bearing animals. In 1984 a Mongolian 
source stated that the forestry sector accounted for about one-sixth 
of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). Until December 
1987, exploitation of these resources was supervised by the Forestry 



134 




Cattle on way to pasture 
Courtesy Regina Genton 
Shearing sheep, Hovd Ay mag 
Courtesy Steve Mann 



135 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

and Hunting Economy Section of the Ministry of Forestry and 
Woodworking. In that month this section was integrated into the 
new Ministry of Environmental Protection (see State Organiza- 
tions, ch. 4). The woodworking component of the former minis- 
try presumably became part of the new Ministry of Light Industry. 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection's assumption of con- 
trol of forest resources reflected the government's concern over 
environmental degradation resulting from indiscriminate deforesta- 
tion. Forestry enterprises reafforested only 5,000 hectares of the 
20,000 hectares felled annually. In addition, fires engulfed 1 mil- 
lion hectares of forest between 1980 and 1986. Mongolia's shrink- 
ing forests lowered water levels in many tributaries of the Selenge 
and Orhon rivers, hurting soil conservation and creating water 
shortages in Ulaanbaatar. 

Timber enterprises and their downstream industries made a siz- 
able contribution to the Mongolian economy, accounting for 10 
percent of gross industrial output in 1985. Approximately 2.5 mil- 
lion cubic meters of timber were cut annually. Fuel wood accounted 
for about 55 percent of the timber cut, and the remainder was 
processed by the woodworking industry. In 1986 Mongolia pro- 
duced 627,000 cubic meters of sawn timber, of which 121,000 cubic 
meters was exported. Lumber also was exported; lumber exports 
declined dramatically from 104,000 cubic meters in 1984 to 85,700 
cubic meters in 1985 and to 39,000 cubic meters in 1986. 

Mongolia's forests and steppes abounded with animals that were 
hunted for their fur, meat, and other products in the late 1980s. 
Fur-bearing animals included marmots, muskrats, squirrels, foxes, 
korsak (steppe foxes), and wolves, which were hunted, and such 
animals as deer, sable, and ermine, which were raised on state 
animal farms. Animal pelts were exported in large numbers. In 
1985 Mongolia exported more than 1 million small hides, which 
included some of the 763,400 marmot pelts, 23,800 squirrel skins, 
3,700 wolf skins, and other furs. Marmot also was hunted for its 
fat, which was processed industrially. Mongolian gazelles were 
hunted for their meat, and red deer, for their antler velvet. Orga- 
nized hunting of wild sheep was a foreign tourist attraction. 

Fishing 

Mongolia's lakes and rivers teem with freshwater fish. Mongo- 
lia has developed a small-scale fishing industry, to export canned 
fish. Little information was available on the types and the quanti- 
ties of fish processed for export, but in 1986, the total fish catch 
was 400 metric tons in live weight. 



136 



The Economy 



Industry 

In 1924 Mongolian industry was limited to the Nalayh coal mine, 
an electric power plant in Ulaanbaatar, and various handicrafts. 
Gross industrial output (measured in constant 1967 prices), was 
300,000 tugriks. Industry developed very slowly in the first two 
decades of the Mongolian People's Republic, primarily because 
Mongolia's benefactor, the Soviet Union, provided few resources 
to invest in industrialization. With Soviet advice, however, Mon- 
golia adopted an industrial strategy that was based on the exploi- 
tation of natural resources and agriculture and it has followed this 
strategy since. The first steps to develop industry began in the 1930s. 
In 1933 the Union of Artisans was organized. In 1934 the Choy- 
balsan industrial combine, the flagship of Mongolian industry, 
began operating in Ulaanbaatar. The combine, a joint Mongolian- 
Soviet company transferred to Mongolian control in 1935, had its 
own power plant, cloth factories, tanneries, and wool-scouring mill 
that produced blankets, felt, footwear, leather coats, and soap. Coal 
production at Nalayh rose in the 1930s, and in 1938 the narrow- 
gauge railroad connecting the mine with the capital's power- 
generating station was completed. In 1940 industry accounted for 
8.5 percent, and construction for 0.8 percent, of national income. 
Gross industrial output rose to 124.7 million tugriks. 

Industry began to develop substantially after World War II, when 
Soviet aid increased and Soviet- style central planning was in- 
troduced, and, in the 1950s, when Chinese assistance started. Most 
industrialization occurred in Ulaanbaatar; smaller food combines 
and livestock-product processing plants were scattered throughout 
the country. In the 1950s, major projects completed with Soviet 
assistance included the modernization of the Choybalsan indus- 
trial combine; the expansion of production at the Nalayh coal mine; 
the opening of oil wells in Buyant-Uhaa (Sayn Shand); and the 
construction of four felt-rolling mills, a water supply plant, and 
leather-processing factories. Chinese aid was given primarily in the 
form of construction projects; Chinese laborers built roads, bridges, 
housing, and a hydroelectric power plant. By 1960 industry and 
construction accounted for 14.6 percent and 6.7 percent, respec- 
tively, of national income. Gross industrial output (in constant 1967 
prices) was 676.8 million tugriks. 

Industrialization took a big step forward after 1960. Large-scale 
investment by the Soviet Union and other East European coun- 
tries took place with Mongolia's entry into Comecon in 1962. This 
assistance enabled Mongolia to diversify industry geographically 
and sectorally. Major industrial centers were built at Darhan and 



137 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Choybalsan in the 1960s and at Erdenet and Baga Nuur in the 
1970s and the 1980s. After 1970 the scope of industry expanded 
beyond processing of agricultural products; exploitation of min- 
erals developed on a large scale, and the energy and the construc- 
tion industries, which supported such development, also grew. In 
1970 industry and construction accounted for 22.6 percent and 5.8 
percent of national income, respectively; in 1985 they accounted 
for 32.4 and 4.9 percent of national income, respectively. Gross 
industrial output (in constant 1967 prices) was 1,733.2 million 
tugriks in 1970 and 6,244.4 million tugriks in 1985. 

In the late 1980s, industry was concentrated in several urban 
centers. Baga Nuur was a coal-mining and energy production 
center. Bor Ondor produced fluorite. Choybalsan had a coal mine, 
a meat-packing plant, a foodstuffs combine, and a wool-scouring 
mill. Darhan was close to the Sharin Gol coal mine and produced 
construction materials, foodstuffs, and light industrial products. 
Erdenet, home of the copper and molybdenum processing com- 
bine, also manufactured carpets and processed timber. Hotol was 
the location of major limestone deposits and a cement production 
center. Ulaanbaatar, the oldest industrial center, specialized in coal 
and energy production, food processing, livestock-product process- 
ing, and textiles (see fig. 11). 

Changes in government organizations responsible for industry 
reflected the regime's efforts to spur industrial development. In 
1968 the Ministry of Industry, originally established in 1938, was 
abolished; the Ministry of Food Industry was transformed into the 
Ministry of Food and Light Industries. That same year, the Minis- 
try of Geology became the Ministry of Fuel, Power, and Geology. 
In 1972 the Ministry of Food and Light Industries established 
industrial producers' associations modeled on Soviet producers' 
associations. The industrial producers' associations grouped minis- 
try enterprises according to their specialization in clothing, flour 
and fodder, footwear, hides and skins, and wool. In 1976 the Minis- 
try of Fuel, Power, and Geology was divided into the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power Industry and the Ministry of Geology and Min- 
ing. In 1986 the Ministry of Construction and Construction 
Materials Industry and the State Committee for Construction, 
Architecture, and Technical Control were dissolved, and the State 
Construction Committee was established. In December 1987, the 
Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking, the Ministry of Geology 
and Mining, the Ministry of Fuel and Power Industry, and the 
Ministry of Food and Light Industries were replaced by the Minis- 
try of Agriculture and Food Industry, the Ministry of Light In- 
dustry, and the Ministry of Power, Mining Industry, and Geology. 



138 



The Economy 



Government organizations also concerned with industry in the late 
1980s were the State Construction Committee and the Ministry 
of Social Economy and Services, formed in 1972 to supervise handi- 
craft production and the artels, or handicraft producers' associations. 

The Ministry of Environmental Protection also was formed in 
1987 out of the Forestry and Hunting Economy Section of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking, the State Land and Water 
Utilization and Protection Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and the Main Hydrometeorological Administration of the Coun- 
cil of Ministers; it dealt with industrial pollution. Environmental 
degradation of the Hovsgol Nuur-Selenge Moron-Lake Baykal 
ecosystem was a concern of both Mongolian and Soviet authori- 
ties. To limit ecological damage, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection took steps to close the Hatgal wool-scouring mill on 
Hovsgol Nuur, to end shipping of gas and oil in the summer, and 
to cease carbon-monoxide-producing motor transportation across 
the ice during the winter. Plans to open the Urandosh strip mine 
on the banks of Hovsgol Nuur also were postponed. Other mea- 
sures to alleviate environmental pollution included closing ther- 
mal power stations in Ulaanbaatar and moving industrial facilities 
outside the city in order to reduce air pollution. Strip mining in 
Mongolia — particularly at the Baga Nuur, Erdenet, and Sharin 
Gol mines — had created large slag heaps of concern to environ- 
mentalists. Other sources of ecological degradation were the dump- 
ing of industrial, agricultural, and household waste into small rivers 
and lakes. 

Light Industry 

In the late 1980s, Mongolian light industry included woodwork- 
ing, textiles, clothing, leather and footwear, printing, and food in- 
dustries, which, primarily, processed agricultural products, and 
handicrafts. In 1985 light industry accounted for 74.2 percent of 
gross industrial output. Woodworking enterprises included wood- 
working plants and combines, paper plants, prefabricated hous- 
ing factories, match factories, furniture factories, and handicraft 
enterprises engaged in the production of ger (see Glossary) frames, 
carts, and barrels. The food industry's meat-packing plants, dairies, 
distilleries, and flour mills produced canned meat, sausages, lard, 
soap, milk, butter, beverages, and confectionery products. The tex- 
tile and clothing industries processed wool and produced woolen 
cloth, blankets, carpets, knitwear, cashmere sweaters, and school 
uniforms. The leather and the footwear industries processed hides 
and skins from sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and camels and produced 
various leather products, including shoes and coats. The Eighth 



139 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




The Economy 



Plan called for increasing production of various light industries by 
1 7 to 46 percent and for improving labor productivity in these in- 
dustries by 15 to 33 percent. 

Mining 

Until the late 1960s, mining in Mongolia consisted primarily 
of coal extraction. In the 1970s, however, joint exploitation of min- 
eral resources by the Soviet Union and other Comecon nations com- 
menced on a large scale. Comecon and joint Mongolian- Soviet 
geological teams surveyed the country's natural resources and dis- 
covered valuable mineral deposits, such as copper, molybdenum, 
wolfram, fluorite, gold, and tin. Several joint stock companies, such 
as Mongolsovtsvetmet, Mongolchekhoslovakmetall, and Mongol - 
bolgarmetall, were formed to develop and to exploit these deposits. 
By the late 1980s, mining was an important sector of the economy, 
and accounted for 42.6 percent of exports in 1985. Little informa- 
tion was available on mining output, however. 

In 1985 Mongolia mined 6.5 million tons of relatively low-grade 
varieties of coal, of which only 225,200 tons, or 3 percent, was ex- 
ported. Exploited lignite deposits were located at Aduun Chuluu, 
near Choybalsan; Baga Nuur; Nalayh, near Ulaanbaatar; and 
Sharin Gol, near Darhan. The Aduun Chuluu coal mine's annual 
output was 300,000 tons. The Baga Nuur strip mine, developed 
in the 1980s, produced 2 million tons annually by 1985. The Nalayh 
coal mine, the country's oldest, produced 800,000 tons annually 
in the 1980s. The Sharin Gol strip mine, developed in the 1960s, 
had an annual output of 1.1 million tons in the 1980s. The large 
Tavan Tolgoy deposit of coking coal remained unexploited because 
of its remoteness from transportation and industrial centers. The 
Eighth Plan called for raising coal production to 9 million tons, 
labor productivity 22 to 24 percent, and the capacity of the Baga 
Nuur mine. 

The copper and molybdenum deposit at Erdenetiyn-ovoo was 
discovered by Mongolian and Czechoslovak geologists in the 
mid-1960s and was developed with massive Soviet assistance in the 
1970s. Erdenet's development required the construction of a branch 
railroad line from Salhit, near Darhan to Erdenet; a highway from 
Darhan to Erdenet; a water pipeline from the Selenge Moron; an 
electric line from the Soviet Union; and factories, housing, and 
other facilities. A Mongolian-Soviet construction force number- 
ing 14,000 built the Joint Mongolian-Soviet Erdenet Mining and 
Concentrating Combine, which included a mine, a concentrating 
plant, a material and technical supply base, a mechanical repair 
plant, and a high-capacity thermal and electric power plant. The 



141 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

first stage of the Erdenet combine went into operation in 1978, with 
a planned output of 50,000 tons for 1979. With the completion of 
the fourth stage in 1981, planned annual production capacity was 
16 million tons of concentrate. From 1979 to 1982, Erdenet 's out- 
put of concentrates amounted to 250,000 tons of copper and 3,400 
tons of molybdenum, with concentrates containing 33 percent cop- 
per and 50 percent molybdenum. In 1983 the Erdenet combine 
was completed. During the Eighth Plan, annual capacity was to 
reach 20 million tons. No information was available on actual output 
or exports. 

Other nonferrous metals exploited by Mongolsovtsvetmet and 
other joint ventures were fluorite, wolfram, tin, and gold. The Berh, 
Bor Ondor, Burentsogt, and Har-Ayrag fluorite deposits had an 
annual output of 786,700 tons; fluorite was exported to the Soviet 
Union, but no figures were available. The Eighth Plan called for 
expanding fluorite production capacity by an unspecified amount. 
No figures were available on output or on exports of wolfram, tin, 
and gold. In the late 1980s, plans to open the Urandosh phosphate 
strip mine near Hatgal were delayed by concerns for environmen- 
tal pollution in Hovsgol Nuur. Exploitation of the Burenhaan phos- 
phate deposit still was planned. Further development of Mongolia's 
other mineral resources was also planned, and the Eighth Plan called 
for continued cooperation with Comecon countries in geological 
prospecting and mining. 

Energy 

In the late 1980s, energy in Mongolia was provided primarily 
by coal-burning thermal and electric power stations. Other energy 
sources were hydroelectric power, wood, and imported gas and 
diesel fuel. Mongolia produced its own oil in the 1950s and the 
1960s, but reports on oil exploitation ended in 1968. Increased elec- 
tric power generation, made possible by the expansion of coal min- 
ing since the 1960s, powered the rapid development of industry 
after Mongolia's entry into Comecon. In 1960 when coal produc- 
tion was 618,800 tons, 106.4 million kilowatt-hours of electricity 
were generated. In 1985 coal production increased to 6.5 million 
tons, and electricity generation rose to 2.8 billion kilowatt-hours. 
Per capita electricity generation increased from 111.7 kilowatt-hours 
in 1960 to 1,487.3 kilowatt-hours in 1985. In 1985 electric power 
and thermal energy generation and the fuel industry accounted for 
11.3 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively, of gross industrial 
output. 

In the late 1980s, despite the growth in power generation, Mon- 
golia suffered from energy shortages. Electricity shortfalls interrupted 



142 



The Economy 



the power supply for industries and households in urban areas, and 
many rural areas lacked electricity. The Eighth Plan called for in- 
creasing energy generation, extending rural electrification, and im- 
proving the efficiency of the energy industry by economizing on 
unit fuel consumption and by raising labor productivity. Specifi- 
cally, the plan called for raising the generation of electric power 
to between 3 . 2 billion and 3 . 4 billion kilowatt-hours and thermal 
energy to 7.4 million to 7.6 million giga-calories by 1990. Capital 
investment in the energy industry was to amount to 2.7 billion to 
2.9 billion tugriks. Extension of the centralized power supply and 
rural electrification were to occur by expanding facilities in Ulaan- 
baatar, by constructing power plants in Baga Nuur and Erdenet, 
and by building power lines to connect the cities of Arvayheer, 
Buyant-Uhaa, and Tsetserleg, and more than thirty somons (see 
Glossary). More remote areas were to install diesel-powered and 
coal-powered energy generating installations to meet their re- 
quirements. 

Construction 

In 1985 the construction sector generated 4.9 percent of national 
income, and the construction materials industry produced 6.7 per- 
cent of gross industrial output. Mongolian statistics indicated that 
approximately 28,200 workers were involved in construction projects 
and that 8,500 workers were employed in the manufacture of con- 
struction materials in 1985. Mongolian statistics, however, were mis- 
leading because they did not include the role of military and foreign 
labor in the construction sector. The Soviet Union and, to a lesser 
extent, East European countries and China, played a key role in 
constructing Mongolia's infrastructure. The Erdenet combine, for 
example, was built by a 14,000-strong joint Mongolian- Soviet work 
force that included military construction troops and workers of the 
Soviet construction company, Medmolibdenstroy. Other Soviet con- 
struction companies working in Mongolia included the joint-stock 
company, Sovmongolpromstroy, which built industrial facilities, and 
Mongolenergostroy, which constructed electric lines and power sta- 
tions. In the mid-1980s, Mongolian construction teams undertook 
40 percent of construction work; Soviet and other Comecon coun- 
tries undertook the rest. China provided laborers to help build up 
Mongolia's transportation and industrial infrastructure in the 1950s, 
but such aid ceased with the Sino-Soviet rift in the 1960s (see So- 
cialist Construction Under Tsedenbal, 1952-84, ch. 1). In addition, 
in the 1980s Mongolian military construction troops were involved 
in building many industrial, agricultural, and other facilities (see 
Economic Role, ch. 5). 



143 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

In the late 1980s, the construction sector was plagued by sub- 
standard work, delays in completing projects and in installing equip- 
ment, and shortages of labor and building materials. To alleviate 
these problems, the Eighth Plan called for increasing total construc- 
tion and installation work by 26 to 29 percent, for raising the work 
performed by Mongolian construction teams by 42 to 44 percent, 
and for increasing labor productivity by 20 to 22 percent. Manufac- 
ture of construction materials was to increase by 160 to 170 per- 
cent, and labor productivity in the construction materials industry, 
by 36 to 38 percent. Measures to increase construction efficiency 
were recommended, including channeling capital investments into 
priority projects; reducing construction times and the amount of 
incomplete construction; improving coordination among planning, 
construction, and supply organizations and their clients; creating 
specialized enterprises for rural construction work; and improv- 
ing working and social conditions for construction workers in order 
to reduce labor shortages. 

Services 

Banking and Insurance 

Before 1924 Mongolia lacked its own banks and currency. Mon- 
golians bartered, using such commodities as livestock, tea, and salt 
for exchange, or such foreign currencies as the United States dol- 
lar, the Russian ruble, the British pound, and the Chinese Mexi- 
can dollar (or, Yanchan, then a standard currency in coastal China) 
in commerce. Chinese and Russian banks offered credit, as did 
monasteries and private moneylenders. The government began to 
transform this chaotic monetary situation with a series of reforms, 
starting with the establishment of Mongolbank, or the Mongolian 
Trade-Industrial Bank, in June 1924. Mongolbank was founded 
as a Mongolian-Soviet joint-stock company. In February 1925, the 
tugrik was made the official national currency, and it was slowly 
introduced into circulation over the next three years. In April 1928, 
all other currencies were withdrawn from circulation. In 1929 the 
government drove private moneylenders out of business by estab- 
lishing a monopoly on foreign trade and then outlawing private 
lending. 

The establishment of a stable financial and monetary system, 
with a centralized bank controlling the national currency flow, per- 
mitted the government to introduce a First Plan in 1931. In 1933 
additional banking reforms strengthened the position of Mongol- 
bank in the economy. All state and cooperative enterprises were 
required to keep their accounts with the bank, and cash transactions 



144 



The Sukhe Bator thermal electric power station, Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Institute of Party History, Ulaanbaatar 



were limited effectively to the household sector of the economy. 
Thus Mongolbank, which was firmly under government control, 
was able to monitor and to supervise the business transactions 
of all enterprises. In April 1954, the Soviet Union handed over 
its shares in Mongolbank, which was renamed the State Bank of 
the Mongolian People's Republic. In 1960 the bank's lending ac- 
tivities were restricted to state, cooperative, and private enter- 
prises for which investment funds were approved by the national 
budget. 

In the late 1980s, the State Bank granted short-term credits to 
cooperatives and state enterprises and long-term credits to the econ- 
omy's industrial sector. Government borrowing from the bank was 
limited, although the limits were not always followed. The State 
Bank worked closely with the Ministry of Finance, and it was 
governed by a central board. In 1984 the State Bank had more 
than 400 offices and branches throughout the country. The State 
Bank, as the central bank, conducted currency transactions with 
foreign countries and had agent relations with about seventy for- 
eign banks. Insurance was offered by the State Directorate for 
Insurance, or Mongoldaatgal, which was under the control of the 
Ministry of Finance. 



145 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Domestic Trade and Other Services 

In pre- 1921 Mongolia, domestic trade and services were primi- 
tive. Few commodities were exchanged; those that were primarily 
were by barter. Traders were almost entirely foreigners — Chinese 
and Russian — except for Mongolians who conducted trade and 
provided services at Mongolia's monasteries. After the 1921 revo- 
lution, the government began seizing control of the internal trade 
system and transforming it into a socialist distribution network with 
Soviet assistance. In 1921 the Mongolian Central Cooperative was 
established; in the late 1920s, such Soviet trade organizations as 
the Stormong Company and the Sherst Company began to dis- 
place all other foreign traders in the Mongolian economy. In 1929 
the Mongolian Central Cooperative was expanded, and Chinese 
traders were expelled from the country. In 1932 the Mongolian 
Central Cooperative was reorganized as the Union of Consumer 
Cooperatives. The Mongolian and the Soviet governments also 
founded a joint-stock wholesale trading company, Mongsovbuner, 
which took over the Mongolian Central Cooperative's wholesale 
operations. In 1934 the Soviet Union handed over its share of 
Mongsovbuner to the Mongolian government, which transformed 
Mongsovbuner into the Mongolian State Trading Office. The ex- 
propriation of monastic property in the late 1920s and the early 
1930s effectively ended the monasteries' participation in trade. 
Forced collectivization of arads, however, failed miserably and set 
back government attempts to socialize the internal trade system. 
Nevertheless, about 90 percent of retail trade was carried out by 
state and cooperative trade organizations by 1940. 

During World War II, state procurement from individual house- 
holds was instituted by means of taxes in kind and obligatory 
delivery of goods. The wartime taxation measures provided the 
foundation of Mongolia's procurement and distribution system 
as the economy was collectivized in the 1950s. During the Three- 
Year Plan (1958-60), the Union of Consumer Cooperatives was 
abolished, and its components were consolidated with state trad- 
ing organizations under the newly formed Ministry of Trade and 
Procurement. By 1983 the state trade network accounted for 95 
percent of retail trade turnover; cooperative agricultural trade 
represented the remainder. In the late 1980s, this ministry still ran 
Mongolia's internal trade and state procurement systems. 

Retail Trade and Consumption 

In 1985 retail trade turnover was 4, 138.4 million tugriks, of which 
3,948.4 million tugriks occurred in state outlets. Retail trade in 
Mongolia rose slowly from negligible levels — the equivalents of 



146 



The Economy 



60,000 tugriks in 1921 and 8.7 million tugriks in 1924— to 184.8 
million tugriks in 1940. Beginning in the 1950s, retail trade grew 
dramatically as large-scale Chinese and Soviet assistance permit- 
ted Mongolia to purchase imported consumer goods not produced 
domestically. By 1960 the total reached 975.8 million tugriks, and 
after Mongolia's 1962 entry into Comecon, retail trade increased 
to 1,914.6 million tugriks in 1970. Total retail trade in 1980 and 
1985 was, respectively, 3,348.3 million and 4,138.4 million tugriks. 
In 1985 foodstuffs accounted for 49.9 percent and non-food com- 
modities, for 50.1 percent of retail trade in state trading organiza- 
tions. Ulaanbaatar accounted for 41 .6 percent of retail trade in state 
trade organizations. 

In 1984 Mongolia's state retail trade and public catering enter- 
prises included 1,382 shops, 2,498 stalls and agents, and 543 restaur- 
ants and canteens. In the 1980s, the government began introducing 
self-service stores, with a limited variety of products, into the state 
retail network. The self-service stores eliminated the practice of 
triple queuing — lining up to select, then to pay for, and finally to 
receive products purchased. State retail outlets, including mobile 
shops in rural areas, offered equipment for arad households, such 
as batteries, cooking pots, and paraffin lamps, as well as special- 
order departments for goods not stocked. A wider range of goods 
was available in urban areas, particularly in Ulaanbaatar. 

The capital's main department store in the late 1980s was Ulsyn 
Ih Delguur. In addition, there was a specialty shop restricted to 
members of the Mongolian nomenklatura (see Glossary). Two duty- 
free shops (in Ulaanbaatar' s main hotels) sold foreign luxury goods 
and high-quality domestic products to foreigners exchanging hard 
currencies and to Mongolians possessing hard-currency vouchers. 
A Sunday market for spare parts and odds and ends was located 
in the northern suburbs of Ulaanbaatar. Prices in this market, unlike 
those in the state retail system, were negotiated freely. 

All other prices were controlled strictly by the government, and 
great efforts were made to ensure stable prices for consumer goods. 
Before January 1988, prices were determined by the State Com- 
mittee for Prices and Standards, the functions of which were ab- 
sorbed by the new State Planning and Economic Committee. Retail 
prices were said to have declined by 0.5 percent from 1970 to 1980. 
In the late 1980s, however, it was unclear how economic reforms 
would affect retail price levels. Although the draft state enterprise 
law stipulated that enterprises would set their own prices for 
products, the role of the State Planning and Economic Committee 
in setting price guidelines was uncertain. There were indications 



147 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

that the government thought that some inflation would be un- 
avoidable . 

In the late 1980s, the Mongolian government was working to 
raise the standard of living by increasing per capita food consump- 
tion and by offering a greater number and variety of consumer 
goods for purchase. In the Eighth Plan, the supply of foodstuffs 
was to rise by 23 percent. Efforts were to be made to increase 
agricultural production; to raise the efficiency of foodstuff procure- 
ment, shipment, storage, and sale; and to eliminate spoilage and 
losses. Changes in the average annual per capita consumption of 
foodstuffs revealed a changing diet. Consumption of such tradi- 
tional foods as meat and dairy products declined, while consump- 
tion of such foods as vegetables, bread, and sugar increased. In 
1985 the government launched a fifteen-year Target Program for 
the Development of Agriculture and the Improvement of Food Sup- 
plies. Per capita meat consumption was to drop to 88 kilograms. 
Other per capita consumption targets were cereals, 13 to 15 kilo- 
grams; dairy products, 120 to 130 kilograms; eggs, 35 to 50 kilo- 
grams; flour and flour products, 110 to 115 kilograms; fruits and 
berries, 11 to 13 kilograms; potatoes, 47 to 53 kilograms; sugar 
and sugar products, 24 to 26 kilograms; and vegetables 29 to 31 
kilograms. The Eighth Plan also aimed to increase the commodity 
turnover of public catering establishments by 19 to 21 percent. More 
restaurants and cafeterias were to open, and tastier meals in greater 
variety were to be offered. 

Statistics on retail sales of consumer goods were sketchy, but they 
revealed increasing availability of goods since the 1970s. In 1984 
the minister of trade and procurement stated that, between 1970 
and 1983, the sale of motorcycles per 1,000 people increased 140 
percent; of refrigerators, 900 percent; of television sets, 140 per- 
cent; of vacuum cleaners, 280 percent; and of washing machines, 
310 percent. A British journalist, Alan J. K. Sanders, calculated 
that between 1975 and 1982, 1 family in 345 purchased a car, 2 
families in 3 acquired radios, and each family bought 2 watches 
or clocks. From 1975 to 1983, roughly one family in seven bought 
a motorcycle; one in nine, a bicycle, and one in twenty-eight, a 
camera. During the 1975-83 period, one urban family in three 
acquired a refrigerator or washing machine; one in three, a televi- 
sion set; and one in seven, a vacuum cleaner. The Eighth Plan 
targeted the sale of consumer goods to rise by 21 to 24 percent. 
The plan stipulated an increase in sales of "cultural-everyday dura- 
bles and also garments and knitwear, carpets, and other types of 
industrial commodities." The plan's goals for increased retail sales 



148 



The Economy 



were part of the government's efforts to increase the quantity and 
the quality of consumer goods. 

Mongolian sources revealed little about other services. In 1985 
Mongolia had 465 hotels, 760 public baths, 295 beauty and barber 
shops, 125 photography shops, 130 dry cleaners, and 392 shoe- 
repair shops. The Eighth Plan called for increasing consumer 
services by 27 to 29 percent, including an expansion of 55 to 57 
percent in rural areas. 

Labor Force 
Composition 

In 1921 nomadic herders and monks dominated Mongolia's work 
force. Foreigners — Russians and Chinese — comprised the vast 
majority of the work force for all other occupations, namely agricul- 
ture, trade, handicrafts, and services. Mongolia faced the task of 
transforming the labor force into one capable of filling the variety 
of occupations required by a modern socialist economy. At first, 
the new government encountered numerous problems in building 
its work force, including illiteracy, the lack of qualified personnel, 
labor shortages, and attitudes inconsistent with systematized work 
and regular hours. As a result of these problems and the economy's 
initially slow development, the labor force remained primarily agrar- 
ian until the mid-1960s. 

The composition of Mongolia's labor force changed slowly in 
the 1920s and the 1930s. In 1924 party leader Horloyn Choybal- 
san remarked that Mongolia had no more than 1 50 industrial work- 
ers. By 1932 the country had 2,335 "workers and employees" 
(employees were defined as nonproduction state employees, such 
as administrators and professionals), of which 302 were industrial 
workers. By 1936 industrial workers had increased to 2,400, and 
they had surpassed 10,000 in 1939. There were 33,100 workers 
and employees in 1940; nevertheless, 90 percent of the work force 
was engaged in agrarian pursuits — primarily, in herding. The dis- 
tribution of the worker and employee work force in 1940 was 41.4 
percent in industry, 29.3 percent in nonproduction occupations, 
3.0 percent in agriculture, 4.2 percent in trade and communica- 
tions, and 2.2 percent in trade. Large-scale transformation of the 
work force accompanied the major effort to industrialize and to 
collectivize agriculture after World War II. By 1960 agricultural 
and forestry workers represented 60.8 percent of the labor force; 
industrial and nonagricultural material production workers, 26.2 
percent; and employees engaged in nonmaterial production labor, 
13 percent. In 1985 agricultural and forestry workers dropped to 



149 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

33.8 percent of the work force, while industrial and nonagricul- 
tural production workers rose to 39.8 percent, and nonproduction 
workers, to 26.2 percent. 

Furthermore, large numbers of women entered all sectors of the 
economy as it developed. Women and children traditionally took 
part in herding activities; as the economy expanded, so did women's 
participation. Between 1960 and 1985, women's representation in 
the "worker and employee" work force rose from 30.8 percent to 
51.3 percent. According to the 1979 census, women comprised 45.6 
percent of the work force. Sixty-nine percent of all employed 
women, or 42.5 percent of the work force, were engaged in material 
production. Thirty-one percent of all employed women were 
engaged in nonmaterial production; these women comprised 54.6 
percent of all workers in nonmaterial production (see table 5, Ap- 
pendix) . 

Foreign labor played a major role in the development of Mon- 
golia's economy. Because of labor shortages, Chinese and Soviet 
workers initially constituted a large proportion of the industrial and 
construction force. In 1927 about 26 percent of industrial workers 
were Mongolian, and in 1934 about 50 percent were foreign. In 
1940 Mongolians made up 87.7 percent of all workers and em- 
ployees; 6.6 percent were Chinese; and 5.7 percent were Soviets. 
In the 1950s, China sent approximately 10,000 laborers to Mon- 
golia to engage in such construction projects as road and bridge 
building. In 1961 the number of Chinese workers peaked at 13,150; 
then, it declined, in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. Soviet citizens 
had a major role in the Mongolian economy as advisers and em- 
ployees of joint Mongolian-Soviet enterprises, particularly after 
1960. Smaller numbers of East European experts also came to Mon- 
golia after its 1962 entry into Comecon. At the beginning of the 
1980s, about 32,000 Soviets and 15,000 East Europeans were work- 
ing in Mongolia. 

Labor Force Policy and Planning 

The Mongolian regime sets and implements labor force policy 
and planning. In the late 1980s, policy on the work force followed 
the General Plan for Development and Distribution of the Mon- 
golian People's Republic's Productive Forces for the Period up to 
the Year 2,000 and the Program for Optimal and Rational Use 
of the Mongolian People's Republic Labor Resources. Manpower 
was managed by the State Committee on Labor and Wages until 
January 1988, when the committee was dissolved and its functions 
were absorbed by the new State Planning and Economic Commit- 
tee (see Major State Organizations, ch. 4). The major objectives 



150 



The Economy 



of state manpower policy were: planned filling of all jobs with work- 
ers possessing the appropriate occupational qualifications in order 
to satisfy manpower requirements for the smooth functioning of 
the economy; full employment, balancing the number of workers 
with jobs available; increased labor productivity in all economic 
sectors; and manpower management based on principles of free 
will and material interest and on observance of the constitutional 
right to work and to free choice of occupation. The government 
planned labor resources and allocated labor by drawing up a na- 
tional manpower balance sheet for one-year and five-year periods. 
This balance sheet, which aggregated territorial and administra- 
tive manpower balance sheets, took into account total population, 
total labor resources, distribution of labor resources, and estimates 
of additional manpower and training requirements; it also estimated 
the number of young people starting work or study courses. Analy- 
sis of the national manpower balance sheet enabled the state to plan 
for the training and the allocation of skilled manpower. 

Special emphasis was placed on domestic vocational and tech- 
nical training and on training opportunities abroad. In 1985 Mon- 
golia had 40 vocational training schools with an enrollment of 27,700 
(see Education, ch. 2). Many Mongolians studied and took train- 
ing courses of varying duration in the Soviet Union and other 
Comecon countries; in 1988 there were approximately 10,000 such 
students in the Soviet Union. The Eighth Plan called for the training 
of 52,000 specialists with higher and secondary technical specialist 
education and for no fewer than 60,000 skilled workers. As a result 
of such training, Mongolia's literate work force possessed increas- 
ingly sophisticated technical skills. 

The state allocated manpower in two principal ways. First, local 
committees considered individual wishes, place of residence, and 
family situation, then provided work warrants to graduating stu- 
dents from all levels who were not pursuing further education. These 
work warrants compelled the management of organizations request- 
ing workers to give the graduating students work in the appropri- 
ate occupation, as well as to provide additional training, housing, 
and other benefits. Second, state labor organizations recruited wor- 
kers to fill positions. Workers could choose occupations, and they 
signed contracts committing them to work for either an indefinite 
period or for a fixed period of up to three years. State recruitment 
of labor was important because of labor shortages in certain sec- 
tors of the economy. With increased urbanization and the empha- 
sis on specialized technical training, agricultural laborers were 
scarce, as were workers in capital construction. Imbalances in the 
labor force, combined with the composition of the population (the 



151 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

World Bank projected in 1987 that by 1990 some 72 percent of 
the population would be younger than fifteen) have led at least one 
Western analyst to suggest that sectoral unemployment among 
Mongolia's well-educated youth would be a problem in the 1990s. 

Working Conditions and Income 

The Labor Law of the Mongolian People's Republic, enacted 
in 1973, set forth the framework governing working conditions, 
wages and benefits, and trade union activity for workers and em- 
ployees. The labor of members of agricultural cooperatives was 
regulated by individual negdel charters; they were based on the 
Model Charter of the Union of Agricultural Associations, last 
amended in 1979, and on other legislation. The Labor Law and 
agricultural legislation emulated Soviet law. 

Workers and employees had an eight-hour workday (six hours 
on Saturdays and on the eve of holidays), eight public holidays, 
and fifteen days' paid vacation. In 1989 some service collectives 
were experimenting with a five-day workweek to determine whether 
the country should change from a six-day to a five-day workweek. 
Those engaged in arduous labor worked seven-hour days. Over- 
time was restricted, with some exceptions for emergencies. Minors 
(ages sixteen to eighteen; some fifteen-year-olds could obtain per- 
mission to work) worked a seven-hour day, and they received thirty 
days' paid vacation; arduous labor for minors was prohibited. The 
Labor Law contained sanctions for those who violated labor dis- 
cipline and incentives for outstanding work performances. Work- 
ers, employees, and negdel members received compulsory state social 
insurance, paid for by their employers or negdels. State social in- 
surance provided benefits for temporary incapacity to work because 
of illness, pregnancy and birth; benefits for birth of a child and 
for burial; and pensions for old age, disability, and loss of a bread- 
winner. In addition, state social insurance funds maintained a sys- 
tem of rest homes, sanitoriums, resorts for workers and employees 
and their families, pioneer camps, and so forth. The retirement 
age for the entire work force was sixty years for men with twenty- 
five years' experience and fifty-five years for women with twenty 
years' experience. Employers provided funds, full pay, reduced 
work days, and leaves of absence in order to raise the professional 
and technical qualifications of workers and employees through study 
and training courses. 

Because of the high percentage of women of childbearing age 
in the labor force, the Labor Law contained provisions to protect 
pregnant women and women with children younger than one year. 
Refusal to hire women, reduction of their earnings, or dismissal 



152 



I 1 III I J 




Bus transportation in Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Allen R. Kassof 



because of pregnancy or the existence of children were all illegal. 
With medical commission concurrence, pregnant and nursing 
mothers were eligible for a shortened workday and for transfer to 
lighter work; they were not eligible for night work, overtime, or 
business trips. Women received forty-five days' pregnancy leave 
and fifty-six days' birth leave; women who did not fully use their 
pregnancy leave could combine the remainder with birth leave. 
Mothers also could combine pre-partum and postpartum leave with 
annual leave. In addition, they could receive an additional six 
months of unpaid leave and retain their jobs. Nursing mothers were 
granted paid breaks of up to two hours per day to nurse infants 
younger than six months and one hour to nurse infants from six 
to twelve months. Workplaces with large numbers of female em- 
ployees were required to provide facilities for nurseries, for kinder- 
gartens, for nursing mothers and infants, and for personal hygiene 
(see Position of Women, ch. 2). 

National income in Mongolia in the 1980s was supposed to be 
distributed according to socialist principles contained in Article 1 7 
of the Constitution (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). First, 
the state deducted from the social fund for "the expansion of so- 
cialist production, the creation of reserves, the development of public 



153 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

health and education, the maintenance of the aged and the dis- 
abled, and the satisfaction of the collective requirements of mem- 
bers of society." Second, the remainder of national income was 
distributed in accordance with the quality and quantity of labor, 
based on the socialist principle "from each according to his abil- 
ity, to each according to his labor. ' ' Information on real wages and 
income, however, was scarce. Western sources estimated that 1985 
per capita income was US$880 based on gross domestic product 
(GPD— see Glossary) and US$1,000 based on GNP. Mongolian 
sources referred to raising wages and income in percentage terms, 
but they rarely listed actual numbers. The Economic and Social 
Development Guidelines for 1986-90 stated that during the Seventh 
Plan real income per capita rose by 12 percent, and they called 
for a 20-percent to 23-percent increase in monetary income dur- 
ing the Eighth Plan. Real income during the latter plan was to grow 
in part through wage increases and in part through such measures 
as reduction of electricity tariffs and a 30-percent increase in the 
minimum pension for negdel members. 

Government statistics provided only limited information on sala- 
ries. For example, statistics on the growth rate of monthly aver- 
age salaries for workers and employees indicated that salaries rose 
44.2 percent between 1960 and 1985. Salaries of production work- 
ers rose 54 percent, and those of nonproduction employees rose 
22.9 percent. No figures were available on the actual level of sala- 
ries. Average annual wages for negdel members rose from 474 tugriks 
in 1960 to 2,400 tugriks at the end of the 1970s. 

Trade Unions 

Mongolia's trade union movement initially had a difficult start, 
but then it settled down to peaceful growth as a useful tool of the 
regime. In 1917 Mongolia's first two trade unions, which had most- 
ly Russian and few Mongolian members, were established but trade 
unionists were murdered in 1920 by troops of the White Russian 
baron, Roman Nicolaus von Ungern-Sternberg (see Period of Au- 
tonomy, 1911-21, ch. 1). Reestablished in 1921 with 300 mem- 
bers, the unions were reorganized in 1925 into Mongolian, Chinese, 
and Russian chapters. In August 1927, 115 delegates, represent- 
ing 4,056 union members, held the First Congress of Mongolian 
Trade Unions, establishing the Mongolian trade union movement 
in the form it still maintained in the late 1980s. In 1927, as in the 
late 1980s, the organization and functions of Mongolia's trade 
unions were patterned on those of the Soviet Union (see Planned 
Modernization, ch. 2; and Mass Organizations, ch. 4). 



154 



The Economy 



In the late 1980s, the highest-level trade union organization was 
the Mongolian Trade Unions Congress, which was convened every 
five years; the thirteenth congress was held in 1987. In the interim, 
trade union affairs were run by the Central Council of Mongolian 
Trade Unions. The chairman of the Central Council was a mem- 
ber of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Com- 
mittee and of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural (see 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, ch. 4; Government Struc- 
ture, ch. 4). Mongolian trade unions, through the Central Coun- 
cil, possessed the right of legislative initiative in the People's Great 
Hural. Below the Central Council were four branch union organi- 
zations — each run by its own central committee — for agricultural 
workers; for construction and industrial workers; for workers and 
employees in transport, for communications, trade, and services; 
and for employees in culture and education. Each aymag, as well 
as Ulaanbaatar, Darhan, and Erdenet, had its own trade union 
council, as did the Ulaanbaatar Railroad. Below the provincial level 
there were 3,000 primary trade union committees and more than 
7,000 trade union groups. The Central Council published the 
newspaper Hodolmor (Labor) three times a week and the magazine 
Mongolyn Uyldberchniy Eblel (Mongolian Trade Unions) six times 
a year. In 1982 there were 425,000 trade union members. In 1984 
about 94.7 percent of all office and professional workers and laborers 
in the national economy were trade unionists, and members of the 
working class accounted for 55.8 percent of trade union mem- 
bership. 

Mongolian trade unions did not engage in collective bargaining 
to represent worker interests to management as was done in 
capitalist countries. Instead, Mongolia's trade unions had a vari- 
ety of functions. Politically, trade unions received party and state 
guidance and served regime goals by . . [contributing] to win- 
ning over the masses in order to succeed in the implementation 
of the social and economic policy of the party." The Mongolian 
trade unions were active in the international arena; the Central 
Council of Mongolian Trade Unions joined the World Federation 
of Trade Unions in 1949, and Mongolia joined the International 
Labour Organization in 1968. The Central Council maintained 
contacts with more than sixty foreign trade union organizations, 
and it sent delegations to all World Federation of Trade Unions 
congresses and other international trade union conferences. Mon- 
golian delegations to conferences sponsored by the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries frequently issued communiques or 
statements supporting Soviet, and criticizing United States, policies. 



155 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The most important functions of Mongolian trade unions were, 
according to the 1973 Labor Law, "[to] represent the interests of 
workers and employees in the realm of production, labor, life, and 
culture, participate in working out and realizing state plans for the 
development of the national economy, decide questions of the dis- 
tribution and use of material and financial resources, involve wor- 
kers and employees in production management, organize the 
socialist competition and mass technical creativity, and promote 
the strengthening of production and labor discipline." Together, 
or by agreement with enterprises, institutions, and organizations 
and their superior agencies, trade unions influenced labor condi- 
tions and earnings, the application of labor legislation, and the use 
of social consumption funds. Specifically, this meant trade unions 
supervised the observance of labor legislation and rules for labor 
protection, controlled housing and domestic services for workers 
and employees, and managed state social insurance as well as trade 
union sanatoriums, dispensaries, rest homes, and cultural and sports 
institutions. In practice, the major function of trade unions was 
the administration of state social insurance and of worker health 
and recreation facilities. 

Despite the broad rights granted to the trade union movement, 
not all trade union bodies carried out their stipulated functions. 
In a May 1987 address to the Thirteenth Congress of Mongolian 
Trade Unions, party general secretary J ambyn Batmonh criticized 
some trade union councils for being "on the leash of the enter- 
prises' administrations," that is, emphasizing the fulfillment of plans 
while neglecting labor productivity and substandard working and 
living conditions. Batmonh also called on enterprises and their 
supervisory government bodies to observe labor laws strictly and 
not to oppose the legitimate demands of trade union groups. 

Foreign Economic Relations and Comecon 

In the late 1980s, Mongolia's foreign economic relations were 
primarily with Comecon members and other socialist countries. 
Mongolian policies related to Comecon were set by the Comecon 
Commission of the Council of Ministers. The principal official 
mechanisms for bilateral foreign economic relations were the vari- 
ous joint intergovernmental commissions on economic, scientific, 
and technical cooperation, which were established by treaty in the 
1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s between Mongolia and the Soviet 
Union as well as other socialist nations. Intergovernmental 
commissions — such as the Mongolian-Soviet Intergovernmental 
Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Coopera- 
tion — met annually or semiannually to coordinate planning and 



156 



The Economy 



to arrange bilateral annual, five-year, and longer-term trade and 
cooperation agreements signed on the deputy premier level. The 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Supply primarily, but 
not exclusively, was handling Mongolia's day-to-day economic 
interaction with foreign countries and with Comecon in the late 
1980s. 

Close economic ties between Mongolia and the Soviet Union 
have existed for a long time. For example, in 1984 Mongolian- 
Soviet links included direct ties among 20 Mongolian and 30 Soviet 
ministries and departments handling economic affairs as well as 
among 55 Mongolian and Soviet ministries and departments and 
about 100 Mongolian and Soviet scientific research organizations 
handling scientific and technical cooperation. 

In December 1987, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Supply was formed from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the 
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and the State 
Committee for Materials and Technical Supplies. Because much 
of Mongolia's machinery and equipment, fuel, and consumer goods 
were imported, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Supply — rather than the Ministry of Trade and Procurement (which 
ran Mongolia's domestic trade system) — had specialized organi- 
zations that combined export-import and domestic distribution func- 
tions. These organizations included Abtoneft Import and Supply 
Cooperative, which handled imports of motor vehicles, fuels, and 
lubricants; the Agricultural Technical Equipment Import and Sup- 
ply Cooperative; Kompleksimport and Supply Cooperative, which 
imported sets of equipment for the mining industry, power sta- 
tions, and production lines for the food and light industries; the 
Materialimpeks and Supply Cooperative, which imported construc- 
tion materials and equipment; and the Technikimport and Sup- 
ply Cooperative, which handled imports of industrial machinery 
and equipment, raw materials, chemicals, and dyestuffs. 

Other organizations involved in foreign trade included Mon- 
golimpex, which handled imports and exports of goods in conver- 
tible currencies; Mongolnom, which exported Mongolian 
publications; and Mongolilgeemj , which handled foreign parcel 
post, the sale and purchase of consumer goods, establishment of 
business contacts with foreign companies, and intermediary ser- 
vice on foreign trade and commodity exchange. The Ministry of 
Social Economy and Services ran Horshoololimpex, which exported 
handicrafts. Mongolia also had a Chamber of Commerce, the func- 
tions of which included establishing contacts between Mongolian 
and foreign trade and industrial organizations as well as organizing 



157 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



and participating in international trade exhibitions in Mongolia 
and abroad. 

Participation in Comecon 

Entry into Comecon was a great boon to Mongolia's economic 
development, enabling it to secure increased amounts of foreign 
investment, assistance, and technical cooperation; to expand for- 
eign trade markets; to raise product quality to international stan- 
dards; and to coordinate economic planning better in order to direct 
the specialization and development the of the economy under ' ' so- 
cialist economic integration." Mongolia coordinated its five-year 
plans with Comecon' s five-year multilateral cooperation plans as 
a participant in Comecon's Cooperation in the Sphere of Planning 
Activity Committee as well as its Science and Technology Cooper- 
ation Committee. These committees also drew up multilateral long- 
term, special cooperation programs in the areas of transportation, 
food, energy, and consumer goods, which included development 
projects in Mongolia, such as the thermal electric power plant in 
Baga Nuur. Mongolia also participated in Comecon commissions 
for agriculture, coal industry, electric power, food industry, geol- 
ogy, light industry, nonferrous metallurgy, and transportation, and 
it cooperated in Comecon efforts in construction, currency-finance, 
foreign trade, health care, standardization, statistics, telecommu- 
nications, and postal communications. 

Mongolia also received assistance from Comecon on a multi- 
lateral basis. Comecon financed the activities of the Comecon Inter- 
national Geological Expedition and the construction of a number 
of scientific, communications, and cultural facilities in Mongolia. 
As a member of Comecon's International Bank for Economic 
Cooperation and the International Investment Bank, Mongolia was 
eligible for, and took advantage of, loans at preferential rates. Mon- 
golia also benefited from "incentive prices" for basic imported com- 
modities; such commodities as fuel were imported at lower prices 
than those charged to Comecon's more developed East European 
countries (see Foreign Assistance, Investment, and Joint Ventures, 
this ch.). 

Foreign Assistance, Investment, and Joint Ventures 

Foreign assistance and investment in Mongolia were in the form 
of credits, gratis assistance, turnkey projects, and joint ventures. 
Most foreign investment and assistance came from the Soviet 
Union, but precise information was lacking or was hard to quan- 
tify. Foreign observers have estimated Soviet assistance (in con- 
stant 1967 United States dollars) to Mongolia from 1955 to 1983 



158 



The Economy 



to total US$7 billion in aid agreements, of which US$5.5 billion 
was disbursed, US$1.9 billion was repaid, nearly US$400 million 
represented interest payments, and US$1.5 billion of loans still were 
outstanding. Estimates included a credit agreement of US$225 mil- 
lion for the period 1947-56, and irregular, minor assistance agree- 
ments of US$61 million in 1957, US$25 million in 1964, US$17 
million in 1969, and US$19 million in 1974. Major assistance agree- 
ments coincided with Mongolia's five-year plans: US$500 million 
in 1961 for the Third Plan, US$550 million in 1965 for the Fourth 
Plan, US$633 million in 1970 for the Fifth Plan, US$1.6 billion 
in 1976 for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1976-80), and US$3.4 bil- 
lion in 1980 for the Seventh Plan. Another Western source esti- 
mated that 11 percent of the Mongolian GNP during the 1976-79 
period came from the Soviet Union. Assistance from capitalist coun- 
tries was negligible; Japan granted Mongolia a 5-billion yen loan 
to finance the building of a cashmere plant which began operating 
in 1981. 

A Soviet source detailing Soviet credit and gratis assistance to 
Mongolia noted that 17 percent of the Mongolian budget from 1924 
to 1940 came from Soviet loans, which accounted for 90 percent 
of Mongolia's foreign credit. Soviet credits to Mongolia totaled 
450 million rubles from 1961 to 1965, 470 million rubles from 1966 
to 1970, 550 million rubles from 1971 to 1975, and about 1.1 bil- 
lion rubles from 1976 to 1980. Most of these loans were granted 
at a concessionary rate of 2 percent annually; deferments of repay- 
ments, during which time interest was not charged, were obtain- 
able if necessary. Soviet credits represented a large proportion of 
Mongolian capital investments: 32.2 percent from 1958 to 1960, 
47 percent from 1961 to 1965, and 59 percent from 1976 to 1979. 
Credit assistance went to reimburse Soviet and Mongolian organi- 
zations involved in construction, installation, and technical as- 
sistance in agriculture, industry, construction, transportation, 
communications, housing, and cultural projects as well as to finance 
Mongolia's trade with the Soviet Union. Soviet gratis assistance 
to Mongolia was listed as 77.5 million rubles from 1921 to 1940, 
as 50 million rubles from 1966 to 1975, and as 40 million rubles 
from 1976 to 1980. 

Turnkey projects, financed by loans from the Soviet Union and 
other Comecon nations, were a major form of assistance in the 
1980s. The Soviet Union was the leader in providing Mongolia 
with turnkey projects; it constructed or modernized 90 economic 
facilities from 1961 to 1965, 52 from 1966 to 1970, 150 from 1971 
to 1975, and 240 from 1976 to 1980. From 1971 to 1975, turnkey 
projects represented 44.9 percent of Soviet credits to Mongolia. 



159 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

By 1981 facilities built by the Soviet Union contributed more than 
half of Mongolia's total industrial output: 90 percent of thermal 
and electric power generation; 80 percent of coal production; 70 
percent of confectionery and bakery products; and 100 percent of 
woolen cloth, felt, formula food, copper and molybdenum concen- 
trate, and fluorite output. 

Examples of turnkey projects constructed after the 1960s included 
a woodworking combine, a glue factory, and two distilleries built 
by Poland; a clothing mill and flour mill built by Hungary; a tan- 
nery and a cement works built by Czechoslovakia; a furniture and 
a cardboard combine built by Romania; a meat combine built by 
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany); a sheepskin 
coat factory and the Sharin Gol state farm's fruit and vegetable 
processing factories built by Bulgaria; and a house-building com- 
bine and spinning mill built by the Soviet Union. Turnkey projects 
often were part of larger joint Soviet-Mongolian development 
projects, such as those at Baga Nuur, Choybalsan, Darhan, and 
Erdenet (see table 8, Appendix). 

Since 1924 joint-stock companies and joint ventures between 
Mongolia and the Soviet Union as well as other socialist countries 
have been a major means of securing foreign investment, of train- 
ing Mongolian personnel, and of developing the Mongolian econ- 
omy. Although many joint- stock companies eventually were handed 
over to sole Mongolian ownership by the Soviets, joint ventures 
in operation in the late 1980s also enabled the Soviet Union to pene- 
trate, and to exercise control over, important sectors of the Mon- 
golian economy, especially in the early days of the republic. 
Mongolbank, Mongoltrans (Mongolian Transportation), Stor- 
mong, the Ulaanbaatar Railroad, and the Erdenet Mining and 
Concetrating Combine are examples of joint ventures of strategic 
economic value to the Soviet Union. All partners in a joint ven- 
ture typically have equal or nearly equal shares; part of the profits 
are allocated to development, reserve, and special funds; the balance 
is shared equally by the partners. Directors of joint enterprises with 
the Soviet Union typically are Soviets, and their first deputy direc- 
tors are Mongolians. Beginning in the 1970s, many East Europe- 
an countries formed joint ventures with Mongolia. 

Mongolia provided a very modest amount of foreign aid. Dur- 
ing World War II, Mongolia gave the Soviet Union 35,000 horses, 
2.5 million tugriks, and 300 kilograms in gold, and it financed an 
armored column of 53 tanks and the Mongolian Herdsman air- 
craft squadron. According to a Soviet source, Ulaanbaatar also sup- 
plied the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) with 



160 



The Economy 



financial assistance during their "wars of liberation." In the 1980s, 
recipients of Mongolian aid included Afghanistan, which received 
two fully equipped ger; Cambodia, which received 77 tons of un- 
specified aid; Laos, which received a sheep-breeding station and 
a 200-bed hospital; and Vietnam, which received canned foodstuffs, 
school equipment, and 100 million meters of cloth. In 1988 the 
Soviet Union accepted 1.9 million tugriks and 300,000 tons of 
canned meat from Mongolia for the Armenian earthquake relief 
fund. 

Exports and Imports 

Although Mongolia's foreign trade has risen consistently since 
1940, it has registered chronic deficits. In 1940 foreign trade 
amounted to 144.2 million tugriks, of which 54.9 million repre- 
sented exports and 89.3 million represented imports. In 1960 for- 
eign trade jumped to 676.7 million tugriks (289.6 million in exports 
and 387.1 million in imports), but it increased more slowly in the 
next decade. It reached 820.5 million tugriks in 1970, of which 
337.6 million represented exports, and 482.9 million, imports. Ex- 
ternal trade more than tripled between 1970 and 1980, rising to 
2.8 billion tugriks — 1.2 billion tugriks in exports and 1.6 billion 
tugriks in imports. In 1985 foreign trade totaled 5.3 billion tugriks, 
with exports valued at 2 billion tugriks and imports at 3.3 billion 
tugriks. 

In the 1980s Mongolia exported primarily fuel, minerals, metals, 
and raw materials, including foodstuffs, and it imported machinery 
and equipment, fuels, and consumer goods. Agricultural products 
initially made up most of the exports, but they decreased in im- 
portance as exports of minerals expanded after 1970. Exports of 
processed foodstuffs and such consumer goods as woolen blankets 
and leather clothing increased after 1970, while exports of un- 
processed foodstuffs and animal products declined. Since 1970 im- 
ports of machinery and fuels have risen, and those of consumer 
goods have fallen (see table 9, Appendix). Principal export com- 
modities included cement, lumber and sawn timber, wool, large 
and small hides, grain, meat, and clothing. Although mineral ex- 
ports were substantial, no figures were available on export volume. 
Principal import commodities included machine tools, diesel gener- 
ators, electric motors, transformers, construction equipment, motor 
vehicles, gasoline and diesel fuel, iron and steel, fertilizers, cement, 
foodstuffs, textiles, and consumer goods (see table 10, Appendix). 
The Eighth Plan called for increasing foreign trade volume by 20 
to 25 percent, for improving the quality and the selection of export 



161 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

products, and for raising the proportion of mining and light in- 
dustrial products in exports. 

Trading Partners 

Since 1930 Mongolia's predominant trading partners have been 
communist countries. Between 1930 and 1952, the Soviet Union 
was Mongolia's sole trading partner. Trade with China began in 
1953 and reached its zenith in 1960, when it accounted for 18 per- 
cent of all foreign trade. Trade with other communist countries 
also began in the 1950s and intensified in the 1960s after Mongo- 
lia's entry into Comecon. In 1966 trade with the Soviet Union fell 
to 60 percent, but it has steadily risen since then, attaining 80 per- 
cent in the late 1980s. 

In 1986 communist countries received 96.7 percent of Mongolian 
exports: Comecon countries absorbed 94.2 percent; other com- 
munist nations, such as China and North Korea, imported 2.5 per- 
cent. Capitalist countries, such as Japan and Britain, imported 3.3 
percent of all Mongolian exports. Communist nations provided 
Mongolia with 98.3 percent of its imports; Comecon countries sup- 
plied 96.7 percent, and other communist states, 1.6 percent. 
Western countries provided 1.7 percent of Mongolian imports. 
Efforts to expand trade with Western countries were hampered by 
lack of hard currency. 

In 1986 foreign trade with the Soviet Union, including credits, 
totaled 1.5 billion rubles, of which exports amounted to 400 mil- 
lion rubles and imports to 1.1 billion rubles. The Soviet Union 
provided Mongolia with machines and equipment for agriculture, 
light, food, mining, and construction materials industries; oil 
products, rolled ferrous metals; instruments; and consumer goods. 
In return Mongolia supplied minerals, processed foodstuffs, and 
such consumer goods as cashmere and camel hair products. 

In 1989 little information was available on the value of Mon- 
golian trade with other countries, but types of commodities ex- 
changed were known. Hungary exported equipment and spare parts 
or light industry and food processing plants, telecommunications 
and laboratory equipment, medicine, textiles, and cosmetics; it im- 
ported animal hides, furs, leather products, and processed meats. 
Czechoslovakia supplied diesel generators; equipment for leather, 
footwear, and clothing industries; equipment for cement plants; 
medical equipment; chemicals; buses; medicines; and consumer 
goods. It received copper, tin, and tungsten concentrates; fluorite; 
and wool, leather, and furs from Mongolia. East Germany provided 
machinery and equipment for the light and the food industries, 
electrical and scientific equipment, and chemicals in exchange for 



162 



The Economy 



mining products, leather and fur clothing, carpets, and wool. China 
exported textiles, machinery, fruit, and light industrial products and 
imported timber, wool, sheepskin, cashmere, and fur. Mongolian- 
Chinese trade amounted to US$33 million in 1988. In 1985 
Mongolian- Yugoslav trade totaled US$8.2 million; Yugoslavia ex- 
ported US$5.4 million and Mongolia exported US$2.8 million 
worth of unspecified goods. In 1988 trade between Mongolia and 
Japan totaled US$30 million, half of Mongolia's trade with Western 
and non-communist countries. Mongolia sent industrial raw mate- 
rials, semimanufactured goods, and ready-made apparel of cash- 
mere and camel wool in exchange for electronic and technical 
equipment, including color television sets and small power gene- 
rators. 

Tourism 

In the late 1980s, tourism played a minor role in Mongolia's 
foreign economic relations. About 10,000 foreign visitors came from 
communist, North American, and West European countries an- 
nually. Mongolia has natural, historical, and cultural sites of in- 
terest to foreign tourists, such as the Nemegt Valley's "dinosaur 
graveyard," the ancient city of Karakorum, and the medieval 
Erdene-Dzuu monastery. Hunting expeditions also are a tourist 
attraction. The Foreign Tourist Office, Juulchin, which was part 
of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Supply in 1989, 
handled all foreign tourists. 

Transportation 

Prior to 1921, Mongolia had a primitive transportation system 
consisting primarily of horse relay stations along ancient caravan 
routes. Arad households supported this relay system by paying a 
horse-relay duty. Draft animals carried passengers and cargo. There 
were no hard surface roads, railroads, or air transportation. Ef- 
forts to introduce a modern transportation system began in 1925, 
when the government established a state transportation commit- 
tee with twelve trucks. Soviet aid to Mongolia's transportation sector 
was inaugurated the same year, with agreements for road repair 
and bridge building, water transportation by the Soviet Selenge 
State Shipping Line on the Selenge and the Orhon rivers, and es- 
tablishment of Mongolian air transport linking Ulaanbaatar and 
Troitskosavsk in the Soviet Union. Construction of hard surface 
roads also began in the late 1920s. In 1929 the Fifth National Great 
Hural nationalized the transportation network and established the 
joint motor transport monopoly, Mongol trans, with the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet share of Mongoltrans devolved to Mongolia 



163 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

in 1936. Railroad construction started in the late 1930s. A 43 -kilo- 
meter, narrow-gauge (1 .435 meters) railroad linking Ulaanbaatar 
and the Nalayh coal mine opened in 1938; the next year the Soviets 
built a 236-kilometer broad-gauge (1.524 meters) line connecting 
Choybalsan with Borzya, Soviet Union, on the Trans-Siberian Rail- 
way. The first asphalt road, linking Ulaanbaatar and Suhbaatar, 
was built in 1940. Development of the transportation system reached 
a plateau in the early 1940s, when the outbreak of World War II 
effectively interrupted Soviet assistance. Despite the moderniza- 
tion of this sector, draft animals remained the predominant form 
of transportation; in the mid- 1940s animals carried 70 percent of 
the freight, and motor transport the rest. 

Rapid development of the transportation sector resumed in the 
late 1940s and the 1950s. In 1947 Soviet-aided railroad construc- 
tion was resumed with the building of the north-south trans- 
Mongolia line. The first segment of this line, connecting Ulan Ude, 
Soviet Union, with Ulaanbaatar, became operational in 1950. The 
second segment, linking the capital and the Chinese border, was 
completed in 1955. The opening of the trans-Mongolia line sig- 
nificantly altered transportation patterns in Mongolia: the railroads 
assumed the bulk of freight transportation, freed large numbers 
of motor vehicles and draft animals for use in other parts of the 
country, and permitted the abolition of the horse-relay duty in 1950. 
Because this line cut across the economic center of the country, 
the economic benefits of its opening were considerable. In the late 
1950s, China rendered Mongolia considerable assistance in road 
construction. 

Since the 1960s, modernization of the transportation system has 
been incremental compared with advances in previous decades. Ef- 
forts have focused on extending hard- surface roadways, on con- 
structing railroad spurs to industrial facilities, on improving rolling 
stock, on upgrading facilities, and on increasing the capacity and 
the productivity of all forms of transportation (see fig. 12). 

Roads 

In the late 1980s, Mongolia had 6,700 kilometers of roads, of 
which 900 kilometers were paved. Most paved roads were in cities. 
Principal routes included the north-south highway connecting 
Ulaanbaatar with Erenhot at the Chinese border and Kyakhta at 
the Soviet border, and the east-west highway linking Ulaanbaatar 
with Choybalsan in the east and Olgiy in the west. Roads also linked 
Choybalsan with Chita, Soviet Union, and Hailar, China. A high- 
way from Biysk, Soviet Union, reached Olgiy, and one from 
Irkutsk, Soviet Union, reached Turt on Hovsgol Nuur. In 1985 



164 



The Economy 



roads carried 35.9 million tons of freight and 1,934.3 million ton- 
kilomerers, accounting for 24.8 percent of all freight turnover. 
Roads transported 168.4 million passengers and 688.3 million 
passenger-kilometers, or 48.7 percent of all passenger turnover. 
Bus service existed in major cities and towns, and in Ulaanbaatar 
it was being supplemented by construction of a trolley bus line. 
Motor transport services were based in depots located in most 
provincial centers. No figures were available on the number and 
the types of motor vehicles in service; however, visitors reported 
that Soviet jeeps provided the major form of transportation in rural 
areas and that motorcycles were becoming increasingly popular. 
Automobiles and trucks also were important modes of transporta- 
tion. It was not known to what extent draft animals supplemented 
motorized transport in carrying freight and passengers on Mon- 
golian roads. 

Railroads 

All trains were powered by diesel locomotives, the last steam 
locomotive having been consigned to a museum in the 1970s. 
Freight cars were of Soviet manufacture, and passenger cars were 
imported from East Germany. More than 90 percent of all rail- 
road freight was loaded and unloaded by mechanized means. 

In the late 1980s, Mongolia had 1,750 kilometers of 1.524-meter, 
broad-gauge track. Major lines included the Ulaanbaatar Railroad, 
which connected Ulaanbaatar with Suhbaatar and Naushki, Soviet 
Union, in the north, and with Dzamyi Uud, Mongolia, and Eren- 
hot, China, in the south. The eastern line connected Choybalsan 
with Ereentsav, Mongolia, and Borzya, Soviet Union. Another line 
linked the Trans-Siberian Railway with Beijing. Branch lines ran 
from Darhan to the Sharin Gol coalfield; from Salhit, near Darhan, 
to Erdenet; from Bagahangay to the Baga Nuur coal mine; and 
from Har-Ayrag to the Bor Ondor fluorite mines. Mongolia's rail- 
road company, Ulaanbaatar Railroad, was a joint- stock venture 
with the Soviet Union; both countries had equal shares in the com- 
pany. The director was Soviet; the deputy director and the chair- 
man of the board were Mongolian. In 1985 Ulaanbaatar Railroad 
carried 14.8 million tons of freight and 5,822.8 million ton- 
kilometers of freight turnover, accounting for 75 percent of all freight 
turnover. In 1985 the railroad transported 2.1 million passengers 
and accounted for 432.2 million passenger-kilometers, or 30.6 per- 
cent of all passenger turnover. Railroads also accounted for 97 to 
98 percent of all import-export transportation. Each year Mongo- 
lia signed a multilateral railroad transportation protocol governing 



165 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




A billboard advertising Mongolian Airlines 
Courtesy Allen H. Kassof 



import-export freight transport with the Soviet Union, China, and 
North Korea. 

Inland Waterways 

Mongolia has 397 kilometers of navigable waterways, principally 
on Hovsgol Nuur and on the Selenge Moron, which are passable 
only five months of the year. These water routes were used to trans- 
port cargo — grain, agricultural machinery, industrial equipment, 
lumber, consumer goods, and fuel — to and from the Soviet Union. 
On Hovsgol Nuur, a fleet of freighters, barges, and tugs connected 
Turt, which had a road link to the Soviet Union, with Hatgal on 
the south shore. Mongolia's shipping fleet was built with the 
assistance of Soviet shipbuilders. In 1985 water transport carried 
40,000 tons of cargo and 4.8 million ton-kilometers, or 0.1 per- 
cent of all freight turnover. Inland waterways did not carry pas- 
senger traffic. 

Civil Aviation 

In the late 1980s, Mongolia had 38,300 kilometers of air routes 
serviced by Mongolian Airlines (MIAT). MI AT was run by the 
Civil Air Transport Administration under the Council of Ministers. 



167 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



The directorate was headed by a military officer, and MI AT pilots 
had military rank. MI AT aircraft were used for crop dusting, 
for forest and steppe fire patrols, and for air ambulance services, 
in addition to carrying passengers, freight, and mail. Mongolia 
had eighty airfields, of which thirty were usable, and ten with 
permanent-surface runways. MIAT's air fleet included 22 major 
aircraft — 19 An-24s and 3 II- 14s — and an assortment of smaller 
aircraft, particularly An-2 biplanes for local service. MIAT offered 
international service from Ulaanbaatar to Irkutsk and Beijing. Aero- 
flot also connected Ulaanbaatar with Moscow, Washington, and 
New York. Regular air service between Ulaanbaatar and Moscow, 
on the Soviet airline Aeroflot, had begun in 1945. Mongolia coor- 
dinated international air operations with other Comecon countries 
under an agreement signed in 1966. The Civil Air Transport 
Administration also cooperated with the Soviet Ministry of Avia- 
tion. Domestic routes offered service to all towns, cities, and aymag 
centers. In 1985 civil aviation carried 11.6 million tons and 6.4 
million ton-kilometers, or 0.1 percent of freight turnover. Air 
transport carried 600,000 passengers and 293. 1 million passenger- 
kilometers, or 20.7 percent of passenger turnover. Efforts to mod- 
ernize the civil aviation system during the Eighth Plan included 
building a new air terminal and reconstructing the runway at the 
Ulaanbaatar airport, providing modern air traffic control equip- 
ment to airfields, and improving air safety. 

Telecommunications 

In 1921 Mongolia nationalized postal and telecommunications 
services — then Russian-owned, Chinese-owned, and Danish- 
owned — and placed them under the Postal and Telegraph Depart- 
ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With Soviet assistance, 
Mongolia extended telephone and telegraph lines between 1923 and 
1930, inaugurated motorized intercity mail delivery in 1925, and 
began radiobroadcasting in 1934 and television broadcasting in 
1967. Since the 1920s, Soviet aid — including technical assistance, 
investment, and training — enabled Mongolia to create national 
postal and telecommunications networks as well as to establish in- 
ternational communications links. In the 1980s, the Ministry of 
Communications, which ran the postal and the telecommunications 
systems, emphasized expanding and upgrading the telecommuni- 
cations services and facilities to create a unified communications 
system. This system included telephone, telegraph, telex, radio, and 
television; it still relied on cooperation and assistance from the Soviet 
Union and other Comecon countries. 



168 



The Economy 



In 1985 Mongolia's telephone, telegraph, and telex system in- 
cluded 420 postal, telephone, and telegraph offices; 28,000 kilo- 
meters of telephone and telegraph lines; and 49,300 telephones. 
The Ministry of Communications was working to introduce a uni- 
fied digital data-transmission system, to upgrade the telephone sys- 
tem to an automatic- switching network, to increase the length of 
multiplex telephone channels, and to establish a land-based mo- 
bile telephone network using earth satellite facilities. Radio-relay 
lines provided intercity and international, direct-dialing telephone 
links. Telex lines connected Ulaanbaatar with Irkutsk and Moscow. 

* * * 

English-language sources on the Mongolian economy are few; 
a substantial literature exists in Russian, but little in that language, 
or in Mongol, has been translated into English. In English the best 
source on Mongolian economic affairs published since 1970 is chap- 
ter 4, "The Economic System," in Mongolia: Politics, Economics, 
and Society by Alan J.K. Sanders. Articles by Sanders in the Far 
Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], in scholarly journals, and 
in other reference publications often deal with economic topics. 
Judith Nordby's "The Mongolian People's Republic in the 1980s: 
Continuity and Change" treats economic policies and problems. 
Michael Kaser's "The Industrial Revolution in Mongolia" deals 
with Mongolian industrialization, as does Alois Holub's "Mon- 
golia: Modernizing the Industrial Structure." "Manpower Poli- 
cy and Planning in the Mongolian People's Republic," by M. 
Lkhamsuren, examines labor resources. William E. Butler's The 
Mongolian Legal System: Contemporary Legislation and Documentation in- 
cludes Mongolian legal documents and commentary touching upon 
economics. Asian Survey and the Far Eastern Economic Review's 
Asia Yearbook contain annual surveys of developments in Mongo- 
lia, including economic developments. Other sources for Mongolian 
economic affairs are the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
Daily Report: East Asia; the Joint Publications Research Service Mon- 
golia Report, Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar]; and the Russian-English- 
French edition of National Economy oftheMPR for 65 Years, 1921-1986. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography). 



169 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



The flag of the Mongolian People's Republic; 

it symbolically proclaims wisdom, liberty, peace, and justice. 



THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC was undergoing 
a major transition in the development of its government and po- 
litical institutions in the late 1980s. Beginning in 1984, the coun- 
try had embarked on a program to restructure its political and 
economic system in ways that engaged the entire population and 
made it responsible and accountable for the country's moderniza- 
tion. Much of the inspiration for this program came from the Soviet 
Union's examples of glasnost (see Glossary) and perestroika (see 
Glossary). 

Nevertheless, in developing its policies, Mongolia's senior leader- 
ship displayed a realistic awareness not only of the severe challenges, 
but also of the opportunities, afforded by Mongolia's unique po- 
litical, social, economic, and geophysical conditions. There were 
efforts by mid- 1989 to revive key elements of the Mongolian cul- 
tural heritage. This effort apparently was inspired by the recog- 
nized need to instill vitality in a polity long stifled by the wholesale 
imposition of Soviet models. Openings to the West, including the 
1987 establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, 
increased Mongolia's options within the international diplomatic 
community and provided additional developmental models. Finally, 
by mid- 1989, the gradual normalizing of Sino-Soviet relations had 
helped significantly to reduce the tensions inherent in Mongolia's 
strategic location, enveloped between these giant countries, which 
facilitated a resurgence of Mongolian national identity and allowed 
a small measure of Mongolian political independence. 

Government Structure 

Form of Government 

Mongolia in 1989 was a communist state modeled on Soviet po- 
litical and government institutions. The government was a one- 
party system, presided over by the Mongolian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party. The party exercised political supervision and con- 
trol over a pyramidal structure of representative governmental 
bodies known as hurals — assemblies of people's deputies (see Glos- 
sary; fig. 13). 

The highly centralized governmental structure was divided into 
three major parts: the executive branch, presided over by the 
Council of Ministers; the legislative branch, represented at the na- 
tional level by the unicameral People's Great Hural (the national 



173 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



PERMANENT 
COMMITTEES 



PEOPLE'S GREAT HURAL 



PEOPLE'S CONTROL 
COMMITTEE 



COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 



STATE COMMITTEES FOR: 



i 



CONSTRUCTION 



PARTY CONTROL 



PEOPLE'S CONTROL 









PLANNING AND ECONOMY 



SPACE RESEARCH 
AND UTILAZATION 



STATE INFORMATION, 
RADIO AND TELEVISION 



PHYSICAL CULTURE 
AND SPORTS 



QUALITY, STANDARDS 
AND METROLOGY 



J SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY 
AND HIGHER EDUCATION 



SOMON ASSEMBLIES 
OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES 



EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATIONS 



MINISTRIES FOR: 



i 





AYMAG/ AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPALITY 
ASSEMBLIES OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES 










EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATIONS 















AGRICULTURE AND 
FOOD INDUSTRY 



COMMUNICATIONS 



CULTURE 



DEFENSE 



ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 



FINANCE 



FOREIGN AFFAIRS 



FOREIGN ECONONIC 
RELATIONS AND SUPPLY 



POWER, MINING, 
INDUSTRY AND GEOLOGY 



IRRIGATION 



LIGHT INDUSTRY 



PEOPLE'S EDUCATION 



PUBLIC SECURITY 



SOCIAL ECONONY 
AND SERVICES 



TRADE AND 
PROCUREMENT 



TRANSPORTATION 



Figure 13. Organization of the Government, 1989 



174 



Government and Politics 



assembly); and the judicial branch, with a Supreme Court presid- 
ing over a system of law administered by courts and by an Office 
of the Procurator of the Republic. The duties and responsibilities 
of each of these major bodies were identified in the Constitution 
promulgated in 1960. 

Beneath the national level were key administrative subdivisions 
consisting of eighteen aymags, or provinces, and of the three autono- 
mous cities (hots) of Ulaanbaatar, Darhan, and Erdenet (see fig. 1). 
On the next lower administrative level were counties, or somons 
(see Glossary), and town centers. At this basic level, government 
and economic activity were connected closely, so that the leader- 
ship of the somon and those of the livestock and agricultural cooper- 
atives operating within the somon often were identical (see Structure 
of the Economy, ch. 3). 

The party related to the apex of the governmental system through 
its authoritative Political Bureau of the party Central Committee. 
In 1989 this nine-person body contained the presiding leadership 
of the country, and it was headed by party general secretary Jambyn 
Batmonh. Batmonh had dual power status in that he also was head 
of state as chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural. 
Batmonh was promoted to these top-level positions in 1984 after 
his predecessor, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, who had been in power 
since 1952, was replaced by the Central Committee, reportedly for 
health reasons (see Socialist Construction under Tsedenbal, 1952- 
84, ch. 1). 

Below the national level, each aymag and somon had its own party 
organization that conveyed the policies and programs decided by 
the Political Bureau and directed the work of its counterpart as- 
sembly of people's deputies, its agricultural cooperatives, and the 
local government executive committee in implementing party pro- 
grams on its level. The concentration of power at the top of the 
political system and within party channels had, throughout history, 
helped to create a complacent party and government bureaucracy, 
a development that hampered the leadership's plans to modernize 
the country and to stimulate economic development in the late 
1980s. 

Constitutional Framework 

The Constitution was adopted on July 6, 1960, by the People's 
Great Hural. It was the third constitution promulgated since the 
revolution of 1921. The first constitution was passed by the First 
National Great Hural on November 26, 1924. It abolished the sys- 
tem of monarchial theocracy, described the legislative consolida- 
tion of state power, provided a basic statement of socioeconomic 



175 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

and political rights and freedoms for the people, and espoused a 
national program that would bypass the capitalist stage of devel- 
opment in the course of promoting fundamental social trans- 
formations in order to bring about socialism in Mongolia (see 
Revolutionary Transformation, 1921-24, ch. 1). 

The second constitution, adopted on June 30, 1940, took the 
Soviet constitution of 1936 as the model. As Mongolian premier 
Horloyn Choybalsan reported to the Eighth National Great Hural 
in 1940: "We are guided in our activity by the experience of the 
great country of socialism, the experience of the Soviet Union. Con- 
sequently, only the constitution of the Soviet Union may be a model 
for us in drafting our new constitution." In subsequent revisions 
to the 1940 Mongolian constitution in 1944, 1949, 1952, and 1959, 
disparities between the Mongolian and Soviet constitutions were 
reduced even further. 

Under the 1940 constitution, elections were restricted — "ene- 
mies of the regime" could not vote — and indirect; lower bodies 
elected higher levels. Constitutional amendments introduced after 
1944 changed this system, however, by restoring political rights, 
including the right of suffrage throughout the society; by institut- 
ing a unitary hierarchy of directly elected representative bodies; 
by reorganizing electoral districts; by replacing voting by the show 
of hands at open meetings with voting by secret ballot; and by 
abolishing the National Little Hural — the Standing Body of the 
National Great Hural — transferring its functions to the National 
Great Hural, which was renamed People's Great Hural in 1951. 
The regime's justification for making these changes was that Mon- 
golia had already realized many sociopolitical achievements in its 
advance toward socialism. Therefore, it became historically cor- 
rect to introduce reforms that had been adopted in the more ad- 
vanced society of the Soviet Union. 

The Constitution adopted in 1960 includes a lengthy preamble 
that acclaims the successes of the revolution and notes the impor- 
tance of the "fraternal socialist assistance of the Soviet Union" 
to growth and development in Mongolia. The preamble clarifies 
the dominant role of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 
as the "guiding and directing force in society," using as its guide 
the "all-conquering Marxist-Leninist theory." A renewed com- 
mitment is made to completing the construction of a socialist soci- 
ety and culture, and eventually, to building a communist society. 
Enunciated foreign policy goals describe a diplomacy based on the 
principles of peaceful coexistence and proletarian internationalism. 

The points outlined in the preamble are explained more fully 
in the main body of the Constitution. Compared with its 1940 



176 



Government and Politics 



predecessor, the 1960 Constitution is more succinct. The 1940 docu- 
ment had been divided into twelve chapters. The 1960 Constitu- 
tion clusters most of the same content into four general sections: 
socioeconomic structure, state structure, basic rights and duties of 
citizens, and miscellaneous provisions. Within these categories, the 
articles are compressed into ten chapters, compared with twelve 
chapters in the 1940 constitution. 

In the first general section, the socialist system, rooted in the 
socialist ownership of national wealth and the means of produc- 
tion, is presented as the economic basis of society. Areas protected 
under law include private ownership of one's income and savings, 
housing, subsidiary husbandry, personal and household articles, 
as well as the right to an inheritance. These legal guarantees, 
however, are subject to the qualification that "it shall be prohibited 
to use the right of personal ownership to the detriment of state and 
social interests." 

The second and longest general section defines the state struc- 
ture, following that laid down in the 1940 constitution, as amended 
in 1959. It details the nature, composition, and duties of all state 
organs of power, including the executive, the legislative, and the 
judicial at both the national and local levels. 

In the third general section, the fundamental rights and duties 
of citizens are grouped together, a departure from the previous con- 
stitutions. The rights promised in this basic law and the actual ex- 
perience of Mongolians in daily life, however, are often at variance. 
Among the basic rights guaranteed are equality irrespective of sex, 
racial or national affiliations, faith, social origin, and status. These 
were overlooked in practice, to the extent that male Khalkha (see 
Glossary) Mongols occupied most of the elite government positions, 
and religious practice has been an impediment to career advance- 
ment in an atheistic Marxist-Leninist society. In addition, citizens 
are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, meeting, 
demonstration, and processions, but with the restriction that the 
activities must be practiced "in accordance with the interests of 
the working people and with a view to developing and strengthen- 
ing the state system of the Mongolian People's Republic." 

A list of duties begins with the exhortation that "every citizen 
of the Mongolian People's Republic shall be obliged to: show dedi- 
cation to the cause of building socialism; maintain the priority of 
the interests of society and the state vis-a-vis private interests; 
safeguard the concept of communal socialist property; and fulfill 
all civic duties, and demand the same of other citizens." Other 
duties involve supporting international friendship and worker 



177 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

solidarity "under the leadership of the Soviet Union," and teaching 
and practicing good social values. 

The Constitution can be amended by the People's Great Hural 
with a majority of not less than two-thirds of the delegate votes, 
a system that has produced frequent revision. Perhaps the most 
novel feature of the Constitution is contained in its concluding 
article, unique among socialist constitutions. Article 94 allows the 
gradual repeal of the constitutional provisions: "The Constitu- 
tion . . . will be repealed when the need for the existence of the 
state, which is the principal instrument for building socialism and 
communism, disappears, when it will be replaced by a communist 
association of working people." 

The official seal of Mongolia also has been revised and reflects 
aspirations of becoming an industrialized society. Furthermore, the 
Constitution says that the state arms of Mongolia "shall reflect the 
essence of the state and the idea of friendship of peoples and shall 
show the national and economic peculiarities of the country." 
Accordingly, the official seal now consists of a circle framed by 
sheaves of wheat, fastened together by a machine cog-wheel, replac- 
ing animal heads that denoted a pastoral country. In the center 
is a figure of a "working man on horseback galloping upward 
toward the sun — communism," in place of a herdsman holding 
a lariat and galloping toward the rising sun. 

Major State Organizations 

As is true of any communist-run state, the party's influence and 
voice were authoritative and all high government officials belonged 
to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (see Mongolian 
People's Revolutionary Party, this ch.). Nevertheless, in order to 
establish the mechanisms of government for pursuing the party pro- 
gram, the Constitution provides authority to key state executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies, and defines their respective charac- 
ter, composition, and powers. 

Legislative 

The unicameral People's Great Hural is described in the Con- 
stitution as "the highest agency of state power in the Mongolian 
People's Republic." It is assigned exclusive legislative power for 
the country by Article 19. The Eleventh People's Great Hural, 
elected in July 1986, had 370 deputies as determined by a con- 
stitutional amendment in 1981 (see table 11, Appendix). Of the 
370 elected deputies, nearly 89 percent were party members or 
candidate members; 28 percent, industrial workers; 28 percent, 
agrarian cooperative members; and 44 percent, intellectuals and 



178 



Main government building, Ulaanbaatar, 
with Sukhe Bator Mausoleum in front 
Courtesy Regina Genton 

bureaucrats. Also, 25 percent of the deputies were women, and 
67 percent were elected for the first time. Finally, deputies were 
afforded special protection in that they may not be arrested 
or brought to trial without the consent of the Hural or its Presid- 
ium. 

Deputies served four-year terms, and they were elected from dis- 
tricts divided equally according to population. The slate of candi- 
dates presented, however, required party review and approval well 
in advance of the election. Candidates were proposed by trade 
unions, farm organizations, youth and party organizations, and 
other social organizations. Before election day, usually in June, 
the names of candidates for these constituencies were published 
in the press. Registered electors could vote for one registered can- 
didate by placing an unmarked ballot bearing the candidate's name 
in the ballot box. To vote against a candidate, an elector had to 
strike the candidate's name from the ballot. 

It was estimated that 33 percent of the deputies — representing 
the party and state leadership — were reelected after each term. Not 
surprisingly, a high proportion of the elected deputies were party 
members or candidate members. There also was a noticeable trend 
reflecting the gradual urbanization of the country, as shown in the 



179 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

1979 Mongolian census figures. Press coverage of results usually 
reported 99.98 percent turnout, in favor of the official candidates. 

The People's Great Hural, which convenes once a year, elects 
its officers, including a chairman (speaker) and four deputy chair- 
men. It selects standing commissions (budget, legislative proposals, 
nationality affairs, and foreign affairs), and it elects the Presidium. 
Constitutional powers accorded to the People's Great Hural in- 
clude amendment of the constitution; adoption of laws; formation 
of the Council of Ministers; and confirmation of ministers, the na- 
tional economic plan, and the budget. In 1989 the deputy chair- 
men were the president of the Presidium, an army officer, a woman, 
and, to show recognition of minorities, a Kazakh (see Glossary). 

Ten permanent committees assisted in specialized areas of 
government work: industry; environmental protection; construc- 
tion; youth affairs; budgets and planning; transportation and com- 
munications; labor resources; agriculture; trade and services; and 
health, education, culture and scientific affairs. Also, the People's 
Great Hural was given powers to establish "the basic principles 
and measures in the domain of internal and foreign policy" and 
to decide "questions of peace and defense of the socialist mother- 
land." In practice, however, authority in the fields of foreign and 
domestic affairs was exercised regularly by the chairman of the 
Presidium and the minister of foreign affairs. By a constitutional 
amendment in November 1980, the People's Great Hural is charged 
with forming the state's People's Control Committee that heads 
a system of agencies ' 'which shall incorporate state and social control 
of the working people at enterprises, institutions, organizations, 
and agricultural associations." 

Although legislative power is concentrated in the People's Great 
Hural, the right of legislative initiative is accorded to several bod- 
ies. They include the Presidium, the Council of Ministers, deputies 
and standing commissions of the People's Great Hural, the Supreme 
Court, and the Office of the Procurator of the Republic (see Legal 
System, ch. 5). In addition, legislation can be introduced by youths 
and workers through the Central Committee of the Mongolian 
Revolutionary Youth League and the Central Council of Mongolian 
Trade Unions. 

The Presidium of the People's Great Hural was the "highest 
agency of state power" presiding in the interval between legislative 
sessions. In 1989 the chairman of the Presidium, Batmonh, was 
the de facto president of Mongolia. Other Presidium officers in- 
cluded a deputy chairman, a secretary, and five members represent- 
ing trade unions (two persons for this category), youth, women, 
and a key party department (either the cadres administration or 



180 



Government and Politics 



foreign relations department). The principal powers of the Presid- 
ium include formation, abolition, and reorganization of ministries; 
appointment of ministers and ambassadors; ratification or denun- 
ciation of treaties and agreements with other states; and award of 
military and other tides and ranks. The Presidium also participates 
in the regular powers accorded to the People's Great Hural. 

Executive 

The Council of Ministers is the "highest executive and adminis- 
trative agency of state administration." Under Article 42 of the 
Constitution, this body is composed of a chairman — or premier, 
a first deputy chairman, five other deputy chairmen, ministers, 
chairmen of the state committees, the chairman of the State Bank 
of the Mongolian People's Republic, the president of the Mon- 
golian Academy of Sciences, and the head of the Central Statisti- 
cal Board. In the 1980s, the deputy chairmen regularly included 
the chairmen of the State Planning Commission; the State Com- 
mittee for Construction, Architecture, and Technical Control; and 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon — see Glos- 
sary) Affairs. In 1986 the Council of Ministers was composed of 
thirty- three members. 

Members of the Council of Ministers also were party members 
or candidate members. In 1989 Dumaagiyn Sodnom, a full mem- 
ber of the party Political Bureau, was chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, making him de facto premier. The principal responsi- 
bilities of the Council of Ministers in the late 1980s were to coor- 
dinate and to direct the work of the ministries; to supervise national 
economic planning and to implement the national plan; to exer- 
cise general direction over foreign relations and defense matters; 
to take measures for the defense of state interests and the concept 
of socialist ownership; to ensure public order; and to direct and 
to guide the work of aymag and somon executive administrations. 

A general ministerial reorganization was carried out in 1987 and 
1988 during which 3,000 administrative positions were abolished — 
reportedly, a significant saving of funds. In December 1987, the 
Mongolian press announced the dissolution of six ministries and 
two state committees and the subsequent formation of five new 
ministries. These efforts to streamline the government structure 
and to make it more efficient continued into January 1988, when 
six state committees and special offices were dissolved and two new 
state committees were formed. In general this reorganization re- 
sulted in the performance of certain functions by separate minis- 
tries or in the subsuming of several committees under the mission 
of one. For example, the responsibilities for agriculture and the 



181 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

food industry, previously handled by two separate ministries, were 
combined in the new Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. 
The newly established Ministry of Environmental Protection in- 
dicated Mongolia's recent and growing concern over one of its most 
intractable problems: the protection and renewal of the national 
environment. 

There was no formally constituted permanent civil service to staff 
government positions. Party organizations were paramount in the 
selection and assignment of civil servants. The party decided which 
person was suited to what kind of work on the basis of individual 
loyalty, honesty, political consciousness, knowledge of relevant 
tasks, and organizational abilities. 

Judicial 

The Supreme Court is described in the Constitution as "the 
highest judicial authority" that directs "all. . . judicial agencies 
and also establishes supervision over their judicial activity." It is 
elected for a four-year term by the People's Great Hural, and it 
presides over the lower structure made up of eighteen aymag courts 
and local somon courts. Members of the local court structure were 
elected locally, and the judges for these courts served three-year 
terms. Elected in May 1986, the chairman of the Supreme Court, 
Lubsandorjiyn Renchin, had a first deputy and two other deputies, 
including the chairmen of the criminal affairs and the military af- 
fairs collegia. 

The Procurator of the Republic exercises "supreme supervision 
over the precise observance of laws by all ministries and other central 
agencies of administrations, institutions and organizations." The 
procurator was appointed by the People's Great Hural for a term 
of four years. 

The law and the legal system were described officially as being 
solidly grounded in the ideology of Marxism- Leninism. The pur- 
pose was to ensure that the socioeconomic order produced and 
shaped a distinctive political, economic, and legal superstructure. 
Within this context, the principal function of law was to regulate 
the economy and to contribute to the building of socialism. As of 
1989, there still was a limited role for custom in the area of so- 
cialist law, but only those considered compatible with prevailing 
legal norms persisted. There also was a new emphasis on equal 
rights for women. For the most part, the law functioned as a body 
of prescriptive regulations that guided social relationships and 
interpreted the duties of citizens in ways that the party found to 
be in the best interests of society and development. In general, regu- 
lations and codes controlled more areas of life than ever before. 



182 



Government and Politics 



Two separate legal codes form the basis of Mongolian law — the 
Civil Code and the Criminal Code. The Civil Code, which went 
into effect in April 1963, was modeled closely on the code adopted 
by the Soviet Union in 1963. This code regulates personal rela- 
tions more carefully than had been the case before its enactment. 
It extends certain rights, including protecting the honor and the 
dignity of citizens. The code enlarges the discussion of obligations 
to include contracts of delivery and carriage — matters essential to 
efficient business operations. There also are law codes that apply 
to the family and to the workplace. 

Formal training in law was given under the Faculty of Social 
Sciences of the Mongolian State University. Beginning in 1980, 
100 full-time students per year were enrolled at this institution. 
Although the Constitution contains no channel of appeal, the law 
does provide for appeals of all verdicts except those of the Supreme 
Court. 

Local Administration 

In Mongolia's organizational pyramid, government beneath the 
national level was carried out by assemblies of people's deputies 
operating in the eighteen aymags and the three provincial-level 
autonomous cities (hots), sometimes called "republic cities." In the 
late 1980s, each aymag continued to be divided into about thirty 
somons; towns and population centers within a somon were appor- 
tioned into "districts and districts-in-cities." Each of these adminis- 
trative divisions had its corresponding governing assembly of 
people's deputies. Some continuity between the Mongolian Peo- 
ple's Republic and the traditional Mongolian political culture was 
provided in preserving the terms aymag, which was a fifteenth- 
century word for a tribal unit, and somon, which was the traditional 
basic-level administrative unit (see Pastoral Nomadism, ch. 2). 
Aymags were established on the basis of geographic boundaries, eth- 
nic groupings, economic conditions, population density, and con- 
venience of administrative control. Somons were the basic units of 
administration within aymags, and they were where the greatest 
interaction between government and the people took place. 

Deputies to the local assemblies are elected for three-year terms, 
according to the Constitution. In June 1987, a total of 15,967 
deputies were elected to local assemblies, by the usual 99.98 per- 
cent of the vote cast. Regular sessions of aymag and autonomous 
municipal assemblies convened at least twice a year. Sessions of 
somon and district assemblies were convoked at least three times 
a year. Each local assembly elected presidiums to administer the 
government between sessions of the assemblies. Presidiums were 



183 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

composed of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and mem- 
bers who included party functionaries and local luminaries resid- 
ing in the administrative centers. 

Within their respective jurisdictions, the assemblies and their 
presidiums were responsible for directing "economic and cultural- 
political construction," for supervising the economic and cooper- 
ative organizations, for confirming and implementing the economic 
plan and local budgets, for ensuring the observance of laws, and 
for making certain that all citizens were fully involved in the work 
of the state. Superior assemblies of people's deputies were em- 
powered to "change or repeal" decisions of lower assemblies and 
their presidiums. 

Procurators and courts also functioned at the local levels. Local 
procurators were appointed by the state procurator for three-year 
terms, and they were subordinate "only to the superior procura- 
tor" in the system. Courts were elected by deputies of the cor- 
responding assemblies of people's deputies, also for three-year 
terms; precinct-level courts were formed by direct elections and 
by secret ballot for three-year terms. 

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 

Mongolia's communist party was established on March 1, 1921, 
with 164 members in a country that previously had no political 
parties. At that time, it was called the Mongolian People's Party 
(see Revolutionary Transformation, 1921-24, ch. 1). In August 
1924 at the Third Party Congress, the party assumed its current 
nomenclature, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. It was 
the only political party, modeled closely after the organizational 
structure and party program of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. It has followed the Soviet example during most of its exis- 
tence, and it continued to do so in mid- 1989. 

The authoritative Party Program, the fourth in Mongolian his- 
tory, which was adopted in 1966, states that party organizations 
serve as "the directing and guiding force of society and the state," 
and at the national level are decisive in setting policy, developing 
programs, and making key personnel appointments. Below the na- 
tional level, party organizations and personnel ensure the implemen- 
tation of the Party Program, maintain political discipline, and 
supervise appointment to all party and non-party organizations. 

Following the pattern of ongoing developments in the Soviet 
Union, high-level substantive discussions of party organizational 
reform measures were being held in 1989. One measure under con- 
sideration would have government bodies play an enhanced role 
as consultative bodies in the party's policy-making process. New 



184 



Government and Politics 



senior government bodies that eventually could disperse some of 
the party's closely held power were being discussed. Considera- 
tion also was being given to the devolution of some decision-making 
powers from upper party levels to the primary party organizations. 
Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, top-level party organizations still 
continued to hold exceptional authority, dominating the govern- 
mental, economic, and military life of the country (see fig. 14). 

Membership 

As of April 1988, party membership was reported at 89,588, an 
average of 1 in 1 1 of the adult population. According to the Rules 
of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, "anyone of the 
working people, acknowledging the Party Program and Rules, 
actively participating in their implementation, working in a party 
organization, and implementing all party resolutions, may be a 
member of the party. ' ' Membership was open to males and females 
at least eighteen years old, although those between eighteen and 
twenty years could earn party membership only through acquir- 
ing a good record as a Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League 
member. 

A candidate for party membership must be sponsored by a party 
member who has held a full membership for three years. After spon- 
sorship, a candidate's acceptance into the party was discussed by 
a general meeting of the appropriate party cell and was considered 
resolved if at least two- thirds of those attending approved. Con- 
versely, expulsion from the party was decided by a vote of at least 
two- thirds of party members present, but it was effective only after 
confirmation by the appropriate party committee at the next-highest 
level. Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party membership in- 
creased by 16 percent during the period 1981 to 1986. 

Party Congress 

The party congress, convened regularly every five years, is theo- 
retically the most authoritative body in the Mongolian party sys- 
tem (see table 12, Appendix). The Nineteenth Party Congress of 
the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, convened in May 
1986, was attended by 851 delegates — for 79 percent of whom it 
was their first party congress. An overview of the composition of 
the delegates revealed that 66 percent also were deputies to the Peo- 
ple's Great Hural or to assemblies of people's deputies. Thirty- 
three percent were workers in industry, construction and commu- 
nications; 17 percent were collectivized herdsmen; and 50 percent 
were white-collar workers, including members of the military and 



185 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



MONGOLIAN PE OPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (M PRP) CONGRESS 

~3 



CONTROL 
COMMISSION 



MPRP CENTRAL COMMITTEE 



POLITICAL BUREAU 



SECRETARIAT 



AYM AG/AUTONOMOUS 
MUNICIPALITY MPRP CONFERENCE 



AYMAG/AUTONOMOUS 
MUNICIPALITY MPRP COMMMITTEE 



PARTY BUREAU 



SOMON MPRP CONFERENCE 



SOMON MPRP COMMITTEE 



PARTY BUREAU 



PRIMARY CELLS 



PARTY COMMITTEE 

i : 



PARTY SECTIONS 



1 



1 



CENTRAL AUDITING 
COMMISSION 



DEPARTMENTS OF THE 
CENTRAL COMMISSION 



m CADRES AFFAIRS 



GENERAL 



IDEOLOGICAL 



MILITARY AND 
SECURITY AFFAIRS 



ORGANIZATION 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 



PLANNING 
AND BUDGET 



INDUSTRY 



— AGRICULTURE 



CONSTRUCTION 



TRANSPORTATION 
AND COMMUNICATIONS 



EDUCATION, 
SCIENCE AND HEALTH 



Figure 14. Organization of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, 
1989 



the intelligentsia. Seventy-nine percent were of the majority 
Khalkha nationality (see Mongols and Kazakhs, ch. 2). 

These statistics showed predominantly urban and educated 
delegates, and they indicated the professionalization of the Mon- 
golian leadership, much like what had occurred in the Soviet Union 
by the 1960s. In 1986 women accounted for 21 percent of the total 
number of delegates, which suggested a substantial representation 
within the leadership until this figure was balanced against the 30 
percent of total party membership that women held in 1986. 

The party congress also elects the Central Auditing Commission, 



186 



Government and Politics 



which examines and verifies state expenditures. The Nineteenth 
Party Congress elected a Central Auditing Commission of twenty- 
three members, smaller than the previous commission of thirty- 
one, elected in 1981 . Eighty-three percent of the commission's mem- 
bers were newly elected. 

The Nineteenth Congress also stated its commitment to the exist- 
ing Party Program, which in essence is dedicated to completing 
the "construction of socialism" in Mongolia. The Party Program 
contains the concepts and goals to be realized through the five-year 
plans and implemented by the government bureaucracy. As stated 
in the program, the party's role is to instill total commitment among 
citizens toward this goal: "The party will devote unflagging atten- 
tion to organizing resolute struggle against views and morals as 
well as survivals of the past alien to socialism in the minds and 
lives of people." Extolling the values of patriotism and "proletar- 
ian internationalism," the program dictates that Mongolia "will 
educate the working people in the limitless love and devotion to 
their homeland, the Soviet Union and other countries in the so- 
cialist community. ..." 

Because the party congress of the Mongolian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party meets in regular session only every five years, it cannot 
serve as the governing party organization. Rather, one of its key 
functions is to elect the Central Committee, the body that sets the 
tone and establishes the overall leadership for the country. 

Central Committee 

The Central Committee elected by the Nineteenth Congress in 
1986 included eighty-five members and sixty-five candidate mem- 
bers. It was a smaller body than the Central Committee elected 
at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1981 , which had an additional 
six members and six candidate members. Fifty- seven members were 
reelected to the Nineteenth Central Committee, eleven were 
promoted from candidate membership, and seventeen were newly 
appointed. No full members were demoted to candidate member- 
ship, but twenty-four retired, died, or had been removed. Candi- 
date members filled the places of former Central Committee 
members. The number of members on the Nineteenth Central 
Committee was smaller than that of its predecessor, but the num- 
ber of new members increased by 20 percent and of new candi- 
date members, by 77 percent. Thus, the composition of the new 
Central Committee suggested trends toward reducing the size of 
the senior party leadership, toward adding new members, and 
toward initiating the newcomers through service first as candidate 
members. 



187 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

In 1989 the Central Committee had twelve departments re- 
sponsible for managing specialized functions including a general 
department for overseeing and coordinating party affairs. The 
departments supervised cadres affairs; ideological matters; party 
organization; military and security affairs; foreign relations; plan- 
ning and budget; industry; agriculture; construction; transporta- 
tion and communications; and education, science, and health. 
Another key body, the Party Control Commission, is subordinate 
to the Central Committee and is responsible for maintaining in- 
ternal party discipline and for dealing with incidents that challenge 
party authority. There also were a Higher Party School and an 
Institute of Social Studies (formerly the Party History Institute), 
both of which had the status of a Central Committee department. 

Political Bureau and Secretariat 

The Political Bureau is elected by the Central Committee to con- 
duct the party's business between plenary sessions of the Central 
Committee and to provide the top leadership for the party and the 
country. As the senior policy-making body, it establishes specific 
goals; and it regularly evaluates the progress of national programs. 

The Secretariat also functions between plenary sessions, and it 
is the administrative center of the party apparatus. It is elected by 
the Central Committee to oversee implementation of the Party Pro- 
gram and party resolutions and to select leading cadres. This last 
function gives the Secretariat nomenklatura (see Glossary), the 
authority to make appointments to the key positions in both the 
party and the government bureaucracies. 

The ruling hierarchy was stable during the 1980s. In May 1986, 
the Political Bureau included seven members and three candidate 
members. The Secretariat was composed of six secretaries. Batmonh 
was reelected general secretary of the Central Committee. These 
elections produced few changes; four leaders were retained as both 
Political Bureau members and secretaries of the Central Commit- 
tee. Three leaders were retained as members of only the Political 
Bureau, and three were elected candidate Political Bureau mem- 
bers. Two new secretaries were elected to the Central Committee. 
This leadership group, averaging fifty-nine years of age, was 
changed somewhat at the third plenary session — or fully constituted 
meeting — of the Central Committee in June 1987, when one Po- 
litical Bureau member retired and was replaced by a candidate 
member. By 1989 the Political Bureau had been reduced to nine 
members after the death of one candidate member. Two Political 
Bureau members mentioned as likely successors to Batmonh were 
Bat-Ochiryn Altangerel, a former Ulaanbaatar first secretary, and 



188 



Government and Politics 



Tserendeshiyn Namsray, a member of the party Secretariat and 
chairman of the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society. 

Some party leaders held concurrent key government positions. 
For example, Batmonh was chairman of the Presidium of the Peo- 
ple's Great Hural, and Sodnom was chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, or premier. All Political Bureau members and candi- 
date members also were deputies to the People's Great Hural. The 
known substantive responsibilities of the top party leadership 
covered several specialties: party disciplinary affairs, law and ad- 
ministration, foreign affairs, building and construction, and in- 
dustry. 

Regional and Local Party Organizations 

A general understanding of the size of the party structure below 
the national level was provided by reports in January 1981 that 
recorded "twenty-seven provincial, town and equivalent-level party 
committees, seven urban district party committees, 256 basic-level 
committees, and 2,600 party cells." In March 1989, Batmonh noted 
that there were 3,199 primary party organizations, or cells. Party 
first secretaries of aymags and those of the three autonomous cities, 
usually were represented on the Central Committee. In addition 
to their key party organizational responsibilities, these regional lead- 
ers had the important duty to implement the party's economic poli- 
cies and programs within the areas under their supervision. In fact, 
active participation in the current party programs emphasizing eco- 
nomic development was regarded as essential to the regional lead- 
ers' success; this probably explained their participation on the 
Central Committee. Two other key posts, probably equal in rank 
to aymag first secretaries, were held by leading party representa- 
tives in the state Railroad Administration and the army's Political 
Directorate. 

Aymag-level and somon-level party organizations are formed by 
election of the conferences of representatives within the respective 
jurisdictions. These committees control the executive and the legis- 
lative institutions of government as well as economic enterprises. 
Meeting in plenary sessions at least twice a year, the committees' 
regular daily business is conducted by an elected bureau of seven 
to nine members. Bureau meetings are held once or twice every 
fourteen days to hear reports and recommendations, to discuss 
implementation of higher-level decisions, to coordinate and to as- 
sign cadres' work, to approve acceptance of candidate members, 
to assign cadres to non-party organs in territorial units, to provide 
leadership to party cells and to evaluate their achievements and 



189 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

shortcomings, and to maintain party discipline within various subor- 
dinate organizations. 

The party cell is considered the primary party organization. Every 
party member has to belong to a cell. These bodies exist in indus- 
trial enterprises; agricultural cooperatives; state farms; and educa- 
tional, cultural, and other establishments. Cells are formed from 
not fewer than eight party members or candidates for member- 
ship. The cell's responsibilities include recruitment of party mem- 
bers, training and ideological development of the membership, and 
party discipline. When there are fewer than eight members to be 
organized, a party section is formed; it has responsibilities simi- 
lar, insofar as possible, to those of the party cell. 

Mass Organizations 

Youth Organizations 

The Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, founded on Au- 
gust 25, 1921, is the party's most important auxiliary. The Party 
Program describes the organization as the party's 4 'militant assis- 
tant and reliable reserve." In 1986 the league had 235,000 mem- 
bers between fifteen and twenty-eight years of age and was a 
significant element in reinforcing the party ranks and in contributing 
to social and economic development. A good record as a youth 
league member was a prerequisite to selection for party member- 
ship. Seminars, lectures, and technical schools were run under 
league sponsorship to raise the ideological, educational, and cul- 
tural standards of Mongolian youths. The league also played an 
active role in preparing youths for service in the armed forces 
by instilling patriotism and by encouraging participation in re- 
serve training programs to maintain a high level of physical fit- 
ness. 

The league structure resembles that of the party, with a Central 
Committee, a Political Bureau composed of members and candi- 
date members, and a Secretariat. Tserendorjiyn Narangerel, who 
was sixty-eight in 1989, was elected first secretary of the Mongolian 
Revolutionary Youth League in 1984. In 1986 he was elected to 
the party Central Committee and became a deputy in the People's 
Great Hural. Narangerel 's predecessor until 1983 was Lodongiyn 
Tudeb, who became editor-in-chief of the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party newspaper, Unen (Truth). In addition to 
Narangerel, the top league leadership in 1989 included a second 
secretary and four secretaries. Below the national level, the league 
included committees led by first secretaries in various-level units 
that had structures comparable to that of the party. The league 



190 



Provisional national government headquarters, Ulaanbaatar, July 1921 
Courtesy Institute of Party History, Ulaanbaatar 



belonged to the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the 
International Union of Students. 

The Sukhe Bator Mongolian Pioneers Organization, named after 
the revolutionary hero, Damdiny Sukhe Bator, and founded in May 
1925, was supervised by the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth 
League. With a membership, in the late 1980s, of 360,000, it served 
children ages ten to fifteen. In 1989 its head — and chairman of the 
Central Council — was concurrently a secretary of the Mongolian 
Revolutionary Youth League Central Committee. Like the youth 
league, the Pioneers Organization is meant to involve the children 
in active work and service in fulfilling party goals. It sponsored 
rallies focused on labor themes; provided medals for good progress 
in work and study; and encouraged the ideological, moral, and 
educational development of children. The organization also hosted 
sports competitions, art reviews, and festivals. In the summer, the 
organization operated camps to enhance the physical training and 
the education of youths. 

Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society 

Although party- sponsored mass organizations existed for wom- 
en, laborers, the elderly, and creative artists, the largest mass 



191 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



organization in the late 1980s was the Mongolian- Soviet Friend- 
ship Society, established in 1924. With 580,000 members in 1984, 
the society was chaired by Political Bureau member Namsray, and 
it included most of the country's prominent leaders. As the name 
implied, its mission was to strengthen friendly ties and coopera- 
tion with the Soviet Union. The society furthered this goal by spon- 
soring films, exhibits, and lectures and by conducting an annual 
friendship month celebration preceding the anniversary of the 
Bolshevik Revolution on November 7. Another body, the Federa- 
tion of Mongolian Peace and Friendship Organizations, acted as 
an umbrella association, serving other international friendship so- 
cieties. 

Women's Organizations 

The Mongolian Women's Committee was established in 1924. 
This body operated through women's councils established in in- 
dustrial centers, businesses, and schools in cities, towns, and ay- 
mags. Lubsanchultemiyn Pagmadulam chaired the group in 1989. 
The federation had approximately 5,000 women's councils that 
sponsored rallies, educational activities, and work-related training, 
and it monitored national health care and maternal issues for those 
sixteen years and older. It supported raising the level of culture 
among youth and enhancing the quality of their upbringing by in- 
stilling moral values. In 1946 the organization affiliated with the 
International Democratic Federation of Women. 

Labor Organizations 

The Mongolian Trade Unions originated in 1927. In 1989 it in- 
cluded 600,000 members, grouped into four categories of trade 
unions: industry and construction; agricultural workers; transpor- 
tation, communications, trade, and services; and culture and en- 
lightenment. Trade union organizations ran production and 
training conferences, and they participated in collective agreements 
between the managements of enterprises and trade union commit- 
tees. They also articulated issues of concern to the work force, su- 
pervised social insurance programs, and oversaw the observance 
of labor legislation. These and other powers were vested in law, 
particularly in the National Labor Law (see Labor Force, ch. 3). 
Schools run by labor organizations focused on improving the qualifi- 
cations and vocational education of factory and office workers. 

The highest body in the organizational structure of the labor 
unions was the Congress of the Mongolian Trade Unions, which 
elected a central council and an auditing commission. In 1989 the 
Central Council of the Mongolian Trade Unions was chaired by 



192 



Government and Politics 



Bat-Ochiryn Lubsantseren, also a member of the party Central 
Committee and the Presidium of the People's Great Hural. A 
presidium — composed of the chairman of the Central Council of 
the Mongolian Trade Unions, a deputy, and two secretaries — 
and a four-person secretariat provided the leadership for the subor- 
dinate trade union councils and committees. About 3,000 commit- 
tees operated at the primary factory level. The composition of the 
trade unions in the late 1980s was 50 percent industrial workers, 
30 percent office and professional workers, and 20 percent agricul- 
tural workers. In a population that was 58 percent working class, 
and in a work force that was 95 percent unionized by 1984, trade 
unions played an important role. How well they performed was 
another question. At a party Central Committee plenary session 
in December 1988, the Central Council of the Mongolian Trade 
Unions was criticized for not adequately protecting workers' in- 
terests. The Mongolian Trade Unions was affiliated with the Soviet- 
sponsored World Federation of Trade Unions. 

Other Mass Organizations 

Like most other professional groups in Mongolian society, jour- 
nalists were organized into a mass organization. By 1989 the Union 
of Mongolian Journalists had 800 members, more than half of them 
formally trained as journalists. Ninety-seven percent of the mem- 
bership had received higher education. In 1989 the press in Mon- 
golia was undergoing major changes, and the effect of these changes 
on this body still was unclear (see The Media, this ch.). 

There also were "creative unions" to organize writers, artists, 
and composers. Their main purpose was to ensure that artistic con- 
tent supported the party's social and political policies. The top lead- 
ers of these mass organizations usually served on the party Central 
Committee. In 1984 the Writers' Union included a sixty-one mem- 
ber committee with seven presiding author-secretaries. 

A newer mass organization, established in 1988, was the Cul- 
ture Fund of the Mongolian People's Republic. Its purpose was 
to protect monuments and key examples of Mongol history, liter- 
ature, and architecture as well as to recover cultural treasures that 
have been taken out of the country. It was funded by voluntary 
contributions. 

The attempt to organize segments of the country's population 
extended to elderly citizens. The Union of Mongolian Senior 
Citizens was established on March 25, 1988, with 120,000 mem- 
bers. Its purposes were to make the elderly more productive and 
involved in the country's development as well as to study and to 
improve the health of the aging. The organization had a chairman, 



193 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

a deputy chairman, a 150-member executive Committee, a 15- 
member presidium, and a 7 -member central auditing committee. 
An important subcommittee of this mass organization, reflecting 
the World War II legacy of military service, was the Committee 
of War Veterans. 

The Political Process 

Since 1924 the Mongolian political system and apparatus, pat- 
terned after those in the Soviet Union, has followed the organiza- 
tional principle of democratic centralism. As applied in the Soviet 
Union, this principle concentrates decision-making authority and 
the power to take policy initiatives at senior party levels. Throughout 
the party system, the decisions of higher-level bodies are binding 
on subordinate-level party organizations. The democratic feature 
of this Leninist principle prescribes that members of party organi- 
zations at all levels are elected by conferences of delegates and are 
accountable to their respective electorates. Policy issues are to be 
discussed freely within the party organizations, but once final de- 
cisions (expressed in programs) are adopted, strict party discipline 
then dictates that policies be implemented exactiy, without any fur- 
ther expressions of disagreement. 

Democratic Centralism 

Under the guidance of early party leaders Horloyn Choybalsan 
and Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, the principle of democratic central- 
ism was weighted heavily toward its centralizing features, just as 
it was being applied in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. Purges, 
reprisals, and political violence in Mongolia mirrored the arbitrary 
behavior of Stalin. Choybalsan directed his attacks against politi- 
cal foes, rivals, and religious institutions. After Choybalsan 's death 
in 1952 and Tsedenbal' s emergence as the top party and govern- 
ment leader, Mongolian politics again followed the Soviet exam- 
ple. Starting in 1956, Tsedenbal initiated an extensive anti- Stalinist, 
anti-Choybalsan campaign, accusing the party leader of having con- 
ducted a "cult of personality" like Stalin. 

In 1989, in the latest mirroring of Soviet politics, observers con- 
cluded that the democratic aspects of democratic centralism were 
beginning to play an enhanced role in Mongolian politics. Highly 
personalized and centralized politics were giving way to increased 
involvement by more democratic or representative sectors. Party 
general secretary Batmonh, speaking before the important fifth ple- 
nary session of the Central Committee held December 21-22, 1988, 
emphasized the need for "renewal" of the Mongolian sociopoliti- 
cal system by "democratizing the party's inner life." Just before 



194 



Posters of Gorbachev, Batmonh, Lenin, and Sukhe Bator, 
May Day parade, 1988, Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Steve Mann 

the plenary session, in November 1988, Batmonh pointed to the 
poor performance of the Mongolian economy even under the poli- 
cies of ''renewal," or Soviet-style restructuring. He gave as rea- 
sons for this condition a lack of vitality in the Mongolian political 
system, which, he said, could be remedied only by a more open 
and free social and political system. 

At the December 1988 plenary session, which focused on reform 
of the political system, Batmonh spoke at length on the Mongolian 
equivalent of glasnost and perestroika and, for the first time, identi- 
fied by name his predecessor, Tsedenbal, with the social, economic, 
and political problems that plagued Mongolia. In addition, Bat- 
monh linked Tsedenbal 's shortcomings with the "serious damage" 
that the personality cult of Choybalsan had caused and charged 
that "democracy was restricted and the administrative-command 
method of management took the upper hand." 

Probably with a view to containing the political impact of these 
provocative statements, Batmonh urged the leadership to recog- 
nize these mistakes in leadership in a positive and instructive way. 
He also laid out the new political course by emphasizing that "a 
key point to the transformation and renewal" was recognition of 
the importance of the various levels of assemblies of people's 



195 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

deputies. He said the assemblies' deputies embodied the institu- 
tional expression of self-government now regarded as essential to 
the efficient and effective functioning of the political system. In 
addition to stressing the importance of these representative bodies, 
Batmonh exhorted several key mass organizations, particularly the 
trade unions and the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, to 
play a more active role in "perfecting organizational renewal" by 
becoming more vocal about issues and more involved in reform 
programs. Accordingly, democratic reform was to be carried out 
at all levels — in central and local government bodies, as well as 
in party, state, and mass organizations. The assemblies of people's 
deputies and all mass organizations were to be made responsible 
for "perfecting" the government system by engaging in free dia- 
logue and in criticism and debate of reform issues and programs. 

This speech by Batmonh set the agenda for further party action. 
The fifth plenary session concluded with the Central Committee's 
adoption of a seven-point resolution espousing the democratiza- 
tion of the political system. Batmonh discussed the major party 
reforms involved during an interview reported in the March 1989 
issue of the Soviet periodical, New Times. They included: reduc- 
ing the size of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party mem- 
bership and giving priority to the primary party organization, the 
point of contact with the Mongolian population; setting a fixed five- 
year term of office for elected party bodies, from the Central Com- 
mittee to the district party committee, and limiting the opportuni- 
ty to be reelected to one further consecutive term; holding party 
conferences every two to three years, with the partial — up to 25 
percent — replacement of members of party committees; and con- 
ducting Political Bureau and Secretariat elections by secret ballot. 
In general, these party reforms were to contribute to a rejuvena- 
tion of party leadership and to democratize internal party politics. 

Batmonh revealed that government reforms being proposed at 
the fifth plenary session were to emphasize the People's Great Hural 
and assemblies of people's deputies as the "political basis of the 
state. ' ' He said that a distinction would be more clearly drawn be- 
tween the functions of party and state organizations. Briefly, party 
organizations were to make policy decisions, the results of which 
were to be managed and implemented through government 
representative bodies. Major government reforms included reducing 
and streamlining the government bureaucracy; limiting the term 
in office in any of the representative assemblies to five years, with 
only one opportunity for reelection; nominating several candidates 
for an office; and discussing candidate qualifications freely. Fol- 
lowing up on the fifth plenary session's initiatives, the Political 



196 



Government and Politics 



Bureau proposed developing revisions to both the Party Program 
and the state Constitution to reflect Batmonh's concerns. In Febru- 
ary 1989, a commission was formed to begin drafting a new edi- 
tion of the state Constitution, to be presented for national discussion 
by December 1989. Addressing its first meeting, Batmonh asserted 
that "implementation of restructuring in the country was impos: 
sible without perfecting its existing laws, and this matter should 
be started with a new edition of the . . . Constitution." In addi- 
tion, a new body was being planned, the Commission for Con- 
stitutional Control, to improve adherence to the Constitution. 
Revisions of the Rules of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party and to the Party Program were to be ready for the Twen- 
tieth Party Congress planned for 1991. 

In large measure, Batmonh's efforts to emphasize and to 
strengthen the democratic features in the political system reflected 
his responsiveness to precedents set in Moscow. Nevertheless, if 
implemented, these reforms may have at least the short-term ef- 
fect of opening debate and allowing more discussion of pressing 
local issues, a development that might improve the quality of life 
for Mongolians. Over the long term, the permanence of these 
"democratic" policies was likely to be related closely to the suc- 
cess or the failure of the ongoing economic programs. 

Batmonh's professional background fits neatly into the mold of 
the senior Mongolian political leader. He was born in 1926 in Hyar- 
gas Somon, Uvs Aymag, in western Mongolia, reportedly to a 
peasant family of herdsmen. Like his predecessor, Tsedenbal, Bat- 
monh was educated in the Soviet Union, at the Academy of Social 
Sciences. Typical of past and present members of the party Politi- 
cal Bureau, Batmonh has a strong economic-technical background. 
He studied at the Mongolian State University, and in the late 1960s 
he was rector of the Higher School of Economics. From 1963 to 
1973, he was vice rector and then rector of the Mongolian State 
University. Batmonh's political ascent was rapid and remarkable. 
While serving as head of the Central Committee's Department of 
Science and Education, he became chairman of the Council of 
Ministers in June 1974, without first being elected to Political 
Bureau membership. At that time, he was only a candidate mem- 
ber of the Central Committee. By December 1984, Batmonh was 
concurrentiy the party's general secretary, having replaced Tseden- 
bal in August, and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great 
Hural. He thus had control over, and access to, the two govern- 
ing bureaucracies, securing his place at the center of the political 
system. 



197 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Sodnom was the second most prominent leader in Mongolia in 
the late 1980s. Born in 1933 in Orgon Somon, Dornogovi Aymag, 
Sodnom graduated from the Finance and Economics Technical 
School in Ulaanbaatar and the Finance and Economics Institute 
in Irkutsk, Soviet Union. His professional career concentrated on 
economics and planning. From 1963 to 1969, Sodnom was minister 
of finance; by 1974 he was chairman of the State Planning Com- 
mission. He became a full Political Bureau member and chairman 
of the Council of Ministers (premier) in December 1984, succeed- 
ing Batmonh. 

The backgrounds of others serving on the Political Bureau in 
1989 were mixed, but they shared a notable emphasis on econom- 
ics and state-planning experience. Demchigjabyn Molomjamts, 
perhaps the third most influential leader, was minister of finance 
and concurrently held key state planning positions. Altangerel was 
concurrendy the first deputy premier. Colonel General Jamsran- 
giyn Dejid a former minister of public security, was concurrently 
a party secretary. Namsray, a former aide to Tsedenbal and a jour- 
nalist, was elected to the Political Bureau in June 1984, just be- 
fore Tsedenbal 's retirement in August. Candidate Political Bureau 
members Bandzragchiyn Lamjab and Sonomyn Lubsangombo 
represented different, but critical, career specialties. Lamjab con- 
currently served as chairman of the Party Control Commission. 
Lubsangombo, an urban development specialist, was chairman of 
the State Building Commission and deputy chairman of the Council 
of Ministers (or, deputy premier). 

Political Issues 

The political leadership style of Batmonh can be described as 
cautious and pragmatic, and it explains in part why the senior 
leadership levels in the party have escaped major shake-ups. Under 
his leadership, the political program has focused on bringing greater 
productivity, efficiency, and material prosperity to society. Imple- 
menting this program, however, has raised certain key political 
issues of central concern to Batmonh and other top party leaders. 
One issue has been the performance of the party and government 
bureaucracies. The official bureaucracy has come under attack for 
apathy to reform measures and for displays of resistance to their 
implementation. Another major criticism, often related to those 
just cited, was that some party and government leaders were con- 
sidered either unqualified or too inept to understand and to carry 
out reform programs. 

In attempts to address this issue, party pronouncements have 
stressed the participation and the accountability of officials at all 



198 




Poster of People *s Great Hural chairman and party 
secretary general Jambyn Batmonh, 1988 
Courtesy Allen H. Kassof 



levels of the bureaucracy. This has been accomplished in some 
measure at the provincial level by increasing participation of aymag 
first secretaries on the party Central Committee. Having them serve 
on this national body included them in the policy debate and made 
them responsible for, and accountable for, the effective implemen- 
tation of policies and programs. In 1986 the Central Committee 
included fourteen of the eighteen first secretaries, as either full or 
candidate members. Two of the unrepresented aymags actually were 
represented indirectly by having representatives on the Central 
Committee who had been elected from the autonomous cities, 
Darhan and Erdenet, located within those aymags. Two decades 
earlier, only a few aymag first secretaries served on the party Cen- 
tral Committee. 

In 1989 the change that linked aymag leaders to the national-level 
leadership probably did not indicate a major decentralization of 
political power in Mongolia. Official policy still followed precedents 
set in the Soviet Union that were transmitted by the central party 
structure. Instead, these "decentralizing" measures appeared to 
be inspired more by a recognition of the nature of past economic 
stagnation and failure. They were designed to provide aymag party 
leaders with a substantial political stake in the regime in order to 



199 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

win their much needed enthusiasm and commitment to the new 
reformist goals. 

Creative approaches and bold thinking were qualities that the 
regime espoused to energize its often-complacent bureaucracy. At 
the Nineteenth Congress in 1986, Batmonh echoed the reformist 
thrust of Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the preceding Twenty- 
seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Batmonh stressed that party members needed to "think and work 
in new ways." He identified as the "chief political result of the 
supreme forum of Mongolian Communists" (that is, the party con- 
gress) the recognition that more attention had to be paid to party 
ideological and organizational work and "to strengthening inner- 
party democracy." Batmonh raised similar themes in his key De- 
cember 1988 plenary session speech. In discussing ideological work 
within the party bureaucracy, he identified the main task as being 
"to foster in people a scientific world outlook and further raise their 
social consciousness." 

Developing a program of "renewal and rejuvenation" has 
precipitated as an issue the question of what should constitute the 
official view of Mongolian history. Who were the heroes, and who 
obstructed progress? By late 1988, Tsedenbal, for the first time, 
was identified with the regime's economic failures because economic 
stagnation and official dogmatism that stifled growth and creativity 
flourished during his tenure. The charges leveled against Tseden- 
bal during this revision of modern Mongolian history also appeared 
to extend into the emotional area of the fate and the status of in- 
digenous Mongolian cultural institutions and heritage. Calling for 
a "realistic appraisal" of Tsedenbal's career, Batmonh said "we 
draw serious conclusions on the acts of destroying historical and 
cultural monuments, monasteries and temples. But that bitter les- 
son was not duly considered, and even today a careless attitude 
to national culture persists." Filling in what have been called "blank 
spots" in Mongolian history appeared in mid- 1989 to extend even 
to the historical treatment of Chinggis Khan and perhaps can be 
viewed as one important barometer of political change in Mongo- 
lia. Traditionally, the Soviet press has described Chinggis as a "feu- 
dal and backward element." By early 1989, the Mongolian press 
had adopted a more positive view of this historic national figure, 
a change suggesting that, politically, the Mongolian leadership has 
begun to move somewhat out from under Soviet political tutelage. 

Role of the Military 

The Mongolian military establishment played only a minor role 
in the political system in the late 1980s. In 1989, no Political Bureau 



200 



Government and Politics 



member or candidate member represented defense interests. Dejid 
served on the Political Bureau and the Secretariat, but not as a 
military leader. Rather, his responsibilities were civilian in nature, 
involving preservation of party and state unity and discipline in 
the course of carrying out the new programs of openness and leader- 
ship restructuring. 

Dejid' s career experience was typical of military leaders who had 
risen to positions of influence in party and state circles. Dejid was 
a former minister of public security and chairman of the Party Con- 
trol Commission. During his active military service, he was involved 
in public security, censorship, and civilian control activities. An- 
cillary to these duties were his obligations to greet visiting Soviet 
military delegations and to participate in defense discussions with 
Soviet commanders. 

The percentage of military representation on the party Central 
Committee was not reported officially, but the number was thought 
to be small. It was clear that military officers with direct and primary 
defense responsibilities maintained a low political profile. This was 
well illustrated by the fact that Colonel General Jamsrangiyn Yon- 
don, minister of defense in 1989, was not a member of the Central 
Committee when he was selected for the senior government defense 
post in 1982. The well-documented career of Yondon's predeces- 
sor, Jorantayn Abhia, was characteristic of a member of the Mon- 
golian military elite. Abhia held several key positions successively 
in police or militia work and in the court and procuracy system. 
Senior military officers often filled the key positions in government 
public security and in the civil and criminal justice system. In 1989 
the minister of public security was Lieutenant General Agbaan- 
jantsangiyn Jamsranjab, and the chief of state security was Lieu- 
tenant General B. Tsiyregdzen. Tsiyregdzen's duties included 
suppressing anti-Soviet propaganda and counterespionage as well 
as guarding against alleged Western subversion, particularly 
through censorship of the mails. 

Probably the greatest impact the military has had on the Mon- 
golian political process has been indirect — through its organiza- 
tional and ideological activities. Beginning with the militarist period 
of leadership under Choybalsan and even in 1989, the military es- 
tablishment contributed to the formation in the popular conscious- 
ness of the concepts of state and national polity (see Modern 
Mongolia, ch. 1). In addition, the army played a significant role 
in spreading literacy, and it served as an integrating agent by 
spreading the national language to minority groups. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, as a result of improvements in media and communica- 
tions, the military probably has found it somewhat easier to fulfill 



201 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

the goal of producing a dedicated cadre of soldiers who will return 
to civilian life. 

General Political Values and Attitudes 

The political system became heavily regimented under com- 
munism and the organizational principle of democratic centralism. 
Young and elderly citizens, urban and rural dwellers, skilled and 
unskilled laborers all had to become fully involved in, and cog- 
nizant of, the goals and the ideological content of party programs. 
Inevitably, the implementation of this political system has provoked 
a variety of responses. Mongolians, now middle-aged and older, 
who by 1959 had experienced collectivization and were deprived 
of their animal herds and the freedom to roam in search of new 
pastures, harbored resentment against the government's procedures 
and limitations on their erstwhile freedoms. Any outright opposi- 
tion was put down quickly, but negative feelings probably have 
not been eradicated. 

Support for the regime existed, and it was likely to continue in 
the 1990s among those with the greatest stake in the success of its 
policies — for example, party and government cadres, economists, 
and technocrats. The earlier sovietization of politics and society, 
and the role of officials in that process, had given this group an 
elevated status, but with the concomitant requirement that they 
exhort the people to uphold the preferred values of conformity and 
political orthodoxy at the expense of more traditional values and 
spontaneity. Improvements in communications and transportation 
as well as the opportunities for reaching a larger audience afforded 
by increased literacy have permitted the communist regime and 
its cadres more immediate contact with the populace. By the 1980s, 
there were no more mass political purges, but the state machinery 
had become more efficient and pervasive in organization. Its po- 
litical influence was deeply felt throughout the country. How this 
system would fare under the reformist policies of openness and 
democratization could not be assessed in mid- 1989. 

Reportedly, some resistance to this method of rule — from Mon- 
golian youths who were better educated, aware that change was 
occurring, and anxious that even greater openness be permitted — 
was becoming evident. Politically, they seemed to advocate extend- 
ing the trend toward democratization. They viewed democracy 
more as a human right than as a means for improving the political 
system and its policies, by such methods as encouraging public criti- 
cism of cadre incompetence, poor management practices, and so 
forth. Youth demands also may have been shared by the artistic 
community and by some members of the intelligentsia. The latter, 



202 



Government and Politics 



while saluting the de-Stalinization campaign ongoing in 1989, also 
may have wanted a more extensive reappraisal of Mongolian cul- 
ture and its heroes. It was difficult to assess how deep these feel- 
ings were, but observers doubted that they represented any 
immediate threat to the regime's stability. 

Foreign Policy 

Mongolia's foreign policy must be viewed in the context of the 
nation's landlocked position, sandwiched between the Soviet Union 
and China. The country's survival and growth have largely de- 
pended on its leaders' adroit management of this sensitive and stra- 
tegic location. Too weak to act independentiy to hold encroachments 
from both China and the Soviet Union in check, Mongolia's lead- 
ers have interpreted their national interests as being best served 
by accepting the political direction and military support of Moscow. 
Thus, for more than sixty years, the Soviet Union has been the 
patron and the predominant force shaping Mongolian foreign af- 
fairs. In 1987 this Mongolian stance was expressed succinctly in 
Batmonh's statement that his country was "grateful Soviet units 
were still guarding socialism in Mongolia." 

Motivation and Goals 

In 1989 the principal motivations driving Mongolia's foreign pol- 
icy were the preservation of territorial integrity, together with the 
projection of a substantial measure of political independence. Major 
goals included expanding and modernizing the economy through 
aid and trade arrangements, and extending diplomatic and eco- 
nomic contacts with the international community. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the opportunities afforded by Soviet economic aid and 
assistance, along with those available through Comecon and the 
Soviet military guardianship, continued to hold Mongolia firmly 
within the Soviet orbit. Internationally, Mongolia often served as 
a Soviet proxy, representing the Soviet position when and where 
needed. 

By mid- 1989, some indications of changes in Mongolia's for- 
eign policy direction were visible, very likely in response to initia- 
tives taken by Soviet leader Gorbachev. Operating within the 
context of the distinct improvements being made in Sino-Soviet 
relations, Mongolian leaders also began to demonstrate a more 
relaxed attitude toward China. Furthermore, they seemed willing 
to explore new relationships with other Asian countries and to ac- 
celerate contact and deepening relationships with Western and 
Third World countries. 



203 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Foreign policy goals are pursued through the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs, headed in 1989 by Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren. The 
trade aspects of foreign relations are carried out by the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Supply (see Foreign Econom- 
ic Relations and Comecon, ch. 3). The power of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is limited to implementing foreign policies formu- 
lated by high-level party organizations. That Gombosuren was only 
a candidate member of the Central Committee underlines this fact. 

The formulation of foreign policy is done in the name of the party 
Central Committee, and it is closely controlled by top party lead- 
ers, organizations, and departments. Foreign policy is formulated 
by senior leaders in the Political Bureau who are well attuned to 
Soviet foreign policy preferences. In mid- 1989 Political Bureau 
member and party secretary Namsray appeared to have responsi- 
bility for supervising foreign affairs. In addition, the party Cen- 
tral Committee has a subordinate department responsible for foreign 
relations; the head of it in mid- 1989 was concurrently a member 
of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural. He probably coor- 
dinated foreign policy matters with the chairman of the Standing 
Commission for Foreign Affairs of the People's Great Hural, who 
also happened to be a party secretary. In 1989 the minister of for- 
eign affairs was assisted in implementing foreign policy by a first 
deputy minister, two deputy ministers, and heads of specialized 
departments. Some key departments believed to have been respon- 
sible for specific geographic areas were: number one, the Soviet 
Union, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany), and Poland; number two, remaining European coun- 
tries; number three, East Asia and Southeast Asia; and number 
four, South Asia, West Asia, and Africa. Additional departments 
handled cultural affairs, treaties and archives, relations with in- 
ternational organizations, legal affairs, protocol, the administra- 
tion of diplomatic agencies, the press, and other matters. 

Foreign Relations 

Soviet Union 

In the late 1980s, the close relationship between Mongolia and 
the Soviet Union was much the same as it had been since the 1920s. 
Mongolian foreign policy stressed consolidating the ''fraternal 
alliance" with the Soviet Union and close cooperation with the 
members of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The two countries 
had direct links among ministries, agencies, departments, and party 
organizations. The Soviet Union encouraged direct contacts 



204 



Detail of mosaic dedicated to Mongolian-Soviet unity, Ulaanbaatar 

Courtesy Steve Mann 



between Mongolia and the Buryatskaya Autonomous Soviet So- 
cialist Republic and Tuvinskaya Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic as well as the Central Asian Soviet republics. By 1985 
the Soviet Union had consulates in the cities of Choybalsan; 
Darhan, where many Soviet-built factories were located; and 
Erdenet, the site of a Mongolian-Soviet joint copper and molybde- 
num mining enterprise (see Industry, ch. 3). In August 1988, the 
only Mongolian ambassadorships with incumbents serving concur- 
rently on the party Central Committee were assignments to coun- 
tries of major concern to the Soviet Union: Albania, Afghanistan, 
East Germany, and Finland. The Mongolian ambassador to the 
Soviet Union also served on the party Central Committee. 

When Batmonh became general secretary of the Mongolian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Party, an event followed closely by Gorbachev's 
election as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, the two leaders pledged to uphold and to strengthen the 
Mongolian-Soviet alliance. Gorbachev's "new thinking" in for- 
eign policy matters soon became evident, however, and it no doubt 
raised major concerns, on the part of Mongolian leaders, particu- 
larly regarding a warming of relations between the Soviet Union 
and China. Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited 



205 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Mongolia from January 23 to 25, 1986, shortly after celebrations 
marking the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the 1966 
Mongolian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance and its extension for ten years. Shevardnadze said that 
"the period of strained relationships with China is now behind us. 
The Soviet Union is for normalizing and improving relations with 
the Chinese republic on condition that the principle of not harm- 
ing third countries be observed." One clear purpose of the Soviet 
formula of "not harming third countries" was to reassure Mon- 
golia that the Soviet Union did not plan initiatives toward China 
that would compromise or endanger Mongolia's national security 
or expose that country to Chinese encroachments. 

In July 1986, Gorbachev extended the new direction in foreign 
affairs in a speech on Asian security delivered in Vladivostok. He 
indicated Soviet interest in improved Moscow-Beijing relations, 
and he included a plan to withdraw Soviet troops from Mongolia, 
a major factor in Soviet diplomatic initiatives designed to meet 
China's conditions for normalization of relations (see Threat Per- 
ception, ch. 5). 

Shortly after the Vladivostok initiative, Mongolian officials began 
talks with United States diplomats concerning another attempt to 
improve relations. Ulaanbaatar probably viewed prospective ties 
with Washington as offering a greater degree of maneuverability 
in the increasingly complex international setting in Asia. In Janu- 
ary 1987, diplomatic ties were established with the United States, 
and the Soviet Union announced its intention to withdraw one di- 
vision of troops from Mongolia. Both actions no doubt were the 
subject of lengthy substantive talks between Soviet and Mongolian 
leaders. 

Mongolia further broadened its diplomatic horizons by hosting 
delegations from twenty-one communist and workers' parties for 
the Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of 
Asia and the Pacific Region, the first regional gathering of this type, 
in July 1986. The theme of this meeting was "peace, security and 
good-neighborly cooperation in Asia and the Pacific region." By 
hosting this meeting, Ulaanbaatar served Moscow's purposes of 
underscoring Gorbachev's new interest in Asia — further highlighted 
by the attendance of a high-powered Soviet delegation. China 
declined to send a delegation, claiming that conditions were "not 
ripe," and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) did not attend either, probably as a gesture to China. 

As Mongolia expanded its contacts in the international commu- 
nity, Gorbachev continued to extend his Asian initiatives, a de- 
velopment directly affecting Mongolia's national interests. In a 



206 



Government and Politics 



speech delivered on September 16, 1988, at the southeastern Si- 
berian city of Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev presented a seven-point pro- 
gram designed to enhance security in the Asia-Pacific region and 
to promote his view of a multipolar approach to resolving issues 
in foreign relations. The so-called Krasnoyarsk initiative indicated 
both Soviet intentions to play a major role in the region and its 
awareness that China also must be included in regional develop- 
ment plans. Observers speculated that the Soviets must have ex- 
pended considerable effort in reassuring Mongolian leaders that 
Soviet proposals dealing with East Asia, particularly those involv- 
ing China, did not threaten Mongolian national security. 

The challenge for Mongolia's foreign policy makers was to com- 
ply with Soviet initiatives, about which they had little choice, but 
to do so in a manner that suggested that Mongolia was acting as 
an independent country, shaping a foreign policy that served its 
national interests. At the same time, the Soviet Union could not 
appear to be overlooking the interests of its ally Mongolia while 
making its overtures to China. This mild restriction on Soviet be- 
havior had helped to reassure Mongolia that continued Soviet pro- 
tection and strategic support were reliable. In any case, Mongolian 
compliance with the Soviet initiatives was evident in Gorbachev's 
address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on Decem- 
ber 7, 1988. In it he announced that most Soviet troops stationed 
in Mongolia would be withdrawn. Subsequently, in February 1989, 
during talks between Batmonh and a Soviet deputy foreign minister, 
the latter explained that discussions to resolve questions connected 
with "the withdrawal from the territory of Mongolia of 75 per- 
cent of Soviet land forces and other military subunits would soon 
begin." On March 7, 1989, the Soviets announced, probably as 
an additional concession to China on the eve of the May 1989 Sino- 
Soviet summit, that withdrawal plans had been finalized. 

China 

Mongolian-Chinese relations historically have suffered because 
of China's claims to "lost territory" and Mongolia's fear of China's 
expansion because of overpopulation. Since 1984 improvement in 
Mongolian relations with China has lagged behind the more rapid 
advances in Sino-Soviet relations. An early indication of lessening 
of tensions, however, came in July 1984 when Ulaanbaatar sent 
to Beijing a delegation led by its deputy foreign minister, the first 
such visit in several years. The Mongolian representative met with 
China's minister of foreign affairs to discuss developing bilateral 
economic, cultural, trade, and technical relations. Also, the offi- 
cials signed a document verifying the first joint inspection of the 



207 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Mongolian-Chinese border. The warming atmosphere continued 
with the signing of an agreement on civil aviation in December 
1985. followed by the resumption of direct Beijing-Ulaanbaatar air 
service in June 1986. A five-year agreement increasing levels of 
trade was signed in April 1986. 

Batmonh gave official sanction to improvements in Mongolian- 
Chinese relations in his address to the May 1986 Nineteenth Con- 
gress. Displaying caution and restraint, Batmonh declared that 
Mongolia was pursuing consistendy its ''scrupulous policy'' of nor- 
malizing relations with China, with the qualification that the rela- 
tionship should be based on equality and "non-interference in 
another's internal affairs." This evident uncertainty concerning 
national security was reflected in Mongolian press statements, just 
prior to Gorbachev's July 1986 address that announced Soviet troop 
withdrawals were under consideration. The press stressed that the 
disposition of Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia was an internal 
matter between Mongolia and the Soviet Union, and that it was 
not a subject for discussion during any Sino-Soviet consultations. 
An article appearing in the press shortly after Gorbachev's speech 
captured the Mongolian sentiment that ' 'no country which borders 
on China feels secure." 

Batmonh' s initiatives were followed by an August 1986 visit to 
Mongolia of a vice foreign minister described as the highest-ranking 
Chinese official to visit Mongolia in twenty years. This important 
meeting resulted in the signing of a consular agreement, the first 
since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the coun- 
tries in 1949. This agreement was followed in 1987 by several key 
visits and events: a high-level delegation from China's legislative 
body, the National People's Congress, visited Mongolia in June; 
this visit was reciprocated in September 1988 by a delegation from 
the People's Great Hural. the first since 1960; a scientific and tech- 
nical cooperative program for the 1987 to 1988 period was ratified 
in July: and a major Mongolian friendship delegation visited China 
in September 1987 — reciprocated by a Chinese friendship delega- 
tion that went to Mongolia in July 1988. 

Other important points of discussion at the August 1986 meet- 
ing reportedly were "certain international issues of common con- 
cern." Japanese press reports indicated that the Mongolians had 
rejected a Chinese request at the meeting that all Soviet troops be 
withdrawn from Mongolia. In China's view, the presence of Soviet 
troops in Mongolia was a key 1 ' obstacle ' ' to normalization of rela- 
tions between China and the Soviet Union. China, maintaining 
that only a total troop withdrawal would be satisfactory, refused 
to back down from this position. From the Chinese perspective. 



208 



Government and Politics 



Mongolia once had been under China's domination; it was there- 
fore particularly galling that Soviet troops were now massed in that 
area and were directed against China. 

In 1988 security concerns and Mongolia's image as an indepen- 
dent country were especially visible in its foreign policy vis-a-vis 
China. The Mongolian minister of foreign affairs remarked in 
November that significant progress had been made in Mongolian- 
Chinese relations, but he stressed that any further Soviet with- 
drawals from Mongolia were a matter for deliberation by the Mon- 
golian government. Mongolia's message was that this was not a 
unilateral Soviet issue. Following Gorbachev's UN address in 
December, Mongolia announced that Soviet troop withdrawals had 
been set in accordance with an agreement reached between Mon- 
golia and the Soviet Union and had resulted from "the positive 
shift that had occurred in Asia and on the international arena as 
a whole." Bilateral cooperation between Mongolia and China on 
security issues had advanced to the point that on November 28, 
1988, a treaty on a border control system was signed in Beijing. 
The Chinese side described the purpose of the treaty as being to 
maintain stability in the border areas. 

The stationing of Soviet troops on Mongolia's border with China 
remained a major impediment both to improved Sino-Soviet rela- 
tions and to Mongolian-Chinese relations. Nevertheless, by early 
1989 Soviet assurances that Mongolian security would not be com- 
promised, complemented by Mongolia's new relationship with the 
United States and enhanced international status, apparently allowed 
Mongolia's leaders to accept additional Soviet efforts to remove 
the Chinese "obstacle" of border troops. Sino-Soviet consultations, 
in preparation for the May 1989 summit between Gorbachev and 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping resulted in the retention of Soviet 
troops in Mongolia — a requirement, no doubt of Mongolia — 
although a 75 percent force reduction was to occur at some un- 
specified time in the future. Whether this action would satisfy China 
fully was still unclear in mid- 1989. What was clear was that Mon- 
golia's status would change significantly, with a much reduced level 
of protection from the Soviet Union. In addition, with increasing 
Chinese influence and involvement in Mongolia, Soviet motiva- 
tion for providing larger aid and assistance packages might be 
diminished. 

Foreign observers assumed that the agenda of the May 1989 
Sino-Soviet summit was a key subject for discussion during Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren's eight-day visit to 
Beijing, beginning in late March. With Sino-Soviet relations 
showing significant improvement, and the normalization of 



209 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Mongolian-Chinese relations being in practice a by-product of these 
developments, the expansion of Mongolian-Chinese relations might 
be expected to accelerate. The Beijing meeting of foreign ministers, 
the first in twenty- seven years, resulted in agreement to establish 
a joint commission on cooperation in economy, trade, and science 
and technology; on allowing visa-free travel between the two coun- 
tries; and on restoring a Mongolian consulate general in China's 
Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia — see Glos- 
sary) . 

United States 

The United States and Mongolia established diplomatic relations 
on January 27, 1987, after a period of "mutual flirtation" when 
negotiations were conducted in New York by the two nations' UN 
missions. United States officials were primarily interested in es- 
tablishing ties because of Mongolia's strategic and geographic po- 
sition in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Washington had considered 
establishing diplomatic relations in the past, but it had deferred 
to the Guomindang (Kuomintang in Wade-Giles), or Chinese Na- 
tionalist, government in Taiwan, which still claimed Mongolia as 
part of China. In the early 1970s, negotiations were reopened, and 
they were almost completed when the proceedings were broken off 
by Mongolia because of problems between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, including the Second Indochina War (1963-75). 

The establishment of Mongolian-United States relations reflected 
improvements in the United States-Soviet relationship, and it was 
consistent with Gorbachev's interest in dealing with all states that 
have substantial interests in Asia. The United States gained the 
diplomatic recognition of a strategically located country in Asia. 
The new Mongolian-United States relationship was assisted by the 
establishment of ties between China and the United States. For 
Mongolia the new relationship has given greater credibility to its 
political independence and sovereign status and has increased its 
foreign policy options. 

The United States embassy in Ulaanbaatar opened in April 1988. 
Because of continued inadequate facilities, however, the ambas- 
sador to Mongolia was the only United States chief of mission who 
was resident in Washington. By 1989 the ambassador had traveled 
to Mongolia several times in the space of a year in order to carry 
out state business. 

Other Countries 

By mid- 1989, Mongolia had diplomatic relations with 104 coun- 
tries. From 1921 until 1948, Mongolia had only one significant 



210 



Government and Politics 



diplomatic tie, that with the Soviet Union. The schedule followed 
by Mongolia in recognizing, and being recognized by, other states 
demonstrated the general character of its foreign policy and rela- 
tions. The first states to be recognized were those run by communist 
parties and established after World War II. In 1955 India became 
the first noncommunist state to be accorded diplomatic recogni- 
tion. By 1965 nine Asian states, along with twenty-four from Eu- 
rope and Africa, had been recognized. The decade of the 1970s 
was the most active diplomatic period; forty-six countries estab- 
lished relations with Mongolia. 

In mid- 1989 only seventeen countries, however, maintained mis- 
sions in Ulaanbaatar. They included Britain, Japan, India, China, 
the Soviet Union, and East European nations. France closed its 
mission because of difficulties in staffing and expenses. Most of 
the other countries with continuing diplomatic relations concur- 
rentiy accredited their ambassadors to the Soviet Union — resident 
in Moscow, or their ambassadors to China — resident in Beijing. 
In a similar fashion, Mongolian diplomats were responsible for 
diplomatic affairs with several countries: the ambassador to 
Japan — resident in Tokyo, also handled matters concerning Malay- 
sia and Australia. The Mongolian ambassador to Britain, resident 
in London, was concurrently the ambassador to Denmark, Nor- 
way, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 

Mongolia established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972. 
Modest economic and cultural ties existed between the two coun- 
tries in 1989, although Batmonh occasionally expressed interest in 
expanding relations. The Mongolian minister of foreign affairs 
visited Japan in May 1987, seeking exchanges in scientific, tech- 
nical, and political areas. Agricultural biotechnology was identi- 
fied as a key field for cooperation. The chairman of the People's 
Great Hural went to Japan to attend the February 1989 funeral 
of Emperor Hirohito, Mongolia's wartime enemy (see Economic 
Gradualism and National Defense, 1932-45, ch. 1). 

After diplomatic ties had been established in 1955, Mongolian- 
Indian relations were strengthened by India's strong support for 
Mongolia's candidacy in the UN. During the 1970s, bilateral re- 
lations were friendly; they were circumscribed only by differences 
in the domestic and the social systems of the two countries and by 
the absence of substantial people-to-people contact. In 1981 an 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Culture and Science 
was signed, followed by the establishment in 1981 of a Center for 
Indian Studies in the Mongolian Academy of Sciences. Batmonh' s 
state visit to India in March 1989 further strengthened bilat- 
eral ties. He and Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi discussed 



211 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Asia-Pacific security issues. The visit produced an agreement on 
cooperation in science and technology. 

International Organizations 

Mongolia became a member of the UN in October 1961 . It had 
permanent delegations resident in New York and in Geneva, 
Switzerland, and was active in the UN Education, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization, as well as these groups: the World Health 
Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Indus- 
trial Development Organization, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the Disarmament Commission, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, and the World Meteorological Organi- 
zation. 

In 1989 Mongolia also belonged to the Economic Council for 
Asia and the Far East, the Interparliamentary Union, the World 
Peace Council, the International Labour Organization, the World 
Federation of Trade Unions, the International Telecommunica- 
tions Union, the Universal Postal Union, the International Associ- 
ation for Mongol Studies, and the International Red Cross. 
Mongolia was a member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, 
headquartered in Moscow, and the Organization for the Collabo- 
ration of Railways, located at Warsaw, Poland. 

In June 1962, Mongolia joined Comecon, an economic associ- 
ation binding the economies of the communist states of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. Mongolia and Vietnam were the 
only Asian states in that association. Afghanistan sent only observers 
to Comecon meetings. Mongolia participated fully in all Come- 
con commissions that related to its own economy, and its Eighth 
Five- Year Plan (1986-90) was adopted only after it was harmonized 
fully with the economic plans of the other member states (see So- 
cialist Framework of the Economy, ch. 3). 

The Media 

Mongolia's approach toward the development and the dissemi- 
nation of information and its policies concerning the degree of access 
to, and influence allowed from, other countries were undergoing 
significant change in the late 1980s as, particularly in 1989, offi- 
cial views concerning themes, events, and leading personalities in 
Mongolia's recent and early history were undergoing substantial 
revision. Many of these new interpretations were opening the way 
to further research on the Mongolian cultural heritage, an area 
previously regarded as sensitive because of its potential for arous- 
ing "nationalistic" emotions. Echoing similar events in the Soviet 



212 



Government and Politics 



Union, these developments were in keeping with the political trend 
toward openness and democratization. 

Information Policy 

At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1986, Batmonh described 
the media as powerful " tools of openness" that were "to influence 
the formation of public opinion, foster a creative atmosphere in 
society, and inspire an active approach to life in the individual." 
Recognizing the chief role of the media as being to educate and 
to inform as well as to direct the population toward the goals and 
program developed by the party, Batmonh and the senior party 
leadership also appeared to be using media channels for improv- 
ing the performance of party and government organizations. There 
was a new emphasis on exposing the shortcomings in economic 
performance and on making "the real state of affairs" known. In 
December 1986, Batmonh launched an attack on "bureaucracy, 
stagnation and passivity," calling instead for "a new and creatively 
courageous approach to work in an atmosphere of openness, frank- 
ness, justness and principledness." By mid- 1987, the press included 
exchanges of letters between readers and responsible officials dis- 
cussing examples of bureaucracy and government inefficiency. 

At the key December 1988 Central Committee plenary session, 
Batmonh said that the media needed to foster in people "a scien- 
tific world outlook and further raise their social consciousness." 
He also extended the scope of il tod (openness), Mongolia's ver- 
sion of glasnost, to include a critical reappraisal of questions about 
Mongolian history and society by filling in the so-called "blank 
spots." In addition to criticisms of Tsedenbal, Political Bureau reso- 
lutions emanating from the plenary session stressed the importance 
of Mongolia's cultural heritage. In a major departure from the past, 
the party was instructed to preserve the national culture carefully 
and to transmit it to the next generation. Even Chinggis Khan, 
whom the Soviet Union repeatedly had identified as a "reaction- 
ary figure," was given an honored place in Mongolian history as 
founder of the nation. A two- volume biography of Chinggis, pub- 
lished in China's neighboring Nei Monggol Autonomous Region 
in 1987, reportedly was in great demand by young Mongolians. 

Underlying the party's new information policy — espousing crit- 
ical thinking, intellectual vitality, and national pride — was the in- 
tention to inspire and to involve the entire population in the party's 
developmental program. The media carried the party message 
throughout society through press, radio, television, publishing out- 
lets, vocational and social clubs, films, and libraries. The selec- 
tion of thematic material was being supervised closely in the late 



213 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

1980s, but, in comparison with the Tsedenbal years, a relaxed at- 
mosphere toward the media was apparent. 

Major Channels 

Channels of communication were government-owned and 
government-operated; information and propaganda were woven 
together in news, educational material, and entertainment. The 
most important body directing the media was the Press Agitation 
and Propaganda Section (Agitprop) of the party Central Commit- 
tee. Agitprop, in conjunction with the Council of Ministers, pub- 
lished Unen (Truth), established in 1920. It was the most widely 
read newspaper; in 1988 it had a circulation of 170,000 and was 
published six days a week. The weekly publication of the Unen 
newspaper organization was Shine Hodoo (New Countryside), aimed 
at the rural population. Unen also published eighteen issues annu- 
ally of the popular satirical magazine, Toshuul (Woodpecker), which 
featured cartoons and light reading material. Namyin Amdral (Party 
Life), with a circulation of 28,000, has served since 1923 as the 
Central Committee's monthly ideological organ. Ediyn Dzasgiyn, 
Asuudal (Economic Questions), also published by the Central Com- 
mittee, carried speeches and documents concerned with political 
and economic affairs and was published in eighteen issues annually. 
Another party periodical, Uhuulagch (Agitator), emphasized pro- 
paganda material and was published bimonthly, with a circulation 
of 34,000 in the late 1980s. 

Communications media were directed by overlapping and in- 
terlocking government commissions and committees of the Peo- 
ple's Great Hural, the Council of Ministers, and the Mongolian 
People's Revolutionary Party. The Presidium of the People's Great 
Hural published a quarterly journal, Ardyn Tor (People's Power), 
with a circulation of 1 1 ,000. The Ministry of Culture, together with 
the Union of Mongolian Writers, published a weekly periodical 
called Utga, Dzohiol Urlag (Literature and Art). The Ministry of 
Defense and the Ministry of Public Security jointly produced Ulaan 
Od (Red Star), a biweekly, and Ardyn Armi (People's Army), a quart- 
erly magazine. The Mongolian Academy of Sciences and the Mon- 
golian Society for the Dissemination of Knowledge published a 
bimonthly popular science magazine, Shinjleh Uhaan, Amidral 
(Science and Life). Finally, the Office of the Procurator of the 
Republic, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry of Justice collabo- 
rated in the publication of the quarterly journal Sotsialist Huul' Yos 
(Socialist Legality). 

In 1987, a total of almost 130 million copies of 35 national 
newspapers and 38 periodicals were being published. In addition, 



214 



Government and Politics 



there were nineteen provincial newspapers, mainly published bi- 
weekly by provincial party and government executive committees. 
The cities of Ulaanbaatar, Nalayh, Erdenet, and Darhan also had 
their own newspapers. The two major news agencies were Mon- 
gol Tsahilgaan Medeeniy Agentlag (MONTSAME — Mongolian 
Telegraph Agency) and Mongolpress. The latter published fort- 
nightly news bulletins in Russian, English, and French. In 1987 
each household reportedly received four to six publications. Another 
body, the Media Information Center, was established in Febru- 
ary 1989, reportedly to expand the range of information available 
to the public by providing members of the press and the media 
with increased access to high party and government officials. 

Various mass organizations also had publishing arms. The offi- 
cial organ of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, 
Dzaluuchudyn Unen (Youth Truth), was published biweekly and car- 
ried league speeches and documents. Other youth journals included 
Dzalgamjlagch (Successor) and Dzaluu Uye (Young Generation). The 
Central Council of the Sukhe Bator Mongolian Pioneers Organi- 
zation, together with the Youth League Central Committee, pub- 
lished 84 issues annually of Pioneriyn Unen (Pioneers' Truth) and 
was circulated to 175,000 subscribers. 

The leading publications of the Central Council of the Mongolian 
Trade Unions was Hodolmor (Labor), published three times a week, 
and a bimonthly magazine entitied Mongolyn Uyldberchniy Eblel (Mon- 
golian Trade Unions). The publishing organ of the Federation of 
Democratic Women was the quarterly magazine Mongolyn Emeg- 
teuchuud (Mongolian Women) . The Union of Mongolian Writers 
published the bimonthly political and literary journal, Tsog (Spark). 
The Union of Mongolian Artists and the Ministry of Culture pub- 
lished a quarterly journal, Soyol, Urlag (Culture and Art). Another 
quarterly journal published by the union was Dursleh Urlag (Fine 
Arts). 

Most tides of Mongolian publications were translations of the 
titles of counterpart Soviet publications, which served as models 
for format and content. A Russian-language newspaper, Novosty 
Mongolii (News of Mongolia) published 26,000 copies, three times 
weekly; a Chinese-language journal, MengguXiaoxi (News of Mon- 
golia), was published weekly. Publications in other languages were 
scarce in 1989, although the situation was improving. In 1986 the 
Mongolia Express Agency for Publication Data was established to 
aid in the distribution of publications and bulletins published in 
several foreign languages. 

Radio and television were available through Ulaanbaatar Radio 
and Mongoltelevidz, both of which were supervised by the State 



215 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Committee for Information, Radio, and Television. In December 
1988, a new radio and television center, built with Soviet aid, 
opened in Ulaanbaatar. It was estimated that in 1989 the center 
would increase the volume of broadcasting by 150 percent. Almost 
every family, including those residing in rural areas, had access 
to a radio receiver in 1989. In 1985 Mongolia had 382 broadcast- 
ing centers, providing radiobroadcasts to more than 90 percent of 
the population and television broadcasts to more than 60 percent. 
By 1987 radiobroadcasts were available eighteen hours daily through 
two programs, with broadcasts in Mongol, Kazakh, Russian, 
English, French, and Chinese to sixty countries. A 1987 poll of 
listeners and viewers indicated that the primary sources of news 
information for this audience were: radio, 66 percent; the press, 
21 percent; and television, 12 percent. 

By 1988 an estimated 64 percent of families residing in Ulaan- 
baatar possessed television sets. National television broadcasts were 
available five times a week, or for 15,000 hours annually. Broad- 
casting also was available from Orbita, a Soviet satellite commu- 
nications system that relays television broadcasts. Almost 60 percent 
of the Mongolian population viewed television by late 1987. 
Mongolian-originated television was available in Ulaanbaatar, 
Erdenet, and Darhan; in fifteen aymag centers; and in forty-eight 
towns and somon centers. The Orbita broadcasting was more limited. 

The State Publishing House and the Mongolian Academy of 
Sciences supervised publishing. Each year they produced a prospec- 
tus of books to be published that year. The Sukhe Bator Publish- 
ing House produced 70 percent of Mongolia's printed matter, 
including 400 book titles. There also were publishing facilities in 
each aymag, and there were other publishing houses in Ulaanbaa- 
tar. Russian-language books always dominated the foreign category, 
but there also were prose and verse from France, the United States, 
and India, which offered a view of the noncommunist world. By 
1985 Mongolia had 983 libraries housing more than 13 million 
volumes, most of which were located at the State Library in Ulaan- 
baatar. 

Foreign Sources 

The major foreign source for media information in the late 1980s, 
as it had been since the 1920s, was the Soviet Union. Foreign news 
consisted mainly of edited material available through the Soviet 
news agency, Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza (TASS). 
Other foreign bureaus located in Ulaanbaatar were the Soviet 
Agentstvo Pechanti Novosti (APN) and the East German All- 
gemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (ADN). MONTSAME had 



216 



Government and Politics 



a staff based in, or visiting and reporting from, all capitals of its 
communist allies. Foreign newspapers, magazines, and books came 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. No newspapers from 
the United States or Britain were being distributed in Ulaanbaa- 
tar in the late 1980s. Also, distribution channels reportedly have 
been faulted for causing lengthy delays in deliveries to subscribers 
and readers. English-language materials include Mongolia Today, 
a magazine geared to foreign consumption, published monthly by 
the Mongolian embassy in New Delhi and distributed in Mongolia. 

The existing political system, ruled by the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party, was firmly established in Mongolia in the 
late twentieth century. Beginning in 1989, however, major revi- 
sions of the country's government and party structure were being 
undertaken, patterned after reforms going on in the Soviet Union. 
Although it was too early to assess the situation adequately in 
mid- 1989, these measures were expected to meet with bureaucratic 
resistance, as had occurred in other communist party-ruled states 
undergoing reform. Still there were certain factors — political and 
international — that might be expected to work in favor of the re- 
form program's success: a stable political leadership, a tradition 
of political conservatism and conformity, and an international cli- 
mate that continued to lessen external pressures on Mongolia. The 
emerging relaxation in internal politics and the thaw in key exter- 
nal foreign relations might, if they lasted, afford Mongolian lead- 
ers valuable opportunities to establish a sense of national identity 
and some measure of cultural authenticity, both probably essen- 
tial to Mongolia's revitalization and revival in the 1990s. 

* * * 

Mongolia's contemporary politics have not been so widely studied 
by Western scholars as have the traditional historical subjects. A 
shortage of qualified linguists, the inaccessibility of the country to 
foreign scholars, and the fact that Mongolia has not played a major 
independent role in international affairs, were the main reasons 
for the dearth of scholarship and reporting. The most recent and 
inclusive source in the English language is Mongolia: Politics, Eco- 
nomics, and Society hy Alan J. Sanders. Sanders also reports frequently 
on all aspects of Mongolia in the Far Eastern Economic Review. Victor 
P. Petrov's, Mongolia: A Profile, although dated, is also helpful. Use- 
ful articles and annual survey articles dealing with Mongolian po- 
litics appear in Asian Survey. Robert A. Rupen's How Mongolia Is 
Really Ruled explores the dynamics of Mongolian politics and demon- 
strates the importance of external factors, mainly the Soviet Union. 



217 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The primary source on Mongolian legislation and legal documen- 
tation was William E. Butler's The Mongolian Legal System. A detailed 
study of the Mongolian Constitution is provided by George Gins- 
burgs in "Mongolia's 'Socialist' Constitution," in Pacific Affairs. 

Mongolian foreign policy matters were dealt with in Thomas 
E. Stolper's China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands, and in more de- 
tail in the annual Asian Survey articles and in Robert A. Scalapi- 
no's Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia. The United States 
government's Joint Publications Research Service publishes trans- 
lations of selected Mongol-language and Russian-language material. 
Mongol radiobroadcasts and periodicals are translated and pub- 
lished in the United States government's Foreign Broadcast In- 
formation Service, Daily Report: East Asia. The annual editions of 
the American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies and the 
Bibliography of Asian Studies also should be consulted for current pub- 
lications on Mongolian government and politics. (For further in- 
formation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



218 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Monument dedicated to the Revolutionary 
Mongolian Tank Brigade of World War II 



THE RICH MONGOL MILITARY tradition reached its highest 
point during the thirteenth century, when a vast empire stretch- 
ing across Asia and into Europe was established and sustained by 
well-organized, disciplined Mongol cavalry. Although Mongol 
political power soon waned, and the empire disintegrated, the repu- 
tation of the prowess of the Mongol cavalry remained well into the 
nineteenth century. 

Modern Mongolian military practices trace their origin to the 
1921 Mongolian Revolution, in which Mongolian rebel forces, 
under the leadership of Damdiny Sukhe Bator and Horloyn Choy- 
balsan, joined with a major detachment of the Russian Fifth Red 
Army to defeat Chinese and Russian White Guard forces. This 
alliance marked the beginning of a long and close relationship be- 
tween the Mongolian and Soviet armed forces. 

In the 1930s, Mongolian forces once again joined with Soviet 
forces to suppress internal rebellion and to guard their borders 
against Japanese incursions. In July and August 1939, Mongolian 
armed forces with their Soviet allies accomplished their proudest 
feat: defeating Japanese forces and ending Japanese provocations 
along the border. Mongolia takes pride in its economic support 
of Soviet military forces during World War II and its part in the 
August 1945 defeat of Japanese forces in Manchuria (see Glos- 
sary). 

Soviet military support greatly increased during the 1960s and 
the 1970s, following the Sino-Soviet split and increased Mongolian 
concern over the Chinese threat. Although Soviet military support 
decreased significantly in the 1980s, when Sino-Soviet and Sino- 
Mongolian relations improved, exclusive defense ties with the Soviet 
Union continued, as did Soviet military training and the acquisi- 
tion of Soviet military equipment. 

In 1 989 internal security was maintained by the national police 
force, called the militia. The structure of the courts and the 
procuraturates was based on the 1960 Constitution, and the 1963 
Code of Criminal Procedure set out the rules for their operation. 
The 1961 Criminal Code determined which acts were criminal and 
the punishment allotted for those crimes, placing heavy emphasis 
on crimes against the state and crimes against socialist ownership. 
All of these documents were under review and were expected to 
be revised or replaced. 



221 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

The Armed Forces 
Historical Traditions 

Mongol military power reached its apex in the thirteenth cen- 
tury. Under the leadership of Chinggis Khan and two generations 
of his descendants, the Mongol tribes and various Inner Asian 
steppe people were united in an efficient and formidable military 
state that briefly held sway from the Pacific Ocean to Central Europe 
(see The Era of Chinggis Khan, 1206-27, ch. 1). 

In an age when opposing armies were little more than feudal 
levies around a nucleus of well-armed and well-trained, but rela- 
tively immobile and inflexible, knights, the Mongol armies were 
the dominant force on the battlefields of Asia and Europe. Mon- 
gol forces, made up of skilled warriors well trained in marksman- 
ship and horsemanship, were characterized by absolute discipline, 
a well-understood chain of command, an excellent communications 
system, superior mobility, and a unified and extremely effective 
tactical doctrine and organization. 

As the control of the descendants of Chinggis weakened and as 
old tribal divisions reemerged, internal dissension fragmented the 
Mongol empire, and the Mongols' military power in Inner Asia 
dwindled. The tactics and techniques of the Mongol warrior — 
who could deliver shock action with lance and sword, or fire ac- 
tion with the compound bow from horseback or on foot — continued 
in use, nevertheless, through the end of the nineteenth century. 
The mounted warrior's effectiveness decreased, however, with the 
growing use of firearms by the Manchu armies beginning in the 
late seventeenth century (see Caught Between the Russians and 
the Manchus, ch. 1). 

Mongol leaders in the late sixteenth century, and later their Man- 
chu overlords, encouraged the spread of Tibetan Buddhism 
(Lamaism — see Glossary). Its passive religious doctrine gradually 
diluted the warlike qualities of the Mongols and encouraged be- 
tween 30 and 50 percent of the male population to escape military 
service by entering monasteries (see Buddhism, ch. 2). To keep 
the Mongols militarily weak, the rulers of the Qing Dynasty 
(1644-1911) downgraded the hereditary princes and recognized the- 
ocracy as the local government of many Mongol areas. The Mon- 
gols were divided further by intertribal warfare fought with 
traditional means and by revolts against the Qing. Nevertheless, 
the Qing continued to call up Mongolian levies to help quell re- 
bellions in actions against foreign invaders in China in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Mongols fought in the Taiping 
Rebellion (1851-65), in the Nianfei peasant revolt in northern 



222 



National Security 



China in the 1850s and 1860s, against the British and French in 
1860, against Muslim rebels in the 1860s and 1870s, in the Sino- 
Japanese War (1894-95), and in the Boxer Uprising of 1900. They 
were employed as light cavalry and were considered the best of the 
traditional troops. Their style of fighting had become obsolete, 
however, because foreign troops and increasing numbers of Chinese 
units used firearms and modern tactics. Mongolia's nomadic econ- 
omy could not produce guns, and the Qing would not permit their 
acquisition. 

The memory of Chinggis, his descendants, and their military 
domination of Asia remains. Although litde attention has been paid 
to Mongol military exploits after that period, popular legends are 
filled with accounts of violent opposition to foreign oppressors, such 
as the usurious Chinese trader and his armed guards, or the local 
Qing tax collector. 

Beginning of Modern Military Practices, 1911-21 

In terms of a consciously expressed military tradition, modern 
Mongolian military history began in 1911 with the autonomy of 
Outer Mongolia (see Glossary) and the establishment of a new- 
style army with Russian military assistance. Russia, after its dis- 
astrous defeat in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, noted the 
modernization of the Chinese army and realized the need for a 
buffer between a resurgent China and Russia's tenuous lifeline to 
eastern Siberia, the Trans-Siberian Railway. Consequently, Rus- 
sia looked with favor on Outer Mongolia's efforts to free itself of 
Chinese rule in 1911. The tsar received a Mongolian delegation 
in August 1911, and he agreed to furnish arms and ammunition 
to Outer Mongolia. When the Chinese revolution occurred in 
October, the Mongolians proclaimed their freedom, receiving diplo- 
matic support from Russia (see The End of Independence, ch. 1). 

In 1912 a small Russian military mission arrived in Yihe Huree 
(present-day Ulaanbaatar — see Glossary) to train a Mongolian army 
of conscripts furnished by the ruling nobles. As increments of this 
force were trained, they were sent as first priority to the Chinese 
frontier. About half the army was retained near Yihe Huree as a 
general reserve. In the summer of 1912, elements of this fledgling 
army fought their first battle, forcing the surrender of a Chinese 
garrison at Hovd in western Mongolia. On November 3, 1912, 
a secret Mongolian- Russian agreement supported Mongolia's claim 
for its own national army and promised to prohibit Chinese troops 
in Mongolia. 

The Mongolian government of monks and nobility lacked 
both the funds and the will to pay for such an armed force. The 



223 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Mongolians, who wanted the Chinese to leave, were disappointed 
by the Sino-Russian agreement of November 1913, which recog- 
nized Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia and substituted the 
vaguer concept of autonomy for the Mongolian claim to indepen- 
dence. In addition, not all the nobility, particularly not those in 
western Outer Mongolia, willingly accepted Yihe Huree's hegem- 
ony over their territories, and the Chinese initially held Hovd. The 
new national state still did not see the need for a modern armed 
force for its preservation, seemingly relying on Russia's diplomatic 
support and promises, as well as on its own estimate that revolution- 
torn China was little to be feared. 

In February 1913, Russia granted the Mongolian government 
a loan of 2 million rubles (then equivalent to about US$1 million) 
for the maintenance and training of an army consisting of two cav- 
alry regiments with a machine gun company, a four-gun battery 
of artillery, and 1 ,900 soldiers and officers. The loan and a Russian 
military mission did not solve the problem. The Russians promptly 
made a new loan of 3 million rubles, but this time they sent a Rus- 
sian financial adviser to control the expenditures. 

Russia's objective of creating a Mongolian self-defense and in- 
ternal security capability encountered further difficulties in 1913. 
Freedom-loving Mongolian recruits did not relish the idea of two 
years of barracks life under harsh discipline. Furthermore, the Rus- 
sian colonel in charge insisted on infantry drills, which were 
anathema to hard-riding nomadic cavalry. The desertion rate was 
high, and one unit actually mutinied against its Russian instruc- 
tors, who called out the Russian Cossack Legation Guard to sup- 
press the uprising. The Mongolian government's lack of interest 
in an effective military force further plagued the Russian effort; 
for the most part, misfits and sick men were sent as recruits. 

Mongolian irritation at the harshness of the Russian instructors 
and the constant Russian pressures for government moral and 
material support resulted in the one-year agreement's being allowed 
to lapse on its termination date. Russia won reluctant Mongolian 
agreement to its being allowed to maintain 1,000 troops and thus 
to reduce its military mission by only half; however, by the end 
of 1914, continued resentment against the Russian instructors and 
reluctance to support a regular army forced the recall of the mili- 
tary mission. 

World War I diverted Russia's attention from Mongolia. Rus- 
sia's principal effort with respect to Mongolia and China was to 
call a tripartite meeting in Kyakhta, on the Siberian side of the 
Mongolian-Russian border, in 1915. Chinese and Mongolian 



224 



National Security 



representatives attended with considerable reluctance, but even- 
tually a treaty resulted (see Period of Autonomy, 1911-21, ch. 1). 
Its principal military effect was to limit Chinese forces in Mongo- 
lia to a 200-strong guard for the residence of the Chinese high 
representative at Yihe Huree. Between 1914 and 1919, the Mon- 
golian army languished, but it retained some semblance of order. 
During these years, the expenditures for the army varied from 20 
to 25 percent of the total government budget. Although an agent 
of the Communist International (see Glossary), also called the 
Comintern, said while visiting Yihe Huree in 1919 that there was 
no army, 2,000 troops were actually on the rolls. 

The Chinese took advantage of the Russian preoccupation with 
their own revolution at home to reinforce their consular guard at 
Yihe Huree in 1918 — in violation of the 1915 Treaty of Kyakhta. 
The Russians protested, but with the collapse of effective White 
Guard forces in Siberia in late 1919, the Chinese brought in 3,000 
more troops. In October 1919, General Xu Shucheng arrived with 
an army of 4,000 (later increased to 10,000); he suppressed the 
autonomous government, carrying out numerous executions, loot- 
ings, and other atrocities. Thus the army of autonomous Mongo- 
lia came to an end after a scant eight years of tenuous existence. 
The army was to live on, however, in a small cadre of demobi- 
lized Russian-trained soldiers that was led by Sukhe Bator and 
aspired to again free Mongolia from Chinese rule. 

Sukhe Bator — whose name means Ax Hero — was poor and job- 
less when he was called up at the age of nineteen as one of the first 
conscripts for the new army in 1912. His lack of wealth and posi- 
tion reportedly was more than compensated for by intelligence and 
vigor. Sukhe Bator soon became a junior noncommissioned officer 
(NCO). During border clashes with the Chinese, he distinguished 
himself in combat and was promoted to senior NCO rank. As a 
member of a machine gun company, a technical and prestigious 
assignment for that time, he was associated closely with Russian 
instructors, and he learned some Russian. He also reportedly was 
a natural leader, liked and respected by his peers, and he was an 
accomplished practical soldier. 

In late 1918, the recently demobilized Sukhe Bator, anticipat- 
ing the return of the Chinese, formed a group of like-minded army 
friends to plan a new revolution and encouraged discharged sol- 
diers to await his call. In November 1919, under the aegis of Rus- 
sian Bolshevik agents in Yihe Huree, Sukhe Bator's group joined 
with a similar small group of revolutionaries led by Choybalsan. 
In 1920 Sukhe Bator and Choybalsan, with about fifty followers, 



225 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

escaped the returning Chinese forces and moved to Siberia where 
they received further military training. 

As Bolshevik victories grew, some opposing White Guard troops 
retreated into Outer Mongolia, where they were supported and 
encouraged by Japanese forces in Manchuria and eastern Siberia. 
The largest White Guard band was 5,000 strong and was led by 
Baron Roman Nicolaus von Ungern-Sternberg. After an abortive 
attack on Yihe Huree in October 1920, von Ungern-Sternberg at- 
tacked again in February, drove out the Chinese troops, and 
declared an independent Mongolia. 

In February 1921, Sukhe Bator, Choybalsan, and their follow- 
ers were joined in Irkutsk by a Mongolian delegation from Moscow. 
In March 1921, they moved to Kyakhta, where they formed the 
Mongolian People's Party and a provisional national government. 
Sukhe Bator was named minister of war. The partisan forces, now 
numbering 400, were combined to form the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Army, with Sukhe Bator as commander in chief and 
Choybalsan as commissar. 

In mid-March 1921, Sukhe Bator drove the Chinese out of the 
trading settlement now known as Amgalanbaatar across the 
Mongolian-Russian border from Kyakhta, and he established a 
provisional capital under the new name of Altanbulag. In April 
1921, the provisional Mongolian government announced the con- 
scription of all males older than nineteen in the territory under their 
control. At the same time, they asked for the assistance of the Rus- 
sian Red Army in opposing the White Guards. 

Von Ungern-Sternberg' s force struck north against the new 
Bolshevik- sponsored government in May. The provisional govern- 
ment, assisted by a division- size task force from the Fifth Red Army, 
resisted. The White Guard offensive began May 22, 1921, and 
Altanbulag was attacked June 6, 1921 . The Red Army force divided 
to meet this two-pronged attack; there was a Mongolian contin- 
gent in each column, one under Sukhe Bator at Altanbulag, and 
the other under Choybalsan. The attacks were repulsed, and the 
combined Red Army-Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army 
force swept toward Yihe Huree. Yihe Huree was captured on 
July 6, 1921, and it was renamed Niyslel — capital — Huree. A 
provisional national government was proclaimed on July 11, 1921 , 
under close Bolshevik supervision. Von Ungern-Sternberg escaped 
with a remnant of the White Guards. In late August 1921, Mon- 
golians in his own forces seized him and turned him over to the 
Red Army for execution (see Revolutionary Transformation, 
1921-24, ch. 1). 



226 




Headquarters of Mongolian partisan army, March 1921, near Altanbulag 
Courtesy Institute of Party History, Ulaanbaatar 



The Mongolians are extremely proud of these revolutionary feats. 
On every public patriotic occasion — such as the anniversary of the 
founding of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army on March 
18, 1921, the day marking the expulsion of Chinese forces from 
Amgalanbaatar — speeches of national leaders invariably refer glow- 
ingly to the events of 1921 and to the virtues of the participants, 
as well as to the fraternal help of the Red Army. Sukhe Bator died 
suddenly, and, some thought, mysteriously, in 1923 while still a 
young man. The tragedy of his early death assisted in his immor- 
talization as the great young hero of the revolution. A heroic- size 
equestrian statue of Suhke Bator stands in the main square of Ulaan- 
baatar (Red Hero). 

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army of Sukhe Bator 
and Choybalsan provided a convenient patriotic symbol to inspire 
Mongolians and established a new military tradition. This army 
also formed the nucleus of the eventual Mongolian People's Army, 
which was to expand to a strength of 10 percent of the population 
by the late 1930s in response to the Japanese threat. It also acted 
as a modernizing force and gave the nation a generation of politi- 
cal leaders. Choybalsan led the nation militarily in the 1920s and 
the 1930s as commander in chief of the army, and he was premier 



227 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

and top party leader from 1939 until his death in 1952 (see Modern 
Mongolia, 1911-84, ch. 1). 

The Mongolian Army, 1921-68 

Early Development 

The provisional national government in March 1921 declared 
that every male in the country, regardless of class, must perform 
military service. This compulsory service included the large num- 
bers of monks and others who traditionally had been exempt, 
although in practice monks were not conscripted during the 1920s. 
The new government also proclaimed that it could declare war, 
negotiate peace, and determine budgets. A Mongolian-Russian 
accord signed on November 5, 1921, provided Russian assistance 
in organizing a regular army and in conducting training. In 
addition, special Comintern representatives eventually set up a mili- 
tary council in the government and propagated militant com- 
munism. Thus began a continuing close military association 
between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, which has endured with 
varying intensity through 1989 (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). This 
association helped to communize and modernize Mongolia, as well 
as to provide the Soviet Union with a loyal ally and a buffer against 
Japan and later China. 

In the early 1920s, Russian White Guard remnants remained 
as brigands in remote parts of Mongolia, and Chinese bandits and 
detachments of warlord armies constantly encroached upon the 
borders. Thus one of the first orders of business for the new Mon- 
golian government was to establish a strong and politically relia- 
ble army. To help suppress White Guard remnants and Chinese 
bandits and to carry out Comintern policy, detachments of the 
Soviet Red Army remained in Mongolia at least until 1925. There- 
after, until the revolts of the early 1930s and the Japanese border 
probes beginning in the mid- 1930s, Red Army troops in Mongo- 
lia amounted to little more than instructors and guards for diplo- 
matic and trading installations. 

The development and politicization of the Mongolian People's 
Army became an essential element of the Comintern's plan for 
Mongolia. As early as August 1921, the Main Political Adminis- 
tration of the army was established to supervise the work of the 
political commissars and the party cells in all army units, and to 
act as a political link between the Central Committee of the Mon- 
golian People's Party and the army (see Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party, ch. 4). This politicization of the army served 
not only to ensure its loyalty, but also that of the government at 



228 



National Security 



large. Up to one- third of the soldiers were members of the party, 
which became the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in 1924; 
still others belonged to the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. 
The army received up to 60 percent of the government budget in 
these early years, and it expanded from 2,560 men in 1923 to 4,000 
in 1924, and to 17,000 by 1927. The more leftist members of the 
government, who also were prominent in the party, tended to be 
connected with the army as well, which made the army an impor- 
tant political force in the 1920s. With the close cooperation of the 
Red Army and the Mongolian and Soviet secret police, purges of 
rightists and nationalists were conducted, and the Buddhist the- 
ocracy was severely curtailed. 

Most of the Altanbulag revolutionaries — soldiers and politicians 
alike — appear to have been more nationalist than communist. 
Choybalsan and a few of his immediate associates were exceptions. 
From an early age, Choybalsan had been Russian-oriented by 
schooling and communist-influenced by Bolsheviks at the Russian 
consular compound and print shop in Yihe Huree. In the early 
1920s, however, the nationalists either became communists or were 
purged. Choybalsan 's close cooperation with Comintern agents and 
the Soviet Union enabled him to survive to become premier. 

Horloogiyn Dandzan, another member of the original Altanbulag 
government, succeeded Sukhe Bator as minister of war and com- 
mander in chief of the army when Sukhe Bator died in 1923. With 
the growth of the Mongolian People's Army and the reduction of 
the Soviet garrison, Dandzan thought he had sufficient power to 
opt for a Mongolian nationalist policy. Dandzan 's anti- Soviet re- 
marks to the Third Party Congress in 1924, however, led to his 
arrest by armed Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League mem- 
bers, directed by Choybalsan. His trial and execution were com- 
pleted within twenty-four hours, and Choybalsan was elevated to 
commander in chief of the army. The portfolio of minister of war 
was given to Sandagdargiyn (Khatan Baatar) Majsarjab, a revolu- 
tionary military hero who had secured western Mongolia for the 
government. Members of the new top command, however, did not 
have the supreme authority enjoyed by Sukhe Bator and Dandzan. 
Comintern agents, many of whom were Russian-trained Buryat 
Mongols (see Glossary) acting either as advisers or as actual 
administrators, were the real power in the government, which was 
backed by the secret police and by the Red Army. They instituted 
organizational changes that effectively attenuated the authority 
exercised by Majsarjab and by Choybalsan. 

The Military Council was inserted in the chain of command be- 
tween the Presidium of the National Great Hural and Council of 



229 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Ministers and the minister of war. The council was headed by a 
Buryat Comintern agent, and its members were among the more 
trustworthy leftists. Furthermore, interposed between the com- 
mander in chief of the army and his staff departments was a Soviet 
general as chief of the general staff. Thus restricted, the Mongolian 
military leadership would have had difficulty becoming deviationist 
even if it had chosen to. Majsarjab may have tried, for he soon 
was executed, but Choybalsan displayed complete loyalty to the 
Soviets. He succeeded Majsarjab as minister of war and continued 
his rise. In 1926 Choybalsan was a member of both the Central 
Committee and the Presidium of the Mongolian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party. 

Even with substantial Soviet assistance, organizing and train- 
ing the Mongolian army in the 1920s was a frustrating experience 
for both the Soviets and the Mongolians. It helped that the recruits 
were excellent riders and good shots. The training base of ex- 
perienced soldiers, however, initially was little better than it had 
been ten years before when the Russians first attempted to train 
Mongolian soldiers. The illiteracy rate of 90 percent among the 
population at large must have been reflected among the recruits. 
Venereal disease, tuberculosis, and trachoma were endemic. About 
one-third of the men of military age were monks exempt from mili- 
tary service in the 1920s. The young nomads who were conscripted 
were resentful of military discipline, were passive by conditioning, 
and were influenced against military service by the monks. Finally, 
the building of the army had to be carried out along with the simul- 
taneous suppression of revolts in the Hovd and the Uliastay areas 
of western Mongolia in the 1922-23 and the 1925-26 periods and 
along with guarding the borders against the encroachments of 
Chinese bandits and warlord armies. 

From the beginning, the army consisted of a cadre of regulars 
augmented by short-term conscripts, who were trained and returned 
to their homes as part of a reserve pool from which they could be 
mobilized when needed. In the beginning, both regulars and con- 
scripts frequently deserted; a deserter was virtually impossible to 
apprehend in the steppes or the mountains. 

Initially, training of conscripts lasted only three months before 
they returned home. Although the training period was short, it was 
an effort to bring as many men as possible under the unifying and 
modernizing influence of military training and political indoctri- 
nation. Administration of conscription and the conduct of post- 
service military training were delegated to aymag (see Glossary) and 
to somon councils. Those eighteen years and older were conscripted 
locally and were sent either to the capital or to one of the principal 



230 



National Security 



garrison towns. Upon completion of their three-month training 
period, they returned to their native districts, where they were to 
reassemble every three years for refresher training and maneuvers. 
The population, however, still was largely nomadic and constantly 
on the move, and the administrative structure of the subdivisions 
was rudimentary and inefficient at best. Because individuals were 
hard to locate — if indeed they were known to exist — initial and 
retraining call-ups were hard to enforce. 

By 1926 the government hoped to train 10,000 conscripts an- 
nually and to increase the training period to six months. Chinese 
intelligence reports in 1927 indicated that between 40,000 and 
50,000 reservists could be mustered at short notice. These reports 
greatly overestimated the mobilization potential of the Mongolian 
army. In the fall of 1929, a general mobilization was called to test 
the training and reserve systems. The expected turnout was 30,000, 
but only 2,000 presented themselves. This fiasco prompted sev- 
eral changes and reforms. A new Soviet chief adviser arrived early 
the following year to aid in enforcing military service, but his un- 
popularity provoked an assassination attempt. The Military Council 
was reorganized, and in September, when the National Great Hural 
met, it strengthened the military service enforcement provisions 
of the legal code (see Government Structure, ch. 4). These actions, 
together with new laws that abolished all but a few monasteries — 
returning monks to civilian life, prohibiting young men from be- 
coming monks, and making them available for conscription — laid 
the foundation for an effective army. 

By the end of the 1920s, despite its deficiencies, an army with 
some cohesion and effectiveness had been established by Soviet in- 
structors and Mongolian leaders through both patient efforts and 
draconian measures. The groundwork was laid for an army that 
was to put down the popular revolts of the early 1930s despite some 
disaffection, to meet the challenge — with its Soviet allies — of large- 
scale border clashes initiated by the Japanese, and finally to mount 
the invasions of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in 1945. In March 
1925, an aviation branch was formed with four aircraft; the an- 
niversary of this event continues to be celebrated annually as Mon- 
golian Aviation Day. By 1927 the army, almost exclusively cavalry, 
numbered about 17,000 mounted troops, and it boasted more than 
200 heavy machine guns, 50 mountain howitzers, 30 field guns, 
and 2 armored cars. The basic unit was the 2,000-man cavalry regi- 
ment of three squadrons. Each 600-plus-man squadron had five 
companies, a machine gun company, and an engineer unit. Cavalry 
regiments were organized into larger units — brigades or divi- 
sions — which included artillery and service support units. The chief 



231 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

characteristic of this force was mobility over the great distances 
of Mongolia; small mounted units were able to cover more than 
160 kilometers in 24 hours. 

Internal Discord and War with Japan 

In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the army frequently was 
called on to put down widespread popular revolts led by nobles 
and monks (see Purges of the Opposition, 1928-32, ch. 1). The 
revolts erupted from a basic feeling of nationalism (particularly in 
western Mongolia), from opposition to the pro-Soviet line, and from 
the government's extreme measures in forcing collectivization of 
stock raising and harsh actions against the monks. The revolts cul- 
minated in an uprising by 13 detachments of more than 3,000 troops 
in April 1932; it was put down by the Mongolian army, assisted 
by a large Soviet Red Army force. By the mid- 1930s, the com- 
munist government had suppressed the insurgency. It then decided 
that a more reliable army was necessary, both for internal security 
and for actions as a forward screen for Soviet troop deployment 
in the event of a Japanese invasion. 

As the army recovered from the revolt, it began rebuilding. The 
number of young Mongolians on active duty increased annually. 
During this period, the army acted as an important unifier of the 
population, in effect supplanting the liquidated monasteries in this 
role. In striving for national reinvigoration, the army's military 
role was less important than its social and political roles. A Soviet 
observer wrote that the army taught the soldier to read and write 
the national language and converted him into a politically aware 
soldier-citizen. Soviet arms and military equipment were provided 
to the expanding army, and Soviet officers acted not only as in- 
structors, but also as unit advisers and commanders. These ar- 
rangements were formalized first in November 1934, when a 
Mongolian-Soviet "gentlemen's agreement" was reached in 
Moscow to provide for mutual assistance in the event of attack. 
This accord was unpublished, because Moscow still nominally 
recognized the Chinese government (see Economic Gradualism and 
National Defense, 1932-45, ch. 1). 

Monasticism direcdy inhibited military buildup. Therefore, it 
was imperative that the monasteries be dealt with. During the pe- 
riod of the "leftist deviation" in the early 1930s, almost half the 
monasteries had been closed. This policy was relaxed during the 
insurrectionary period between 1933 and 1936, however, and the 
monasteries were reopened. By 1936 the monastic population had 
increased by 10,000 to more than 100,000 — 11 percent of the total 
population and 35 percent of men of military age. This drain 



232 



National Security 



adversely affected the government's ability to meet the increasing 
personnel requirements both for defense and for economic produc- 
tion. Monastic influence also perpetuated a general lack of interest 
among the general population in establishing an effective national 
army. The government, therefore, undertook drastic measures 
against the monks. Monasteries were taxed severely for each monk 
of military age who did not respond to the military call-up. A law 
was passed requiring the first son of every family to enter the army 
when of age; the second son was to remain with the family to work; 
only the third son was permitted to enter the monastery. Because 
few Mongol families had more than two sons, this measure was 
effective in diminishing the monastic population. Monastic power 
was reduced, senior monks were liquidated, and monks of middle- 
rank were imprisoned. Finally, ordinary monks were forced out 
of the monasteries, which then were destroyed, and all monastic 
livestock (10 to 15 percent of the national total) was confiscated. 
By 1939 these repressive measures had ended monasticism and had 
released a substantial reservoir of manpower for military service 
and for the civilian economy. 

Japan's occupation and annexation of neighboring Manchuria 
in 1931 left no doubt of Tokyo's long-range objectives in North- 
east Asia. A program of subversion among the Mongolians and 
of agitation in support of pan-Mongolism was followed by minor 
clashes along the Mongolian-Manchurian border in 1934 that 
reached major intensity in 1935. After serious clashes with the 
Japanese along the eastern Mongolian border in early 1935, a con- 
ference of Mongolian and Japanese representatives was convened 
in June at the Chinese border town of Manzhouli to settle border 
demarcation and other matters. After six months without reach- 
ing agreement, the effort was abandoned. On March 1 , 1936, Josef 
Stalin publicly and unequivocally stated that "If Japan should ven- 
ture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon 
its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's 
Republic . . . just as we helped in 1921. . . ." Two weeks later, 
a Protocol Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance reiterated 
the main provisions of the 1934 agreement. Apparently the Soviets 
at the time were less concerned about Chinese sensibilities than 
they had been earlier. The protocol was to run for ten years; it 
provided for joint consultation and protective action in the event 
of threat to either party by a third power, for military assistance 
in the case of a third-power attack, and for the stationing of troops 
in each other's territory as necessary. Some Soviet troops had re- 
mained in Mongolia after the suppression of the revolts; when Japan 
invaded northern China and occupied Inner Mongolia, this treaty 



233 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

provided a basis for increasing Soviet strength to a reinforced corps, 
the Fifty- seventh Independent Rifle Corps. 

In 1937 the Japanese invaded northern China, which enabled 
Japanese forces to occupy the Inner Mongolian provinces of Qahar 
and Suiyuan along Mongolia's southern border. This widened the 
zone of contact between Mongolian and Japanese forces and in- 
creased Mongolian security problems. Incidents continued along 
the Mongolian borders with Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In 
July 1938, the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung in Wade-Giles 
romanization) Army (the Japanese army in Manchukuo, as Japan 
called the region) mounted a major, yet unsuccessful, attack against 
Soviet positions in an ambiguously demarcated area along the 
Manchurian-Siberian border near Vladivostok. Frustrated along 
the Siberian border, Japan turned the following year to the more 
vulnerable Mongolian border, where it thought that subversion 
against the Mongolians would pave the way. 

Mongolia's easternmost portion is a salient jutting deep into 
Manchuria (see fig. 1). A branch railroad runs from Changchun 
on the Shenyang-Harbin railroad to within a few kilometers of the 
border; on the other side of the frontier, the Halhin Gol runs parallel 
to the border on the Mongolian side for about 70 kilometers. This 
area had been the scene of serious clashes in early 1935. To facili- 
tate military deployment into this vulnerable area, the Soviet Union 
built a wide-gauge railroad, completed in 1939, connecting the 
Chinese-Eastern railroad to the Mongolian town of Choybalsan. 
The frequency of border clashes increased until they occurred almost 
daily in this area during 1938 and early 1939. In early May 1939, 
Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov issued another stern 
warning to Japan: "I give warning that the borders of the Mon- 
golian People's Republic will be defended by the USSR as vigor- 
ously as we shall defend our own borders." 

On May 11, 1939, the Japanese army occupied portions of 
Mongolia between the border and the Halhin Gol. A combined 
Mongolian- Soviet force quickly moved against the invaders. By 
the end of May, the joint force had seized a bridgehead on the 
Halhin Gol's eastern bank. To counter this move, the Japanese 
by early July concentrated a corps of 38,000 troops and attacked 
the northern flank of the Mongolian- Soviet bridgehead. The 
Japanese drove the allies back across the Halhin Gol, crossed it 
themselves, and established their own bridgehead on the western 
bank. On July 5, 1939, Soviet armor counterattacked and elimi- 
nated the Japanese bridgehead, after which both sides began a major 
force buildup. 



234 



Detail of mosaic commemorating the Mongolian-Soviet victory 

over Japan in 1939, Ulaanbaatar 
Courtesy Steve Mann 

During July 1939, the Mongolian-Soviet forces were reorganized. 
The Trans-Baykal Military District was set up as a front headquar- 
ters, with the First Army Group under General Georgi Zhukov 
as the striking force. Soviet forces were concentrated in eastern 
Mongolia, and the Mongolian army mobilized to its full strength 
of 80,000 in eight cavalry divisions; the 515 aircraft of the com- 
bined force were used mostly in screening the southern borders. 
Zhukov 's First Army Group included Mongolia's Sixth and Eighth 
Mongolian cavalry divisions, both of which were employed as flank 
protection for the army group along the 70-kilometer front on the 
Halhin Gol. During July and early August, the Japanese forces, 
setting August 20, 1939, as the target date, prepared to cross the 
river and to destroy the opposing forces. 

The Japanese decision to attack must have been based on faulty 
intelligence or on extreme overconfidence, because the Japanese 
were weaker in infantry battalions by 30 percent, in tanks by 60 
percent, and in aircraft by 25 percent. Further, Soviet intelligence 
was superior to the Japanese, because the Soviets had detected the 
Japanese buildup for the attack and had evidently correctly esti- 
mated its timing. At dawn August 20, 1939, the commander of 
the Mongolian-Soviet troops preempted the Japanese attack: 150 



235 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

bombers struck Japanese positions, rear areas, and lines of com- 
munication. A ground attack by the southern and the northern 
wings of the First Army Group penetrated the Japanese flank with 
armor and infantry, and then they turned inward in a classic dou- 
ble envelopment as Mongolian cavalry protected the outer flanks. 

The Japanese defended tenaciously, but by August 23 the Soviets 
had encircled the Japanese forces along the Halhin Gol. For five 
days, the Mongolian-Soviet forces beat back fierce attacks by 
Japanese relief forces as well as attempts by the surrounded units 
to break out. Japanese relief attempts slackened, and pockets of 
resistance were cleared out. On August 31, 1939, the Mongolian- 
Soviet forces advanced to the frontier. The Japanese conceded defeat 
and a cease-fire took effect on September 16, 1939. 

Soviet casualties came to nearly 10,000, and the Mongolians lost 
1,130. Japanese losses were far greater, with more than 18,000 killed 
and 25,000 wounded (some total estimates were as high as 80,000). 
More than 170 guns and 200 aircraft were lost. After the defeat, 
Japan turned its military thrust southward. On June 9, 1940, an 
agreement fixing the Manchukuo-Mongolian border was signed in 
Moscow. This was followed on April 13, 1941, by the Soviet- 
Japanese Neutrality Pact, which included a Soviet pledge to recog- 
nize the territorial integrity of Manchukuo and a similar Japanese 
pledge with respect to Mongolia. Germany's invasion of the Soviet 
Union in June 1941 and the entry of the United States into World 
War II in December fully committed the Soviet Union and Japan 
to other flanks of their respective domains; thus, their Mongolian 
flanks remained relatively quiet until the final weeks of World War II. 

Mongolia stayed mobilized, however, at the 80,000-troop level 
to guard its frontiers and to discourage any further Japanese in- 
cursion. Mongolia also devoted extensive resources to its part of 
the 1936 mutual-assistance pact, providing the Soviet armed forces 
with winter clothing, wool, hides, leather goods, meat, and almost 
half a million ponies and horses for draft and remount use from 
1941 to 1945. The Mongolian people raised the money for a brigade 
of tanks, named the Revolutionary Mongolian Tank Brigade, and 
for a squadron of aircraft, named Mongolian Herdsmen, presented 
to the Red Army. In August 1945, Mongolian and Soviet forces 
joined in the invasion of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, destroyed 
the greatly weakened Japanese army, and achieved Soviet politi- 
cal and military goals in northeastern Asia. 

Postwar Developments 

In early 1946, Mongolia and the Soviet Union renewed the 1936 
Protocol Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance for another 



236 



National Security 



ten years, this time making it extendable. Although the provisions 
remained essentially the same, what had been a protocol treaty be- 
came a formal treaty to signify that, because China had relinquished 
claims of suzerainty, Mongolia was legally competent to handle 
its own foreign affairs. Thus Mongolia's close defense ties with the 
Soviet Union continued, as did Soviet military assistance in the 
form of training and materiel. This treaty encouraged Ulaanbaatar's 
intransigence against Guomindang (Kuomintang in Wade-Giles 
romanization), or Chinese Nationalist Party, troops in 1947, when 
violence flared along the ill-defined and disputed Mongolian- 
Chinese border in the Altai Mountain region. Indigenous Kazakhs 
and Mongols had been grazing their herds indiscriminately through- 
out the entire area, and the Soviets had developed gold and tung- 
sten mines in areas the Chinese considered part of Xinjiang. Kazakh 
rebels opposed to the Chinese regime had declared their auton- 
omy in 1944, probably with Soviet encouragement; however, when 
China reestablished control over Xinjiang in 1946, some of the 
Kazakh leaders redefected to China. 

In June 1947, Mongolian cavalry with tank and air support at- 
tacked the Kazakh and Chinese troops, apparently in an attempt 
to take over the disputed territory. The Soviet Union and Mongo- 
lia denied that they were aggressors and claimed that the Chinese 
were 15 kilometers inside Mongolia; the Chinese countered that 
the Mongolian army had driven 200 kilometers into Xinjiang. The 
Chinese were driven back, and the Soviets continued to operate 
the mines despite a further outbreak of fighting in early 1948 (see 
Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

The Mongolian armed forces, with the close and continuous col- 
laboration of the Soviet Red Army, came of age in the years after 
1929. It had survived and had helped to suppress internal revolts, 
had successfully fought the Japanese and the Chinese, and had 
played a major role in the education, training, and indoctrination 
of the Mongolian people. The 1949 communist victory in the 
Chinese civil war eliminated the threat on Mongolia's southern 
border for the next decade. This development permitted Mongo- 
lia to begin reducing its 80, 000- troop army, which had been main- 
tained at about that level for 10 years. 

During the 1950s, Mongolia was able to deemphasize defense. 
Defense expenditures dropped from 33 percent of the total budget 
in 1948 to 15 percent in 1952. Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal became pre- 
mier after the death of Choybalsan in 1952. Although he had been 
a lieutenant general and chief political commissar of the army during 
World War II, Tsedenbal was an economist, and he was less in- 
clined to maintain a large army without a definite need. Thus, 



237 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

defense expenditures continued their steady drop in the next few 
years; soldiers went into the labor force and defense funds were 
diverted into neglected economic development and social services. 

The nation's economic and social development required an in- 
frastructure: public buildings, housing, factories, roads, and power 
plants. The army formed a mobile, disciplined, and partially skilled 
work force in a country that was short of labor. Units were ap- 
prenticed to construction gangs made up of technicians and work- 
ers from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. By the 
late 1950s, the army's Military Construction Administration was 
building workers' apartments and public buildings, and it was in 
charge of constructing a large part of the industry around Darhan 
(see Labor Force, ch. 3). 

The army continued to develop and modernize during the 1950s. 
It continued to use the two years' compulsory military training to 
provide Mongolian youth with Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, 
to ensure their literacy, and to teach them a variety of useful tech- 
nical skills. Soviet troops continued to be garrisoned in Mongolia 
until 1956, at first to ensure against Chinese irredentist moves and 
later, probably, to discourage any deviation that might have resulted 
from the post-Stalin and post-Choybalsan thaw. The combat ele- 
ments of the now- smaller army were modernized; tanks, self- 
propelled guns, armored infantry, jet fighters, and surface-to-air 
missiles replaced the last of the cavalry. Soviet instructors and ad- 
visers served with the Mongolian army, but more and more, the 
Mongolian People's Army was standing on its own, except in the 
production of arms and heavy equipment. 

The 1960s saw quite altered prospects for the army. The Sino- 
Soviet rift occurred in 1960, and China adopted an increasingly 
hostile policy toward the Soviet Union and Mongolia. As the new 
threat from China was perceived and then grew more ominous, 
the Soviet Union and Mongolia again became militarily close. 
Soviet troops once more entered Mongolia in strength. Military, 
and other, national celebrations provided opportunities for the ex- 
change of top-level military delegations, for consultations on defense 
matters, and for public hymns of praise, loyalty, eternal friend- 
ship, and cooperation. Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovskiy 
and other top Soviet military leaders, together with senior Chinese 
generals, visited Ulaanbaatar on People's Army Day, March 18, 
1961 . The Soviets were honored with high Mongolian decorations, 
whereas the Chinese were snubbed, receiving none. 

Significantly, while Mongolia and the Soviet Union reacted to 
the perceived Chinese threat much as they had to the Japanese 
threat in the 1930s — that is, by deploying Soviet troops and 



238 



National Security 



strengthening Mongolia's defenses — the magnitude of the measures 
taken in the 1960s was not so great. This circumspection probably 
reflected the policies of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and 
Tsedenbal, versus those of Stalin and Crioybalsan, as well as the 
strengthened internal and global positions of Mongolia and the 
Soviet Union. Soviet assistance enabled the Mongolian army, while 
continuing to equip and train for modern war, to carry on with 
its construction projects at Darhan and elsewhere. 

Chinggis and ancient Mongol warriors were used as symbols to 
inculcate patriotism and a military tradition as early as 1927. Feeling 
pride and confidence in their new national viability, Mongolian 
leaders, despite Soviet disapproval, celebrated the 800th anniver- 
sary of the birth of Chinggis on May 31, 1962, with ceremonies 
and the unveiling of a monument at his purported birthplace. The 
Soviet Union took exception to this display of nationalism with its 
pan-Mongol overtones, and the Soviet press vehemendy attacked 
Chinggis as a reactionary and an evil person. Whether connected 
or not with this demonstration of independent thought and the Sino- 
Soviet rift, a bloodless purge of a number of top Mongolian defense 
officials took place. Those replaced were the commandant of Ulaan- 
baatar, the minister of public security, the chief of the general staff, 
and the head of the army's political department. Just as past purges 
had missed Choybalsan, this one passed by Colonel General 
Jamyangiyn Lhagbasuren, longtime minister of people's army af- 
fairs and commander in chief of the army. Again, suspected na- 
tionalists and those with pro-Chinese leanings were purged. The 
military tradition to be fostered was not that of ancient Mongol 
military heroes, but that of the 1921 revolution and the battles 
against the Japanese in the 1930s and the 1940s. These events al- 
ways stressed the cooperation and close comradeship in arms of 
the Soviet army. 

Chinese border incidents, though not serious, continued through 
the 1960s, and they were accompanied by a strengthening of the 
Mongolian troop presence in border areas. China, in turn, charged 
that reconnaissance flights from Mongolia and Siberia had violated 
its airspace. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and Mongolia continued 
their public display of political and military affinity. In 1966 the 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was 
renewed for another twenty years; it was extendable for an addi- 
tional ten. It included a clause permitting the stationing of Soviet 
troops in Mongolia. A parade in Ulaanbaatar in 1967 honored the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and showed 
off new weapons, including Mongolian army-manned SA-2 surface- 
to-air and SNAPPER antitank guided missiles. In his address, 



239 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S 
REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 



NATIONAL PARTY 
CONGRESS 



PEOPLE'S GREAT HURAL 



CENTRAL COMMTTTEE 



COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' 



SPECIAL MILITARY 
DEPARTMENT 



MILITARY COUNCIL 



I t 



MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE 



MINISTER OF DEFENSE 



MONGOLIAN 
PEOPLE'S ARMY 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 



FUNCTIONAL DIRECTOR/ 



POLITICAL COMMISSARS 



MILTARY UNITS 



CONTROL 



COORDINATION 

1 THE PRESIDIUM FORMS THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 

2 THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS APPOINTS THE 

MILITARY COUNCIL 



Figure 15. Organization of the Armed Forces, 1989 



Lhagbasuren gave high praise to Soviet military aid. In May 1968, 
at the forty- seventh anniversary of the founding of the Mongolian 
People's Army, Lhagbasuren spoke similarly of the "fraternal dis- 
interested" aid of the Soviet Union. These panegyrics, while in- 
tended to instruct Mongolians in the current policy and to reassure 
the Soviets of Mongolian solidarity, nevertheless amply demon- 
strated the degree of Soviet influence and the subordinate Mon- 
golian position in the Soviet mutual defense agreement. 

Organization since 1968 

The Military Council, originally established by the Mongolian- 
Soviet defense accord of 1921, was responsible in the 1980s to the 
Council of Ministers for all defense matters (see Major State 
Organizations, ch. 4). Observers thought that the council was 



240 



National Security 



composed of the minister of defense (who was called the minister 
of people's army affairs until March 1968) and his deputy ministers, 
the chief political commissar of the army, and top party officials 
with military experience and orientation. The Military Council 
worked in close conjunction with the Special Military Department 
of the party Central Committee, which lent political authority to 
its directives (see fig. 15). 

In 1987 the Ministry of Defense was allotted an annual budget 
of US$249.44 million. It was administered by the minister of 
defense, Colonel General Jamsrangiyn Yondon, assisted by the chief 
of the general staff, Lieutenant General C. Purebdorj, and by 
deputies responsible for various functional directorates, including 
operations and intelligence, organization and mobilization, mili- 
tary transportation, and signal communications, the main inspec- 
torate, the main directorate of the rear services, and the main 
political directorate. More than 70 percent of armed forces per- 
sonnel were members of either the Mongolian People's Revolu- 
tionary Party or the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. 

In 1988 the armed forces consisted of 24,500 active-duty per- 
sonnel (21,000 army and 3,500 air force), augmented by 200,000 
army reservists and by various paramilitary forces, including militia 
(internal security troops and frontier guards attached to the Ministry 
of Public Security) and military construction troops. The army in- 
cluded approximately 17,000 conscripts (see fig. 16). It was or- 
ganized into four motorized rifle divisions and equipped with Soviet 
weapons and equipment ranging from relatively modern to obso- 
lete (see table 13, Appendix). The air force included 100 pilots and 
was organized into one fighter regiment, at least two transport 
squadrons, and a helicopter squadron. The air force was equipped 
with more than thirty Soviet MiG-21 fighters along with An-2 
biplanes, An-24, An-26, and An-32 transports, and Mi-4 and Mi-8 
helicopters. 

The Civil Air Transport Administration, responsible for Mon- 
golian Airlines (MIAT), was thought to be affiliated with the air 
force. All airline pilots had military ranks, and they flew Soviet- 
built transport aircraft on crop dusting, forest and steppe fire patrol, 
and air ambulance missions. They also provided mail and passenger 
service on 38,300 kilometers of domestic routes as well as on inter- 
national routes to Irkutsk and Beijing, the latter inaugurated in 
1986 (see Civil Aviation, ch. 3). 

Personnel 

The Universal Military Service Law declared all male citizens 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight to be eligible for 



241 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



THOUSANDS 



40,000 




1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 

YEAR 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Mili- 
tary Balance, London, 1978-88. 

Figure 16. Armed Forces Personnel Strength, Selected Years, 1978-88 

military conscription. Soldiers and noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs) in the Mongolian armed forces had been required to serve 
three years of active duty — two years, for those with higher edu- 
cation. In August 1988, compulsory military service for all con- 
scripts was reduced to two years. Males seventeen or older who 
attended military schools were considered to be on active military 
duty. Those older than twenty-eight with special skills who had 
not been drafted might be accepted into special service. Male en- 
listed personnel could serve on active duty until the age of forty- 
five. Although there were women in the armed forces in 1989, no 
information was available on the role women played. 

Most officers received their commissions from a military acad- 
emy, but some were educated in civilian universities. Soldiers and 
NCOs with a secondary or higher education who had performed 
in an exemplary fashion also might be granted commissions after 
being discharged from active duty. Experts up to the age of thirty- 
five might be inducted to carry out such functions as those of medical 
officers or computer specialists. Company-grade officers (junior 
lieutenant, lieutenant, senior lieutenant, and captain) were per- 
mitted to serve on active duty to the age of forty-five and in the 
reserves to the age of fifty. Field- grade officers (major, lieutenant 



242 



National Security 



colonel, and colonel) were permitted to serve on active duty to the 
age of fifty-five and in the reserves to the age of sixty. General 
officers (major general, lieutenant general, and colonel general) 
were permitted to serve on active duty to the age of sixty and in 
the reserves to the age of sixty-five. Those holding the rank of gen- 
eral of the army or marshal could remain on active duty regard- 
less of age. (The last person to hold these ranks was Tsedenbal.) 
In 1989 there were indications that these age restrictions were being 
relaxed because of a shortage of middle-aged men. 

The uniforms and insignia of the armed forces in the 1980s were 
similar to those worn by the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Mon- 
golian officer and enlisted uniforms differed in texture and quality 
of material, but the cut and style were the same. Women's uni- 
forms generally were the same color and texture as their male coun- 
terparts' in the respective services and branches. 

There were four categories of uniforms in the army and the air 
force: full dress, dress, service, and field. The full-dress uniform 
was worn during formal reviews, such as parades; during confer- 
ral of a promotion in rank or a military decoration; or in perfor- 
mance of duties as a member of an honor guard. The dress uniform 
was worn during off-duty hours; the service uniform was worn for 
duty with troops in garrison. The field uniform was worn during 
training, maneuvers, and firing exercises. All four categories of 
uniform were olive drab. An ornate gold and red belt was worn 
on the service jacket of the full-dress uniform, along with medals, 
an olive drab shirt and tie, long trousers, low quarter shoes, and 
a service hat. The dress uniform was similar to the full-dress, ex- 
cept that service ribbons were substituted for medals and no belt 
was worn. The service uniform was the same as the dress uniform, 
except that leather Sam Browne- type belts were worn by officers, 
and garrison caps were worn by enlisted personnel. Both officers 
and enlisted personnel wore breeches, high boots, and steel hel- 
mets with their field uniforms. Seasonal differences allowed for the 
wearing of an overcoat, gloves, and a fur pile cap. A quilted olive 
drab jacket and field breeches also were worn as a winter field uni- 
form. The background of the shoulder boards, the collar tabs, and 
the service hatband was red for the army and blue for the air force. 

All rank insignia were displayed on shoulder boards. Marshals 
(when there were any) and general officers wore stars on a broad, 
ornate gold stripe with a red background. Field-grade officers wore 
two longitudinal gold stripes and smaller gold stars, and company- 
grade officers wore one longitudinal gold stripe with even smaller 
gold stars. Enlisted ranks were identified by longitudinal or trans- 
verse gold stripes on shoulder boards (see fig. 17). Branch-of- service 



243 



Mongolia: A Country Study 




244 



National Security 



insignias worn on collar tabs were gold metallic devices, except in 
the veterinary service, which used silver devices. Both officers and 
enlisted personnel wore a cockade on their headgear. 

The armed forces maintained a reserve force in excess of 200,000 
people. Enlisted personnel automatically were transferred to the 
reserves when they were discharged from active duty, and they re- 
mained in the reserves until the age of forty-five. 

Education and Training 

The educational level of the Mongolian armed forces compared 
favorably with that of the armed forces in most other countries. 
All officer and enlisted personnel in the mid-1980s had at least a 
secondary education, and many had received a specialized civilian 
education. Most officers were educated in the academies and schools 
of the Military Institute, an outgrowth of the Sukhe Bator Mili- 
tary Academy of the 1930s. Among those who were offered direct 
commissions were some discharged enlisted personnel with secon- 
dary or higher education, whose enlisted performance was exem- 
plary, and civilians up to thirty-five years of age who had expertise 
useful to the military. Many officers received higher education and 
high-level training in the Soviet Union. 

In the late 1980s, arms training at individual, small unit, and 
combined arms levels was supervised by Soviet instructors and ad- 
visers, or by Mongolian army instructors thoroughly trained in 
Soviet army courses. The training met Soviet military standards, 
and it was conducted under both winter and summer conditions. 
Discharged enlisted personnel with up to two years of active mili- 
tary service received two months of reserve training every two years. 
Those who had more than two years of active military service 
received up to two months of reserve training every three years. 
Officers who registered in the reserves after completing their ac- 
tive duty, no matter what the source of their commission, received 
up to three months of reserve training every two years. Soldiers 
received a thorough political indoctrination. The technical train- 
ing required for their military specialty was related constantly to 
civilian needs after military service. Soldiers trained as tank drivers 
could apply these skills in civilian life as tractor drivers, and sol- 
diers trained as truck drivers in the army could be used as civilian 
drivers. The army also trained printers and tailors, as well as 
specialists in agriculture and animal husbandry. 

In the mid-1980s, the Mongolian armed forces instituted major 
improvements in the content and methodology of staff, logistical, 
and field military training. Tactical training grounds, firing ranges, 



245 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

tank training grounds, and airfields were mechanized and auto- 
mated. Field and training exercises included good-quality live fir- 
ings, rocket launches, and operational training flights. 

Civil-Military Relations 

In the Mongol military tradition, all men were warriors, and 
therefore military training was not confined to the regular army. 
In the early days of the Mongolian People's Republic, before 
universal military conscription, party and youth league members 
received sporadic special military training in the reserve and in phys- 
ical culture detachments. Women were admitted to this training 
on a voluntary basis. In 1929 the League for Assisting the Defense 
Aims of the Mongolian State was established by the party Central 
Committee; it was based on the Soviet Voluntary Society for 
Cooperation with the Armed Forces. In 1942 the league was reor- 
ganized as the People's Volunteer Self-Defense Detachment and 
was used in home defense against the Japanese. In 1945, at the 
end of World War II, it again was reorganized and renamed — 
this time the Auxiliary Defense Organization. A 1975 decree of 
the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee specifically 
assigned the Auxiliary Defense Organization the task of fostering 
patriotism and support for the army through sponsorship of an- 
nual defense popularization months, Mongolian- Soviet friendship 
months, and military sports competitions throughout the year. In 
the late 1980s, the Auxiliary Defense Organization still was respon- 
sible for these activities and for providing spare-time schools and 
courses to train all seventeen-year-old males in basic military skills 
and specialties of use to the military. "To protect the economy 
against weapons of mass destruction, ' ' all citizens were obliged to 
participate in civil defense training organized by the Civil Defense 
Office of the Ministry of Defense. In 1982 there reportedly were 
600 civil defense units in Mongolia. 

Economic Role 

The army over the years has had a generally positive impact on 
the national economy. Although the work-force shortages and mili- 
tary expenses of World War II imposed austerity on personal con- 
sumption and retarded social development and the economy's 
civilian sector, many soldiers acquired valuable technical skills. In 
1934 the Choybalsan industrial combine with 1,500 workers was 
established to produce cloth, clothing, saddles, harnesses, fur coats, 
and footwear for the army. By 1939 its production almost com- 
pletely supplied the army with clothing and individual equipment. 
Beginning in the early 1950s, wartime facilities turned to producing 



246 



National Security 



items both for the civilian sector and for export (see Light Indus- 
try, ch. 3). 

Transportation was another industry intended initially as much 
for military as for civilian use. In 1929 the Soviet Union aided in 
the establishment of Mongoltrans (Mongolian Transportation), a 
transportation company with approximately 100 trucks and buses 
as well as a repair shop. Mongoltrans was a paramilitary organi- 
zation from the beginning; its personnel received military train- 
ing and transport was diverted to military tasks on call. Air transport 
was established, in 1925, also with Soviet assistance. In 1989 it 
was operated as part of the air force both for military and for civilian 
use (see Civil Aviation, ch. 3). 

The Military Construction Administration, developed out of the 
Darhan Military Construction Project in the late 1950s, continued 
in the late 1980s as a paramilitary organization under the Mon- 
golian army. Between 1981 and 1984, military construction troops 
helped to establish the new city of Erdenet; they built more than 
1 ,000 installations and enterprises — including state farms, a shoe 
factory in Ulaanbaatar, and an international camp for young 
pioneers — for the civilian economy. 

Threat Perception 

In the early 1980s, despite improved Sino-Soviet relations, Mon- 
golia maintained its traditional distrust of Beijing and was unwill- 
ing to reduce its own armed forces or the level of Soviet forces 
stationed in Mongolia. By 1985 Soviet troops in Mongolia still num- 
bered 75,000; they included two tank and three motorized infan- 
try divisions. China insisted that Soviet forces in Mongolia be 
withdrawn as a condition for improved Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet 
communist party general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev responded 
to that demand in a July 1986 Vladivostok speech in which he 
offered to withdraw Soviet troops from Mongolia. Two weeks later, 
the Mongolian government gave its support for "the withdrawal 
of a considerable part of the Soviet troops from Mongolia ... to 
promote the establishment of the overall Asian and Pacific security 
and serve the cause of strengthening trust and good neighborliness 
in Asia." Between April and June 1987, the Soviet Union an- 
nounced the withdrawal of one full- strength motorized rifle divi- 
sion and several separate units, which reduced Soviet forces in 
Mongolia to approximately 55,000 (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). 

Mongolia's relations with China also improved during this peri- 
od; the exchange of government, trade, and friendship delegations 
culminated in the November 1988 signing of a Mongolian-Chinese 
border treaty. In December 1988, Mongolia's first deputy minister 



247 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

of foreign affairs, Daramyn Yondon, commenting on a Soviet offer 
to withdraw the majority of its troops stationed in Mongolia within 
two years, stated that "if relations with China continue to improve, 
all Soviet troops will be withdrawn." In February 1989, official 
Mongolian news sources quoted Mongolian military leaders as call- 
ing for a reduction in the size of the Mongolian armed forces. Mon- 
golia's concern over the Chinese threat, although by no means 
eliminated, was at its lowest level in nearly thirty years. 

Criminal Justice and Public Security 

The Mongol legal heritage, based on a nomadic pastoral cul- 
ture, first was unified and codified in the yasaq (see Glossary). The 
yasaq, promulgated in 1229, contained directives on state adminis- 
tration and military discipline, criminal law, private law, and spe- 
cial customs for the steppe region. It served as a basis for a more 
extensive legal code during the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368). 

With the breakup of the Mongol empire, Mongol tribes returned 
to earlier customs. In 1640 an alliance of Mongol princes drafted 
the Mongol-Oirad Regulations, characterized by the strong in- 
fluence of Lamaism and by considerably milder punishments than 
foreign codes of the time or previous Mongol codes. Under Qing 
Dynasty rule, Mongol laws and customs were combined with 
Chinese law. 

In an effort to improve on some of the harsher aspects of the 
criminal justice system, the Mongolian government, in 1922, 
abolished various investigative tortures and corporal punishments 
left over from the Qing period. A November 1925 law on judicial 
reform provided that courts were to be guided by new laws and 
that punishment should be to protect public order and to reedu- 
cate criminals. The old system remained in effect, however, ex- 
cept when superseded by the new regulations. 

The first criminal code of the Mongolian People's Republic, 
adopted on October 21, 1926, established a statutory basis for the 
control of crime and disorder. It consisted of 227 articles in 31 chap- 
ters, and it applied extensive criminal regulations and sanctions 
to citizens and foreigners. That code was replaced on September 
23, 1929, by a new criminal code with modifications reflecting the 
political struggle taking place in Mongolia at that time (see Purges 
of the Opposition, 1928-32, ch. 1). The 1929 code remained in 
effect for five years. It was replaced by the 1934 criminal code, 
which was adopted in two stages — the general part, confirmed on 
May 24, 1934, and a special part, confirmed on October 8, 1934, 
that expanded the scope of "counterrevolutionary" crimes and 
added a chapter on military crimes. The 1934 code was in turn 



248 



National Security 



replaced on January 17, 1942, by a code reflecting the changes in 
society and the influences of World War II. The 1942 code remained 
in effect, with numerous amendments, until January 31, 1961, when 
the code still in use in 1989 was confirmed. 

Mongolia's first constitution, adopted by the National Great 
Hural on November 26, 1924, established a state structure, includ- 
ing courts and procuraturates, based on the Soviet system. The 
1924 constitution was replaced by the 1940 constitution, closely 
modeled on the 1936 Soviet constitution. The 1940 constitution 
was replaced by the Constitution adopted on July 6, 1960. Later 
amendments to the 1960 Constitution increased the terms of 
Supreme Court members and procurators from three to four years 
and the terms of the members of city and people's courts from two 
to three years (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). 

The Legal System 

Criminal Code 

According to the 1961 Criminal Code, a crime was a socially 
dangerous act or failure to act. Insignificant acts that did not present 
a "social danger" were not considered crimes, even though they 
may have violated the letter of the law. Crimes committed against 
the state and socialist ownership were considered more serious than 
crimes against private persons. Crimes against the state included 
treason, espionage, terrorism, sabotage, and smuggling. Crimes 
against socialist ownership included theft, misappropriation, or 
embezzlement of state property; and intentional or negligent de- 
struction of state property. Other crimes listed in the criminal code 
included murder; deliberate crippling; mayhem; impairing the 
health of others; rape; theft; banditry; vagrancy; destruction of state, 
communal, or individual property; slander; insult; misuse of 
guardianship; false imprisonment; forgery; hindering people in vot- 
ing; illegal search of homes; violation of the privacy of correspon- 
dence, of labor laws, or of the separation of church and state, or 
church and school; and interference with religious freedom. 

Generally, any crimes committed by military personnel and 
active-duty reservists were treated as military crimes. Specific mili- 
tary crimes included insubordination, desertion, unwarranted ab- 
sence or abandonment of a duty station, evading military service 
through self-mutilation, violations of guard-duty rules, and mis- 
treatment of prisoners of war. 

Close attention was given to equal rights for women. According 
to the 1961 Criminal Code, it was a crime to force a woman to 
marry or to prevent her marriage, to violate the equal rights of 



249 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

women (for example, by preventing them from studying in a school 
or working in a state agency or in industry), and to refuse jobs 
to pregnant women or to mothers. 

People sixteen and older were considered legal adults. Those be- 
tween the ages of fourteen and sixteen were treated as juveniles, 
except in the most serious cases. Courts were encouraged to apply 
"compulsory measures of education" rather than criminal penal- 
ties to people younger than eighteen who had committed crimes, 
unless doing so would risk a serious danger to society. 

According to the criminal code, punishment was intended to 
reeducate and correct the offender's behavior rather than to inflict 
bodily harm or humiliation. If court sentences were reversed, the 
official responsible for wrongly imposing punishment was liable 
to criminal court or disciplinary action. 

Punishments consisted of confinement in prisons or correctional 
labor colonies, assignment of correctional tasks without depriva- 
tion of freedom, deportation from the country, prohibition from 
holding public executive or managerial jobs, fines, public repri- 
mands, confiscation of private property, expulsion from one's na- 
tive aymag, and loss of the right to hold public office. For treason, 
espionage, public subversion (which covers a variety of antistate 
crimes), murder, and armed banditry, the death penalty could be 
imposed. Women were exempt from the death penalty, as were 
men younger than eighteen or older than sixty. 

Prison sentences generally were limited to terms of six months 
to ten years, but repeated criminal acts could be punished by prison 
terms as long as fifteen years. Minor theft and embezzlement usually 
were punished by imprisonment of up to one year, plus eighteen 
months of correctional tasks to be served at the convicted person's 
place of work or residence; repeat offenders could receive sentences 
of one to five years in prison. 

Stricter punishments could be imposed on those who misap- 
propriated, plundered, or stole state and public property. They 
could be sentenced to up to seven years in prison, and repeat 
offenders could be sentenced to six to fifteen years, in some cases 
accompanied by full or partial confiscation of property. Stealing 
private property could be punished by terms of up to five years 
in jail or by eighteen months of correctional tasks without depri- 
vation of freedom; repeat offenders could receive five to ten years 
in prison. Robbery with the use or threat of force could be punished 
by imprisonment for ten years, and repeat offenders could be im- 
prisoned eight to fifteen years. Malicious embezzlement and squan- 
dering of state property were punishable by death by a firing squad 
and confiscation of private property. A sentence of death, ten to 



250 



Soviet-made BMP-1 mechanized infantry 
combat vehicles, from a train window 
Courtesy Allen H. Kassof 

fifteen years in prison, or property confiscation was meted out to 
persons using force in robbery or banditry; misappropriating funds 
and property, or dissipating them by illegal consumption; abus- 
ing their official positions; swindling; extorting; or showing care- 
lessness or negligence in the discharge of official duties. Terms spent 
in jail awaiting trial counted toward completion of the sentence, 
and probation was permissible after one to five years in prison had 
been served. There were statutes of limitation for most crimes, and 
pardons occasionally were granted. Penalties against violators of 
public order consisted of warnings, public rebukes, fines, imprison- 
ment, and compulsory labor for five to thirty days. 

Criminal Court System 

The Constitution charges the courts with administering justice 
in accordance with the laws of the state; with upholding the Con- 
stitution; with protecting the rights and interests of the state; with 
protecting state, public, and cooperative property; and with 
safeguarding the personal, political, and property rights of the 
citizens. Courts try cases of treason; sabotage; embezzlement of 
state, cooperative, and public property; theft; robbery; swindling; 
and other crimes based on the criminal code. They also try cases 



251 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



involving losses inflicted on private citizens, on the state, and on 
cooperative and public enterprises and organizations according to 
the civil code (see Major State Organizations, ch. 4). 

Courts punish persons convicted of crimes, but they also serve 
as educative and political agencies. They correct, reeducate, and 
reform criminals. They are called on to train citizens in the spirit 
of "dedication to the fatherland" and in the cause of "socialist 
democracy"; to uphold the strict and undeviating observance of 
the law; to train citizens in the careful treatment of state, coopera- 
tive, and other public property; and to support the observation of 
labor discipline, the honoring of state and public duty, and respect 
for the rules of communal life. The courts are expected to promote 
popular attitudes of loyalty, patriotism, peaceful behavior, and en- 
thusiasm for socialism; to uphold conformity with the laws and 
respect for public property and labor discipline; and to involve 
citizens in state and civic affairs. 

The court system consists of the Supreme Court, aymag courts, 
city courts, and special courts. Except in special cases for which 
provisions are made by law, all cases in all courts are tried by per- 
manent judges in the presence of assessors, who are elected represen- 
tatives sitting on the bench with the judges. The assessors hear the 
evidence, may question witnesses and the accused, examine the 
case as presented by the procurator, and participate in findings 
and sentences. When a question of law or its interpretation arises, 
however, the judge's opinion rules. An assessor may serve for no 
more than twenty days per year, unless the nature of a case or crime 
requires the period to be extended. Citizens twenty-three years or 
older who have never been convicted by a court are eligible for 
election as judges and assessors. 

According to the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the highest 
judicial body. It is elected by the People's Great Hural for a term 
of four years, and it is responsible and accountable to the People's 
Great Hural and its presidium (Article 66 of the Constitution as 
amended). It consists of a chairman, a deputy chairman, mem- 
bers, and assessors, as may be determined by the People's Great 
Hural. The Plenum of the Supreme Court consists of the chair- 
man, the deputy chairman, and all members meeting together in 
a general session. The Presidium of the Supreme Court consists 
of a committee of selected members. There is a judicial chamber 
in charge of criminal cases, another in charge of civil cases, and 
a third in charge of overseeing the work of all the judicial organs 
of the state. 

The Supreme Court directs, inspects, and reviews the work of 
all the lower courts. It supervises all judicial work in the state, and 



252 



National Security 



it formulates national legal policies. The court holds a general ses- 
sion at least once a month, that is attended by the procurator or 
the procurator's deputy. Decisions at general sessions are adopted 
by voice majority of the membership. Such sessions may change 
previous interpretations of the laws, but not the Constitution. Only 
the Presidium of the People's Great Hural has the right to exam- 
ine and change decisions reached in the Supreme Court's general 
sessions or in court cases. The Presidium of the Supreme Court 
reviews the work of all lower courts and investigates the general 
causes of crime in the country. The Supreme Court also may take 
jurisdiction over certain cases, presumably those posing serious 
difficulties, problems of legal procedure or jurisprudence, or seri- 
ous dangers to the state that ordinarily would be tried by military 
or by railroad courts. 

In 1989 there were about 100 circuit courts throughout the 
country — 5 to 7 in each aymag. Circuit courts serve about 340 coun- 
ties, or somons (see Glossary), and towns. Each circuit court has 
jurisdiction over several somons in dealing with citizen complaints 
and with criminal and civil cases. Judges and jurors are elected 
for three-year terms — the judges by the regular session of the aymag 
assemblies, the jurors by direct elections. The courts promote 
knowledge of the laws, and they work for crime prevention. 

Each aymag and city court consists of a chairman, a deputy chair- 
man, members, and assessors. Judges and assessors are elected for 
two-year terms by the local assemblies of people's deputies. These 
courts can try all criminal cases except those that fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the special courts, and the state 
arbitration organs. These courts also engage in crime prevention 
propaganda and the popularization of the law. They report on their 
own work to aymag and municipal assemblies. 

There also are special military and railroad transport courts. Each 
is staffed by a chairman, a deputy chairman, members, and asses- 
sors; all are elected by the People's Great Hural to three-year terms. 
Military courts try cases involving military personnel, fire fight- 
ers, and militia members. Railroad courts try cases connected with 
the operation of railroad lines and with criminal and civil offenses 
committed by railroad workers. A trial is carried out under the 
chairmanship of one judge, assisted by two assessors. 

The Constitution establishes the Office of the Procurator of the 
Republic. It vests the position with supreme supervisory power over 
the strict observance of the laws by all ministries and other central 
administrative bodies, and by the institutions and organizations 
subordinate to them; by local bodies; by all public and coopera- 
tive organizations; by all officials; and by all citizens. The procurator 



253 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

is appointed by the People's Great Hural to a four-year term and 
is responsible and accountable to the People's Great Hural and 
its presidium. The procurator appoints aymag, somon, ancl municipal 
procurators for three-year terms. These local procurators are sub- 
ordinate only to the procurator of higher rank. 

Thus the procuratorial system parallels that of the courts, and 
its chain of command extends unbroken from top to bottom. The 
Office of the Procurator serves as a check on the entire court sys- 
tem, as well as on the government apparatus. As such it wields 
enormous power and is a strong arm of the party for enforcing its 
national policies. 

The procurator is authorized to review the activities of the Minis- 
try of State Security and its field organizations, all organizations 
of inquiry, all militia units, and all judicial organizations. The 
procurator's staff reviews all cases, takes account of sentences, and 
checks on the legality of detentions and on prison conditions. It 
supports public prosecution work in each locality, issues arrest war- 
rants and confirms indictments, protests against laws it considers 
illegal or unconstitutional, checks the legality of resolutions, en- 
sures that state orders and regulations are properly issued, and su- 
pervises all public prosecutors and the investigative apparatus. 

The deputy procurator is appointed by the procurator for a three- 
year term, subject to confirmation by the Presidium of the Peo- 
ple's Great Hural. The incumbent is charged with reviewing the 
investigative organs of the Ministry of State Security and the militia; 
with checking prison conditions and the legality of detentions; with 
reviewing legal judgments, rulings, and decisions of regular and 
special courts; and with participating in Supreme Court prepara- 
tory and judicial sessions as the procurator's representative. 

The assistant procurator is appointed by the procurator and con- 
firmed by the Presidium of the People's Great Hural. The assis- 
tant procurator supervises the coroners, the Office of the Military 
Procurator, and the border guards; is responsible for prompt ac- 
tion on all statements and complaints from state and public insti- 
tutions and private citizens; and supervises the legal personnel on 
the procurator's staff and legal training in the country. 

At the local level, aymag and municipal procurators issue arrest 
warrants, direct coroners and militia organs in crime investigations, 
and review the investigative activity of the organs under the Minis- 
try of Internal Affairs. Coroners, under direction of the procura- 
tors, are required to make prompt inquiry into all criminal cases. 
They appear in court in criminal cases as expert witnesses and in 
civil cases as defenders for workers and the state. They may be 
members of the medical bureaus that are attached to all courts in 



254 



Mongolian People's 
Army honor guard 
Courtesy Steve Mann 



order to examine victims injured in crimes, to perform autopsies, 
and to conduct scientific investigations. Bailiffs at each level are 
appointed by the court chairman. They see that the decisions and 
sentences imposed by the courts are carried out. 

All persons charged with a violation can be handed over, together 
with the evidence against them, to the courts of local assemblies 
by official and public organizations, local authorities, procurators, 
militia members, or citizens. An accused person has the right to 
be tried within one month of arrest or is automatically absolved. 

Court proceedings are conducted in Mongol, but a person not 
speaking the language has the right both to an interpreter and to 
use his or her own language in court. Accused people are guaran- 
teed the right to defend themselves. All cases are heard in public, 
except for special cases in which the law provides for closed courts. 

Verdicts, decrees, and decisions of all courts except the Supreme 
Court may be appealed by the defense or by the prosecution. De- 
cisions and sentences legally in force can be protested only by the 
chairman of the Supreme Court, by the state procurator, or by 
the minister of state security. 

The Penal System 

Mongolia maintained both prison camps and correctional or 
educational colonies in the 1980s. There also were detention camps 
for minor offenders, designed to rehabilitate them by "socially useful 



255 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

labor." Such labor included town-improvement projects: clean- 
ing the street, and repairing buildings. Those performing this labor 
received neither wages nor food; they purchased their food or de- 
pended on their families to provide it. Local jails existed for brief 
detentions (twenty-four hours or less) of intoxicated persons and 
those awaiting indictment. 

Law Enforcement 

The Security System 

The people of Mongolia were subject to the control of a variety 
of political, economic, and social organizations inside and outside 
the government. The entire system was guided by the party, which 
directed the overall policies of the government agencies; other po- 
litical groups, such as the youth and labor organizations; and the 
network of herding and agricultural cooperatives that extended to 
include the lowliest arad (see Glossary). Through this hierarchy of 
formal control and the dynamics of its politico- social activities, the 
central government extended its general, and often extremely par- 
ticular, direction over the entire population (see The Society, ch. 2; 
Major State Organizations, ch. 4). 

In the government structure itself, the security system comprised 
the Ministry of Public Security under which were the central Militia 
Office and the network of police departments, called militia depart- 
ments; the State Security Administration; the Fire Prevention Ad- 
ministration; the Border and Internal Troops Administration; and 
the offices handling correctional organizations. In addition, both 
governmental and public auxiliary law-enforcement groups helped 
these agencies to maintain public order and safety (see Local Ad- 
ministration, ch. 4). 

The national police apparatus, commonly called the militia, had 
a department in each aymag and a militia office in each district. 
The militia was responsible for the registration and supervision of 
the internal passports that all citizens aged sixteen and older were 
required to carry, and for enforcement of the passport regulations 
at the national and local levels. A passport was necessary for in- 
ternal travel, and persons wishing to travel first had to obtain per- 
mission from the militia. After arriving at their destination, they 
had to register with the militia. The militia collected the passports 
of those entering military service. The passports of persons under 
criminal investigation and detention were held by the investiga- 
tive organ, but those who were sentenced to prison surrendered 
their passports to the militia. A system of tight control was imposed 
upon the movements of all citizens. The militia also had been 



256 



Mongolian People's Air Force pilots 
Courtesy Mongolian State Publishing Office 



designated as the organ of criminal investigation — giving central 
direction to police work and combining the functions of criminal 
investigation and criminal arrest. The procurators supervised the 
militia's crime-detection work. Militia investigators were expected 
to have strong political convictions, a knowledge of jurisprudence, 
extensive working experience, loyalty, and honesty. 

Militia organs, together with local assemblies administered com- 
pulsory labor sentences of convicted criminals. Militiamen, as well 
as the executive committees of local governments, had authority 
to put intoxicated persons into detention houses for twenty-four 
hours or less and to fine them. 

Each militia office had a motor- vehicle inspection bureau, which 
regulated vehicular traffic, investigated accidents, issued licenses, 
and could impose fines on operators guilty of minor law infrac- 
tions. Detectives attached to motor vehicle inspection bureaus also 
investigated vehicular accidents. Militia members directed motor 
traffic, and they were stationed along the railroads. 

The Ministry of Public Security also was responsible for the Fire 
Prevention Administration and the State Security Administration. 
The Fire Prevention Administration supervised all fire-prevention 
and fire-fighting activities. The State Security Administration was 



257 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

a counterintelligence organization thought to oversee anti- 
espionage, antisubversion, and anti-sabotage activities. 

The Border and Internal Troops Administration was in charge 
of 15,000 troops responsible for border patrol, for guard duties, 
and for immigration control. Border defense troops were equipped 
with fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, tanks, motor vehicles and 
motorcycles, radio communications equipment, engineering equip- 
ment, and automatic weapons. 

Auxiliary Security Forces 

Various governmental and public organizations assisted the regu- 
lar law-enforcement agencies in keeping order. Public brigades had 
been organized as auxiliaries to help the militia in crime detection 
and prevention, in gathering evidence, in observing public gather- 
ings, in finding stolen goods, and in tracking escaped criminals. 
In addition, there were mass social organizations, including block 
and district committees, and parents' committees in schools. These 
citizens' groups were used to help fight such crimes as murder, 
burglary, theft, and arson. They also could function as deputies 
or special police, as the occasion demanded. In addition, there were 
administrative committees, special police courts, committees of 
public- spirited citizens to deal with juvenile delinquents, and anti- 
crime commissions in the larger cities and towns. 

The most important of these bodies were the Crime Fighting 
and Crime Prevention Councils, which were voluntary and infor- 
mal party organizations operating without paid staffs at all levels 
of the party- government structure. These councils were strictiy ad- 
visory bodies, and they had no authority to replace judicial or law- 
enforcement agencies in any way. Their function was to discuss 
in general terms the problems of crime and how best to combat it. 

Incidence of Crime 

In the late 1980s, the most common crimes were theft and em- 
bezzlement of state property, black-marketing, juvenile delin- 
quency, misappropriation of materials (food and drugs, for 
example), and speculation (such as selling automobiles). To com- 
bat these crimes, the authorities called for better enforcement of 
laws, harsher punishment for criminals, and additional public in- 
volvement in fighting crime. 

Hooliganism and vandalism by juvenile delinquents in the towns 
and cities also caused the authorities grave concern. Much of this 
activity was attributed to the rising rate of divorce and to broken 
homes. To combat this situation, the authorities called for efforts 
to strengthen the family structure; to ensure better compliance with 



258 



National Security 



family and marriage laws; to improve the laws on family, mar- 
riage, child adoption, and guardianship; and to better integrate 
schools with the job market, in order to discourage idleness among 
students more effectively. 

In 1989 Mongolian government and party leaders, now less fear- 
ful of foreign threat, were taking steps to reduce the size of the armed 
forces and to make further use of the skills of demobilized military 
personnel in support of the civilian economy. The leaders were more 
concerned with the threats of corruption and of incompetence in 
law enforcement that allowed for an increase in crime, especially 
economic crimes. To remedy this situation, the Mongolian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Party called for renewed efforts to reform law- 
enforcement organizations by enhancing the role of the Ministry 
of Justice, to ensure the independence of prosecutors, and to im- 
prove the training and evaluation of judicial cadre. 

* * * 

Little has been published on the Mongolian armed forces. What 
is available is mainly historical, such as the discussion of the great 
Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century in History of the Mon- 
golian People's Republic, published by the Soviet Akademia Nauk, 
and an account of the exploits of the Mongolian People's Army 
in World War II in the History of the Mongolian People 's Republic, 
available in William A. Brown's and Urgunge Onon's English 
translation. William R. Heaton's and Kenneth Jarrett's articles 
in Asian Survey provide insight into the evolving Mongolian per- 
ception of the military threat from China. Military Balance [Lon- 
don] each year provides an up-to-date table of organization and 
equipment for the Mongolian armed forces. Albert P. Blaustein 
and Gisbert H. Flanz's Constitutions of the Countries of the World and 
William E. Butler's The Mongolian Legal System provide indispens- 
able information on the legal system. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



259 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Statistics, Selected Years, 1918-89 

3 Ethnic Composition, 1979 Census 

4 Urban-Rural Breakdown by Family Size, 1979 Census 

5 Females in the Work Force by Sector, 1979 Census 

6 Education Statistics, 1970, 1980, and 1985 

7 Employment by Sector, Selected Years, 1960-85 

8 Major Joint Ventures, 1987 

9 Foreign Trade, 1970, 1980, and 1985 

10 Principal Foreign Trade Commodities, 1986 

11 Hurals, 1924-86 

12 Party Congresses, 1921-86 

13 Major Equipment of Mongolian People's Army, 1988 



261 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) .. . 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) divide by 5 

and add 32 



Table 2. Population Statistics, Selected Years, 1918-89 



Year 


Estimated 
Population 


Crude Birth Rate 
(per thousand) 


Crude Death Rate 
(per thousand) 


Rate of Natural Increase 
(per thousand) 


1918 .... 


. . , , 647,000 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1925 


. ... 651,700 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1935 


738,200 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1940 


738,600 


26.1 


21.8 


4.3 


1945 


759,300 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1956 , , , 


845,500 


32.3 


14.2 


18.1 


1960 .... 


936,900 


43.2 


10.5 


32.7 


1965 


. , , , 1,076,000 


38.0 


12.0 


26.0 


1970 


1,230,500 


40.2 


12.3 


27.9 


1975 


1,424,400 


39.4 


10.0 


29.4 


1979 


1,595,000 


37.2 


9.5 


27.7 


1980 .... 


. . . . 1,639,700 


37.9 


10.4 


27.5 


1985 


. . . . 1,890,500 


36.0 


9.2 


26.8 


1989 * 


2,125,000 


35.1 


7.6 


27.5 



n.a. — not available. 
* Projected. 



Source: Based on information from Mongolia, Central Statistical Board, National Economy 
oftheMPRfor65 Years, 1921-1986, Ulaanbaatar, 1986, 79-80; United States, Depart- 
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Center for International Research, World 
Population Profile, 1987, Washington, 1987, 292; and K.C. Zachariah and My T. Vu, 
World Population Projections: 1978-88 Edition, Baltimore, 1988, 282. 



263 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Table 3. Ethnic Composition, 1979 Census 



Estimated 

Population Percentage of 

Ethnic Group (in thousands) Population 



Khalkha 1,236 77.5 

Kazakh 84 5.3 

Dorbet 45 2.8 

Bayat 31 1.9 

Buryat 29 1.8 

Dariganga 24 1.5 

Dzakchin 20 1.3 

Urianhay 19 1.2 

Oold 9 0.6 

Torgut 9 0.6 

Other 88 5.5 



TOTAL 1,594 100.0 



Source: Based on information from Mongolia, Central Statistical Board, National Economy 
oftheMPR in 1981, Ulaanbaatar, 1982, translated in JPRS-MON-86-001, Jan- 
uary 27, 1986, 13. 



264 



Appendix 



c 



<~D oo — i oo 



ffl -H O l£l 

00 rn o' (O 
(O 05 N lO CO 



jo 55 

II 



M N * CM in 



o n * cs 



(N N CO « 



o 

T3 

CO ^t 1 CO 

« CO If) N Ol 



■43 (£» 

«3 00 

g CD 

i2 - 

.5 CM 

° la 



265 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Table 5. Females in the Work Force by Sector, 1979 Census 



Sector 



Female Employees 
as Percentage 
of Sector 



Females in Sector 
as Percentage of 
Employed Females 



Material production 

Agriculture 46.8 34.9 

Communications 46.9 0.9 

Construction 35.0 6.7 

Industry 45.9 14.5 

Trade and procurement 57.8 8.9 

Transportation 14.7 2.8 

Total material production 42.5 1 69.0 2 

Nonmaterial production 

Education, art, and culture 62.6 11.5 

Finance, credit, and insurance 59.3 0.6 

Housing and domestic services 54.9 3.1 

Public health and social security 78.8 9.4 

Science and scientific service 41.3 1.4 

Total nonmaterial production 54.6 1 31.0 3 

TOTAL , . 45.6 1 100.0 

1 Average. 

2 Figures do not add to total because of rounding. 

3 As published. 

Source: Based on information from Mongolia, Central Statistical Board, National Economy 
oftheMPR for 65 Years, 1921-1986, Ulaanbaatar, 1986, 144-47. 



Table 6. Education Statistics, 1970, 1980, and 1985 

1970 1980 1985 

Schools 

Institutions of higher learning 5 7 8 

Vocational secondary 28 37 40 

Specialized secondary 19 25 28 

Primary and junior secondary 761 885 91 1 

Total schools , 813 954 987 

Students 

Institutions of higher learning 8,400 23,200 24,600 

Vocational secondary 10,600 22,100 27,700 

Specialized secondary 11,100 18,700 23,000 

Primary and junior secondary 245,900 394,400 435,900 

Total students 276,000 458,400 511,200 

Source: Based on information from Mongolia, Central Statistical Board, National Economy 
of the MPR for 65 Years, 1921-1986, Ulaanbaatar, 1986, 361-64. 



266 



Appendix 



Table 7. Employment by Sector, Selected Years, 1960-85 
(in percentages) 

Sector 1960 1970 1980 1985 



Material production 







47.3 


39.9 


33.8 






5.8 


6.0 


6.1 




1 O 1 


10.3 


lo.U 


18.6 


Trade, material, technical supplies, and 












. 3.5 


6.5 


6.8 


7.3 






5.4 


7.1 


7.8 


Total material production * 


87.0 


80.6 


76.0 


73.8 


Nonmaterial production 












. . 3.7 


7.8 


9.6 


10.3 




0.1 


0.3 


0.4 


0.4 




0.6 


2.0 


2.8 


3.8 


Public administration 


. 4.6 


2.1 


2.2 


2.4 


Public health and social security institutions . . 


2.8 


5.2 


6.3 


6.4 


Science and scientific services 


0.4 


1.0 


1.7 


1.9 


Total nonmaterial production * 


. . 13.0 


19.4 


24.0 


26.2 


TOTAL 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


* As published. 

Source: Based on information from Mongolia, Central Statistical Board, National Economy 



of the MPR for 65 Years, 1921-1986, Ulaanbaatar, 1986, 134-37. 



267 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



-a a 

V V 



a 
-a o 
c « 

Cd Oh 



"2 5 

So 

S § 

■go 
w 



o 
c 

o 



1957 


1934 




1936 


1957 


_c 








c 


rol 


rol 
I Ol 




rol 


rol 


conl 


com 




com 


com 


c 

.2 


c 

.2 


US ! 


c 

.2 


c 
.2 


Mongol 


Mongol 


nonferro 


Mongol 


Mongol 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


over 


over 


ition i 


over 


over 


rned 


-ned 


Exploits 


ned 


"ned 


Tui 


Tin 


Tui 


Tui 



pq 



1 

o 

E 

U 

bo 
o 

C 

bo 
c 
o 



V 

v -a 

o 5 



O HH 



o o> 

2 2 S < 



6 £ S h S 



2 2 2 S 



*o "o 

bo bo 

C C 

O O 

2 2 



£ 

bo 
c 
o 

E 

> 
o 
in 



c 

o 



> i 



co 
c § 

v a, 



« bo 
'5 E 



.2 -a 
2 8* 



bo 
c 
o 

£ 

o 
C0 



268 



Appendix 



Table 9. Foreign Trade, 1970, 1980, and 1985 
(in percentages) 

1970 1980 1985 

Exports 

Raw materials and processed products 

(nonfoodstuffs) 58.5 30.9 24.5 

Raw materials (foodstuffs) 19.5 13.4 6.2 

Foodstuffs 9.6 19.0 9.2 

Industrial consumer goods 5.9 9.6 16.8 

Fuel, minerals, raw materials, and metals . . 5.4 26.4 42.6 

Chemicals, fertilizers, and rubber 

Construction materials 0.9 0.4 0.6 

Machines and equipment 0.2 0.3 0. 1 

Total exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 

Imports 

Raw materials and processed products 

(nonfoodstuffs) 2.0 2.4 2.8 

Raw materials (foodstuffs) 0.3 2.9 1.4 

Foodstuffs 12.7 8.4 6.2 

Industrial consumer goods . . . 36.3 20.9 17.3 

Fuel, minerals, raw materials, and metals . . 12.8 24.1 28.7 

Chemicals, fertilizers, and rubber 5.1 6.3 6.0 

Construction materials 1.7 1.9 1.4 

Machines and equipment 25.9 33.1 36.2 

Total imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 

means negligible. 

Source: Based on information from Mongolia, Central Statistical Board, National Economy 
of the MPR for 65 Years, 1921-1986, Ulaanbaatar, 1986, 340-42. 



269 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Table 10. Principal Foreign Trade Commodities, 1986 

Commodity Unit Quantity 
Exports 

Cement thousands of tons 13 

Grain -do- 139 

Meat and meat products -do- 44 

Wool -do- 16 

Large hides thousands 121 

Small hides -do- 1,256 

Lumber thousands of cubic meters 39 

Sawn timber -do- 121 

Clothing millions of rubles 38 

Imports 

Cement thousands of tons 49 

Fertilizers -do- 33 

Fresh fruits -do- 2,600 

Gas, diesel, and paraffin -do- 788 

Lubricating oil -do- 24 

Paper -do- 9 

Refined sugar -do- 42 

Rolled iron and steel -do- 74 

Canned vegetables tons 1,500 

Insecticides -do- 1,615 

Cotton cloth millions of meters 55 

Silk and synthetic cloth -do- 8 

Woolen cloth -do- 1 

Buses units 319 

Clocks and watches -do- 120,000 

Cranes -do- 55 

Diesel generators -do- 7 

Electric forklifts -do- 17 

Excavators -do- 60 

Machine tools -do- 50 

Motorcycles -do- 7,107 

Automobiles -do- 551 

Radio receivers -do- 17,100 

Refrigerators -do- 12,600 

Sewing machines -do- 10,100 

Television sets -do- 11,000 

Tractors -do- 695 

Transformers -do- 186 

Trucks -do- 1,546 

Washing machines -do- 6,500 

Leather footwear thousands of pairs 566 

Source: Based on information from Europa Year Book, 1988, London, 1988, 1, 865. 



270 



Appendix 



Table 11. Hurals, 1924-86 



Hural * Date 

First National Great Hural November 1924 

Second National Great Hural November 1925 

Third National Great Hural November 1926 

Fourth National Great Hural October- November 1927 

Fifth National Great Hural December 1928-January 1929 

Sixth National Great Hural April 1930 

Seventh National Great Hural December 20-27, 1937 

Eighth National Great Hural June 20-July 9, 1940 

Ninth National Great Hural February 12-19, 1949 

First People's Great Hural July 1951 

Second People's Great Hural June 1954 

Third People's Great Hural ' June 1957 

Fourth People's Great Hural July 1960 

Fifth People's Great Hural June 1963 

Sixth People's Great Hural July 1966 

Seventh People's Great Hural June 1969 

Eighth People's Great Hural July 1973 

Ninth People's Great Hural June 1977 

Tenth People's Great Hural June-July 1981 

Eleventh People's Great Hural July 1986 

* Known as National Great Hural from 1924 to 1951, when the National Little Hural was abolished 
and its functions absorbed; thereafter known as People's Great Hural. 



Table 12. Party Congresses, 1921-86 



Party Congress * Date 

First Party Congress March 1-3, 1921 

Second Party Congress July 18-August 18, 1923 

Third Party Congress August 4-24, 1924 

Fourth Party Congress September 23-October 2, 1925 

Fifth Party Congress September 26-October 4, 1926 

Sixth Party Congress September 22-October 4, 1927 

Seventh Party Congress October 23-December 10, 1928 

Eighth Party Congress February 21 -April 3, 1930 

Ninth Party Congress September 28-October 5, 1934 

Tenth Party Congress March 20- April 5, 1940 

Eleventh Party Congress December 7-23, 1947 

Twelfth Party Congress November 19-24, 1954 

Thirteenth Party Congress March 17-22, 1958 

Fourteenth Party Congress July 3-7, 1961 

Fifteenth Party Congress June 7-11, 1966 

Sixteenth Party Congress July 1971 

Seventeenth Party Congress June 14-18, 1976 

Eighteenth Party Congress May 26-30, 1981 

Nineteenth Party Congress May 29-31, 1986 

* Party known as Mongolian People's Party from 1921 to 1924; thereafter known as Mongolian Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Party. 



271 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Table 13. Major Equipment of Mongolian People's Army, 1988 

Country Estimated Number 

Description of Origin in Inventory 



Armor 

Main battle tanks (T-54, T-55, T-62) Soviet Union 650 

BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles -do- 135 

BMP-1 mechanized infantry combat vehicles -do- 420 

BTR-40, BTR-60, and BTR-152 armored 

personnel carriers -do- 450 

Artillery 

D-30 122mm, M-46 130mm, and ML-20 

152mm towed artillery -do- 650 

ZPU-4 14.5mm, M-1939 37mm, and S-60 

57mm air defense guns -do- 100 

T-12 100mm antitank guns -do- n.a. 

120mm and 160mm mortars -do- n.a. 

BM-21 122mm, B-13 132mm, BM-16 

132mm, BM-14 140mm, BM-16 140mm, 

and BM-17 140mm multiple rocket 

launchers -do- 120 + 

Surface-to-air missiles 

SA-7 -do- 300 

Fighters 

MiG-21 (Fishbed), including one MiG-21U 

trainer -do- 30 

Transports 

An-2 (Colt) -do- 20 

An-24 (Coke) -do- 19 

An-26 (Curl) -do- 1 

An-32 (Cline) -do- 1 

Helicopters 

Mi-4 (Hound) -do- 10 

Mi-8 (Hip) -do- n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1988-1989, London, 1988, 171. 



272 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Aalto, Pentti. " Swells of the Mongol-Storm Around the Baltic," 

Acta Orientalia [Budapest], 36, 1982, 5-15. 
Akademiia Nauk SSSR. History of the Mongolian People's Republic. 

Moscow: Nauka, Central Department of Oriental Literature, 

1973. 

Allen, Thomas D. "Time Catches Up with Mongolia," National 
Geographic, 167, No. 2, February 1985, 242-69. 

Allsen, Thomas T. The Policies of the Grand Qan Mbngke in China, 
Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251-1259. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1987. 

Basilov, Vladimir N. (ed.). Nomads of Eurasia. (Trans. Mary Flem- 
ing Zirin.) Los Angeles: Natural History Museum of Los Angeles 
County, 1989. 

Bawden, Charles R. The History of Mongolia. New York: Praeger, 
1968. 

The Modern History of Mongolia. New York: Kegan Paul In- 
ternational, 1989. 

Bira, Sh., and N. Ishjamts. National- Liberation Movements in Mon- 
golia in the Late 19th-Early 20th Centuries. (Papers of Mongolian 
Delegation to XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences, 
San Francisco, August 22-29, 1975.) Ulaanbaatar: 1975. 

Boyle, John A. The Mongol World Empire, 1206-1370. London: Vari- 
orum Reprints, 1977. 

Bregel, Yuri. "Tribal Tradition and Dynastic History: The Early 
Rulers of the Qpngrats According to Munis," Asian and African 
Studies [Haifa], 16, No. 3, November 1982, 357-98. 

Brown, William A., and Urgunge Onon (trans, and annot.). His- 
tory of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Harvard East Asian Mono- 
graphs, 65.) Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1976. 

Buell, Paul D. "The Role of the Sino-Mongolian Frontier Zone 
in the Rise of Cinggis-Qan." Pages 63-76 in Henry G. Schwarz 
(ed.), Studies on Mongolia: Proceedings of the First North American Con- 
ference on Mongolian Studies. Bellingham: Center for East Asian 
Studies, Western Washington University, 1979. 

- ' ' Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara, ' ' Jour- 
nal of Asian History [Wiesbaden], 13, No. 2, 1979, 121-51. 



273 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Campi, Alicia J. "Mongolia and Tibet in the Seventeenth Century: 
The Nature of a Special Relationship." Pages 77-87 in Henry 
G. Schwarz (ed.), Studies on Mongolia: Proceedings of the First North 
American Conference on Mongolian Studies. Bellingham: Center for 
East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 1979. 

Cassidy, Robert B., Jr. "Mongolia: At Plan's End," Asian Survey, 
11, No. 1, January 1971, 86-91. 

Chambers, James. The Devil's Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of 
Europe. New York: Atheneum, 1979. 

Chan, Hok-lan. Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions under the 
Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115-1234). (Publications on China of 
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University 
of Washington, 38.) Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1984. 

Cheney, George A. The Pre- Revolutionary Culture of Outer Mongolia. 
(Mongolia Society Occasional Papers, No. 5.), Bloomington, 
Indiana: The Mongolia Society, 1968. 

Cleaves, Francis Woodman (trans.). The Secret History of the Mon- 
gols; For the First Time Done into English out of the Original Tongue 
and Provided with an Exegetical Commentary, 1. (Trans., Harvard- 
Yenching Institute.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1982. 

Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939. Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1985. 
Dardess, John W. Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change 

in Late Yuan China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 
. "From Mongol Empire to Yuan Dynasty: Changing 

Forms of Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia," 

Monumenta Serica [St. Augustin, West Germany], 30, 1972-73, 

117-65. 

Dawson, Christopher (ed.). The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Let- 
ters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thir- 
teenth and Fourteenth Centuries. New York: AMS Press, 1980. 

De Hartog, Leo. "The Army of Genghis Khan," Army Quarterly 
and Defence Journal [Tavistock, Devon, United Kingdom], 109, 
No. 4, October 1979, 476-85. 

. Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1989. 

Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. The Military Life of Genghis, Khan of Khans. 
New York: Franklin Watts, 1969. 

Dziewanowski, M.K. A History of Soviet Russia. Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1989. 

Endicott-West, Elizabeth. Mongolian Rule in China: Local Adminis- 
tration in the Yuan Dynasty. (Council on East Asian Studies, 



274 



Bibliography 



Harvard University, and Harvard-Yenching Institute, 29.) Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 

Ewing, Thomas E. Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Rus- 
sian Policies in Outer Mongolia, 1911-1921. (Indiana University 
Uralic and Altaic Series, 138.) Bloomington: Research Institute 
for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1980. 

"Ch'ing Policies in Outer Mongolia, 1900-1911," Modern 

Asian Studies [London], 14, Pt. 1, February 1980, 145-57. 

"Revolution on the Chinese Frontier: Outer Mongolia 

in 1911," Journal oj Asian History [Wiesbaden], 12, No. 2, 1978, 
101-19. 

Fairbank, John K., Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig. 
East Asia: Tradition and Transformation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1978. 

Fisher, Alan. The Crimean Tatars. (Hoover Institution Publication, 
166.) Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 
1978. 

Fletcher, Joseph. "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspec- 
tives," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 46, No. 1, June 1986, 
11-50. 

Gorelik, Mikhail V., and Mark G. Kramarovskii. "The Mongol- 
Tatar States of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries." Pages 
67-86 in Vladimir N. Basilov (ed.) Nomads of Eurasia. (Trans. 
Mary Fleming Zirin.) Los Angeles: Natural History Museum 
of Los Angeles County, 1989. 

Green, Elizabeth E. "China and Mongolia: Recurring Trends and 
Prospects for Change," Asian Survey, 26, No. 12, December 1986, 
1337-63. 

Grousset, Rene. Conqueror of the World: The Life of Chingis Khan. 
(Trans. Marian McKellar and Denis Sinor.) New York: Orion 
Press, 1966. 

The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. (Trans. 

Naomi Walford.) New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1970. 

Gumilyev, Lev Nikolaevich. Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom: The 
Legend of the Kingdom of Prester John. (Trans. R.E.F. Smith.) (Past 
and Present Publications Series.) New York: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 1987. 

"The Secret History of the Mongols in the Twelfth and 

Thirteenth Centuries: As They Themselves Wrote It." Pages 
193-208 in D.A. Olderogge (ed.), The Countries and Peoples of the 
East: Selected Articles. Moscow: Nauka, 1974. 

Haggard, M.T. "Mongolia: New Soviet Moves to Bolster Rul- 
ing Group," Asian Survey, 6, No. 1, January 1966, 13-17. 



275 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



. "Mongolia: The First Communist State in Asia." Pages 

82-113 in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution 
in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1965. 

. "Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer," Asian Survey, 5, No. 1, 

January 1965, 18-24. 

Haider, Mansura. "The Mongol Traditions and Their Survival 
in Central Asia (XIV-XV Centuries)," Central Asiatic Journal 
[Wiesbaden], 28, Nos. 1-2, 1984, 57-79. 

Halkovic, Stephen A., Jr. The Mongols of the West. (Indiana Univer- 
sity Uralic and Altaic Series, 148.) Bloomington: Indiana 
Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 
1985. 

Halperin, Charles J. Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact 
on Medieval Russian History. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1985. 

. The Tatar Yoke. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1986. 

Heaton, William R. "Mongolia in 1982: Looking Forward but 
Also Back," Asian Survey, 23, No. 1, January 1983, 47-52. 

"Mongolia in 1983: Mixed Signals," Asian Survey, 24, 

No. 1, January 1984, 127-33. 

. "Mongolia: Looking Forward at Fifty," Asian Survey, 12, 

No. 1, January 1972, 69-77. 

. "Mongolia 1978: Continuing the Transition," Asian Sur- 
vey, 19, No. 1, January 1979, 58-64. 

"Mongolia 1979: Learning from 'Leading Experiences'," 

Asian Survey, 20, No. 1, January 1980, 77-83. 

"Mongolia: Troubled Satellite," A sian Survey, 13, No. 2, 

February 1973, 246-51. 

. "Mongolia — Year of Socialist Competition," Asian Sur- 
vey, 14, No. 1, January 1974, 30-35. 

Heissig, Walther. A Lost Civilization: The Mongols Rediscovered. Lon- 
don: Thames and Hudson, 1966. 

Henthorn, William E. Korea: The Mongol Invasions. Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1963. 

Hibbert, R.A. "The Mongolian People's Republic in the 1960's," 
World Today, 23, No. 3, March 1967, 122-30. 

Howorth, Henry H. History of the Mongols, From the 9th to the 19th 
Century. 4 vols. London: n.p., 1876-1927. (Burt Franklin 
Research and Source Work Series, 85.) New York: Burt Frank- 
lin, 1965. 

Hulsewe, A.F.P. China in Central Asia, The Early Stage: 125 B.C- 
A.D. 23: An Annotated Translation of Chapters 61 and 96 of the His- 
tory of the Former Han Dynasty. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979. 



276 



Bibliography 



Hyer, Paul. "Japan's Occupation of Mongolia (1931-1945)." 

Pages 161-68 in Ch'en Chieh-hsiu (ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth 

East Asian Altaistic Conference, December 26, 1979-January 2, 1980. 

Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1980. 
. "The Dalai Lamas and the Mongols," Tibet Journal [Dhar- 

masala], 6, No. 4, Winter 1981, 3-12. 
Isono, Fujiko. "Soviet Russia and the Mongolian Revolution in 

1921," Past and Present [Oxford], 83, May 1979, 116-40. 
Jackson, P. "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," Central Asiatic 

Journal [Wiesbaden], 22, Nos. 3-4, 1978, 186-244. 
Jagchid, Sechin. Essays in Mongolian Studies. (Monograph Series, 

David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, 3.) Provo, 

Utah: Brigham Young University, 1988. 
"The Failure of A Self-Determination Movement: The 

Inner Mongolian Case." Pages 229-45 in William O. McCagg, 

Jr., and Brian D. Silver (eds.), Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers. New 

York: Pergamon Press, 1979. 
. "The Kitans and Their Cities," Central Asiatic Journal 

[Wiesbaden], 25, Nos. 1-2, 1981, 70-88. 
"Kitan Struggle Against Jurchen Oppression: Nomadism 

Versus Sinicization," Zentralasiastische Studien [Bonn], 16, 1982, 

165-85. 

. "Mongolian Nationalism in Response to Great Power 

Rivalry, 1900-1950," Plural Societies [The Hague], 4, No. 1, 
Spring 1973, 43-57. 

Jagchid, Sechin, and Paul Hyer. Mongolia's Culture and Society. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. 

Kahn, Paul. The Secret History of the Mongols; The Origins of Chingis 
Khan: An Adaptation of the Yuan Ch'ao Pi Shih, Based Primarily 
on the English Translation by Francis Woodman Cleaves. San Fran- 
cisco: North Point Press, 1984. 

Keighdey, David N. (ed.). The Origins of Chinese Civilization. (Studies 
on China, 1.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 

Kirchner, Walther. A History of Russia. (6th ed.) New York: Barnes 
and Noble Books, 1976. 

Kohl, Philip (ed.). The Bronze Age Civilization of Central Asia: Recent 
Soviet Discoveries. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1981. 

Kwanten, Luc. Imperial Nomads: A History of Central Asia, 500-1500. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979. 

Kwanten, Luc, and Susan Hesse. Tangut (Hsi Hsia) Studies: A Bib- 
liography. (Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series, 137.) 
Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana 
University, 1980. 



277 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Lamb, Harold. Genghis Khan: Emperor of All Men. New York: 

Doubleday, 1962. 
Langlois, John D., Jr. (ed.). China under Mongol Rule. Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1981. 
Lattimore, Owen. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. Boston: Beacon 

Press, 1962. 

. Mongol Journeys. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1941. 

. Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1955. 
Lin, Chiang C. "The Mongolian- Soviet Relations, 1945-1975." 

Asian Forum, 8, Spring 1976, 15-24. 
Lister, R.P. The Secret History of Genghis Khan. London: Peter Davies, 

1969. 

Lowry, Glenn D., and A. Heller. "The Mongolian Expansion." 
Pages 89-168 in Storm Across Asia. New York: HBJ Press, 1980. 

McMillan, James. "Mongolia: The Economy in 1968," Asian Sur- 
vey, 9, No. 1, January 1969, 23-28. 

Michael, Franz H. The Origin of Manchu Rule in China. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. 

Miyakawa, Junko. "The Khalkha Mongols in the Seventeenth 
Century." Pages 178-81 in Ch'en Chieh-hsiu (ed.), Proceedings 
of International Ch 3 ing Archives Symposium, July 2, 1978-July 6, 1978. 
Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1982. 

Morgan, D.O. "Who Ran the Mongol Empire?" Journal oj 'the Royal 
Asiatic Society [London], No. 2, 1982, 124-36. 

Morgan, David. The Mongols. (People of Europe Series.) New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986. 

Moses, Larry W. The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism. (Indiana 
University Uralic Altaic Series, 133.) Bloomington: Asian Studies 
Research Institute, Indiana University, 1977. 

Moses, Larry W., and Stephen A. Halkovic, Jr. Introduction to Mon- 
golian History and Culture. (Indiana University Uralic and Altaic 
Series, 149.) Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian 
Studies, Indiana University, 1985. 

Murphy, George G.S. Soviet Mongolia: A Study of the Oldest Political 
Satellite. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. 

Olschki, Leonardo. V Asia di Marco Polo. (Civilta Veneziana Studi, 
2.) Venice and Rome: Istituto per la Collaborazione Culturale, 
1978. 

. Guilaume Boucher: A French Artist at the Court of the Khans. 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1946. 
. Marco Polo's Precursors. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 

1943. 



278 



Bibliography 

Onon, Urgunge (ed. and trans.). Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth 
Century. New York: AMS Press, 1976. 

Onon, Urgunge, and Derrick Pritchatt. Asia's First Modern Revolu- 
tion: Mongolia Proclaims Its Independence in 1911. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1989. 

Phillips, E.D. The Mongols. (Ancient Peoples and Places Series.) 

New York: Praeger, 1969. 
Piano Carpini, John of. Geschichte der Mongolen und Reisebericht, 

1245-1247. (Trans, and ed., Friedrich Risch.) Leipzig: E. 

Pfeiffer, 1930. 

Prawdin, Michael. (Pseud. forM. Charol.) The Mongol Empire. Lon- 
don: Allen and Unwin, 1940. 

Presniakov, A.E. The Formation of the Great Russian State: A Study 
of Russian History in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries. (Trans., 
A.E. Moorhouse.) Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. 

Ratchnevsky, Paul. Cinggis-khan: Sein Leben und Wirken. Wiesbaden: 
Franz Steiner, 1983. 

Rockstein, Edward. "The Mongol Invasions of Korea: 1231," 
Mongolia Society Bulletin, 11, No. 2 (21), Fall 1972, 41-54. 

Ronay, Gabriel. The Tartar Khan's Englishman. London: Cassell, 
1978. 

Rossabi, Morris (ed.). China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and 
Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries. Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1983. 

The Jurchens of the Yuan and Ming. (Cornell University East 

Asia Papers, 27.) Ithaca: China-Japan Program, Cornell Univer- 
sity, 1982. 

. Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times. Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1987. 

Rubruck, William of. The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern 
Parts of the World, 1253-55, As Narrated by Himself, with Two Ac- 
counts of the Earlier Journey of John of Pian de Carpine. (Trans, and 
ed., William Woodville Rockhill.) (2d Series, No. 4.) London: 
Hakluyt Society, 1900. 

Rupen, Robert A. How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History 
of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900-1978. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979. 

The Mongolian People's Republic. Stanford: Hoover Institu- 
tion on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966. 

"The Mongolian People's Republic and Sino-Soviet Com- 
petition." Pages 262-92 in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist 
Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties. 
(Praeger Publications in Russian History and World Com- 
munism, 132.) New York: Praeger, 1963. 



279 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



. Mongols of the Twentieth Century. (Indiana University Pub- 
lications, Uralic and Altaic Series, 37, Pts. 1-2.) Bloomington: 
Indiana University, 1964. 

. "Outer Mongolia since 1955," Pacific Affairs [Vancouver], 

30, No. 4, December 1957, 342-57. 

"Recent Trends in the Mongolian People's Republic," 

Asian Survey, 4, No. 4, April 1964, 812-20. 

Salisbury, Harrison E. "Mongolia Revisited," Mongolia Society Bulle- 
tin, 1, No. 1, Winter 1962, 17-22. 

Sanders, Alan J. K. "Mongolia: From Sambuu to Tsedenbal," 
Asian Survey, 14, No. 11, November 1974, 971-84. 

"Mongolia in 1975: 'One Crew in Battle, One Brigade 

in Labour' with the USSR," Asian Survey, 16, No. 1, January 
1976, 66-71. 

. "Mongolia in 1984: From Tsedenbal to Batmonh," Asian 

Survey, 25, No. 1, January 1985, 122-30. 
. "Mongolia 1976: Drawing Together Frankly with the 

Soviet Union," Asian Survey, 17, No. 1, January 1977, 27-33. 
"Mongolia 1977: Directive No. 14," Asian Survey, 18, 

No. 1, January 1978, 29-35. 
Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society. (Marxist Regimes 

Series.) Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 
Sanjdorj, M. Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia. 

(Trans. Urgunge Onon.) New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 
Saunders, John Joseph. The History of the Mongol Conquests. New 

York: Barnes and Noble, 1971. 
Schamiloglu, Uli. "Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the 

Golden Horde." (Ph.D. dissertation.) New York: Columbia 

University, 1986. 
Schwarz, Henry G. The Minorities of Northern China: A Survey. (Studies 

on East Asia, 17.) Bellingham: Center for East Asian Studies, 

Western Washington University, 1984. 
Sebes, Joseph S. "The Fragmentation of the Mongols During the 

Ming Dynasty and Their Step-by-Step Conquest by the Man- 

chus and Russians (Part I)." Canada-Mongolia Review [Saskatoon], 

2, No. 2, 1976, 127-49. 
"The Fragmentation of the Mongols During the Ming 

Dynasty and Their Step-by-Step Conquest by the Manchus and 

Russians (Part II)." Canada-Mongolia Review [Saskatoon], 3, 

No. 1, May 1977, 24-32. 
Serruys, Henry. The Mongols and Ming China: Custom and History. 

(Ed. Francoise Aubin.) London: Variorum Reprints, 1987. 
Sicker, Martin. The Strategy of Soviet Imperialism: Expansion in Eurasia. 

New York: Praeger, 1988. 



280 



Bibliography 



Sinor, Denis. Inner Asia and Its Contacts with Medieval Europe. Lon- 
don: Variorum Reprints, 1977. 

. Inner Asia: History, Civilization, Languages; A Syllabus. (2d 

rev. ed.) (Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic 
Series, 96.) Bloomington: Indiana University, 1971. 

"Interpreters in Medieval Inner Asia. " Asian and African 

Studies [Haifa], 16, No. 3, November 1982, 293-320. 

. "Notes on Inner Asian Historiography, IV: The Mon- 
gols in the 13th Century, "Journal of Asian History [Wiesbaden], 
23, No. 1, 1989, 26-79. 

Sinor, Denis (ed.). The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia. Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 

Smith, John Masson, Jr. '-'Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mon- 
gol Failure?" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 44, No. 2, Decem- 
ber 1984, 307-45. 

Smith, Robert A. "Mongolia: In the Soviet Camp," Asian Survey, 
10, No. 1, January 1970, 25-29. 

Spuler, Bertold. History of the Mongols, Based on Eastern and Western 
Accounts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries. (Trans., Helga 
Drummond and Stuart Drummond.). London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1972. 

The Mongols in History. (Trans. Geoffrey Wheeler.). New 

York: Praeger, 1971. 

Ssanang Ssetsen, Chungtaidschi. The Bejewelled Summary of the Ori- 
gins of the Khans . (Trans., John R. Krueger.). Bloomington, In- 
diana: The Mongolia Society, 1964. 

Tamura, Jitsuzo. "The Legend of the Origin of the Mongols and 
Problem Concerning Their Migration," Acta Asiatica [Tokyo], 
No. 24, 1973, 1-19. 

Tang, Peter S.H. Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer 
Mongolia, 1911-1931. Durham, North Carolina: Duke Univer- 
sity Press, 1959. 

Tao, Jing-shan. The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study ofSini- 
cization. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 
1976. 

Tumenjargal, E. (comp. and ed.). The 1917 Russian Revolution and 

Mongolia: Towards the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist 

Revolution. Ulaanbaatar: Montsame, 1977. 
Underdown, Michael. "Aspects of Mongolian History, 1901- 

1915," Zentralasiatische Studien [Bonn], 15, 1981, 151-240. 
"Banditry and Revolutionary Movements in Late 19th 

and Early 20th Century Mongolia," Mongolian Studies, 6, 1980, 

109-16. 



281 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Valliant, Robert B. "Japanese Involvement in Mongol Indepen- 
dence Movements, 1912-1919," Mongolia Society Bulletin, 11, 
No. 2 (21), Fall 1972, 1-32. 

Van der Kuijp, L.WJ. "A Note to the Development of Buddhism 
in Mongolia," Canada-Mongolia Review [Saskatoon], 1, No. 1, 
1975, 67-94. 

Vernadsky, George. The Mongols and Russia. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1953. 

Weidlich, Mary Frances. "Mongolia in 1980: A Year of Adjust- 
ments and Resolves," Asian Survey, 21, No. 1, January 1981, 
63-69. 

Wiencek, Henry. "Genghis Khan and the Mongols." Pages 9-88 

in Storm Across Asia. New York: HBJ Press, 1980. 
Zagoria, Donald S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961. Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1962. 
Zhagvaral, A. (ed.). The Mongolian People's Republic. Ulaanbaatar: 

Committee of Sciences of the Mongolian People's Republic, 

1956. 

Zhao, Zhan. "On the Origins of the Mongols," Journal of the Anglo- 
Mongolian Society [Cambridge], 9, Nos. 1-2, December 1984, 
43-47. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: American Association for the 
Advancement of Slavic Studies, American Bibliography of Slavic and 
East European Studies; and Association for Asian Studies, Bibliography 
of Asian Studies.) 

Chapter 2 

Akademiia Nauk SSSR. History of the Mongolian People's Republic. 
Moscow: Nauka, Central Department of Oriental Literature, 
1973. 

Allen, Thomas D. "Time Catches Up with Mongolia," National 
Geographic, 167, No. 2, February 1985, 242-69. 

Basilov, Vladimir N. (ed.). Nomads of Eurasia. (Trans., Mary Flem- 
ing Zirin.) Los Angeles: Natural History Museum of Los Angeles 
County, 1989. 

Brown, William A., and Urgunge Onon (Trans, and annot.). His- 
tory of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Harvard East Asian Mono- 
graphs, 65.) Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1976. 



282 



Bibliography 



Cable, Mildred, and Francesca French. The Gobi Desert. London: 
Virago, 1984. 

Chadra, B. "Cosmic Horizons in Science." Pages 53-58 in Novosti 
Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board (eds.), The 60th Anniver- 
sary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

Chapman, M.J. "Bactrians and Dromedaries." Asian Affairs [Lon- 
don], 18, Part 3, October 1987, 276-82. 

Chen Cheng-hsiang. A Geography of Mongolia. (Research Report, 
28.) Hong Kong: Geographical Research Center, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 1970. 

"The Curative Power of Mineral Springs," Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar] , 
No. 5 (80), 1984, 23. 

Enkh, T. "The Team — A United Family," Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar], 
Nos. 2-3 (65-66), 1982, 21-22. 

Fletcher, Joseph. "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspec- 
tives," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 46, No. 1, June 1986, 
11-50. 

Gellner, Ernest. "Buddha and Marx: A Review Article," Com- 
parative Studies in Society and History, 29, No. 2, April 1987, 381-84. 

Gombo, S. "A Sociologist's Notes," Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar], No. 2 
(71), 1983, 8-9. 

Haining, Thomas. "The Mongols and Religion," Asian Affairs 
[London], 17, Pt. 1, February 1986, 19-32. 

Humphrey, Caroline. Karl Marx Collective: Economy, Society, and 
Religion in a Siberian Collective Farm. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. 

Jagchid, Sechin, and Paul Hyer. Mongolia's Culture and Society. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. 

Kaser, Michael. "The Industrial Revolution in Mongolia," World 
Today [London], 38, No. 1, January 1982, 12-17. 

Khazanov, A.M. Nomads and the Outside World. Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1984. 

Kimura, Hisao. "The Activities of the MPR State Committee for 
Terminology." Pages 26-29 in Studies on Mongolia. (Proceedings 
of First North American Conference on Mongolian Studies.) Bel- 
lingham: Western Washington University, 1979. 

Lattimore, Owen. Mongol Journeys. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 
1941. 

Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited. New York: Ox- 
ford University Press, 1962. 

Lkhamsuren, M. "Manpower Policy and Planning in the Mon- 
golian People's Republic," International Labour Review [Geneva], 
121, No. 4, July-August 1982, 469-80. 



283 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Michel, Walter. Im Zeichen des Sojombo: Impressionen aus der Mon- 
golischen Volksrepublik. Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1981. 

Micheli, Silvio. Mongolia: In Search of Marco Polo and Other Adven- 
tures. (Trans., Bruce Penman.). London: Hollis and Carter, 1967. 

Mongolia. Central Statistical Board. National Economy of the M PR 
for 65 Years, 1921-1986. Ulaanbaatar: 1986. 

Central Statistical Board. National Economy of the MPR in 

1981. Ulaanbaatar: 1982. (Trans., Joint Publication Research 
Service.) (JPRS-MON-86-001 .) Washington, January 27, 1986. 

Moses, Larry W. The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism. (Indiana 
University Uralic and Altaic Series, 133.) Bloomington: Asian 
Studies Research Institute, Indiana University, 1977. 

Moses, Larry W., and Stephen A. Halkovic, Jr. Introduction to Mon- 
golian History and Culture. (Indiana University Uralic and Altaic 
Series, 149.) Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian 
Studies, Indiana University, 1985. 

Murphy, George G.S. Soviet Mongolia: A Study of the Oldest Political 
Satellite. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. 

Novosti Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board (eds.). The 60th 
Anniversary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

Nyam-Osor, D. "Health Protection for the People." Pages 96-98 
in Novosti Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board (eds.), The 
60th Anniversary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

Onun, Urgunge (ed. and trans.). Mongolian Heroes of the Twentieth 
Century. New York: AMS Press, 1976. 

Oyuntsetseg, S. "The Work and Life of a Building Team," Mon- 
golia [Ulaanbaatar], No. 6 (75), 1983, 9-10. 

Pastoral Production and Society. (Proceedings of International Meet- 
ing on Nomadic Pastoralism, Paris, 1976.) Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1979. 

Petrov, Victor P. Mongolia: A Profile. New York: Praeger, 1980. 

Purevsuren, N. "The Glorious Festival of Tsagan Sar." Pages 182- 
85 in Novosti Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board (eds.), 
The 60th Anniversary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

Rinchin, L. "Collectivisation: The Key to a Rise in the Standard 
of Living." Pages 73-78 in Novosti Press Agency and Unen 
Editorial Board (eds.), The 60th Anniversary of People's Mongolia. 
Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

Rinchindorj, T. "Cooperation in Medicine," Mongolia [Ulaan- 
baatar], No. 4 (67), 1982, 8-9. 

Rosenberg, Daniel. "Leaders and Leadership Roles in a Mongolian 
Collective: Two Case Studies," Mongolian Studies, 7, 1981-82, 
17-51. 



284 



Bibliography 



. " 'Negdel' Development: A Socio-Cultural Perspective," 

Mongolian Studies, 1, 1974, 62-75. 

Rundall, Richard A., and Raymond D. Terell. "Educational 
Desert or Oasis? An Educator's Trek to Outer Mongolia, ' ' Adoles- 
cence, 21, No. 81, Spring 1986, 185-89. 

Rupen, Robert A. How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History 
of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900-1978. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979. 

. Mongols of the Twentieth Century. (Indiana University Pub- 
lications, Uralic and Altaic Series, 37, Pts. 1-2.) Bloomington: 
Indiana University, 1964. 

Sanders, Alan J. K. Mongolia: Politics, Economics, and Society. (Marxist 
Regimes Series.) Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 

. The People's Republic of Mongolia: A General Reference Guide. 

London: Oxford University Press, 1968. 

. "Scientific Restructuring," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], December 10, 1987, 42-43. 

. "The Tainted Waters: The Government Begins To Ad- 
dress Pollution Problems," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 
Kong], October 20, 1988, 40. 

Sanzhasuren, R. "The Torch of Knowledge." Pages 89-95 in 
Novosti Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board (eds.), The 60th 
Anniversary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

"Science in Progress," Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar] , No. 4 (73), 1983, 
26-27. 

Sodnom, D. "Planning: The Decisive Advantage of Socialism. " 
Pages 43-48 in Novosti Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board 
(eds.), The 60th Anniversary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 
1981. 

Soviet Union. Council of Ministers. Main Administration of 
Geodesy and Cartography. Mongolskaia Narodnaia Respublika, 
ekonomicheskaia karta dlia srednei shkoly (Mongolian People's Repub- 
lic, Economic Map for the Middle School). Moscow: 1985. 

Council of Ministers. Main Administration of Geodesy 

and Cartography. Mongolskaia Narodnaia Respublika, fizicheskaia 
karta dlia srednei shkoly (Mongolian People's Republic, Physical 
Map for the Middle School). Moscow: 1985. 

Council of Ministers. Main Administration of Geodesy 

and Cartography. Mongolskaia Narodnaia Respublika, spravochnaia 
karta (Mongolian People's Republic, Reference Map). Moscow: 
1985. 

Tamir, B. "Mongolian State University: Forty Years of Progress," 
Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar], No. 5 (68), 1982, 10-13. 



285 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Times of London. The Times Atlas of the World: Comprehensive Edi- 
tion. (2d rev. ed.) Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971. 

United Nations. Department of International Economic and Social 
Affairs. World Demographic Estimates and Projections, 1950-2025. 
New York: 1988. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 
1989. (CPAS WF 89-001.) Washington: May 1989. 

. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Center 

for International Research. World Population Profile, 1987. Wash- 
ington: 1987. 

Vainshtein, Seyvan I. Nomads of South Siberia: The Pastoral Economies 

of Tuva. (Ed., Caroline Humphrey; trans., Michael Colenso.) 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
Vreeland, Herbert Harold. Mongol Community and Kinship Structure. 

New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962. Reprint. 

Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973. 
Walder, Andrew G. Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority 

in Chinese Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
Weiers, Michael (ed.). Die Mongolen: Beitrage zu ihrer Geschichte und 

Kultur. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986. 
Weissleder, Wolfgang (ed.). The Nomadic Alternative: Modes and Models 

of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes. The Hague: 

Mouton, 1978. 

Xu Wenyi. "Mongolia Revisited." Shijie Zhishi (World Knowledge) 
[Beijing], November 16, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: China, (FBIS-CHI-88-239.) December 13, 
1988, 10-11. 

Zachariah, K.C., and My T. Vu. World Population Projections, 1978- 
88 Edition: Short and Long-Term Estimates. Baltimore: World Bank, 
1988. 

Zhao Qingmao. "Mongolia: Economic Reforms Under Way," 
Beijing Review [Beijing], 31, No. 39, September 26, 1988, 12-13. 

Zorig, D. "An Active Promoter of Health Care," Mongolia [Ulaan- 
baatar], Nos. 2-3 (65-66), 1982, 26-27. 

(Various issues of the following publication were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Association for Asian Studies, Bib- 
liography of Asian Studies.) 



Chapter 3 

Allen, Thomas D. "Time Catches Up with Mongolia," National 
Geographic, 167, No. 2, February 1985, 242-69. 



286 



Bibliography 



Bach, Quintin V.S. Soviet Economic Assistance to the Less Developed 
Countries. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. 

Bolotin, Evgeny. "In the Geologists' Wake," New Times [Moscow], 
No. 48, November 1985, 26-27. 

Brown, William A., and Urgunge Onon (trans, and annot.). His- 
tory of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Harvard East Asian Mono- 
graphs, 65.) Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1976. 

Butler, William E. The Mongolian Legal System: Contemporary Legis- 
lation and Documentation. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 

' 'Civil Aviation of the MPR: Today and Tomorrow," Mongolia 
[Ulaanbaatar], No. 3 (78), 1985, 8-9. 

Enebish, B. "Mongolia's Transport Systems," Mongolia [Ulaan- 
baatar], No. 3 (48), 1979, 25-27. 

Europa Yearbook, 1988. 2 vols. London: Europa, 1988. 

"Foreign Tourists! Mongolia, A Country of Eternally Blue Skies, 
Awaits You!" Mongolia [Ulaanbaatar], No. 4 (79), 1985, 32. 

Heaton, William R. "Mongolia in 1986: New Plan, New Situa- 
tion," Asian Survey, 27, No. 1, January 1987, 75-80. 

Holub, Alois. "Mongolia: Modernizing the Industrial Structure." 
Pages 536-59 in Ngo Manh-Lan (ed.) Unreal Growth: Critical 
Studies on Asian Development, 1. Delhi: Hindustan, 1984. 

Kaser, Michael. "The Industrial Revolution in Mongolia," World 
Today [London], 38, No. 1, January 1982, 12-17. 

Lkhamsuren, M. "Manpower Policy and Planning in the Mon- 
golian People's Republic," International Labour Review [Geneva], 
121, No. 4, July-August 1982, 469-80. 

Mongolia. Central Statistical Board. National Economy of the MPR 
for 65 Years, 1921-1986. Ulaanbaatar: 1986. 

"Mongolia Moves Ahead, ' ' Communications International [London] , 
14, No. 10, October 1987, 22. 

Nordby, Judith. "The Mongolian People's Republic in the 1980s: 
Continuity and Change, " Journal of Communist Studies [London] , 
3, No. 4, December 1987, 113-31. 

Ovdiyenko, Ivan Kharitonovichueger. Economic-Geographical Sketch 
of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Ed., John R, Krueger; trans., 
The Mongolia Society.) Bloomington, Indiana: The Mongolia 
Society, 1965. 

Petrov, Victor P. Mongolia: A Profile. New York: Praeger, 1980. 
Qi Hongmin. "China and Mongolia Speed Up Business," China 

Daily [Beijing] (Business Weekly Supplement), March 27, 1989, 

1, 4. 

Sanders, Alan J. K. "Economic Realism," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], December 10, 1987, 41-44. 



287 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



. "Exporting the Problem," Far Eastern Economic Review 
[Hong Kong], October 27, 1988, 42. 

. "Glasnost Gathers Support Despite Limits on Debate," 

Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong Kong], December 10, 1987, 
40-41. 

"Merger Mania," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 

Kong], February 11, 1988, 62. 

. "Mongolia in 1988: Year of Renewal," Asian Survey, 29, 

No. 1, January 1989, 46-53. 

Mongolia: Politics, Economics, and Society. (Marxist Regimes 

Series.) Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 

"Scientific Restructuring," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], December 10, 1987, 42-43. 

. "The Tainted Waters: The Government Begins to Ad- 
dress Pollution Problems," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 
Kong], October 20, 1988, 40. 

"The Winds of Change," Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], July 16, 1987, 62, 64. 

Soviet Union. Council of Ministers. Main Administration of 
Geodesy and Cartography. Mongolskaia Narodnaia Respublika, 
ekonomicheskaia karta dlia srednei shkoly (Mongolian People's Repub- 
lic, Economic Map for the Middle School). Moscow: 1985. 

. Editorial Board Academy of Sciences. Oriental Studies 

Institute. Mongolskaia Narodnaya Respublika (Mongolian People's 
Republic). Moscow: Nauka, 1986. 

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 
1989. (CPAS WF 89-001.) Washington: May 1989. 

World Aviation Directory, 1989. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988. 

Zhao Qingmao. "Mongolia: Economic Reforms Under Way," 
Beijing Review [Beijing], 31, No. 39, September 26, 1988, 12-13. 

(Various issues of the following publication were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Association for Asian Studies, Bib- 
liography of Asian Studies; and Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 
Yearbook. ) 



Chapter 4 

Batmonh, Jambyn. "Renewal," New Times [Moscow], No. 9, 
February 27, 1989, 33-36. 

Brown, William A., and Urgunge Onon (trans, and annot.). His- 
tory of the Mongolian People's Republic. (Harvard East Asian Mono- 
graphs, 65.) Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1976. 



288 



Bibliography 



Butler, William E. The Mongolian Legal System: Contemporary Legis- 
lation and Documentation. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 
Enkhsaikhan, Jargalsaikhany. "Ensuring Peace in Asia and the 

Pacific: The Mongolian Initiative," Asian Survey, 25, No. 10, 

October 1985, 1031-38. 
Europa Yearbook, 1988. London: Europa, 1988. 
Farrett, Kenneth. "Mongolia in 1987: Out from the Cold," Asian 

Survey, 28, No. 1, January 1988, 78-85. 
Flanz, Gisbert H., and Karen Shaw Kerpen (eds.). "Mongolian 

People's Republic." In Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz 

(eds.), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 10. Dobbs Ferry, 

New York: Oceana, February 1981. 
Friters, Gerald M. Outer Mongolia and Its International Position. New 

York: Octagon Books, 1974. 
Ginsburgs, George. "Mongolia's 'Socialist' Constitution," Pacific 

Affairs [Vancouver], 34, No. 2, Summer 1961, 141-56. 
Gorbachev, Mikhail. "Excerpts from Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech 

in Krasnoyarsk on September 16, 1988," Far Eastern Affairs 

[Moscow], No. 1, January 1989, 2-4. 
Green, Elizabeth E. "China and Mongolia: Recurring Trends and 

Prospects for Change," Asian Survey, 26, No. 12, December 1986, 

1337-63. 

Heaton, William R. "Mongolia in 1986: New Plan, New Situa- 
tion," Asian Survey, 27, No. 1, January 1987, 75-80. 

Hillary, Naylor. "Letter from Ulan Bator," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], November 19, 1982, 98. 

Jagchid, Sechin, and Paul Hyer. Mongolia's Culture and Society. Boul- 
der, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. 

Katerinich, A., and A. Sherstnoyov. "The Road of Peace and 
Progress," Far Eastern Affairs [Moscow], No. 4, 1984, 13-24. 

Lattimore, Owen. "Mongolia as a Leading State," Mongolian 
Studies, 10, 1986-87, 5-18. 

"Leadership Profile: Jambyn Batmonh, ' ' Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Weekly, September 3-9, 1984, 7. 

Mann, Steve. "Making It in Mongolia: At the New Post, an 'Aroma 
of Mutton'," State, No. 320, March 1989, 7-12. 

Mongolia. Central Statistical Board. National Economy of the MPR 
for 65 Years, 1921-1986. Ulaanbaatar: 1986. 

Nordby, Judith. "The Mongolian People's Republic in the 1980s: 
Continuity and Change , " Journal of Communist Studies [London] , 
3, No. 4, December 1987, 113-31. 

Novosti Press Agency and Unen Editorial Board (eds.). The 60th 
Anniversary of People's Mongolia. Moscow: Novosti, 1981. 

Petrov, Victor P. Mongolia: A Profile. New York: Praeger, 1980. 



289 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Rupen, Robert A. How Mongolia Is Really Ruled: A Political History 
of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1900-1978. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979. 

"The Mongolian People's Republic and Sino-Soviet Com- 
petition." Pages 262-92 in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist 
Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties. 
(Praeger Publications in Russian History and World Com- 
munism, 132.) New York: Praeger, 1963. 

Sanders, Alan J. K. ''Looking Beyond the Steppe: Sino-Soviet Re- 
lations Remain the Key to the Future," Far Eastern Economic 
Review [Hong Kong], December 10, 1987, 39-44. 

"Mongolia in 1984: From Tsedenbal to Batmonh," Asian 

Survey, 25, No. 1, January 1985, 122-30. 

. "Mongolia in 1988: Year of Renewal," Asian Survey, 29, 

No. 1, January 1989, 46-53. 

. Mongolia: Politics, Economics, and Society. (Marxist Regimes 

Series.) Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 

"Tsedenbal Is Riding High, ' ' Far Eastern Economic Review 

[Hong Kong], November 19, 1982, 38-44. 

Scalapino, Robert A. Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia. (Asian 
Agenda Report, 9.) Lanham, Maryland: University Press of 
America, 1987. 

Sheel, Ram Rahul. "Mongolia in International Perspective," Inter- 
national Studies [Delhi], 22, No. 3, July- September 1985, 236-50. 
Stolper, Thomas E. China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands. Armonk, 

New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1985. 
Union of International Associations (ed.). Yearbook of International 

Organizations, 1988-89. Munich: K.G. Saur, 1989. 
United States. Board on Geographic Names. Gazetteer of Mongolia. 

(2d ed.) Washington: Defense Mapping Agency, 1988. 
. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 1989. 

(CPAS WF 89-001.) Washington: May 1989. 
Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Background 

Notes: Mongolia. (Department of State Publication, No. 8318.) 

Washington: May 1987. 
"U.S. and Mongolia Establish Diplomatic Relations," Department 

of State Bulletin, 87, No. 2120, March 1987, 41. 
Zheleznyakov, A. "The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 

at Its Present-Day Stage," Far Eastern Affairs [Moscow], No. 4, 

1983, 144-46. 

(Various issues of the following publication were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Association for Asian Studies, Bib- 
liography of Asian Studies.) 



290 



Bibliography 



Chapter 5 

' 'Activities Mark Anniversary of Halhyn Gol Victory, ' ' Novosti Mon- 
golii [Ulaanbaatar], July 24, July 27, 1984; Montsame [Ulaan- 
baatar], August 15, 1984. Joint Publications Research Service, 
Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-85-002.) March 24, 1985, 48-52. 

Akademiia Nauk SSSR. History of the Mongolian People's Republic. 
Moscow: Nauka, Central Department of Oriental Literature, 
1973. 

"Anniversary of Military Newspaper Celebrated," Novosti Mongolii 
[Ulaanbaatar], February 7, 1984. Joint Publications Research 
Service, Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-84-012.) December 20, 
1984, 187-91. 

"Announcement of Soviet Troop Withdrawal — Cuts in Mongolian 
Forces," Keesing's Record of World Events [London], March 1989, 
36523. 

"Antimissile Defense System Press Conference Held," Novosti Mon- 
golii [Ulaanbaatar], May 15, 1984. Joint Publications Research 
Service, Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-84-012.) December 20, 
1984, 132-33. 

"Army To Be Saluted," Montsame [Ulaanbaatar], March 18, 
1989. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East 
Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-053.) March 21, 1989, 3. " 

Batmonh, Jambyn. "Renewal," New Times [Moscow], No. 9, Feb- 
ruary 27, 1989, 33-36. 

"Batmonh, Rogachev Discuss Troop Withdrawal," Ulaanbaatar 
International Service, [Ulaanbaatar], February 14, 1989. For- 
eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. 
(FBIS-EAS-89-030.) February 15, 1989, 6. 

Bellamy, Christopher D. "Swift Flight of the Parthian: Great Cap- 
tains of Asia," Military Review, 67, No. 7, July 1987, 30-39. 

"Biographic Information on Mongolian Personalities," Joint Pub- 
lications Research Service, Translations on Mongolia, No. 312. 
(JPRS 73503.) May 21, 1979, 1-2, 9-11. 

"Biographic Information on Mongolian Personalities," Joint Pub- 
lications Research Service, Mongolia Report, No. 323. (JPRS 
76168.) August 6, 1980, 16. 

"Biographic Information on Mongolian Personalities," Joint 
Publications Research Service, Mongolia Report, No. 336. (JPRS 
79909.) January 21, 1982, 2. 

"Biographic Information on Mongolian Personalities," Joint Pub- 
lications Research Service, Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-84- 
007.) May 7, 1984, 4, 11, 28. 

"Biographic Information on Officials," Joint Publications Research 



291 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Service, Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-87-002.) April 15, 1987, 
51, 145. 

Brown, William A., and Urgunge Onon (trans, and annot.). His- 
tory of Mongolian People's Republic. Harvard East Asian Mono- 
graphs, 65.) Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1976. 

Butler, William E. The Mongolian Legal System: Contemporary Legis- 
lation and Documentation. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 

"Construction Troops Deputy Chief," Montsame [Ulaanbaatar] , 
July 10, 1978. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations 
on Mongolia, No. 301. QPRS 71711.) August 18, 1978, 16. 

Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1985. 

"Correction Camps Chief Holds News Conference," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar], June 3, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-1 13.) June 14, 
1989, 8. 

"Council of Ministers of MPR Organized," Hodolmor [Ulaan- 
baatar], July 3, 1986. Joint Publications Research Service, Mon- 
golia Report. QPRS-MON-87-003.) April 16, 1987, 46-47. 

"Crime on the Descent," Novosti Mongolii [Ulaanbaatar], Janu- 
ary 22, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-1 50.) August 7, 1989, 10-11. 

"Defense Assistance Society," Pravda Vostoka [Tashkent], December 
12, 1978. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on 
Mongolia, No. 306. QPRS 72833.) February 16, 1979, 25-26. 

"Defense Popularization Month," Montsame [Ulaanbaatar], 
February 14, 1978. Joint Publications Research Service, Trans- 
lations on Mongolia, No. 299. (JPRS 71058.) May 3, 1978, 29. 

De Hartog, Leo. "The Army of Genghis Khan." Army Quarterly 
and Defence Journal [Tavistock, Devon, United Kingdom], 109, 
No. 4, October 1979, 476-85. 

"A Delicate Balancing Act," Asiaweek [Hong Kong], March 24, 
1989, 21-22. 

"Division to Leave Mongolia," Krasnaya Zvezda [Moscow], Janu- 
ary 16, 1987. Joint Publications Research Service, USSR Mili- 
tary Affairs. (JPRS-UMA-87-040.) August 18, 1987, 42. 

"Division Withdrawn from Mongolia," Krasnaya Zvezda [Moscow], 
April 11, 1987. (Joint Publications Research Service, USSR Mili- 
tary Affairs. (JPRS-UMA-87-037.) July 14, 1987, 77. 

"Duration of Compulsory Military Service Cut," Ulaanbaatar 
International Service [Ulaanbaatar], August 29, 1988. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS- 
EAS-88-168.) August 30, 1988, 4. 



292 



Bibliography 



Europa Yearbook, 1988. London: Europa, 1988. 

"15 May Set for Soviet Troop Pullout," Kyodo [Tokyo], May 
6, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: 
East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-087.) May 8, 1989, 10-11. 

"First Detachments of Soviet Troops Leave," Ulaanbaatar Inter- 
national Service, [Ulaanbaatar] May 17, 1989. Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS- 
89-094.) May 17, 1989, 8. 

Flanz, Gisbert H., and Karen Shaw Kerpen (eds.). "Mongolian 
People's Republic." In Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz 
(eds.)," Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 10. Dobbs Ferry, 
New York: Oceana, February 1981. 

"Forty-fifth Anniversary of Halhyn Gol Victory," Novosti Mon- 
golii [Ulaanbaatar], August 17; August 21, 1984. Joint Publica- 
tions Research Service, Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-85-005.) 
May 2, 1985, 77-88. 

"General Acknowledges Border Incidents," Ulaanbaatar Interna- 
tional Service, [Ulaanbaatar], October 3, 1988. Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-88- 
192.) October 4, 1988, 3. 

"General Banchindorj Praises Soviet Army, Navy," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar], February 24, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Informa- 
tion Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-039.) 
March 1, 1989, 4. 

"Hazing Reportedly Persists in People's Army," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar], May 29, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-103.) May 1, 
1989, 7. 

Heaton, William R. "Mongolia in 1986: New Plan, New Situa- 
tion," Asian Survey, 27, No. 1, January 1987, 75-80. 

Jamiyan, J. "The MPR Auxiliary Defence Association Is 50 Years 
Old," Voyennyye Znaniya [Moscow], No. 7, July 1979. Joint Pub- 
lications Research Service, Mongolia Report, No. 318. QPRS 
74698.) December 3, 1979, 11-16. 

Jarrett, Kenneth. "Mongolia in 1987 — Out from the Cold?" Asian 
Survey, 28, No. 1, January 1988, 78-85. 

Keller, Bill. "Gorbachev Promises Big Cut in Military Spending," 
New York Times, January 19, 1989, A6. 

Kuznetsov, I. "Heroes of the Mongolian People's Republic Who 
Participated in the Battles on the Halhyn Gol River," Voyenno- 
Istoricheskiy Zhurnal [Moscow], No. 9, September 1984. Joint Pub- 
lications Research Service, USSR Report: Military Affairs, Mili- 
tary History Journal QPRS-UMA-85-004.) January 15, 1985, 
48-51. 



293 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



"Leaders Celebrate Army's 68th Anniversary." Montsame [Ulaan- 
baatar], March 17, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information Ser- 
vice, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-053.) March 21, 
1989, 2-3. 

The Military Balance. London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1978-88. 

"Military Festivities Held in Ulaanbaatar," Novosti Mongolii [Ulaan- 
baatar], May 1 1 , 1984. Joint Publications Research Service, Mon- 
golia Report. (JPRS-MON-84-012.) December 20, 1984, 192-93. 

"Military Meeting," Montsame [Ulaanbaatar], November 10, 
1982. Joint Publications Research Service, Mongolia Report, 
No. 352. (JPRS 82655.) January 17, 1983, 38-39. 

"Mongolian Army Feats, Present Vigilance Noted," Krasnaya 
Zvezda [Moscow], March 16, 1979. Joint Publications Research 
Service, Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, 
No. 948. QPRS 73270.) April 20, 1979, 34-35. * 

"Mongolian Defence Cuts," Jane's Defence Weekly [London], 
March 18, 1989, 447. 

"Mongolian Press Suggests Armed Forces Reduction," Far Eastern 
Economic Review [Hong Kong], January 5, 1989, 14. 

"Mongolians Reported in Cosmonaut Training," Moscow Domes- 
tic Service [Moscow], March 8, 1978. Joint Publications 
Research Service, USSR and Eastern Europe Scientific Abstracts: Geo- 
physics, Astronomy and Space, No. 418. (JPRS 70878.) March 31, 
1978, 36. 

Morozov, S. "Military Tribunals Conference Held," Krasnaya 
Zvezda [Moscow], March 7, 1987. Joint Publications Research 
Service, USSR Military Affairs. (JPRS-UMA-87-037.) July 14, 
1987, 76. 

"Moscow to Remove More Troops from Mongolia," Far Eastern 
Economic Review [Hong Kong], February 2, 1989, 14. 

"MP A Official Writes on Soviet Armed Forces Anniversary," 
Montsame [Ulaanbaatar], January 27, 1978. Joint Publications 
Research Service, Translations on Mongolia. (JPRS 70697.) Febru- 
ary 28, 1978, 6. 

"Namsray Attends Meeting to Mark Legal Profession," Mont- 
same [Ulaanbaatar], June 27, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Infor- 
mation Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-88-125.) 
June 29, 1988, 7. 

"New Talk — Soviet Troop Withdrawal from Mongolia Not Yet 
Completely Resolved," Hsin Wan Pao [Hong Kong], Decem- 
ber 10, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: China, (FBIS-CHI-88-238.) December 12, 1988, 3-4. 

Paramonov, V. "The 'Mongolian Peasant' Squadron Attacks," 



294 



Bibliography 



Krasnaya Zvezda [Moscow], October 1 1 , 1983. Joint Publications 
Research Service, USSR Report: Military Affairs, No. 1817. (JPRS 
84853.) December 1, 1983, 61-62. 

' 'People's Call for Armed Forces Cut Noted," Ulaanbaatar In- 
ternational Service [Ulaanbaatar], February 13, 1989. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service [Ulaanbaatar] , Daily Report: East 
Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-029.) February 14, 1989, 6. 

"Periodic Studies Announced for Security Forces," Ulaanbaatar 
International Service [Ulaanbaatar], August 18, 1988. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS- 
EAS-88-163.) August 23, 1988, 4. 

'Tress Conference Held on Defense Aims Month," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar], February 14, 1985. Joint Publications Research 
Service, Mongolia Report. (JPRS-MON-85-003.) March 18, 
1985, 25. 

"Public Prosecution Activities Amended," Montsame [Ulaan- 
baatar], March 15, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Information Ser- 
vice, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-88-051 .) March 16, 
1988, 8. 

"Renewal and Tasks of Public Security Organs," Novosti Mongolii 
[Ulaanbaatar], December 6, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Informa- 
tion Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-057.) March 
27, 1989, 9-14. 

"Renewal of Law Enforcement Agencies Urged," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar], August 23, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Informa- 
tion Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-88-165.) Au- 
gust 25, 1988, 4. 

Sanders, Alan J. K. "Defining the Limits: Sino-Mongolian Treaty 
Signals Improved Ties," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 
Kong], December 22, 1988, 18. 

"111 Winds of Anarchy: Party Organ Warns Against Mis- 
use of Democratisation," Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong 
Kong], March 16, 1989, 21-22. 

"Mongolia in 1988: Year of Renewal," Asian Survey, 29, 

No. 1, January 1989, 46-53. 

Mongolia: Politics, Economics, and Society. (Marxist Regimes 

Series.) Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1987. 

Sapov, V. "Strategy of Defense," Pravda [Moscow], April 18, 1989. 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 
(FBIS-SOV-89-075.) April 20, 1989, 25-27. 

"Security Minister Denies Existence of Opposition," Ulaanbaatar 
International Service [Ulaanbaatar], May 31, 1989. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS- 
EAS-89-105.) June 2, 1989, 13. 



295 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



"Send-off for Soviet Soldiers," Komsomolskaya Pravda [Moscow], 
April 17, 1987. Joint Publications Research Service, USSR Mili- 
tary Affairs. (JPRS-UMA-87-040.) August 18, 1987, 42. 

"A Solemn Meeting," Novosti Mongolii [Ulaanbaatar], March 20, 
1984. Joint Publications Research Service, Mongolia Report. 
QPRS-MON-84-010.) June 27, 1984, 54-58, 61-63. 

"Soviet Delegation; Air Force Personnel Awards," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar], May 24, 1985. Joint Publications Research Ser- 
vice, Mongolia Report. QPRS-MON-007.) July 5, 1985, 17. 

"Soviet Troops Begin Withdrawal 15 May," Ulaanbaatar Inter- 
national Service [Ulaanbaatar], May 15, 1989. Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS- 
89-093.) May 16, 1989, 5. 

"Soviets Announce Troop Withdrawal from Mongolia," Far Eastern 
Economic Review [Hong Kong], March 16, 1989, 14. 

"Soviets to Pull Out from Mongolia 15 May," Xinhua [Beijing], 
May 12, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: China. (FBIS-CHI-89-092.) May 15, 1989, 22-23. " 

"Soviets Withdraw Troops, Tanks from Mongolia," Xinhua [Bei- 
jing], June 1, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 
Report: China. (FBIS-CHI-89-104.) June 1, 1989, 5. 

"Statement to China Deals with Soviet Troops in Mongolia," 
Novosti Mongolii [Ulaanbaatar], March 3, 1984. Joint Publica- 
tions Research Service, Mongolia Report. QPRS-MON-84-012.) 
December 20, 1984, 185-186. 

Troshin, A.I. , and Yu. B Gurov. "The Brigade Contract at MPR 
Construction Projects," Ekonomika StroiteVstva [Moscow], No. 2, 
February 1979. Joint Publications Research Service, Translations 
on Mongolia, No. 311. QPRS 73249.) April 18, 1979, 21-27. 

"Tsedenbal Urges Vigilance Against PRC Threat in Speech to 
USSR Troops," Pravda [Moscow], May 11, 1978. Joint Publi- 
cations Research Service, Translations on Mongolia, No. 301. 
QPRS 71711.) August 18, 1978, 3-5. 

"Unen Reflects on Choybalsan Place in History," Ulaanbaatar 
International Service [Ulaanbaatar], December 19, 1988. For- 
eign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. 
(FBIS-EAS-88-246.) December 22, 1988, 4. 

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. 
Background Notes: Mongolia. (Department of State Publication, 
No. 8318.) Washington: May 1987. 

"When the Policy Remains Unchanged . . .," Unen [Ulaanbaatar], 
October 30, 1979. Joint Publications Research Service, Mongo- 
lia Report, No. 325. (JPRS 76562.) October 7, 1980, 24-37. 



296 



Bibliography 



"Work of Law Enforcement Agencies Viewed," Montsame [Ulaan- 
baatar], July 28, 1988. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-88- 149.) August 3, 1988, 3-4. 

"Yondon Announces Armed Forces Reduction," Montsame 
[Ulaanbaatar] , March 4, 1989. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report: East Asia. (FBIS-EAS-89-042.) March 6, 
1989, 8. 

"Yondon on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Announcement," Ulaan- 
baatar International Service [Ulaanbaatar], December 10, 1988. 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia. 
(FBIS-EAS-88-238.) December 12, 1988, 8. 

Zorig, D. "An Active Promoter of Health Care," Mongolia [Ulaan- 
baatar], Nos. 2-3 (65-66), 1982, 26-27. 

(Various issues of the following publication were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Association for Asian Studies, Bib- 
liography of Asian Studies.) 



297 



Glossary 



arad — Mongolian term for people; the workers; the common people. 

aymag — Provincial-level or second-level unit of administration in 
Mongolia since 1921. Aymags are divided into somon (q.v.). 
Traditionally, an aymag was a tribe. 

Communist International — also called the Comintern or the Third 
International. It was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate 
the world communist movement. Officially disbanded in 1943, 
the Comintern was revived as the Cominform (Communist In- 
formation Bureau) from 1947 to 1956. 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)— Also ab- 
breviated CEMA and CMEA, the organization was established 
in 1949 to promote economic cooperation among socialist bloc 
countries and is headquartered in Moscow. Its members as of 
1989 included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslo- 
vakia, German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hun- 
gary, Poland, Mongolia, Romania, and Vietnam. Mongolia, 
the first non-European member, joined Comecon in 1962 and 
has traditionally been a supplier of raw materials to the Soviet 
Union. 

fiscal year (FY) — January 1 through December 31. 

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence — Mutual respect for one 
another's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonag- 
gression; mutual noninterference in one another's internal af- 
fairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. 

ger — Mongol term for the round, felt-covered tent known by its 
Russian (from the Turkic) name of yurt. 

glasnost — Russian term meaning outreach, openness. 

Golden Horde — From Mongol, altan ordo, or Tatar (q.v.), altun ordu, 
literally golden palace or camp, from the color of the tent used 
by Batu Khan (died 1255) in his conquest of Russia. Term used 
to refer to the Mongol suzerains of Russia (1240-1480), also 
known as the Khanate of Kipchak. 

govt — Mongol term for arid pastureland, and source of the name 
Gobi. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and service 
produced by the domestic economy during a given period, 
usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed 
by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compen- 
sation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capi- 
tal). Most GDP usage in this book was based on GDP at factor 



299 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been 
taken into account. 

gross national product (GNP) — Obtained by adding GDP (q. v. ) 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP valued at mar- 
ket prices was used in this book. Real GNP is the value of GNP 
when inflation has been taken into account. 

horde — A horde (ordo in Mongol) was a force of several tumen (q. v.), 
roughly equivalent to a modern army corps. See also Golden 
Horde. 

hurals — Assemblies of people's deputies. Hural is a vernacular term 
for kuriltai (q.v.). 

Inner Mongolia — The southern part of traditional Mongolia; dur- 
ing the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), comprised the provinces 
of Suiyuan, Qahar, and Rehol; the present-day Nei Monggol 
Autonomous Region of China (Outer Mongolia, q.v.). 

Kazakh — Turkic-speaking, traditionally Muslim ethnic group of 
pastoralists, living in the Soviet Union, northwestern China, 
and western Mongolia. 

Khalkha — Mongol subethnic group inhabiting the central and 
eastern portion of Mongolia and forming the majority of the 
population. Variant form: Halha. 

khan — A king, prince, or chief; common tide for sovereigns in Inner 
Asia. Sometimes used interchangeably with kaghan. 

kuriltai — A council of Mongol chieftains or khans having origins 
among the assembly of the Kitan; a great assembly and a type 
of electoral procedure developed among tribal leaders in the 
first century A.D. A classical Mongol term having the same 
meaning as hural (q.v.). 

Lamaism — Tibetan Buddhism, became the state religion of Mon- 
golia in 1586. 

living buddha or incarnate buddha — Western term for Tibetan 
Buddhist leaders who are considered incarnations and reincar- 
nations of buddhas actively working for human salvation. Mon- 
golia's Jebtsundamba Khutuktu was one of the many Living 
Buddhas. 

Manchuria — The present-day northeast Chinese provinces of 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning; homeland of the Manchus, 
founders of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Known as Man- 
chukuo during the period of Japanese control (1931-45). 

negdel — Mongol term for a herding collective. Comprises agricul- 
tural stations and herding camps in the somon (q. v. ) and is subor- 
dinate to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. 
Contrast with state farm, which produces crops. 



300 



Glossary 



nomenklatura — Russian-language term for the elite administrative 
positions filled by direct appointment by the communist party, 
and hence for the elite administrative class as a whole. 

Outer Mongolia — The name applied to the northern part of tradi- 
tional Mongolia during the period of Manchu control (1691- 
1911) and commonly in Western literature thereafter. 

perestroika — Russian-language term meaning reform, or, restruc- 
turing of political system. 

somon — Third-level administrative unit, subdivision of an aymag. 
The term, the root of which means arrow, derives from a Qing 
Dynasty (1644-191 1) hereditary military unit of about 100 fa- 
milies. 

Tannu Tuva — Uriankhai region of northwestern Outer Mongo- 
lia (q.v.); in December 1921, as a result of Soviet insistence, 
it became the Tannu Tuva People's Republic, the indepen- 
dence of which was later recognized by Mongolia in the 
Mongolian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1926. In 1944 it was 
annexed by the Soviet Union as the Tuvinian Oblast of the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and in 1961 it 
became the Tuvinskaya Autonomous Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lic. Tuvins (q.v.). 

Tatar — Name of unknown origin, which first appeared in the eighth 
century. In the thirteenth century it became the European ap- 
pellation for the Mongols, although the Mongols themselves 
had been fighting against the Tatars. From the fourteenth cen- 
tury, the name was applied to Turks living in the European 
parts of Russia, mainly in the khanates of Kazan and of the 
Crimea. 

tugrik — The unit of currency; in March 1989, value of 1 tugrik = 
US$2,985. The tugrik is made up of 100 mongo; there are one, 
two, five, ten, fifteen, twenty, and fifty mongo denomination 
coins and a one tugrik coin. Currency consists of 1, 3, 5, 10, 
25, 50, and 100 tugrik notes. 

tumen — Traditional Mongol military unit, roughly equivalent to 
a modern division, comprising 10,000 troops and their families. 

Tuvins — Ethnic group of Turkic- speaking pastoralists from the 
Tannu Tuva (q.v.) region of the Soviet Union, which was ad- 
ministered as part of Mongolia under the Qing Dynasty 
(1644-1911). Also known as Uriankhai. 

Uighurs — Inner Asian ethnic group of oasis-dwelling, Turkic- 
speaking, traditionally Muslim agriculturalists resident large- 
ly in northwest China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. 

Urga— see Yihe Huree. 



301 



Mongolia: A Country Study 

Uzbeks — Inner Asian ethnic group of Turkic-speaking, Muslim 
agriculturalists, resident primarily in the Soviet Union. 

yasaq — A legal code developed after Chinggis Khan's death but at- 
tributed to him; regulations; the code of Mongol law. 

Yihe Huree — Literally, "great monastery" or "great camp," 
founded in the seventeenth century as the residence of the Jeb- 
tsundamba Khutuktu (Living Buddha, [q. v. ]) and capital of 
Mongolia in 1911, when it was renamed Niyslel — capital — 
Huree. Commonly referred to in Western literature as Urga. 
In 1924 when the state was secularized, the name was changed 
to Ulaanbaatar, which means Red Hero. 



302 



Index 



Abbasid Caliphate, 23 
abbots, 43, 48, 103 
Abhia, Jorantayn, 201 
Abtoneft Import and Supply Cooperative, 
157 

Abu Said, 27 
Adriatic Sea, xxvii 
Afghanistan, 4, 19, 161 
African nations, 52 

Afro- Asian People's Solidarity Organiza- 
tion, 104 

Agentstvo Pechanti Novosti (APN), 216 

Agitprop. See Press Agitation and Propa- 
ganda Section (Agitprop) 

Agreement on Economic and Cultural 
Cooperation, Mongolia-Soviet Union 
(1946), 50 

Agreement on Economic and Cultural 
Cooperation (1965) with Soviet Union, 
52 

Agreement on Mutual Recognition and 
Friendly Relations (1921) with Soviet 
Union, 41 

agreements {see also treaties), 38, 46, 52; 
for air transport with Comecon, 
168; with China, 52, 208-10; with 
India, 211-12; on Manchukuo-Mon 
golian border, 49, 236; related to uran- 
ium mining (1981), xxxv; with Soviet 
Union, 41, 50, 52, 223, 228, 232, 
233 

agricultural sector (see also cooperatives, 
herding; herders; pastoral nomadism; 
state-owned farms): collectivized, 117, 
119-20; cooperatives, 125, 128, 131, 
133; crop production in, 118, 131-32; 
development of, 51, 127-28; economy 
of, 53, 127-36; effect of weather on, 53, 
54, 66; exports of, 127; government or- 
ganization changes affecting, 129; in 
economic regions, 122 

agricultural stations. See negdels 

Agricultural Technical Equipment Import 
and Supply Cooperative, 157 

AIDS incidence, 107 

Ain Jalut (battle), 25, 27 

air bases, military, 47 



aircraft squadron (Mongolian Herds- 
men), 236 
air force, 241 
airport, 168 

Akihito, Emperor, xxxvi 
Albania, xxxiv 
Albazin, 35 

Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst 

(ADN), 216 
Allied Expeditionary Force, 40 
Altai Mountains, 6, 7, 10, 11, 63 
Altanbulag, 226 
Altangerel, Bat-Ochiryn, 188 
Altan Khan, 32, 33-34, 100 
ambulance, air, 168, 241 
Amgalanbaatar, 227 
Amur River, 35, 63 
Amur Valley, 35 
Anatolia, 19 

animal husbandry {see also arads [herders] ; 

herding), 132-34 
Arabian Sea, 16 

arads (herders, see also herders), 87, 117, 

127, 131, 132 
Aral Sea, 3, 8 
Argun River, 63 
Arhangay Aymag, 122 
Arik-Buka, 23 

aristocracy, 43-45, 59, 80-81, 91, 117, 
232 

armed forces: educational level of, 245; 
officers in, 242-43; size of, 241; train- 
ing of, 245-46; uniforms and insignias 
of, 243, 245 

army {see also Mongolian People's Army), 
43; actions in nineteenth century of, 
222-23; of autonomous Outer Mongo- 
lia, 225; aviation branch of, 231; cav- 
alry of, 231-32; development of 
effective, 231, 238; Military Construc- 
tion Administration of, 238, 247; new- 
style, 223; politicization of, 241, 245; 
role in economy of, 246-47; size of, 47; 
Soviet assistance with, 46-47; as unify- 
ing force (1930s), 232; in World War 
II, 49 

art, xxxiv 

Asia. See Inner Asia 



303 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Asia, Southeast, 22 

Asia, Southwest, 22, 27 

Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace, 104 

Asian Development Bank, xxxv, xxxix 

Astrakhan, 16, 30 

Attila, 4 

Austria, xxvii 

Auxiliary Defense Organization, 246 

aymag centers, 117, 183 

aymags (provinces) (see also somons [coun- 
ties]), 53, 88, 175, 199; court system 
in, 252-53; hospitals in, 105; legisla- 
tive assemblies in, 183-84; trade union 
councils in, 155 

ayrag, 99 

Ayuka Khan, 34 

Azerbaijan, 28 



BagaNuur, 118, 122, 125, 138, 139, 158 
Baghdad, 23 
Baibars, 25, 27 

Bandung Conference (1955), 52 
banks, 144-45 

banner system (koshuus), 32, 34, 36, 79 

barter economy, 144, 146 

Batmonh, Jambyn, 54, 98, 156, 175, 
188-89, 194-97, 211; economic reforms 
of, xxxi; on information and the media, 
213; political leadership of, xxxvii, 
198-200; on relations with China, 
xxxvi, 208; replaced by Ochirbat, 
xxxvii; replaces Tsedenbal, xxxiii- 
xxxiv, 55; upholds relations with Soviet 
Union, 205 

Batu Khan, 19, 20-22, 27 

Bayan, 23 

Bayan-Olgiy Aymag, 71, 73, 122 
Bayanhongor Aymag, 122 
Bela IV (king of Hungary), 21 
Berke Khan, 27 
Bhutan, 104 
Black Sea, 3 
blizzards, xxviii, 53, 66 
Bodoo, Dogsomyn, 39, 40, 41 
Bogdo Khan. See Jebtsundamba Khtuktu 
Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 5, 39-40, 
226, 239 

Border and Internal Troops Administra- 
tion, 257 
Borjigin Mongols, 13 



Bor Ondor, 138 

Boxer Uprising (1900), 223 

Brezhnev, Leonid, 52, 54 

Britain: relations with, xxxiv, 211; trade 
with, 162 

buddhas, living, 101-2 

Buddhism (see also Lamaism; shamanism; 
Tibetan Buddhism), 12, 32, 37, 100-4; 
monastic system of, 59-60; role in 
social and economic structure of, 103- 
4; suppression of, 44-45, 98, 102-3, 
108 

budget, government (see also defense spend- 
ing), 118; education spending of, 108; 
military spending of, 229, 237-38; scope 
of, 121 

Bukhara, 31 

Bulgan Aymag, 122, 127 

Bulgaria, 21, 22, 27, 160 

Bulghar, 21 

Bulghar people, 19, 20 

bureaucracy, xxxi, 86, 182 

Burma, 52 

Buryatia, 39 

Buryat Mongols, 35, 39, 72, 74, 75, 
229-30 

Buryatskaya Autonomous Soviet Socialist 

Republic, 39, 205 
Byambarusen, Dashyn, xxxix- xl 
Byzantines, 28 



Cambodia, 52, 104, 161 

Carpathian Mountains, 21 

Caspian Sea, 10, 16, 17 

Catde Breeders' Day, 99 

Caucasus, 27 

Caucasus Mountains, 16 

Center for Indian Studies, 211 

Central Auditing Commission, 186-87 

Central Council of Mongolian Trade 

Unions, 155 
Central Europe, 4 
Central Statistical Board, 181 
Chagadai, 19 

Chagadai Mongols, 19, 31 
Chahar Mongols, 32, 33 
Chamber of Commerce, 157-58 
Chang'an (Xi'an), 10 
Chang Jiang River, 8 
Chiang Kai-shek, 44, 52 
Chiang people, 8 



304 



Index 



China: assistance from, 147; attitude of 
Mongolia toward, 203, 247; border 
with, xxx, 209, 230, 237, 239, 247; 
expansion of, 8, 36-37; forces in Mon- 
golia of (1915), 225; Great Wall of, 6-7, 
8, 16; Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces 
of, 11; influence of, xxxi, 8, 10-11, 
37-38; influence of Mongols on, xxvii- 
xxviii, 3, 25-27; invades Mongolia, 27; 
invasion by and defeat of Turk people 
of, 10-11; labor force assistance of, 117, 
137, 164; Manchu conquest of, xxix, 
4-5; Mengke's war in, 22-23; modern- 
ization of army of, 223; Mongolian 
population of, 59; nomadic tribes in, 4, 
6-7; recognizes independence of Mon- 
golia, 50; relations with, xxx, xxxii, 
xxxvi, xxxviii, 50, 52-53, 207-10, 237, 
238-39, 247-48; response to Russian 
expansion by, 37; revolution in (1911), 
38, 223; Shanxi Province in, 8; sover- 
eignty over Outer Mongolia of, 37, 38, 
42, 46, 223-24; Soviet Union defense 
against, 52, 54, 237; territorial claims 
to Mongolia of, xxx, xxxviii, 52, 207, 
237; threat of incursion by, 228, 
238-39, 247-48; trade with, xxx, 43, 
162-63; treaty with xxxviii, 52, wars of 
Khubilai in, 23, 25; Xinjiang-Uygur 
Autonomous Region in, 7, 12, 73, 237; 
Xizang Autonomous Region of, 8 
China, People's Republic. See China 
China, Republic of (Taiwan), xxxviii 
Chinese Communist Party, xxxiv 
Chinese: employed by Mongols, 3; in 
Mongolia, xxix, xxxi, 43, 45, 59, 74, 
76, 230 

Chinese Revolution (1911), 5 
chinggis, 15 

Chinggis Khan (see also Temujin), 3-4, 
11-12, 19, 30; conquests of, xxvii-xxix, 
15-18; eulogies for, xxxvii; historical 
significance of, xxxiii-xxxiv, 213, 223, 
239; last campaign of, 18; military 
organization of, 222; rise and influence 
of, 13, 15, 222 

Choybalsan, Horloyn, 39, 40, 42, 44-45, 
48-49, 51, 176, 194, 238; cooperation 
with Soviets by; criticism of, xxxiv; as 
government and party leader, 227-30; 
as revolutionary leader, 221, 225-27 

Choybalsan (city), 71, 118, 123, 138, 205 

Choybalsan industrial combine, 137 



Choybalsan University, 48 

Christianity. See Nestorian Christianity 

Christian Peace Conference, 104 

cities, autonomous (hots), 175 

Civil Air Transport Administration, 167— 
68, 241 

Civil Code, 183 

civil defense, xxxiii 

climate, xxviii, 63, 66 

clinics, medical, 104-5 

coal deposits, 125 

coal mining, 137, 141, 142 

Code of Criminal Procedure (1963), 221 

collectives, xxxi, 44-45, 46, 60, 87-88, 
90-91, 117, 119-20, 128 

Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance), 52, 118, 120; Commission 
on Cooperation in Public Health, 106; 
economic activities of, 158; economic 
planning, xxxi; economic relations with 
countries of, 1 56-63 ; effect of member- 
ship in, 158; International Bank for 
Economic Cooperation, 158; Interna- 
tional Geological Expedition, 158; Inter- 
national Investment Bank, 158; member 
of (1962), xxx, 212; trade with countries 
of, 162-63 

Comintern (Communist International). 
See Communist International (Com- 
intern) 

Committee of War Veterans, 194 
communes, agricultural, 47 
communication systems, 47, 118 
Communist International (Comintern), 

39, 43, 45; Buryat Mongols as agents 

of, 229-30; influence on Mongolian 

army of, 228-29 
Communist Party: of China, xxxiv, 44, 

50; of Soviet Union, 45, 59 
conscription, xxxiii, 228, 230-31, 241- 

42 

constitution (1924), 42, 48, 175, 249 
constitution (1940), 48-49, 176, 249 
Constitution (1960), 51, 104, 175, 221, 
249; adoption of, 175-76; amended, 
xxxvii-xxxviii; definition of socialist 
ownership in, 118; duties of, 177-78; 
provisions for legislative branch, 178- 
81; provisions of, 176-78 
constitution, draft (1990), xxxv 
construction industry, 143-44 
Consul's Group, 39 



305 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Consultative Meeting of Communist and 
Workers' Parties of Asia and the Pa- 
cific Region, 206 

cooperatives, agricultural. See agricultural 
sector 

cooperatives, herding. See arads; herding 

copper deposits and mining, 125, 127, 
141-42 

correctional colonies, 255 

Council of Ministers: Comecon Commis- 
sion of, 156; deputy chairman of 
replaced, xxxix; Military Council re- 
sponsibility to, 229-30, 231, 240-41; 
reorganization of, 119; responsibilities 
of, xxxii, 181-82; right of legislative ini- 
tiative of, 180; role in planned economy 
of, 118, 120 

Council of Mongolian Trade Unions, 106 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. 
See Comecon 

counties. See somons (counties) 

court system (see also Procurator of the 
Republic; procurators), 175, 182-84, 
221; circuit courts in, 253; for crimi- 
nals, 251-55 

credit market, 145 

Crimea, 16-17, 27, 30 

Crime Fighting and Crime Prevention 
Councils, 258 

crimes: incidence of, 258; types of, 251- 
52, 258 

Criminal Code (1961), 183, 221, 249-51 
criminal codes (1926, 1929, 1934, 1942), 
248 

crop dusting, 168, 241 
Cuba, 52 

cultural reform, xxxiv 

Culture Fund of the Mongolian People's 

Republic, 193 
Cuman people, 16, 19 
currency, 43 

Cyrillic alphabet, xxxiv, 50, 72, 98, 108 
Czechoslovakia, 127, 160 



Dadu (Beijing, Khanbalik, Cambaluc), 

xxviii, xxix, 23, 25-27 
Dai state, 8 

Dalai Lama, 36, 100, 101, 104 
Dalmatia, 21 
Damba, Dashiyn, 51 
Dambadorj, Tseren-Ochiryn, 44 
Dandzan, Horloogiyn, 39, 42, 229 



Danube Valley, 21 
Daoism, 25 

Darhan, 71, 106, 118, 122, 137-38, 175, 
205 

Dayan Khan, 31-32 

defense sector (see also civil defense): policy 

with Soviet Union of, xxxii, 232-40; 

purge of, 239 
defense spending, 47, 50, 229, 237-38 
Dejid, Jamsrangiyn, 198, 201 
democratic centralism, 194-98, 202 
Democratic Party of Mongolian Believers, 

xl 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

(North Korea), 50, 160, 162 
Deng Xiaoping, 209 
Disarmament Commission, 212 
disease, 60, 106-7, 230 
divorce, 69, 94 
Dnieper River, 17, 20 
Donghu people, 7-8 
Don River, 16, 20 
Dornod Aymag, xxxv, 71, 122, 127 
Dornogovi Aymag, 122, 125, 127 
droughts, 53 

Dundgovi Aymag, 122, 127 
dust storms, xxviii 
Dzavhan Aymag, 122 
Dzungar Mongols, 33-34, 36-37 
Dzuun (East) Huree Group, 39 

earthquakes, 63 

Eastern Han Dynasty, 7, 8 

economic assistance (see also mutual assis- 
tance): from China, 52; from Comecon 
countries, xxx, 53, 128, 158; from 
Soviet Union, xxx, 47, 51, 53, 54, 59, 
69, 117, 128, 131, 137, 158-60; from 
Western countries and Japan, xxxv, 
159; to Soviet Union and other coun- 
tries, 49, 133, 160-61, 236; turnkey 
projects as, 159-60 

Economic Council for Asia and the Far 
East, 212 

economic development, xxxi-xxxii; with 
Comecon membership, 158; under 
communist control, 117-18 

economic performance, 96, 121-23; role 
of military in, xxxiii, 246-47 

economic policy (see also Five- Year Plans): 
central planning of, 118, 1 19-20; change 
in, 45-46; coordination of planning with 



306 



Index 



other countries, xxxi, 120; for develop- 
ment, 51-52; effect of communist, 45; 
government intervention in, xxxi; New 
Turn Policy of, 46-49; post- World War 
II, 50-51; reforms in, 118, 123-25; 
Soviet Union control and guidance of, 
43, 59, 117, 120 

economic regions, 122 

education, 48, 51, 60, 84, 86; of armed 
forces, 245; as channel for social mobil- 
ity, 97; higher, 110; military, 245; for 
Mongolians in Soviet Union, 110 

educational system {see also schools): con- 
trolled by Tibetan Buddhism, 107; 
development of secular, 107-9; women 
in, 95-96 

Egypt, xxvii, 3 

elections, multiparty, xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxix 
electric power, 137, 141, 142-43 
energy, 142-43 

environmental issues, 66-67, 139 

Erdenet (city), 71, 74, 106, 118, 123, 138, 
139, 160, 175, 205, 247 

Erdenet Mining and Concentrating Com- 
bine, 141-42, 143, 160 

Erdes, xxxv 

Esen Khan, 31 

Estonia, 22 

ethnic groups, xxix, 72-75 
Eurasian continent, xxxix, 3-4 
Europe: Mongol administration in, 26; 
invasion of, xxvii, 16; economic aid 
from countries in, xxx; Hun empire in, 
4; relations with countries of, 50 
European Economic Community (EEC), 

xxxiv-xxxv 
executive branch of government (see also 
Council of Ministers), 173, 177, 181-82 
exports, 127; of animal products, 133, 
161; of foodstuffs, 161; of fuel, 161; of 
fur pelts, 136; of minerals, 141, 161 

family structure, 91-93 
famine, 45 

Federation of Democratic Women, 215 
Federation of Mongolian Peace and 

Friendship Organizations, 192 
Ferghana, 31 

Fire Prevention Administration (Minis- 
try of Public Security), 256-57 
fish, 76, 125, 136 

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 52 



Five- Year Plans (see also Three- Year 
Plan), xxxi, 119; First, 51, 117, 120; 
Second, 51, 120; Third, 120, 159; 
Fourth, 53, 159; Fifth, 53, 159; Sixth, 
54, 159; Seventh, 122, 131, 154, 159; 
Eighth, 122, 131-32, 134, 139, 141-44, 
148, 154, 161-62, 168, 212 
fluorite, 125, 127, 138, 141, 142 
Food and Agriculture Organization, 212 
food processing plants, 117, 139 
foreign policy: administration of, 204; of 
economic relevance, xxxv; formulation, 
203; role of Buddhism in, 103-4; Soviet 
influence in, 203 
forest fire patrol, 168, 241 
forests, 63, 125, 134, 136 
France, 211 

Free Labor Party, xxxix 



Galdan Khan, 32, 34, 36 
Gandan Monastery, xl, 103, 104 
Gansu corridor, 8 
geography, xxviii, 60, 63 
Georgian people, 16 
ger, 72, 94, 139 

Germany, East, 160, 162-63, 165 
Gandhi, Rajiv, 211-12 
glasnost, 173, 195 

Gobi area, xxvii, xxviii, 5-7, 8, 63, 66, 

67, 74 
gold deposits, 125, 142 
Golden Horde, xxviii, 21, 27-28, 30 
Gombojab, D., xxxix 
Gombosuren, Tserenpiliyn, xxxvii, 204, 

209 

Gonchigdorj, Radnaasumbereliyn, xxxix 

Gorbachev, Mikhail, xxxiv, 200, 203, 
205, 206-7, 209, 247 

Govi-Altay Aymag, 122 

government intervention: in the econ- 
omy, xxxi, 43; in internal trade, 47 

government structure (see also aymags; 
somons): administrative subdivisions in, 
88, 175, 183; changes in, xxxviii-xxxix, 
123-25; design for control by, 256; 
major parts of, 173, 175; Military 
Council in, 229-30, 231, 240-41 

Grand Canal, 26 

Group of 77, xxxv 

Guandong Army of Japan, 234 

Gungaadorj, Sharabyn, xxxvii 



307 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party), 
xxxii, 44, 50, 210, 237 



Halhin Gol, Battle of, 49, 234-36 

Halperin, Charles, 17 

Hangayn Nuruu (mountains), 63, 67 

Hangzhou, 23 

Hanoi, 23 

Hentiy Aymag, 123, 125, 127 
Hentiyn Nuruu (mountains), 63 
Herat, 31 

herders (see also arads), 45, 59-60, 76-81, 
87-88, 92 

herding, xxxi, 78-80, 82, 87-88, 117, 

132-33 
Horshoololimpex, 157 
hospitals, 104-5 
Hotol, 138 

hots. See cities, autonomous (hots) 
housing, 71-72, 86 
Hovd Aymag, 72, 122, 230 
Hovd Basin, 73 

Hovsgol Aymag, 72, 106, 122, 127 
Hovsgol Nuur(lake), xxviii, 63, 67, 167; 

as part of ecosystem, 139 
Hsien-pei people. See Xianbei people 
Hsiung-nu people. See Xiongnu people 
Huang He River, 7, 11, 18 
Hulegu, 22, 23, 25, 27 
Hun empire, 4, 8 
Hungary, 3, 21, 160, 162 
hunger strikes, xxxvii, xxxviii 
hurals. See National Great Hural; National 
Little Hural; National Provisional Lit- 
tle Hural; People's Great Hural; Small 
Hural (Baga Hural) 
hurals defined, 173 

Hutyen Orgil (Nayramadlin Orgil), 63 



Ilkhans (see also Iran), xxviii, 22, 27, 28, 
30 

illiteracy. See literacy 

II milione (see also Marco Polo), 26 

imports, 157; of fuels, 161 ; of machinery 

and equipment, 161-62 
income distribution, 153-54 
independence (1921), 40; recognized by 

China (1946), 50 
India, 4, 6, 21, 52; relations with, 211-12 
Indo-Europeans, 3, 6 
industrial centers, 118, 137-38 



industrial combine, 137 
Industrial Development Organization, 
212 

industrial sector, 137-41; light industry 

in, 139, 141 
infertility, 60 

information: policy, 213-14; sources, 
214-17 

infrastructure: under communist govern- 
ment, 47; development under Mongols 
of, 25-26; military contributions to, 238 

Inner Asia, xxvii, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 
19, 37; peoples of, 4, 19, 26, 59 

Inner Mongolia, xxix, 5, 7, 37, 39, 46, 
50; invasion of (1945), 231; Japanese 
occupation of (1937), 234 

Institute of Agriculture, 110 

Institute of Economics, 110 

Institute of Geography and Permafrost, 
111 

Institute of Hygiene and Virology, 107 
Institute of Medicine, 110 
Institute of Physical Culture, 110 
Institute of Russian Language, 110 
insurance, 145 

International Association for Mongol 
Studies, 212 

International Atomic Energy Agency, 212 

International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion, xxxv 

International Democratic Federation of 
Women, 192 

International Labour Organization, 155, 
212 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
xxxix 

International Red Cross, 212 
International Telecommunications Union, 
212 

International Union of Students, 191 
Interparliamentary Union, 212 
invasions: by Chinese, 10-11, 27; by 
Japan, xxx, 49, 221, 233-34; by no- 
madic tribes, 6-7 
investment, foreign, 137-38, 158 
Iran, xxviii, 6, 19, 27; people of employed 

by Mongols, 3 
iron ore, 125, 127 
irrigation systems, 55, 131 
Islam: in China, 25; as Golden Horde 
state religion, 28; in present-day Mon- 
golia, 104; reaches Inner Asia, 11 



308 



Index 



Jamsranjab, Agbaanjantsangiyn, 201 
Jao Modo, 36 

Japan, 3, 25; agreement on Manchukuo- 
Mongolian border, 236; attempted inva- 
sion by Mongols of, xxvii, 25; Buddhist 
association members visit Mongolia, 
104; economic assistance to Mongolia, 
xxxvii; fight with forces in Manchukuo 
of, 49; interest in Mongolia of, 38-39; 
invades Mongolia (1939), xxx, 49, 221; 
invades northern China (1937), 233-34; 
loan from, 159; Mongolian border inci- 
dents of, 231, 234; most-favored-nation 
agreement, xxxvii; occupation of Man- 
churia (Manchukuo) by (1931), 46, 233; 
occupies Mongolia (1939), 234; offen- 
sive in Russia (1920), 40; pressure on 
Mongolia, xxxix; relations with, 211; 
threat of, 227, 228; trade with, 162-63; 
war declared with (1945), 49-50 

Java, xxvii, 25 

Jebe, 16, 17 

Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (Living Buddha), 

34, 36, 38-42, 101-2 
Jin Dynasty, 13, 15-16, 18-19, 33 
Jochi, 19 

John of Piano Carpini, 21, 26 

Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, 212 

joint-stock companies and ventures, 117, 

141-46, 160, 165 
Juan-juan people. See Ruruan people 
judicial system {see also court system; 

Supreme Court), 175, 177, 182-83 
Jurchen people (see also Jin Dynasty; Man- 

chu people), 12-13, 19 



Kabul Khan, 13 

Kadan, 21 

Kaidu Khan, 20-21 

Kaifeng, 16, 19 

Kaifu Toshiki, xxxvi-xxxvii 

Kalka River, 17 

Kalmyk tribe, 33, 37 

Kangxi (emperor), 36 

Karakitai state, 13, 16 

Karakoroum, xxviii, xxix, 15, 18, 21, 

27-28 
Karluk people, 11 
Kazakh people, xxix, 72, 73, 74 
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, 6, 73 
Kazan, 30 
Kereit clan, 13 



Khalkha Mongols, 31-32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 

72, 186 
Khanbalik (Beijing), 23 
Khrushchev, Nikita, 239 
Khubilai Khan (Zhiyuan), xxvii, 22-23, 

25-26 

Khwarizm state, 16-18, 27, 31 
Kiev, 20 
kinship, 91 

Kipchak (Khanate), 21 

Kipchak people, 28 

Kirghiz people, 11, 59 

Kitan people (see also Liao Dynasty), 

10-13 
Kiyat people, 13 

Kompleximport and Supply Cooperative, 
157 

Korea (see also Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea; Republic of Korea), 
3 

Korean Peninsula, 6, 7, 19 
Koryo (Korea), 13 
Kosygin, Alexei, 54 
Krasnoyarsk initiative, 207 
Kuban steppes, 16 
Kuchlug, 16 

Kuomintang. See Guomindang (Chinese 

Nationalist Party) 
kuriltai, 15, 18-19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 36 
Kushan Empire, 7 
Kushan people, 4 
Kuyuk, 21-22 



labor force (see also Labor Law; manpower 
allocation): from China, 52, 117, 137, 
150, 238; in collectives, 90-91; East 
Europeans and Soviets, 86, 150, 238; 
military in, 143, 238, 239, 247; policy 
for, 150-52; salaries of, 154; shortages 
in, 86, 90, 92, 134, 151; women in, 
92-93, 150, 152-53 

Labor Law (1973), 69, 152-53, 156, 192 

Lake Balkash, 6, 11, 16 

Lake Baykal, 11, 31, 35, 63, 67; as part 
of ecosystem, 139 

lakes, 63, 125, 136 

Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism), xxxi, 11, 

25, 32, 100-2, 104, 222 
Lamjab, Bandzragchiyn, 198 
land: confiscation of, 44-45; development 

and reclamation of, 118, 131 



309 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



languages {see also Cyrillic alphabet): 
Arabic, 28; English, 217; Kazakh, 73; 
Khalkha Mongol, 72; Mongol, xxxiv, 
28, 72-73, 98, 107-8, 110, 255; Mon- 
gol dialects, 72-73; Russian, xxxiv, 59, 
73, 86-87, 97, 98, 108, 110; Tatar, 28; 
teaching of foreign, xxxv-xxxvi; Ti- 
betan, 107; Tungusic, 73; Turkic, 73 

Laos, 161 

Law on Elections, xxxvii-xxxviii 
lead, 127 

League for Assisting the Defense Aims of 

the Mongolian State, 246 
legal system {see also criminal code; court 

system; Mongol-Oirad Regulations), 

182; Civil and Criminal Codes of, 183, 

248-51 

legislative branch of government (see also 
National Great Hural; National Litde 
Hural; National Provisional Little 
Hural; People's Great Hural), 173, 
175, 178-81 

Lhagbasuren, Jamyangiyn, 239-40 

Lhasa, 36 

Liao Dynasty, 11-13 

Liegnitz, battle at, 20 

Ligdan Khan, 33 

lignite deposits, 141 

limestone deposits, 127 

literacy, 60; low levels of, 44, 48, 59, 107, 

117, 230 
Lithuania, 20, 22 

livestock. See animal husbandry; herders 
Living Buddha (Jebtsundamba Khutuktu). 

See Jebtsundamba Khutuktu; Tibetan 

Buddhism 

local government {see also aymags [prov- 
inces]; somons [counties]), 119, 120, 
121, 183-84 
Lubsangombo, Sonomyn, 198 
Lubsantseren, Bat-Ochiriyn, 192-93 

Majsarjab, Sandagdargiyn, 229, 230 
Malinovskiy, Rodion Y., 238 
Mamluks, xxvii, 3, 23, 25, 27, 28 
Manchukuo (Manchuria), 46, 49, 236 
Manchu people {see also Qing Dynasty), 
4; armies of, 222; domination of Mon- 
golia by, 37; pressure on Mongolia, 5; 
response to Russian expansion of, 
33-36; rivalry with China, 5 



Manchuria {see also Manchukuo), 7; border 
with, 49, 233-34; Japanese Guandong 
Army in, 234; Japanese occupation of, 
46, 234; Mongolian rail link with, 234; 
Mongolian-Soviet troops invade, 50, 231 

manpower allocation, 151-52 

Manzhouli, 233 

Mao Zedong, 52 

Mardai uranium mine, xxxv 

marriage, 69-70, 92, 93-94 

Marxism-Leninism: as basis for legal sys- 
tem, 182; in military training, 238 

mass organizations, 84, 190-94; publish- 
ing activity of, 215; security duties of, 
257-58 

Materialimpeks and Supply Cooperative, 
157 

media, 212-17 

Media Information Center, 215 
Mediterranean, xxvii 
medical care, 104-5 
medical research, 106 
Medmolibdenstroy, 143 
Mengke, 22-23 
Mesopotamia, 23 
Metropolitan See of Rus', 20 
MIAT. See Mongolian Airlines (MIAT) 
Michigdorj, Nyamyn, xxxvii 
Middle East nations, 26, 52 
migration, 6 

military: assistance from Soviet Union, 
xxix-xxx, 46-47, 221, 223-24, 228, 
230-31, 233-40; assistance to Soviet 
Union, 49; compulsory service in, 228, 
242; compulsory training for, xxxiii, 
238; courts, 253; dominance of Soviet 
influence on, xxxii; effect of monasti- 
cism on, 232-33; practices, historical, 
6, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 36, 
222-23; practices, modern, 49, 223-28, 
238; role in politics of, 201-2; ties to 
civilian sector of, xxxiii 

Military Construction Administration, 
238, 247 

Military Council, 229-30, 231, 240-41 

Military Institute, 245 

militia, or national police force, 221, 
256-57 

Ming Dynasty, 27, 32 

mining and mineral resources, 55, 125, 
127, 139, 141-42 

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Indus- 
try, xxxix, 119, 129, 138, 182 



310 



Index 



Ministry of Agriculture, Light, and Food 

Industry, xxxviii 
Ministry of Aviation (Soviet Union), 168 
Ministry of Communications, 119, 

168-69 

Ministry of Construction, xxxviii 
Ministry of Culture, 214, 215 
Ministry of Defense, 214, 241; Civil 

Defense Office of, 246 
Ministry of Education, xxxviii 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, 

67, 119, 129, 136, 139, 182 
Ministry of Finance, 119, 120, 121, 145 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 204; Postal 

and Telegraph Department of, 168 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 

and Supply, xxxix, 119, 157, 204 
Ministry of Forestry and Woodworking, 

138 

Ministry of Fuel and Power Industry, 138 
Ministry of Geology and Mining, 138 
Ministry of Health and Social Security, 

xxxviii-xxxix 
Ministry of Heavy Industry, xxxix 
Ministry of Justice, 214 
Ministry of Light Industry, xxxix, 119, 

138 

Ministry of Power, Mining Industry, and 

Geology, xxxix, 119, 138 
Ministry of Public Security, 214, 256-57 
Ministry of Social Economy and Services, 

xxxix, 119, 139, 157, 204 
Ministry of Trade and Cooperation, 

xxxix 

Ministry of Trade and Procurement, 

xxxix, 146 
Ministry of Transport, 119 
modernization, social and economic, 

81-87 

Molomjamts, Demchigjabyn, xxxv, 198 

Molotov, Vyacheslav, 234 

molybdenum deposits and mining, 125, 
127, 141-42 

monasteries (see also Gandan monastery), 
108, 231-33; abolition of majority of, 
98, 231, 232-33; historical role of, 80, 
81, 100-3, 117; role in internal trade 
of, 146; toleration of, xl 

monasticism, 232-33 

Mongolbank (Mongolian Trade-Industrial 
Bank) (see also State Bank of the Mon- 
golian People's Republic), 144-45, 160 



Mongol empire (see also Chinggis Khan; 
Golden Horde; Yuan Dynasty), 3; in 
China, 25-27; conquests of, 15-23; in- 
fluence of Golden Horde, 27-28 
Mongolenergostroy, 143 
Mongolia (see also Inner Mongolia; Mon- 
golian People's Republic; Outer Mon- 
golia), 3, 4-5, 19, 27, 31, 41-42; 
autonomy of, 38-40; buffer state sta- 
tus of, xxx, 46, 59, 228; Chinese domi- 
nation of, 37-38; habitation in, 5-6; 
independence of (1921), 40, 226; inva- 
sion by Russia (1920), 39; northern and 
southern provinces of, 37; Soviet troops 
in (1921-25), 40, 42 
Mongolia Express Agency for Publication 

Data, 215 
Mongolian Academy of Sciences, xl, 111, 

181, 214, 216 
Mongolian Airlines (MIAT), 167-68, 241 
Mongolian Aviation Day, 231 
Mongolian Building Cooperative, 43 
Mongolian Central Cooperative, 146 
Mongolian Democratic party, xxxix 
Mongolian Democratic Union, xxxvi 
Mongolian Green Party, xxxix 
Mongolian National Bank, 43 
Mongolian Partisan Army, 40 
Mongolian People's Army, xxxii, 227; 
development and politicization of, 
228-29, 230-32, 237, 238-40, 241 
Mongolian People's Party: First Party 
Congress of, 40; formation of (1921), 
39-40, 184, 226; Second Party Con- 
gress of, 41; Third Party Congress of, 
42 

Mongolian People's Provisional Govern- 
ment, 40 

Mongolian People's Republic, 3; formal 
establishment of (1924), 5, 42 

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army 
(see also Mongolian People's Army), 46, 
226-27 

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party: 
armed forces personnel membership in, 
241; assumes present name (1924), 42, 
184, 229; Central Committee of, xxxii, 
187-88; composition of, xxxi, 54, 97; 
economic and social control by, 83-84, 
120, 173, 175; information policy of, 
213-14; military training of, 246; oppo- 
sition to, xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxviii; Party 
Congresses of, xxxiv, xxxvi, 43-44, 



311 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



184-87; Party Control Commission of 
Central Committee, 188; Party Pro- 
gram of, 184, 187, 188; philosophy of, 
59, 187; Political Bureau, xxxii, xxxvi, 
xxxvii, 175, 188-89; purges in, 48, 49, 
51; reform in, 184-85; relations with 
Chinese Communist Party, xxxiv; 
repression by, 44-45; role in Constitu- 
tion, xxxvii; role in government of, 
173; role in trade unions of, 155; 
Secretariat of, xxxii, 188-89; social 
position of members of, 86-87; Special 
Military Department of, 241; structure 
on national level, 184-89; structure on 
provincial and local level, 189-90; suc- 
cess in free elections, xxxi* 

Mongolian Red Cross, 106 

Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, 
84, 97, 106, 180, 190-91, 215, 229; 
armed forces personnel membership in, 
241; military training in, 246 

Mongolian-Russian agreement, 38 

Mongolian Society for the Dissemination 
of Knowledge, 214 

Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society, 
189, 191-92 

Mongolian-Soviet Geological Expedition, 
127 

Mongolian-Soviet Intergovernmental Com- 
mission for Economic, Scientific, and 
Technical Cooperation, 156-57 

Mongolian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship 
(1936), 46 

Mongolian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 
(1966), 206 

Mongolian State Trading Office, 146 

Mongolian State University, 48, 54, 97, 
110, 183 

Mongolian Telegraph Agency (Mongol 
Tsahilgaan Medeeniy Agentlag: 
MONTSAME), 215, 216-17 

Mongolian Trade Unions, 154-56, 180, 
192-93; Congress and Central Coun- 
cil of, 154, 192-93; publications of, 215; 
Thirteenth Congress, 156 

Mongolian Women's Committee, 84, 192 

Mongolilgeemj, 157 

Mongolimpex, 157 

Mongolnom, 157 

Mongol-Oirad Regulations, 248 

Mongol people (see also Buryat Mongols; 
Chagadai Mongols; Chahar Mongols; 



Dzungar Mongols; Khalkha Mongols; 
Naiman Mongols; Oirad Mongols; 
Ordos Mongols; Torgut Mongols), 
12-13, 15; decline of, 30-33; influence 
on other countries of, xxvii-xxviii, 11, 
27-28, 30-31; origins and conquests of, 
xxvii; in population, xxix 

Mongolpress, 215 

Mongoltelevidz, 215-16 

Mongoltrans (Mongolian Transporta- 
tion), 160, 163-64, 247 

Mongsovbuner, 146 

monks (see also Buddhism), 43, 44-45, 48, 
59, 60, 81, 100, 101-2, 103, 117, 228, 
230, 232-33 

MONTSAME. See Mongolian Telegraph 
Agency (Mongol Tsahilgaan Medeeniy 
Agentlag: MONTSAME) 

mountains, 60, 63 

Mstislav (prince of Kiev), 17 

Mukden incident (1931), 46 

mutual assistance: with China, xxxviii, 
52; Soviet-Mongolian, xxxii, 46, 
232-35, 236-37 

Naadam festival, 99-100 
Naiman Mongols, 15, 16 
Namsray, Tserendeshiyn, xxxvii, 188, 

192, 198, 204 
Nanchao (Yunnan), 22 
Narangerel, Tserendorjiyn, 190 
National Great Hural (see also People's 

Great Hural), 42, 44, 48-49, 51, 163, 

175, 176 

nationalism, xxxiii-xxxiv, 37, 39, 98, 
173, 232, 239 

nationalization, 45, 117, 163, 168 

National Little Hural (see also Small 
Hural), 42, 44, 176 

National Progress Party, xxxix 

National Provisional Little Hural, 40 

national security, xxxii 

natural resources, 46, 125, 127, 137 

negdels (agricultural stations), 92, 125, 
128-29, 131, 132 

Nei Monggol Autonomous Region, 
China, 7, 59, 210 

Nestorian Christianity, 12, 25 

news agencies, 215, 216-17 

newspapers, 90, 108, 155, 214-15; for- 
eign language, 215, 217 

New Turn Policy. See economic policy 



312 



Index 



Nianfei peasant revolt, 222-23 
Ningxia, 18 

Niyslel Huree (see also Ulaanbaatar), 38, 

39, 42, 226 
nobles. See aristocracy 
nomads (see also pastoral nomadism), xxix, 

28, 33, 47, 59, 90; repression of, 45; 

tribal activity of, 3-4, 6-8, 10 
nomenklatura, 86, 147, 188 
Northern Wei Dynasty, 8, 10 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), 52-53 
Nurhaci, 33 
nutrition, 60, 77 

oblasts, 53 

Ochirbat, Gombojabyn, xxxvii, xxxviii 
Ochirbat, Punsalmaagiyn, xxxvii, 

xxxviii, xxxix, xl 
Office of the Procurator of the Republic, 

See Procurator of the Republic 
Ogedei, 18-19, 21 
oil deposits, 127, 142 
Oirad Mongols, 31-32, 33 
Omnogovi Aymag, 71, 122, 125, 127 
Oold, Tsebeenjabyn, xxxvii 
Orbita satellite communication system, 

216 

Ordos Mongols, 32, 33 

Organization for the Collaboration of 

Railways, 212 
Orkhon inscriptions, 10 
Outer Mongolia, xxix, 5, 37, 39, 74; 

army of autonomous state of, 224-25; 

as Chinese autonomous state, 38, 42, 

46, 223 
Ovorhangay Aymag, 122 
Oxus Valley, 6-7, 11 

Pacific Ocean, 35 

Pagmadulam, Lubsanchultemiyn, 192 

Palestine, xxvii, 27 

Pamir Mountains, 6, 7, 13 

Panchen Lama, 101 

paramilitary organizations, 247, 257-58 

pastoral nomadism, xxxi, 75-80, 81, 88, 
90, 117 

penal system, 255-56 

People's Government of Mongolia, 41-42 

People's Great Hural (see also Small Hural 
[Baga Hural]), xxxii, 173, 175; amends 
Constitution, xxxviii; appoints Procu- 



rator of the Republic, 182; constitu- 
tional provisions for, 178; elections to, 
xxxix; Mongolian People's Revolution- 
ary Party in, xxxix; Presidium of, 180- 
81, 214; renamed from National Great 
Hural, 176; role in economic planning 
of, 118, 120; Supreme Court account- 
ability to, 252 

People's Republic of China. See China, 
People's Republic 

People's Volunteer Self-Defense Detach- 
ment, 246 

perestroika, 118, 123, 173, 195 

Pergamon Press, xl 

periodicals, 155, 214-15, 217 

Persian Gulf, 16 

Pest, 21 

phosphate deposits, 127, 142 
physicians, 105-6 
pipeline, water, 141 
plains, 63 
plateaus, 60 
Podgorny, Nikolai, 54 
Poland, 20, 22, 160 
police, secret, 229 

police force, national (militia), 221, 
256-57 

political system (see also Mongolian 
Revolutionary People's Party; Soviet 
Union), 83-84; legalization of opposi- 
tion parties in, xxxviii; party opposition 
to Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party, xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxix 

Polo, Maffeo, 26 

Polo, Marco, 26 

Polo, Niccolo, 26 

Polytechnic Institute, 110 

population: Chinese and Russians in, 
xxix, 72-74; in economic regions, 122- 
23; levels of, xxviii-xxix, 60, 67, 69; 
policy to increase, 69-70; urban and 
rural, 60, 71, 86 

postal service, 168, 241 

precipitation, xxviii, 63, 66, 75 

Press Agitation and Propaganda Section 
(Agitprop), 214 

price system: controls in, 121, 147; free 
market, 147 

prison camps, 255 

Procurator of the Republic, 175, 180, 

182, 214, 253-54 
procurators, provincial and local, 184, 

253-55 



313 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Protocol Treaty of Friendship and Mutual 
Assistance, Mongolia-Soviet (1936), 
46, 233-34, 236-37 

provinces. See aymags (provinces) 

public health, 60, 104-7 

publishing industry (see also newspapers; 
periodicals), 216 

Purebdorj, C, 241 

purges by communist regime, xxx, 44-46, 
48, 51, 239 

Qian Qichen, xxxiv 
Qing Dynasty (see also Manchu people), 
34, 36, 38, 80, 222-23 

radio, xxxvi, 168, 215-16 

railroads, 47, 52, 117, 141, 164, 165, 167; 
Shenyang-Harbin, 234; trans- Mongolia 
line, 164; Trans-Siberian Railway, 164, 
165, 223; Ulaanbaatar Railroad, 117, 
160, 165 

railroad transport courts, 253 

rebellions and revolts against communists, 
45, 230-32 

Red Army (Soviet Union): in Mongolia, 
xxxii, 226, 228-29; in Mongolia 
(1930s), 232 

religion (see also Buddhism; Islam; Lama- 
ism; shamanism; Tibetan Buddhism), 
43, 44, 48, 59, 100-4; campaign against, 
48-49, 102-3, 232; easing of suppres- 
sion of, xl; freedom of, 104 

Renchin, Lubsandorjiyn, 182 

Republic of China (see also Taiwan), 38 

Republic of Korea (South Korea), xxxviii 

Revolution (1921), xxx, xxxi, 40-42, 221, 
226-28 

Revolution in Russia. See Bolshevik Revo- 
lution (1917) 

Revolutionary Mongolian Tank Brigade, 
236 

rights, constitutional, 177 

river systems, xxviii, 63, 125, 136 

roads, 47, 141, 163-65 

rock music, xxxiv 

Roman Catholicism in China, 25 

Romania, 160 

Ruruan people, 8, 10 

Russia (see also Bolshevik Revolution 
[1917]): agreements with, 223; colonial 
expansion of, 5, 34-35, 37; influence of, 
xxix-xxx, 5; influence of Golden Horde 



Mongols on, 27-28; influence of Mon- 
gols on, xxviii, 3, 27-28, 30; invasion 
by Mongols of, 16-17, 20; revolution 
and civil war in (1917), 5, 39-40, 226, 
239; rise of power in, 28, 30; steppes of, 
8, 19, 21; Tatar heritage of, 30; White 
Guard invasion of, 39-40, 154, 226, 228 
Russian Orthodox Church, 104 
Russian Revolution. See Bolshevik Revo- 
lution 

Russians: employed by Mongols, 3; in 

Mongolia, 74-75 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), 223 

Sajo River, 21 
Samarkand, 31 
sanatoriums, 106-7 
Sanders, Alan J. K., 148 
Sarai, 21, 28 

satellite communication system, 216 

schools, 107-9 

schools, military, 242 

scientific research, 111-12 

Scythian people, 3, 6 

Secret History of the Mongob, 13 

Selenge Aymag, 71, 122 

Selenge Moron (river), 63, 66, 67, 167; as 

part of ecosystem, 139 
Serbia, 21, 22 
Shahin Girai, 30 
shamanism, 12, 100, 104 
Shangdu (Xanadu), 23 
Sharin Gol, 125, 139 
Sherst Company, 146 
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 205-6 
shipping fleet, 167 
Siberia, 19, 27, 34, 40, 75 
Silesia, 20 

Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), 223 
Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic 

and Cultural Cooperation (1952), 52 
Sino-Russian agreement (1913), 38, 224 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alli- 
ance (1945), 50 
Small Hural (Baga Hural), xxxviii, xxxix, 
xl 

Social Democratic Party, xxxix 
social structure (see also family structure; 
kinship; marriage): distinctions among 
classes in, 84, 86-87; historical, 80-81; 
mobility in, 96-97; modernization of, 
xxxi, 81-83; transformation of, 60 



314 



Index 



Sodnom, Dumaagiyn, xxxvi-xxxvii, 55, 

181, 189, 198 
somons (counties), 88, 90, 92, 104, 143, 

175, 181, 182, 183, 189; court system 

in, 253 

Song Dynasty, 12-13, 18-19, 22-23, 25 
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (1941), 
49, 236 

Soviet Union: agreements with, xxxv, 41, 
42, 46, 50, 52, 156-57, 206, 228, 232, 
233; announcement of troop withdrawal 
plans (1989), 207; assistance for postal 
and telecommunications modernization 
from, 168; assistance to, 49, 133, 160- 
61 , 236; coordination of economic plan- 
ning with, xxxi, 120; credit and assis- 
tance from, xxx, 159-60; education for 
Mongolians in, 110; influence of, xxix- 
xxx, 42-46, 50, 59, 152, 203, 217; joint 
military operations, xxx, 234-36; joint 
mineral exploration activity of, xxxv, 
127, 141; Manchurian- Siberian border 
of, 234; military assistance from, 221, 
237, 239-40; military influence of, xxxii; 
military training in Mongolia by, 232, 
245; relations with, 40-51, 204-7; rela- 
tions with China of, xxvii, xxxii, 42, 
49-53, 173, 238; relations with Japan 
of, xxvii; trade with, 43, 162; troops in 
Mongolia of, 52, 54, 74-75, 228, 229, 
238-39, 247; troop withdrawal of, 52, 
247 

Soviet Voluntary Society for Cooperation 
with the Armed Forces, 246 

Sovmongolpromstroy, 143 

Special Military Department, 241 

Sri Lanka, 104 

Stalin, Josef, 44, 194, 233 

State Bank of the Mongolian People's 
Republic, 119, 145, 181 

State Committee for Information, Radio, 
and Television, 216 

State Committee for Prices and Stan- 
dards, 147 

State Construction Committee, 119, 
138-39 

State Directorate for Insurance (Mongol- 

daatgal), 145 
State Library, 216 
state-owned enterprises, 90, 123-25 
state-owned farms {see also collectives), 

82-83, 87-88, 128, 129, 131 
State Pedological Institute, 110 



State Planning and Economic Commit- 
tee, 120, 123, 147, 150 

State Publishing House, 216 

State Socioeconomic Development Com- 
mittee, xxxix 

State Security Administration (Ministry 
of Public Security), 256-57 

Stormong Company, 146, 160 

strategic location, xxvii, xxxiii, 46, 59, 
173, 203 

Subetei, 17-19, 20 

Sudak, fortress at, 17 

Sukhe Bator, Damdiny, 39-40, 42, 191, 
221, 225-27, 229 

Sukhe Bator Military Academy, 245 

Sukhe Bator Mongolian Pioneers Organi- 
zation, 191 

Sukhe Bator Publishing House, 216 

Sun Yat-sen, 52 

Supreme Court, 175, 180, 182-83, 214, 

252-55 
Syria, 19, 23, 27 



Taiping Rebellion (1851-65), 222 

Taiwan, xxxviii 

Tajik people, 59 

Tamerlane. See Timur 

Tang Dynasty, 10-11 

Tangut people, 12, 15, 18, 19 

Tannu Tuva, 41, 75 

Tantrism, 101 

Tardu (Turk ruler), 10 

Tarim Basin, 8, 11, 13 

Tatar people, xxviii, 12, 13, 19, 28, 30 

tax system, 43 

Technikimport and Supply Cooperative, 
157 

telecommunications system, 168-69 
Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskovo Soy- 

uza (TASS), 216 
telephones, 90, 168-69 
television, xxxvi, 168, 215-16 
Temujin {see also Chinggis Khan), 13, 15 
Teregene, 21 

Three-Year Plan (1958-60), 51, 120, 146 

Tibet, 8, 20, 32, 33-34, 36 

Tibetan Buddhism {see also Buddhism; 
Lamaism; monasteries; monks; sha- 
manism), xxxi, 11, 80, 81, 100-2, 104, 
222; control of educational system by 
monks of, 107; Yellow Sect of, 100-102 



315 



Mongolia: A Country Study 



Tibetan people, 59 
timber enterprises, 134, 136 
Timur (Timur Lenk), 30 
tin deposits, 127, 142 
Toba people, 8, 10 
Tonkin, 22-23 

Torgut Mongols {see also Kalmyk tribe), 

32, 33, 34 
tourism, 163 
Tov Aymag, 122, 127 
trade, foreign {see also exports; imports), 

161-63; organizations handling, 156- 

58; railroad transportation protocol for, 

165, 167 
trade, internal, 146-50 
trade unions, 84, 90, 154-56 
trading companies, 146 
training: legal, 183; military, xxxiii, 47, 

238, 245-46; technical and vocational, 

151 

Trans-Baykal Military District, 235 
Trans-Siberian Railway. See railroads 
Transoxiana, 6 

transportation {see also airports; Mon- 
golian Airlines; railroads; roads): by 
auto, truck, or motorcycle, 165; using 
animals, 163-64, 165; by water and air, 
163, 167 

transportation system, 118, 122, 163-65, 

167-68 
Transylvania, 21 

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance (1966) with Soviet 
Union, 52, 206, 239 

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assis- 
tance, Mongolia-Soviet Union (1946), 
50, 233-34, 236-37 

Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assis- 
tance (1960) with China, xxxviii, 52 

Treaty of Kyakhta (1727), 36-37 

Treaty of Kyakhta (1915), 38-39, 224-25 

Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), Sino- 
Russian, 35-36 

treaty related to Mongolia-China border 
(1988), 247 

Treviso, 21 

Tsagaan Sar (the White Month), 99 
Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiyn, xxxv, 48, 51, 
123, 175, 194-95, 200, 237, 239; expul- 
sion from party of, xxxvii; proposed 
trial of, xxxvi; replacement of, xxxiii- 
xxxiv, 54-55, 175, 197, 198 
Tserendorj, Balingiyn, 42 



Tsewang Rabdan, 36 
Tsiyregdzen, B., 201 
Tsogto Taji, 33 

Tudeb, Lodongiyn, xxxvii, 190 
Tului, 18-19 
Turned clan, 32 
tumen, 15, 16, 20, 21, 32 
Tungusic speakers, 73 
Tunguz people, 7 
Turkestan, 11, 19, 30 
Turkic people, xxix, 3, 33, 35 
Turkic speakers, 73, 76 
Turk people, 10, 12 
Turks, 19 

turnkey projects, 159-60 
Turpan, 36 
Tushetu tribe, 34 
Tuul Gol (river), 66 
Tuvin people, xxix, 73, 74 
Tuvinskaya Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, 204 

Uighur people, 11, 12-13, 59, 73 
Ukraine, 17, 20 

Ulaanbaatar: as autonomous city {hot), 
175; average temperatures in, 66; elite 
living in, 86; industry and production 
in, 117, 122, 138, 139; as location of 
first national university, 48; as location 
of State Library, 216; physicians in, 
106; population in, xxviii, 71; political 
rallies in, xxxvi; renamed, 42 

Ulaanbaatar Radio, 215-16 

Ulaanbaatar Railroad. See railroads 

Uliastay area, 230 

Union of Agricultural Associations, 152 
Union of Artisans, 137 
Union of Consumer Cooperatives, 146 
Union of Mongolian Artists, 215 
Union of Mongolian Believers, xl 
Union of Mongolian Journalists, 193 
Union of Mongolian Senior Citizens, 
193-94 

Union of Mongolian Writers, 214, 215 

United Nations (UN), xxxv; Education, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
of, 212; membership in, 50, 52, 212 

United States, xxx, xxxiv, 206, 210 

Universal Military Service Law, 241 

Universal Postal Union, 212 

university, 109, 110 

Ural Mountains, xxvii, 10, 31 



316 



Index 



Uralo- Altaic people, 3 
Urandosh strip mine, 127, 139 
uranium mine, xxxv 
Uriimqi, 36 

Uvs Aymag, 72, 106, 122 
Uzbek people, 31-32, 59, 72, 73 
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 6 



Venice, 21 

veterinary medicine, 82 
Vienna, 21 

Vietnam, 104, 160, 161 
Vladivostok, 234 
Volga River, 20, 21 
von Ungern-Sternberg, Roman Nicolaus, 
39, 40, 154, 226 



waterways, inland, 167 

Western culture, xxxiv 

Western Liao Dynasty. See Karakitai state 

Western Xia (Xixia), 12, 15, 16, 18 

White Guard (Russian): invasion of, xxx, 
xxxii, 39, 154; Mongolian opposition 
to, 40, 226; remnants in Mongolia of 
(1920s), 228 

William of Rubruck, 26 

winter weather, 53, 54, 78-79 

wolfram deposits, 127, 142 

women: in armed forces, 242; in educa- 
tional system, 95, 96, 109; equal rights 
for, 249-50; in labor force, 69-70, 92- 
93, 96; military training for, 246; in 
politics, 186; role in society of, 94-96 

working conditions, 152-53 

World Bank, xxxix 

World Federation of Democratic Youth, 
191 

World Federation of Trade Unions, 155, 
193, 212 



World Health Organization (WHO): and 
AIDS policy, 107; Mongolian member- 
ship in, 106, 212 

World Intellectual Property Organiza- 
tion, 212 

World Meteorological Organization, 212 
World Peace Council, 212 
World War II: effect of, xxx, 133; neu- 
trality in, 49 
Writers' Union, 193 
Wuhuan people, 8 



Xianbei people, 7-8 
Xinjiang, 7, 12, 34, 36, 37, 237 
Xiongnu people, 3-4, 6-8, 10 
Xizang Autonomous Region. See Tibet 



Yalta Conference (1945), 52 

Yangtze River. See Chang Jiang River 

Yanjing (Beijing), 16 

Yarkand, 31 

yasaq, 19, 21, 248 

Yenisey River, 63 

Yesugei, 13 

Yihe Huree (see also Niyslel Huree), 38, 

101, 102, 107, 226 
Yondon, Daramyn, 248 
Yondon, Jamsrangiyn, xxxv, 201, 241 
Young Pioneers, 84 
Yuan Dynasty (see also Khubilai Khan 

[Zhiyuan]): end of, 31; influence of, 

25-27, 248 
Yiieh-chih people. See Yuezhi people 
Yuezhi people, 3-4, 6-7 
Yugoslavia, 163 



Zhukov, Georgi, 49, 235 
Zhu Yuanzhang, 27 



317 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



550-65 


Afghanistan 


550-87 


Greece 


550-98 


Albania 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-59 


Angola 


550-82 


Guyana and Belize 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-151 


Honduras 


550-169 


Australia 


550-165 


Hungary 


550-176 


Austria 


550-21 


India 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-68 


Iran 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-31 


Iraq 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-25 


Israel 


550-61 


Burma 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


Korea, North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-85 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic and 


550-76 


Mongolia 




Haiti 






550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-35 


Nepal and Bhutan 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-167 


Finland 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-46 


Panama 



319 



550-156 


Paraguay 


550-53 


Thailand 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-89 


Tunisia 




rem 


jju OU 


Turkey 


c en 70 


Philippines 


C C A 7 A 


U ganaa 


c ca i en 


roiand 


c en Q7 


Uruguay 


550-181 


Portugal 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-160 


Romania 


550-32 


Vietnam 


ODU-0 / 


Rwanda and Burundi 


JJV— loo 


Yemens, The 


J JU— Jl 


Saudi Arabia 


j j\j — r/ y 


Yugoslavia 


JJU-/U 


Senegal 


£7 


Zaire 


550-180 


Sierra Leone 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-184 


Singapore 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


DOU— od 


Somalia 






c c a no 


South Africa 






CCA QS. 


Soviet Union 






c en •) 7q 

oou-i /y 


Spain 






550-96 


Sri Lanka 






550-27 


Sudan 






550-47 


Syria 






550-62 


Tanzania 







320 



PIN: 004250-000 



